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PART I 
1 
ANALYZING THE KMERS ROUGES TERROR: 
SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
"The greatest slaughter in history", "auto-genocide", "worse 
than Hitler", "complete extermination of all intellectuals 
and all minorities", these are just some of the oft-repeated 
assertions made about Democratic Kampuchea ( 1 ) . Given such 
a general condemnation and uproar, plenty of thorough and 
searching analysis of such a terrible regime would be 
obvious. After all, massive terror and genocide are so 
serious one would expect large sections of the social-
science community to concern themselves with so fundamental 
a problematic. Analyses of the Khmers Rouges (KR) terror 
are, however, remarkably few. 
Anyone who does try to fathom what happened in Demo-
cratic Kampuchea runs into two tremendous problems: the 
lack of verifiable information and the difficulties of 
interpretation (2). In the dissemination of information on 
Democratic Kampuchea in the 'West' there have been three 
'waves'. The first followed directly on the KR' victory and 
was predominantly an anti-communist one, characterized 
mainly by atrocity stories which could be and were quite 
easily ignored by most leftists (3). Had not the 'bloodbath' 
of Hue, to name but one example, also been a United States' 
concoction (4)? Many leftists attributed these stories to 
United States attempts to vindicate their role in Indo-
china, to make people forget American atrocities and respon-
sibility for post-war chaos, to discredit revolution and 
communism, and lastly to discredit the anti-war movement. 
Although rapidly published, quite a number of the 
'facts' in these atrocity stories about what was happening 
in Democratic Kampuchea turned out to be false or distorted. 
For example, pictures of "KR executing people with spades", 
"forced labour" and "forced marriages" were published, 
inter alia, in Paris-Match and Stern (both April 1976), the 
Washington Post (8-4-1977), the London Observer 
(30-10-1977), Time (21-11-1977), Newsweek (23-1-1978) and 
Der Spiegel (30-1-1978). They were supposed to have been 
smuggled out of Cambodia by a relative of the photographer 
who died in the escape attempt, by a KR deserter who passed 
them on, or, according to the Sygma Photo Service which 
distributed the pictures and made a clean $20.000 along the 
way, by a refugee in Paris whose identity had to remain 
secret to protect his family. The pictures were first 
published in a Thai newspaper just before the April 4th 
1976 elections. A few days later the Bangkok Post 
(19-4-1976) printed them under the heading "True or False?" 
with the comment that they had at first been refused. The 
photos had been offered the Bangkok Post by a Thai trader 
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for about $150. Cambodia watchers had expressed their doubt 
about the authenticity of the pictures, saying they may 
have been forged to influence the Thai elections by dis-
crediting the socialist parties. A Thai intelligence officer 
later admitted the pictures had been posed inside Thailand. 
Peang Sophi, a Cambodian refugee, reported seeing how this 
had been done. An American State Department intelligence 
source, who had also been offered the pictures in Thailand, 
said he considered them fake. He had told both Time and the 
Washington Post this. The other publications, too, were 
told of the falsifications, but refused to even print 
letters of correction. Only the Washington Post published a 
short item acknowledging the doubts. Nearly two years after 
the exposure of the photos as fakes Newsweek published 
them, one even being featured on the cover (5). 
This is just one example of a long list of distortions 
and manifest dishonesty by serious and supposedly respon-
sible, non-partisan western journals (6). Distortions also 
occurred through the bias in refugee reports, the major 
source of information. These reports emanated mainly from 
upper and middle class urban people who had lost all or 
most of their wealth and who, therefore, had enough reason 
to hate and discredit the new regime. With the sorry condi-
tion of life in the refugee camps they would depict the 
situation in Democratic Kampuchea even worse than it was to 
justify their flight. This bias was compounded by the 
frustrations and tension of refugee life, by covert pressure 
from camp leaders. Thai officials and foreign agencies, on 
whom the refugees were dependent, by homesickness and 
imagination, all of which tended to exaggerate and distort 
the refugees' accounts with each telling. They would also 
tell the stories they thought the interviewers wanted to 
hear, supposing this might help them get out of the camps 
to some third country. They were well aware that their 
interviewers were more interested in sensationalist horror 
stories. Hearsay became personal experience. Camp leaders, 
subordinate to anti-communist Thai officials, did select 
refugees to recount atrocity stories. Stories could be 
bought. Sometimes standard interviews were handed out, 
written by people who could neither read nor write and 
sometimes did not even speak Khmer. Some refugees gave 
different stories to different people. 
But media treatment of Democratic Kampuchea was not 
distorted just because the refugees were often not accurate. 
Most journalists responsible for publicizing the stories 
selected the information most suitable for sensational 
publicity and ignored the rest. Their role was also often 
dubious because of their biases, shoddy methods (like 
interviewing in the presence of camp leaders or Thai offi-
cials), the language barrier and an uncritical attitude to 
what they heard. Western and Thai intelligence agencies 
and governments probably also played their part. So al-
together it was not too difficult for many leftists to 
find evidence to confirm their scepticism (7). 
Still, on a factual level, there was really little 
information to disprove the general tenor of the refugees' 
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horror stories as Democratic Kampuchea had shut itself off 
from the rest of the world. But then the real problem was 
that many on the Left did not want to believe the horror 
stories. Having for many years supported the KR, together 
with the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese National Liberation 
Front (NLF), against United States imperialism, they found 
it very difficult to accept that these liberation movements 
themselves could be oppressive and even terrorist. 
Towards the end of 1977, however, the mass of evidence 
against the Pol Pot regime had grown so large that some 
people on the Left began to doubt and seriously tried to 
evaluate what was happening (8). These efforts were quickly 
snowed under when the Cambodian - Vietnamese and Chinese -
Vietnamese conflicts flared out into the open. 
From the Left's reaction its underestimation of the 
role of nationalism became evident. Many leftists, further-
more, were unwilling to look critically at communist regimes 
and to evaluate them as they did other states. With two 
communist regimes in conflict they chose sides and analyzed 
the conflict on the basis of this prior choice. The com-
munist regime they had not chosen was, in their analysis, 
then no longer truly communist, had strayed and become 
revisionist, social imperialist or even fascist. Whatever 
had gone wrong, including the origin of conflict with the 
other communist regime, was then not the result of communist 
ideology or practice, but of the regime having betrayed 
true communism. 
After the Vietnamese invasion of Democratic Kampuchea 
in the last weeks of 1978, this choosing sides became much 
stronger, with most of the Left coming down heavily (and 
rather uncritically) against the Pol Pot regime. This third 
'wave' seemed inspired mainly by a desire to rationalize 
the negative and problematic aspects of the Vietnamese 
invasion, to present it solely as a service to mankind and 
a benevolent deed of neighbourly love. As far as half-
truths, prejudices, propaganda and distortions are con-
cerned, the third 'wave' is, although perhaps to a lesser 
degree, comparable to the first. Many on the Left seemed to 
uncritically accept what the Vietnamese authorities said 
even though the Vietnamese used western propaganda they 
knew to be false (9). On the other hand, after the Viet-
namese invasion many western governments and media made a 
complete turnabout. The "barbaric and genocidal" Pol Pot 
regime was not criticized anymore. It was able to keep 
Cambodia's seat at the United Nations (UN). It received 
material support to continue its guerilla struggle against 
the Vietnamese and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). 
Now it was the Vietnamese who were accused of committing 
genocide, of appropriating all the foreign aid sent to help 
the starving Cambodians for their military and undertaking 
a massive colonization of Cambodia. Vietnam was also ac-
cused, by western governments, foremost among them the 
United States of America (USA), of having violated interna-
tional law. When the same USA invaded Indo-China, Grenada 
and, most recently, Panama, however, international law did, 
somehow, not apply. 
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Through the media some sort of general standard view 
of Democratic Kampuchea has come to be imbedded in the 
minds of the general public. After the Vietnamese invasion 
not only refugees, but also Cambodians inside the country 
could be, and were, questioned. But again, rarely were poor 
peasants asked about their experiences under Pol Pot. Rarely 
also were in depth interviews done and this information 
checked and analyzed. Where interviewers took the time to 
pursue their line of questioning, without dubious inter-
mediaries and translators around, a marked difference 
between an informant's initial story and details that 
emerged later on during the interviews often became ap-
parent, as Vickery has clearly shown (10). An informant's 
claim to have personally witnessed executions could turn 
out to be no more than having heard a rumour of executions. 
An intellectual's claim that all intellectuals were killed 
was belied not only by his own survival but by his asser-
tion, on asking further, of having been given a privileged 
position because of his intellectual background. Assertions 
that all former military and civilian officials and all the 
well-to-do, intellectuals and students had been killed 
under the Pol Pot regime, that most women had become infer-
tile, that hardly any children had been born, that all 
industry, all Buddhist temples, all books and, more gener-
ally, all western products had been destroyed - to mention 
but a few of the assertions made by many westerners (offi-
cials and journalists) as well as by the Vietnamese and 
their propagandists, all part of this general view - are 
demonstratably exaggerated (11). 
One problem in this respect is the great reluctance 
shown by the media to correct false or distorted information 
when this was brought to their attention. The imminent 
famine that threatened to wipe out the Cambodian race in 
1979 dominated the headlines all over the world for months. 
When it became clear that there had been no threat of 
famine, that only a very small and specific group of people 
suffered from starvation at that time, the general public 
was not told (12). 
The role of the media in using Democratic Kampuchea in 
an ideological struggle, for sensationalist ends, to boost 
circulation or for other reasons, instead of attempting to 
uncover and analyze what was really happening, first started 
me off on this study. Soon the emphasis shifted to the way 
the Left dealt with the issue. Once it became clear that 
the initial atrocity stories, although often containing 
false or distorted information, did convey a more or less 
accurate picture, I wanted to find out what had really 
happened. In order to understand and explain how and why 
the KR had created a regime of terror I felt convinced 
that, although specific circumstances and developments 
played a part, it was also essential to analyze the role of 
the intellectual leadership of the KR, its ideology and 
motives. 
Sometimes I despaired of my arrogance in ever having 
started such a complex task. But then I believe the attempt 
to analyze something fundamental to humanity is preferable, 
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even if the results turn out to be meagre or disappointing, 
to some irrelevant sociological inquiry that 'discovers' 
what plain common sense already knows. As the above will 
have made clear, great caution must be exercised in dealing 
with sources concerning Democratic Kampuchea. I have tried 
where possible to justify my use of sources, to check and 
double check, to avoid using unconfirmed sources, to indi-
cate when there was also contradictory information, to 
use, but not to be misled by, propaganda. I can only hope I 
have succeeded (13). 
Emotions, too, influence and distort. Mine have shifted 
about quite a bit. In the face of blatant and massive United 
States aggression against and destruction of Indo-China, I 
felt sympathy for the revolutionary movements. In the face 
of Vietnamese arrogance towards little Cambodia, I felt 
sympathy for the underdog. I suppose my defence at different 
times of any of the main actors in this drama was determined 
by who attacked and in which way. Sympathy for underdogs, a 
dislike for hypocrisy and 'sinners who throw the first 
stone' are probably at the root of these emotional reac-
tions. My sympathy was with the ordinary people, usually 
the victims of this type of drama. But I did notice that I 
often dealt with the horror of my subject matter as unemo-
tionally as counting figures. The emotions were brought 
back, often enough, by television, pictures and newspaper 
articles about injustice and cruelty by the strong and 
powerful against the weak, by big powers against weaker 
ones, by rulers against ruled, the triumph of weapons and 
money over justice and righteousness. A 1982 visit to 
refugee camps also helped. Still, I doubt if I would have 
been able to finish this work if I had constantly been 
filled with impotent rage. Although emotions are the roots 
and raison d'être of this work, I have tried not to let 
them take the place of rational analysis. 
If what happened in Democratic Kampuchea was a fluke 
of history, an isolated unique event, the importance of the 
subject matter of this work would be small. "So many deaths, 
such traumas, terrible to be sure but there it is, it is a 
unique case, so what's there to be learned?" one could say. 
Tragically enough, it is an all too common occurrence. Let 
me give a very limited and rather random series of recent 
examples, to put this study into perspective: Turkey 1915 -
more than 1 million Armenians massacred, Stalin's Soviet 
Union between 1929 and 1939 - 20 million dead, Nazi Germany 
- 6 million Jews and an unknown number of gypsies, homosexu-
als, Slavs and others killed in concentration camps. More 
recently we have seen, inter alia, half a million people 
slaughtered in Indonesia in 1965 - 1966, nearly 3 million 
Bengalis killed in Bangladesh in 1971, the near genocide of 
the Hutus in Burundi in 1971 - 1972, and again in 1988, 
more than one third of the black Southern Sudan population 
killed between 1955 and 1970, and their continued slaughter 
since 1983, Amin's reign of terror in Uganda, Ceausescu's 
in Rumania, the massacres and death squads in Middle America 
and Argentina, the near extermination of Latin-American 
Indians, Israeli indiscriminate violence and suppression in 
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Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank, the Sabra and Chatila 
massacres in 1982, and the South African Apartheid regime. 
More specifically, I have tried to ground this study 
in a general framework of the struggle for power and the 
political ideologies and strategies of specific groups. As 
such I hope this case study will throw more light on the 
functioning of revolutionary elites, intellectuals in fact, 
and on revolutionary communist elites and communist ideology 
in particular. I share the humanistic ideals of the Left 
for a more just and free society for all, but events such 
as the Pol Pot reign of terror in Cambodia make it highly 
necessary to thoroughly analyze the mechanisms that lead 
from fine ideals to mass graves. Perestroika and the col-
lapse of communism in Eastern Europe do not in the least 
distract from this necessity. What is really needed is a 
better understanding of those who hold these high ideals 
and try to realize them and why the masses of people in 
whose name they claim to act so seldom end up with more 
freedom and justice. 
The central questions of this study, therefore, focus 
upon how the KR, under the leadership of a revolutionary 
intellectual elite, were able to achieve power, why they 
resorted to the use of systematic terror to achieve and 
maintain this power and why to the extent that they did. 
In chapter 2 I give the general setting in Cambodia and 
deal with events up to 1970, the year in which Cambodia was 
drawn into the second Indo-China war. Conditions and events 
that helped shape the KR leaders' development and way of 
thinking are discussed. Chapter 3 describes how, thanks 
basically to the massive disruption caused by the war, the 
KR were able to achieve sole power and how this was done. 
In this prelude to Democratic Kampuchea all elements that 
were to become manifest on a national scale after the KR' 
victory are already apparent. 
Before continuing the description of events during the 
Democratic Kampuchea period chapter 4 discusses what the KR 
leaders wanted, the type of society they were aiming at and 
how this was to be achieved. What their coming to power 
meant in practice for the people, especially those newly 
liberated, is dealt with in chapter 5. The leading organ of 
the revolution and the new state, the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea (CPK), was not a very unified or homogeneous 
organization. The very radical and rapid implementation of 
general policies, the extent of the terror used and even 
some of the policies themselves were gradually being ques-
tioned by more and more cadres. The ensuing internal party 
struggle from which the group led by Pol Pot, the group 
which dominated the central organs of the party and the 
state, emerged victorious, is discussed in chapter 6. 
The Pol Pot faction continued to centralize and con-
solidate its hold on power, more distrustful than ever. 
All criticisms, mistakes and failures were considered the 
work of traitors in the service of foreign powers. This 
attitude only created more dissent leading to a vicious 
circle. Simultaneously traditional antipathetic relations 
with Vietnam had developed into a violent conflict with the 
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new communist powerholders there so that the internal 
opposition was identified more and more as Vietnamese 
agents. To face these growing problems the Democratic 
Kampuchean powerholders generalized the terror system in 
order to continue to implement their policies for the 
development of the new state. These issues, leading up to 
the Vietnamese invasion and the fall of the Pol Pot regime, 
are discussed in chapter 7. In chapter β I review the 
evidence on the numbers of dead and from what causes during 
the Democratic Kampuchea period and attempt to arrive at 
some sort of acceptable estimate. 
In Part II I try to analyze the events described in 
Part I and place them in a broader theoretical framework. 
To that end, I discuss the role of the peasantry and its 
reactions to oppression and injustice, as well as the role 
of revolutionary intellectuals, their ideology and motives, 
and their relationship with the masses, specifically con­
cerning the issue of coercion, in chapter 9. Chapter 10 
deals with the concept of state terror, its causes and the 
circumstances under which it is resorted to, specifically 
under revolutionary communist regimes. I then (in chapter 
10.4 and 11) discuss the specific configuration of these 
variables and conditions that led to terror, why and when 
it was used, in the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam, three 
cases that have, to illustrate more theoretical points, 
been intermittently referred to in the preceding chapters, 
and compare them to what happened in Democratic Kampuchea. 
I hope thus to throw more light on why the KR leaders 
resorted to terror in the way they did and why to such an 
extent. 
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THE ORIGIN OF THE KHMERS ROUGES. THE PERIOD UP TO 1970 
Cambodia, the once great Angkor Empire, but for centuries 
already in fear of being gobbled up completely by its 
powerful neighbours, Thailand and, especially, Vietnam, had 
only escaped this fate (temporarily?) by French colonialism. 
The hostile relationship continued, however. The Vietminh, 
fighting for independence in Vietnam, and later, during the 
Second Indo-China War, the Vietnamese communists, used the 
Cambodian Left for their own, Vietnamese, ends. King 
Sihanouk, initially a puppet of French colonialism, turned 
into a high-handed and cunning ruler interested in keeping 
power to himself and to the monarchy as a system. Khmer 
students in France, where they learned their Marxism, 
returned to Cambodia with their own definite ideas about 
who should rule and how the country should be run. The 
ensuing struggle for power and interest spheres between 
these actors, as well as some others such as the Cambodian 
Right and the USA, is the subject matter of this chapter. 
2 .1 The General Setting 
The French colonial period was not nearly as disruptive as 
in Vietnam. Cambodia was, after all, primarily considered a 
buffer-state against possible British expansion from the 
West. Of course Cambodia was harnessed to the needs of the 
French colonial empire and French capitalism. The country 
was heavily taxed but hardly developed. Rice was exported, 
some infrastructure was built, but mainly to connect the 
paddy heartland of Cambodia to Saigon. In the 1920's rubber 
plantations were established in the east. But here, as in 
the administration, the French used Vietnamese, thus adding 
fuel to the historical resentment against the Vietnamese, 
but not particularly polarizing internal Khmer class con-
tradiction. Some local artisanship was lost due to the 
import of cheaper factory-made French products. No indus-
trialization took place in Cambodia. Cambodia was integrated 
into the world capitalist system as a peripheral country, 
but the direct consequences for the vast majority of the 
people were not so dramatic as in Vietnam, Malaysia, Burma 
and other colonized countries of the region. 
Basically the Khmer peasant (85% of the population) 
was a small landowning, traditional cultivator. The few 
studies about the Cambodian peasantry are not at all un-
animous in their conclusions. No doubt the description of 
their lives as "short of idyllic, no doubt, but not very 
far short" (1) was beside the mark, as, on the other ex-
treme, was Khieu Samphan's claim that a "rural explosion" 
was in the making due to agrarian structural imbalance, 
according to Carney (2). Probably the most detailed and 
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best study on Cambodia's peasantry is Delvert's excellent 
work Le Paysan Cambodgien (3). A farmer who tilled waste 
land for five consecutive years became its owner and there 
was plenty of uncultivated arable land available. Land-pres-
sure was slight. The basis of land tenure did not change. 
But the size of peasant holdings decreased as more and more 
children inherited smaller and smaller parcels of land, 
especially in the well-watered areas. Most peasant house-
holds owned less than five hectares, the majority of this 
group perhaps even less than one hectare. Landlordism was 
not a national problem, nor was there much of a rural 
proletariat. According to the 1962 census only 6.6% of the 
active population were agricultural wage-earners (4). In 
Vietnam, by contrast, the landless peasants probably became 
a majority at the end of the 1920's (5). 
But rural indebtedness was widespread. According to 
Delvert, however, peasants did not find their domination by 
traders and usurers too burdensome (6). Patron - client 
relationships, although perhaps restrictive in fact, are 
often not felt that way by peasants. Traders and money-
lenders also served a function for the peasants. From the 
peasant's point of view, the local Chinese merchant provided 
him with commodities not otherwise available, with credit 
to buy these commodities and with the opportunity to sell 
his harvest surplus. As the peasants were quite easily 
able to subsist on what was left them, they did not consider 
the price they had to pay for these services and goods 
unjust (see chapter 9.1). There was partial integration 
into the market economy, especially along the river banks, 
where diversification and cultivation of garden crops was 
developing, but barter and self-subsistence remained common. 
Fruit and especially fish were abundant. There was hardly 
any modernization of paddy cultivation, labour input re-
mained relatively low and returns per year were the lowest 
in Southeast Asia (7). Peasant cultivation remained depen-
dent on the vicissitudes of nature. Still, production was 
sufficient to feed the population and leave a small surplus 
for export. There was very little penetration of government 
influence at village level (8). 
This was the general picture. There were pockets where 
the situation was not as rosy. Of the Chamcar Loeu area in 
Kompong (Kp.) Cham Province, for instance, Delvert concluded 
that society there was very hierarchical, with incessant 
conflicts between miserable peasants, the plantation owners 
and the administration (9). Outside the central rice plain, 
in the peripheral, remoter mountainous and jungle areas, 
there was, according to Vickery, another peasantry, a 
minority, isolated, almost autarkic, more primitive and 
sometimes of non-Khmer ethnicity, whose mores and beliefs 
differed considerably with their relatively more market-
and town-oriented rice- and garden-farming cousins. Here 
hatred for urban people was greater and Buddhism had little 
influence (10). Later this contradiction would aggravate 
and become one of the characteristics of the Pol Pot regime. 
Non-agricultural economic life, mostly commercial, was 
in the hands of Chinese and Vietnamese business and mid-
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dlemen and French capital. Industry was hardly developed 
and so the proletariat was tiny and largely Chinese at 
that. There was only some export-oriented and luxury goods 
production. The urban elite's economic and political power 
base was mainly in the military, the bureaucracy and state 
enterprises. By syphoning off foreign aid and using balance 
of payment deficits for personal consumption the urban 
elite was able to live extremely well. Due to a lack of any 
coherent effort to develop the productive sectors, partly 
the result of the predominance of commercial sectors, 
advocates of laisser-faire capitalism, the Cambodian econo-
my's prospects were bleak. Yet, although there was this 
downhill trend, class contradictions were, in general, not 
sharp, exploitation rarely direct. After all, commercializa-
tion processes had not much affected the traditional rural 
social structure. Outside interference was still slight. 
The peasants' level of subsistence was hardly threatened. 
In many ways the situation was comparable to that in Thai-
land in the ISSO's. 
The Cambodian Left was born in the Vietnamese dominated 
anti-French struggle (11). Its numbers remained small, the 
Vietminh finding most of their support among the ethnic 
Vietnamese community in Cambodia and those of mixed 
Khmer/Vietnamese ancestry. Of the several thousand Cam-
bodians who cast their lot with the Vietminh, many were 
Khmer Krom (12). The Khmer People's Revolutionary Party 
(KPRP), formed in 1951 under the aegis of the Vietminh 
after the dissolution of the Indochina Communist Party 
(ICP), gained a foothold more easily in these same areas 
(13). Although the Vietnamese and Khmer communist military 
achievement was considerable - they co-operated closely 
with the non-communist nationalist Khmer Issarak - their 
social impact was not. As far as the diffusion and penetra-
tion of communist ideology was concerned, they were not 
very successful (14). 
Khmer peasants as well as the elite have a strong 
resentment and mistrust of the Vietnamese, born of centuries 
of more or less violent encroachment and the steady disman-
tling of the once great Khmer Empire (Angkor) by the Viet-
namese and Thai. The violence of the first half of the 
nineteenth century, especially, remains vivid (15). For 
many Khmers, and in particular the educated ones, their 
country is a nation forever diminishing in size and 
threatened with extinction. Just as hundreds of years ago 
the Kingdom of Champa was wiped of the map by Vietnamese 
southward expansion, leaving the Cham people stateless, only 
French domination stopped Cambodia from being overrun by 
both Thai and Vietnamese armies in the nineteenth century. 
The possibility of this extinction is a nightmare that 
still haunts Khmers of all description. Even now, although 
most Khmers are relieved that the Vietnamese have rid them 
of the hateful Pol Pot regime, they are suspicious and wary 
of the Vietnamese (16). 
This animosity was exacerbated by Vietnamese attempts 
to Vietnamize the Khmers, creating a clash of very differing 
cultures, Brahmin Khmer versus Mandarin Vietnamese. On the 
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other hand, Khmer and Thai culture resemble each other 
quite closely, this perhaps being a crucial reason for the 
lesser animosity the Khmer feel towards the Thai. "The 
Thai", as Newman notes, "almost never tried to effect such 
cultural transformations" (17). French use of Vietnamese in 
the Cambodian administration, encouraging their colonization 
of Cambodia and favouring them strongly, helped to keep 
these memories alive. Vietnamese arrogance and patronizing 
attitude towards the Khmers and even the mere presence of 
Vietnamese advisers and instructors fanned anti-Vietnamese 
nationalism (18). When Sihanouk genuinely appeared to start 
working for independence this anti-Vietnamese hostility 
showed itself as Issarak cadres, mistrustful of Vietnamese 
intentions, rallied to Sihanouk (19). Those Khmer socialists 
who did accept Vietnamese tutelage and support were quickly 
isolated from the mainstream of the Khmer independence 
struggle, receiving the not very nationalist label "Khmer 
Vietminh" (20). 
The Geneva Conference of 1954, to settle the first 
Indo-China war, recognized Sihanouk as sole representative 
of Cambodia. Both the Vietminh and the Khmer Vietminh tried 
unsuccessfully to get the latter recognized as participants 
in the conference. This was not only the result of the 
opposition of the French and their allies at the conference. 
The North Vietnamese, Soviets and Chinese, under heavy 
pressure from the USA, including the threat of nuclear 
warfare, urgently wanted a cease-fire and were willing to 
drop the Cambodian revolutionaries. Furthermore, the Viet-
namese, then and subsequently, saw the revolutionary strug-
gle in Indo-China first in terms of Vietnamese national 
interests (21). Whilst separate zones were created for the 
Lao and Vietnamese liberation movements, the Cambodian 
revolutionaries were to be amnestied if they laid down 
their arms. They were in a sense politically sacrificed 
(22). A few thousand retreated to Hanoi, a much smaller 
number, "especially the 'sans-grade', the local cadres" 
(23), remained in the maquis, living in outlying, not easily 
accessible areas, among unintegrated communities that had 
supported the resistance earlier. 
Other leftists and members of the resistance re-entered 
the legal political scene under the banner of the 
Pracheachon group. This organization was set up in 1955, 
under auspices of the KPRP, to enable leftists to partici-
pate in legal politics. They thought the Geneva Conference 
supervision of the post-war armistice and political arrange-
ments would provide them a measure of protection and that 
Hanoi would continue to support their national political 
struggle, according to one of the members of the Cambodian 
revolutionaries' delegation present at the Geneva Conference 
(24). In his view Hanoi was obliged to aid them under the 
principles of proletarian internationalism and because of 
the sacrifices they had made in laying down resistance. 
They had, he said, accepted the compromise reached at the 
conference because of their socialist obligations to safe-
guard the world revolution, out of faith in the foreign 
policies of the socialist powers. 
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But it soon became evident that Hanoi had shifted its 
support to Sihanouk, a shift coinciding with the decision 
of the international socialist powers, following the Bandung 
Conference, to support neutralist regimes such as Sihanouk's 
in the cold war against imperialism (25). 
2.2 The Returnees 
The following years were disastrous for the Cambodian 
communists. The Pracheachon and the Democratic Party, which 
had moved to the left since young radicals, returned from 
France, had assumed its leadership, were decimated at the 
elections, mainly because of police intimidation. Directly 
after the Geneva Conference Sihanouk had already begun 
having leftist resistance fighters arrested and even ex-
ecuted. By 1958 he had eliminated opposition parties, both 
the right-wing republicans and the leftists, and consoli-
dated his power. 
During this period a new generation began to replenish 
the communist movement in Cambodia. They had received higher 
education in France. After the ideologically mixed Khmer 
Students Association was disbanded by the French police, 
the radicals organized themselves in the Marxist Khmer 
Student Union. On arrival in France many were already anti-
monarchist nationalists, having grown up in the radical 
nationalist days of the 1940's (Japanese occupation, anti-
French struggle). In France, during this key phase in their 
formation, they became influenced by Marxist ideas, in fact 
becoming immersed in an ideological framework, that of the 
French Communist Party, which at the time was extremely 
Stalinist. Even so, their nationalism was virulent enough 
to give them a strong sense or need of independence. Saloth 
Sar's 1950 visit to Yugoslavia, just after this country had 
wrested its independence from the Soviet Union, is a clear 
indication of this. Khieu Samphan's thesis deals essentially 
with how Cambodia could achieve real independence. In 1952 
a group of these students published an issue of Khmer 
Student which was a violent attack against Sihanouk and his 
policies. One article was written by Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) 
and signed "the original Khmer" (26). Not much is known 
about this period in the life of such people as Khieu 
Samphan, Rat(h) Samuoeun, Touch Phoeun, Hu Nim, the four 
Thiounn brothers (Prasith, Chum, Thioeunn and Mum), Son 
Sen, the sisters Khieu Ponnary (Pol Pot's wife) and Khieu 
Thirith (who married leng Sari), leng Sari, Saloth Sar, and 
Hou Youn. The latter four and Thiounn Mum do seem to have 
been among the signatories of a letter to Sihanouk in 1952 
saying they did not recognize him as king and declaring 
themselves to be the true leaders of the Cambodian people 
(27). 
Their experiences as non-white students from the 
colonies in the developed, mundane capital of the mother-
country, the home of their rulers, left deep scars. Both 
their western education and their stay in Europe made them 
more aware of the world at large and the defects of their 
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own society than other groups in Cambodian society. On 
returning it was not always easy for them to find jobs, 
let alone positions in accordance with their training. Yet 
merely becoming admissable for higher education in France 
had surely been a promise of upward mobility to them. The 
frustrations of "blocked ascendancy" went together with a 
strong sense of alienation. Through their western education, 
ideas and position they neither belonged to the illiterate 
peasant masses (from which some of them had come), nor to 
the middle class, which was nearly completely non-Khmer, 
nor the old ruling princely class (from which some of the 
others came). 
It does seem that they were already suspicious of the 
Vietminh and, in consequence, of the Khmer Vietminh (28). 
They had little contact with the Vietnamese revolution. 
They lacked the comradely feelings that the Khmer Vietminh 
had as a result of fighting with the Vietminh and being 
taught socialism by them. Yet most of the left-wing retur-
nees from France joined or sympathized with the Pracheachon 
in spite of its Vietminh association. Like the Vietminh 
during the anti-French struggle in Cambodia, the 
Pracheachon, too, received a large proportion of its support 
from ethnic Vietnamese (29). The returnees, however, saw 
and personally experienced how Sihanouk was able to decimate 
the Left and how the same Sihanouk was being supported by 
North Vietnam and other socialist countries. 
Many years later, after the Pol Pot group had more or 
less achieved full power, Pol Pot described the Geneva 
Conference as an outright betrayal of the Cambodian revolu-
tion, "a sell out under which all the gains of the com-
munists 'vanished into thin air' since power was assumed 
by Sihanouk" (30). Another of the returnees, Hou Youn, saw 
the Geneva Conference as a tactical manoeuvre by the socia-
lists, the result of an understandable, given the circum-
stances of the time, overestimation of the strength of the 
imperialist powers (31). A third point of view, expressed 
in a party history written during the war by the military 
political service of the CPK's East zone in 1973 (East Zone 
Party History), saw the conference as a "victory over the 
French imperialists and their lackeys...(won) with the 
Party and people of Vietnam, Laos..." (32). This view 
represents the thinking of the ex-Khmer Vietminh. 
From our vantage point of writing we know that there 
were various competing factions within the Cambodian com-
munist movement and we also know the outcome of the struggle 
between them. But because many of the statements by these 
various factions concerning major events were made much 
later it is difficult to know what their positions and 
points of view were at the time the events occurred. The 
same holds for the Pol Pot regime and the Vietnamese who, 
during the height of the Cambodia - Vietnam conflict in the 
late 1970's, wrote about the events of the 1950's and I960's 
to suit their purpose, strengthen their position and justify 
their actions at the time of writing, not as academic 
historiographers. 
Still, the seeds of discord within the Cambodian 
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communist movement that would later lead to violent purging 
were there from the beginning. To the returnees it was also 
obvious that party strategy was bankrupt. Linking this 
bankruptcy with the party's close Vietminh connection was 
logical, giving them another reason for their critical 
attitude vis-à-vis the Vietnamese communists. It is quite 
likely that even most ex-Khmer Vietminh in Cambodia had 
become more critical of their Vietnamese comrades, not so 
much because of the Geneva Conference itself, but especially 
after Hanoi started supporting Sihanouk. They also recog-
nized the failure of party strategy. According to the 
aforementioned East Zone Party History, the party in 1955 
lacked "ideologies, policies, and organisation" (33). 
To develop a new strategy a party congress was called 
in 1960. From the 28th to the 30th of September 21 delegates 
met in secret at the Phnom Penh railway station. They drew 
up statutes for a new clandestine party organization, 
renamed the Workers Party of Kampuchea (34). Saloth Sar was 
elected vice party secretary. This congress is generally 
considered the turning point in the Pol Pot group's ascen-
dancy to power. Later the Pol Pot group was to call it the 
founding date of the party. Already in 1974, in a party 
history distributed to cadres in Hanoi, leng Sari called it 
the party's first congress instead of the second (35). In 
fact, while it is doubtful if what was later to become the 
Pol Pot group, had as yet crystallized so clearly, the 
communist returnees from France, with Saloth Sar in the 
front lines, had been working to gain control over the 
Cambodian communist movement since the Geneva Conference 
already. Besides Saloth Sar in the number three position, 
other returnees from France, the teacher Moong (according 
to Kiernan this was perhaps Koy Thuon (36)) and leng San, 
took the numbers four and five positions in the party 
hierarchy. 
The man elected party secretary, however, was Tou 
Samouth, ex-Khmer Vietminh and leader of the KPRP, who was 
later to be called a Vietnamese puppet by Pol Pot (37). 
Nuon Chea, his deputy, who had studied law in Bangkok, had 
also been a leading Khmer Vietminh, as had the other members 
elected to the party's Central Committee (CC); Keo Meas, So 
Phim and Son Ngoc Minh (who had left for Hanoi m 1954, not 
to return to Cambodia), and the two candidate members, 
Prasith and Non Suon, secretary general of the Pracheachon 
(38). The congress probably adopted a line of independence 
and self-reliance without dumping the Vietnamese altogether. 
According to a summary of Non Suon's statements about this 
period made at Tuoi Sleng (the Pol Pot regime's central 
interrogation and torture centre) in 1976, "his Party holds 
the principle of independence (...) takes the Vietnamese 
experience, but with the Khmer holding state power" (39). 
Changing the party's name to Workers Party of Kampuchea 
could be seen as following the Vietnamese communists with 
their Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP), but also signify the 
assumption of equal Marxist-Leninist status, as Kiernan 
suggests (40). Interestingly enough, it was the supposedly 
pro-Vietnamese East Zone Party History that considered the 
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1960 Party Congress, which it referred to as the second, an 
"important organizational breakthrough (...) after a series 
of setbacks" (41). 
The Pracheachon finally collapsed when, just before 
the 1962 elections, its candidates, including Non Suon, 
were imprisoned. In July of that year Tou Samouth disap-
peared, probably assassinated either by Sihanouk's police 
or by his party colleagues (42). This is still unclear, but 
it did work to Saloth Sar's benefit. He became acting party 
secretary in Samouth's place. At the party's next congress, 
held in Phnom Penh in February 1963, Saloth Sar was con-
firmed as number one man, Nuon Chea retained the number two 
slot in the Politburo, followed by leng Sari, So Phim and 
French educated teacher Sok Thuok (Vorn Vet), who, like 
Saloth Sar, had spent a short period with the Khmer Viet-
minh, had been introduced to the KPRP in 1954 by Saloth 
Sar, with whom he became close associates (43). An enlarged 
CC now included Moong (Koy Thuon?), Prasith, Son Sen, Son 
Ngoc Minh (still in Hanoi), Mok (an ex-Issarak from peasant 
background, who had supposedly developed close relations 
with Saloth Sar), Phuong (an ex-Khmer Vietminh and 
Pracheachon candidate), and Muol Sambath (Nhim Ros, also an 
ex-Khmer Vietminh). Keo Meas and Non Suon were dropped, 
however (44). The returnees from France had clearly 
strengthened their position in the party. But shortly after 
this congress Saloth Sar and "90% of the central committee" 
fled to the rugged northeast of Cambodia as a result of 
stepped up repression and real fear for assassination by 
the Sihanouk regime (45). 
Both the East Zone Party History and leng Sari's 1974 
version agree that this congress was held to "rectify and 
improve the political line (and approve) a decision for a 
new operational direction..." (46). A central aspect of a 
revolutionary ideology is the analysis of society to esti-
mate the revolutionary potential of its various classes. 
As 85% of the population in Cambodia were peasants, not 
only did the analysis of their revolutionary potential take 
a central place, it was vital for the party to show that 
the peasantry was a powerful revolutionary force. The party 
needed this analysis to show the necessity of revolution. 
That, after all, was its raison d'etre. Here ideological 
commitment was beginning to side-track matter-of-fact 
analysis. 
In its class analysis the party's Stalinist background 
was clearly apparent (47). The party identified the main 
antagonistic contradiction in Cambodian society as that 
between exploiting landlords and exploited peasants. But, 
as we have seen, Cambodia hardly knew any landlordism, nor 
was its peasantry remarkably rebellious. Willmott has tried 
to identify the origin of this error. He presupposes that a 
major contribution to this party debate was made by Khieu 
Samphan, who had presented his doctoral dissertation, 
entitled L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industri-
alisation. at the University of Paris in 1959. This presup-
position, that the theoretical foundation of the KR regime 
lay in Samphan's dissertation, is shared by many other 
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authors (48). In so far as Samphan's dissertation stresses 
an autarkic and self-reliant approach and the party clearly 
adopted such a policy, it is not unreasonable to impute to 
Samphan a major theoretical role (49), although at this 
time he was not even on the party's CC. Both Hou Youn and 
Hu Nim followed Samphan's analysis in their works, as 
Willmott indicates (50). 
There are two main errors in the class structure of 
Cambodia that Samphan developed. Firstly, he underestimated 
the actual ownership of land and overestimated the size a 
holding needed to be in order for a family to survive. 
Secondly, he based his class structure on statistical 
evidence from the provinces of Battambang, Prey Veng and 
Svay Rieng, three provinces that are exceptional to the 
average rural situation in Cambodia. Prey Veng and Svay 
Rieng are in the southeast 
"where there was the highest concentration of 
Vietnamese peasants, and where land tenure was 
most affected by the high rates of tenancy in 
neighboring (...) South Vietnam" (51). 
Battambang was even more of an exception. Here "rural 
society is much more diversified, much less egalitarian..." 
(52). More than half the peasants were either partial 
tenants or completely landless. Ever since the anti-French 
revolt of 1Θ84 colonists began settling underpopulated but 
fertile Battambang. They came mainly from the more densely 
populated 'old provinces' in the southeast and from Cochin-
china, Khmer Krom as well as Vietnamese. Putting outlying 
arable land into production often demanded heavy investment. 
Here the largest landholdings developed, with large land­
owners, often Khmer officials or Khmer-Chinese merchants, 
using paid farmers or coolies. Already in the 1930's large 
scale capitalist rice farms were established, involving 
thousands of hectares, rented out or cultivated by hired 
labour (53). Even in these three exceptional provinces, 
comprising only about one fifth of the Cambodian peasantry, 
the nature of exploitation was misunderstood, not the 
landlord but the rural Chinese merchant being the major 
exploiter of the peasantry. Besides class struggle the 
party also identified national struggle against imperialism 
as a major contradiction. This was not only a correct 
identification of the nation's peripheral and dependent 
position in the "world economic system" (Wallerstein), but 
also the result of a nationalism that needed to be stronger 
even than Sihanouk's, and that had been fanned by the 
failure of Indo-Chinese communist solidarity. 
Already at this time differences of opinion had emerged 
within the ranks of the leftist returnees from France. 
Some, like leng Sari, Saloth Sar and Son Sen, saw Sihanouk 
as the chief enemy who was preventing a true revolution 
from taking place and who, therefore, had to be defeated by 
armed struggle. The mass of the population had to be shown 
that Sihanouk's "nationalist pose (was just a camouflage 
for) his real neo-colonial collaboration". Cambodia "was a 
satellite of imperialism...(it) was not independent" (54). 
The repression of the leftists and the failure of indepen-
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dent parliamentarianism reinforced this opinion. Whether 
Cambodia was independent or not was one source of conflict, 
as Pol Pot later indicated (55). 
Others, like Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim, 
thought co-operation with Sihanouk was necessary because of 
his neutralist stand and opposition to United States im-
perialism. They opted to work within Sihanouk's Sangkum 
movement, at least for the time being. Samphan had stressed 
the need for a class alliance to ameliorate the country's 
economic dependency. National struggle against international 
capitalism in order to develop the national economy is more 
important than class antagonisms within the country, he had 
written (56). In his book The Cooperative Question, publi-
shed in 1964, Hou Youn, member of the CPK and a legal 
Sangkum parliamentary representative, called for heightened 
class struggle within the framework of the patriotic regime 
in order to improve both the living conditions of the 
peasants and bolster Sihanouk's anti-USA position (57). 
The activities of some party members in the Pracheachon 
indicate that at least some of the ex-Khmer Vietminh in the 
party shared these views. According to Sihanouk, documents 
brought into Cambodia from Vietnam by Tou Samouth in 1962, 
held the enemy to be the feudalists and national reactio-
naries and considered it useless to contest the elections 
because of police oppression, conform Saloth Sar. But, 
contrary to the opinion of Saloth Sar and his group, the 
documents stressed continued restraint, advocating con-
fidence in the revolutionary developments in Laos and 
Vietnam, where victories would immediately after lead to 
victory in Cambodia. The party should "make the confidence 
of the young intellectuals" working within Sihanouk's 
Sangkum who sympathize with "our movement" (58). 
So Saloth Sar, leng Sari, Son Sen (59) and others 
found themselves in the remote northeast of Cambodia, a 
thinly populated hill-tribe area. They only managed to 
survive thanks to the help of these tribals. During the 
following years they developed a close relationship with 
these isolated and culturally different tribes (60), who 
were to become perhaps Pol Pot's most devoted and loyal 
social base, the back-bone of his military force (61). The 
Pol Pot group had little or no contact with the majority of 
Khmer peasants inhabiting the central rice-producing re-
gions, however, something that must have influenced it and 
its later attitude towards the peasantry. 
Other leftists seem to have fled to old Khmer Vietminh 
resistance areas. Perhaps they even tried to reactivate 
them. So Phim, with Phuong, his deputy, built up the East 
zone party organization mostly with ex-Khmer Vietminh 
veteran communists like himself. Prasith and Muol Sambath 
were holed up in the Cardamon Mountains near the Thai 
border. Sambath was joined in 1965 by Keu, who, in 1963, 
had been appointed Vorn Vet ' s deputy on the Phnom Penh 
party committee. Among those who did not flee, Samphan, 
Youn and Nim effectively created popular peasant bases in 
their constituencies by showing genuine concern for people's 
grievances. Apart from certain small areas once dominated 
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by the Vietminh, however, most Khmer peasant support for 
leftists was more personal than ideological. Their work as 
parliamentarians, within Sihanouk's Sangkum movement of 
course, and even as cabinet members, remained without 
effect. This was basically because they held no real power. 
Sihanouk really only used them to offset pressure from the 
capitalist Right trying to get rid of the aristocratic-
bureaucratic state he represented. 
It is very difficult to believe that going underground 
(the Pol Pot group) and working within Sihanouk's Sangkum 
(Khieu Samphan and others) were part of one preconceived 
central plan. What with precarious communications, repres-
sion and geographical problems, it is doubtful if there was 
much contact between those who had fled to different outly-
ing parts of the country and those who remained in Phnom 
Penh, not to mention those who had gone to Hanoi in 1954. 
The party was all but a homogeneous organization. The lack 
of contact can explain why, in spite of major differences, 
these groups still coexisted. At the same time this lack of 
contact, the physical separation, stimulated the development 
of separate groups with differing views. Still, in 1966 a 
CC meeting was apparently held at which the party's name 
was changed to Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) (62). 
2.3 The Beginning of Armed Struggle 
One achievement of the Sihanouk era was the mass expansion 
of education. The increasing numbers of high-school and 
university graduates, however, found it difficult to find 
suitable employment. This led to frustration which formed a 
fruitful breeding ground for leftist ideas. The intellec-
tuals' frustration was exacerbated by Sihanouk's domination 
of the political scene. He stimulated Sihanoukism. His 
portrait hung everywhere. Day after day it was published in 
newspapers and magazines (63). There was really no room for 
an independent legal leftist alternative, as is clearly 
demonstrated by the Pracheachon case. Cambodians did not 
get a chance to participate in a modern bureaucracy, did 
not learn organizational skills. Sihanouk's wishes deter-
mined policy. There was no thought-out plan how to use all 
the new institutions, nor absorb all the new graduates, no 
existing organizational framework for setting up stable 
government. The organizational structure was more one of 
form than of content and function. As Osborne notes: 
"Administrative and political talent were scarcely 
a surplus commodity in Cambodia, and they had 
little opportunity to flourish under Sihanouk's 
regime" (64). 
The young intellectuals' dilemma was compounded by 
Sihanouk's neutralist stand. The Second Indo-China War was 
in full blaze and Sihanouk was doing his best to keep 
Cambodia out of it, resisting strong pressure from the USA 
and their Thai and South Vietnamese allies. His social and 
economic policies did sometimes upset the Right. The inter-
ests of laisser-faire commercial capitalists were not always 
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in accord with Sihanouk's aristocratic-bureaucratic state's 
interests. But they were inspired more by his perennial 
political balancing and meant to enhance his progressive 
image, and hence were often ineffective economically. 
Problems of unemployment and poverty, however, were mild in 
Phnom Penh compared to other Southeast Asian cities. 
In most rural areas grievances were comparatively few. 
Villagers lived apart from the state, outside of political 
affairs. Sihanouk's popularity remained unchallenged. His 
populist wooing of the peasantry and their attachment to 
him, the semi-divine prince, are very important factors for 
understanding the situation of the peasantry and the proba-
bility of unrest. Sihanouk made full use of this. He had 
given up the crown to be able to participate in politics 
and become head of state, but he never gave up the use of 
royal attributes (65). 
With the onset of Lon Nol's rightist government in 
1966 we have, therefore, a frustrated and estranged urban 
intelligentsia but not much of an agrarian, urban or natio-
nal crisis. This does not mean Cambodia was treading the 
path towards a bright economic future for all, on the 
contrary. It only means that the break-down of traditional 
society, frustration, class antagonisms and polarization in 
general had, as yet, not developed to such an extent that 
mass protest or mass participation in activities aimed at 
fundamental change were to be expected. 
The province of Battambang formed an exception. By 
1960 it was by far the most important rice growing province 
in Cambodia. Increasing population pressure due to the 
swelling stream of colonists created problems. Domination 
by, often absentee, landowners, including government offi-
cials, increased. Crop failure, high rents and low produc-
tivity gave rise to increasing impoverishment. Peasants 
were pushed off their land and forced to become share-crop-
pers or farm labourers. Others were forced more and more 
into the backwoods. Especially on the fruit plantations a 
rural proletariat developed. 
In 1966 Sihanouk, for some reason still not satisfac-
torily explained (66), dropped his usual practice of select-
ing election candidates so that a balance between various 
political fractions and leanings was ensured. This led to 
the formation of a right-wing government under Lon Nol. One 
of the most serious problems plaguing the Cambodian economy 
was the smuggle of a large proportion of the rice crop to 
the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) or to 
the black market in Saigon. Official agencies had collected 
only one third of the 1966 crop. As a result the government, 
which taxed rice exports fairly heavily, ran short of 
legitimate sources of income. Lon Nol's government asserted 
its control, penetrating to the village level, using the 
military to effectively take over the purchase of rice from 
the civil agencies. An efficient ramassage du paddy was 
instituted to buy as much of the crop from the peasants as 
possible against prices as low as one third of black market 
prices. The very low yield of the 1966 rice and cotton crop 
worsened matters considerably. This combined with the 
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already existing intensity of class conflict in southern 
Battambang (peasant protest was already being severely 
repressed), led to the 1967 peasant uprising known as the 
Samlaut Rebellion (67). 
The Lon Nol government's activities also provoked 
increased activism from the urban Left. The Chinese Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (CR), which had great appeal 
for many of the discontented, young, urban intellectuals, 
further stimulated leftist activism. By late 1966 some of 
these intellectuals had started doing propaganda work in 
the rural areas, where local grievances were strong. So 
leftist intellectuals did play a part in fanning unrest, 
but the Samlaut Rebellion was not organized by them. It was 
a local and 'spontaneous' peasant uprising (68). These 
urban leftists, many of whom were students or teachers 
closely associated with Phouk Chhay and Hu Nim, the leaders 
of the Kampuchea - China Friendship Association during 1966 
and 1967 and strongly influenced by the CR, formed what 
Kiernan originally termed the "cultural revolution group" 
(tendency would be more accurate), although he later opted 
for "revolutionary independents" (69). The general suppres-
sion which followed the outbreak of the Samlaut Rebellion 
forced many of them (among them Samphan, Hu Nim, Youn, and 
various members of Vorn Vet's underground Phnom Penh network 
like Poe Doeuskoma and the Tiv 01 group of leftist teachers, 
including Thuch Rin and Khek Penn (70)), to flee to the 
jungle. The event of a peasant uprising gave them the 
feeling that things were happening, that finally the masses 
were on the move. Here their erroneous class analysis 
started to come home to roost, misinterpreting and genera-
lizing what were specific local conditions. 
Political activism and anti-Lon Nol and even anti-
Sihanouk propaganda increased. The revolt remained local, 
however. It was viciously put down, villages razed to the 
ground, peasants clubbed to death. But the underground 
activists were now contacting each other and setting up 
some kind of guerilla infrastructure. Some of the old Khmer 
Vietminh bases, long dormant, were also reactivated. 
The Samlaut Rebellion took the small CPK's central 
apparatus, holed up in the rugged and isolated northeast, 
by surprise. Holding the most important positions, they 
held authority, but initiative lay with the cultural revolu-
tion tendency. If they did not act fast this tendency could 
easily sidetrack them and form a rival leadership of the 
communist movement, all the more so with such well known 
and respected leaders as Samphan, Youn and Hu Nim. Saloth 
Sar and his group had to temporarily swim with the tide, 
probably the reason why, in early 1968, they organized 
another uprising in southern Battambang, although supposedly 
nation-wide. It was to present their credentials and impress 
the, mostly urban, intellectual leftists they wanted to get 
control over with their revolutionary zeal. 
The differing views on the outbreak of armed struggle 
clearly illuminate the rivalries. According to the cultural 
revolution tendency, the CPK started armed struggle in 1967 
with the first Samlaut Rebellion, which was organized by 
20 
the party (71). On the other hand the 1974 Party History 
claims the enemy (led by Lon Nol) started the civil war in 
early 1967. Although the party was already "properly or-
ganized", it had not yet "raised the principle of armed 
struggle, but in the face of this massive civil war (...) 
our Party had to fight back with arms" (72). Later the Pol 
Pot group claimed the party had more or less been surprised 
by the 1967 uprising. It had not yet, at that time, decided 
on a nation-wide uprising. It had asked for the uprising to 
be postponed, considering conditions not yet right for 
armed struggle. The party only launched this armed struggle 
a year later, in January 1968, with the successful attack 
on the Banan army post, when the Revolutionary Army of 
Kampuchea was formed (73). This attack, however, is not 
even mentioned in the 1974 Party History, which was, as 
noted earlier, very much a Pol Pot group document (74). The 
difference between the 1974 Party History and the position 
taken by the Pol Pot group later is in the greater distance 
the latter position takes towards the cultural revolutio-
nists' view. Probably internal party tensions had not yet 
surfaced to such an extent that the Pot group needed to 
'clean' its history as radically as it did later. And also, 
even if it had already wanted to, it was not yet, during 
the war, in a position to enforce its reading of the party's 
history. The fact that the 1972 Party History, distributed 
in the Southwest zone, endowing the cultural revolutionists' 
view, was distributed by the CC, would seem to confirm 
this. 
On the other hand, the East Zone Party History, which 
represents the views of the so-called Khmer Vietminh, agrees 
with Pol Pot in considering 1968 as the starting point of 
the party's policy of armed struggle. This was in 1973, 
quite some time before Pol Pot himself made public this 
view. The East Zone Party History also said that the East 
zone party committee only "worked to co-operate with this 
political movement supported by arms in the country from 
1968 to 1970" (75). According to a CPK East zone cadre 
interviewed by Kiernan, the 1967 - 1970 period was one of 
"combined political and armed struggle, (...) we (...) had 
not yet adopted armed struggle as the line" (76). This 
would suggest they did not actually participate in the KR 
armed struggle, which would confirm their subserviency to 
the Vietnamese communists. These were not anxious to see 
Sihanouk's position threatened, considering all the tacit 
support he was providing them. Actually So Phim started 
armed struggle in 1968, in the face of strong Vietnamese 
disapproval (77). There had already been Cambodian communist 
guerilla attacks in 1967, and according to another East 
zone party cadre, the leaders of the revolution, in order 
to face the Sihanoukist repression, "decided to take up 
arms against the enemy in February 1967" (78), a position 
very similar to leng Sari's 1974 Party History. All this, 
specifically the East Zone Party History's formulation, 
hardly indicates a unified party. On the contrary, it 
suggests different, rather loose groups, more or less 
co-operating. 
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The VWP's opinion concerning the Samlaut Rebellion 
differed from the East Zone Party History, another indica-
tion of at least some amount of independence of the latter 
from the Vietnamese. The VWP shared the Pol Pot group's 
critique of the cultural revolutionists, but blamed Pol Pot 
for it. According to the Vietnamese it was the Pol Pot 
group which had tried to 
"organize some maquis in a jungle area close to 
Kampuchea's northern and western frontiers. (But 
they failed to get) adequate popular support (and 
the) premature uprising by peasants in Samlaut 
(...) was drowned in blood" (79). 
In the East zone anti-Sihanouk propaganda was now also 
being made, as was the case elsewhere in Cambodia, espe-
cially in areas where the cultural revolutionists were 
active, such as the district of Baray in Kp. Thorn Province 
and Prey Chhor in Kp. Cham Province (Hu Nim's constituency), 
in parts of Kp. Speu and Battambang. It was also apparent in 
the party's clandestine newspaper, Red Light, established 
in 1966, and in pamphlets circulated at the time. Although 
it is unclear whether these emanated from the Pol Pot group 
or other tendencies, they referred to Marxism-Leninism, to 
preparing for armed struggle in the countryside and the 
overthrow of Sihanouk (80). In this, too, the various 
Cambodian communist tendencies disagreed with the Vietnamese 
communists, who continued to support Sihanouk. 
The resumption of the rice-collecting campaign and the 
government decision to appoint village chiefs (thereby 
doing away with traditional village autonomy) were the 
direct grievances that led peasants to join the rebels in 
the 1968 uprising. The local roots of some of the rebel 
leaders may have been one reason for popular peasant sup-
port, although quite a number of rebels were ex-urban 
intellectuals. These grievances as well as problems, such 
as corruption and military brutality, were general problems, 
and although their intensity varied considerably from region 
to region, they created peasant discontent. 
But outside the southern Battambang area the uprising 
remained limited to pin-prick actions, usually skirmishes, 
the execution of a village chief, the burning of a govern-
ment farm, the seizure of some rifles, the kidnapping of 
some local official. They took place mainly in parts of 
the southwest, such as the Chouk district of Kampot Pro-
vince, the Chriev district of Kp. Chhnang, the Kirirom 
area and the Amleang district of Kp. Speu. Some 10.000 
peasants, mainly in southern Battambang, the Chouk district 
and the Kouk Banteay district of Kp. Chhnang, all tradi-
tional Vietminh resistance areas, temporarily joined the 
rebels in their mountain or jungle hideouts. Most of them 
went voluntarily, I suspect, although at the instigation of 
the rebels. Savage military reprisals did result in numbers 
of peasants becoming rebels themselves. Militarily the 
uprising was defeated and the KR forced to retreat having 
suffered heavy casualties. Many peasants returned to their 
villages while the rebels pulled back to their bases in the 
mountains and forests. They did now possess more arms, had 
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gained some experience, enjoyed some peasant support in 
various areas. A network of bases and lines of communi-
cation were being established. 
At the same time a tribal revolt had broken out in the 
northeast, sparked off by what the tribals felt to be racist 
domination and interference by Phnom Penh. As the central 
authorities had little or no control over the northeast 
they had started moving lowland Khmer colonists into the 
area and Khmerizing the hilltribes. What Saloth Sar's role 
in the revolt was is unknown, but as this had been his base 
area for so long, he was probably involved. 
All through 1968 and 1969 small scale guerilla actions 
took place. Yet the KR did not pose any serious threat to 
the government, as even Pol Pot admitted. In a speech given 
in 1977 he said that in the north, the northeast and the 
east they had only managed to capture a handful of weapons. 
Only in the northwest and the southwest did they capture 
"dozens" of guns, "large numbers of weapons" (81). Life was 
certainly becoming more difficult for the peasants but 
there was no real threat to their security and subsistence. 
Furthermore, the lack of a tradition of organization amongst 
the peasantry made it even more difficult for the KR to 
gain a foothold. As Ebihara notes: 
"There are no well-defined groups beyond the 
family and household. (There is) a striking lack 
of indigenous, traditional organized associa-
tions, clubs (and such) formed on non-kin prin-
ciples" (82). 
This is in sharp contradistinction to Vietnam, but com-
parable to Thailand (83). 
The real problem was that Lon Nol's right-wing govern-
ment and the beginning of armed struggle by the KR (as a 
result of this) swiftly polarized Cambodia's political life 
to such an extent that Sihanouk's position of keeping the 
country neutral in a region immersed in bloody war was 
undermined. The Right can be identified with republican 
minded, especially commercial, capitalist interests, pro-USA 
(especially American aid!) supported by those, especially 
in the military (and to a lesser extent the bureaucracy) 
who stood to gain by stepped up United States aid, build-up 
of the military and reduction of state influence on the 
economy. To many people Sihanouk, the representative of a 
corrupt monarchic-bureaucratic state which he considered 
his private possession, was holding back development. The 
Left, of course, envisaged different solutions than the 
Right. The latter was fast gaining control over the state 
and Sihanouk was acutely aware that it would bring Cambodia 
into the war on the side of the USA. He was also convinced 
that the KR were really aiming to overthrow him. The Cam-
bodian political system which he favoured was falling apart. 
His neutralist balancing act was becoming ever more dif-
ficult. The effects of the CR in Cambodia threatened to 
disrupt usually cordial Cambodian - Chinese relations. The 
growing number of NLF/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in 
eastern Cambodia compounded his difficulties. 
The North Vietnamese were still supporting Sihanouk. 
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To them the KR was "something of an embarrassment", to 
quote Burchett (84). As long as Sihanouk's neutralism kept 
Cambodia out of the war their sanctuaries and supply lines 
through eastern Cambodia were guaranteed. They had also 
made a deal with him which enabled them to receive aid 
through the harbour of Sihanoukville. This deal also 
strengthened Sihanouk's position in repressing the KR. The 
Vietnamese communists were not likely to be much taken in 
by a guerilla movement aimed at toppling Sihanouk. This 
would almost certainly draw Cambodia into the war, thus 
endangering their position in eastern Cambodia. 
Saloth Sar had already encountered this when he was 
refused aid in Hanoi back in 1965. He also visited China 
then, but China, too, preferred Sihanouk, continuing to 
supply him with military aid after the KR had started their 
armed struggle. This refusal of aid was another reason why 
the CPK "consolidated and strengthened its position of 
independence, sovereignty and self reliance" (85). In the 
spring of 1969 Saloth Sar again travelled to Hanoi for 
high-level meetings with the Vietnamese leaders. The CPK's 
CC, Sar said, was expecting Lon Nol to stage a coup against 
Sihanouk. The Vietnamese should, therefore, support the KR' 
armed struggle. But the Vietnamese again refused. As long 
as Sihanouk was in power KR armed struggle only created 
problems for them (86). Together with continuing Vietnamese 
arrogance and condescension towards the Khmer communists 
(87), these contradictions between the Cambodian and Viet-
namese revolutions certainly strengthened anti-Vietnamese 
sentiments within the CPK. The CPK's CC estimated that the 
Lon Noi coup they were expecting would drive many more 
people to their side. It was necessary to prepare to receive 
them. An enlarged Politburo meeting in July 1969 adopted a 
national united front line to fight Lon Nol, but to recog-
nize Sihanouk as a political ally (88). Pol Pot even said 
that the party's CC 
"criticized the statements of the intellectuals 
who had joined the guerilla and attacked Samdech 
Norodom Sihanouk. It was of the opinion that 
those statements ran counter to the party line" 
(89). 
By 1969 the Vietnamese communists were recruiting 
Khmer from South Vietnam and Cambodia for courses in North 
Vietnam. But few, if any, returned to Cambodia. The Viet-
namese had refused to help when the East zone took up armed 
struggle in 1968. There was even an incident in which 
Vietnamese communists fired on Cambodian communists who 
fled into Vietnam to escape Sihanoukist repression (90). 
The little assistance given to the KR in areas of tradi-
tional Vietnamese influence in the form of political and 
military training and some equipment was mainly aimed at 
controlling the budding Cambodian guerilla movement. It was 
provoked by intensified American and South Vietnamese 
military operations against the border areas which forced 
the NLF/NVA to withdraw further into Cambodia. They had to 
strengthen the defences of their sanctuaries and supply 
lines and needed good relations with the local people. 
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The Cambodian Right fulminated against the NLF/NVA 
presence that Sihanouk had always connived in. He had to 
avoid anything - such as a too explicit denunciation of an 
outside force (the Chinese, the Vietnamese communists) for 
interfering in Cambodian internal affairs - that might 
expose the country to the danger of American intervention, 
to "save the country from a communist take-over". He had to 
restrain the Lon Nol group, only too eager to brand every 
manifestation of domestic unrest as subversion and a jus-
tification for soliciting United States aid. The USA and 
their allies were bringing increasing pressure to bear on 
him, including military violation of Cambodian soil. 
"Sihanouk was enveloped with threatening developments in 
all directions - all interacting with each other" (69). He 
lost his grip. His actions oscillated between conciliatory 
gestures towards the KR, such as the sacking of officials 
for incompetence or corruption, to ordering severe repres-
sion and mobilizing townspeople and peasants against the 
rebels. 
In March 1970 he was overthrown by the Lon Nol - Sirik 
Matak coup, executed with Washington's approval. Cambodia 
became the "Sideshow" to the war in Vietnam (91). 
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3 
THE WAR, 1970-1975 
Although conditions were not getting better, on the eve of 
the war Cambodia was still a long way from any KR led 
revolution. It was the massive upheaval and destruction of 
the war that gave the KR the possibility of grabbing power. 
Initially they needed the help of others, notably Sihanouk 
and the Vietnamese communists. But as they grew stronger 
they started more and more to shunt out these potential 
rivals to power. The experiences of war also strengthened 
their radicality and single-mindedness as well as increasing 
the conditions that would enhance a terrorist approach to 
the realization of the KR' ideals. 
3.1 The Seeds of Dissent, the Initial Phase (1970-1973) 
It is illuminating that in Phnom Penh Lon Nol ' s coup was 
welcomed by the middle class, by intellectuals and by the 
mass of students. To them it meant the end of an autocratic, 
corrupt regime. Their expectations were high. When Lon Nol 
called for 10.000 recruits to build up Cambodia's small 
army, 70.000 volunteered (1). In the countryside, where his 
"corruption had been less visible and his autocracy less 
painful, the Prince's overthrow seemed an act of sacrilege" 
(2). Pro-Sihanouk demonstrations and riots broke out in 
various provinces. Thousands of unarmed peasants marched 
into Kp.Cham, Skoun, Ang Tassom and other towns only to be 
mowed down by police and troops. Hundreds were killed and 
wounded, many more arrested (3). Out of fear for more 
reprisals many peasants took to the jungle. According to 
the Lon Nol government, the peasant demonstrations were 
inspired by the Vietnamese communists (4). 
The new leaders also wanted to get rid of the NLF/NVA 
presence in eastern Cambodia. Troops were sent to repulse 
"the Vietnamese communist invasion" in the border areas. 
But the Cambodian army was small, inexperienced and badly 
equipped. Partly as a ploy to camouflage its inability to 
achieve results against the NLF/NVA, government propaganda 
began asserting that all Vietnamese residents were Viet 
Cong. Lon Nol then launched a brutal anti-Vietnamese pogrom 
in which thousands of ethnic Vietnamese Cambodians were 
butchered, exploiting traditional Khmer fear of the Viet-
namese to compensate for lack of peasant support. A few 
hundred thousand ethnic Vietnamese fled Cambodia either to 
Saigon or NLF/NVA controlled areas. 
With massive United States aid a crash program was set 
up to increase the Cambodian army manyfold. Crack Khmer 
Serei (5) and Khmer Krom units that had been trained by the 
USA in Vietnam were sent to Phnom Penh. South Vietnamese 
and American military incursions across the border in-
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creased. The massive and illegal bombing of eastern Cam-
bodia, begun in 1969, continued. And on the 1st of May 
1970 an outright invasion by South Vietnamese and American 
troops took place "because of the Hanoi invasion of Cam-
bodia, to destroy the communist headquarters in Cambodia" 
(6). All this did not destroy the NLF/NVA. In fact the 
cruelty of Saigon troops (taking revenge for the anti-Viet-
namese pogrom) and Lon Nol troops against civilians, the 
indiscriminate bombing, Sihanouk's deposition and his appeal 
to join the National United Front of Cambodia (generally 
known by its French acronym FUNK) (7), were enough for many 
to join the guerilla (8). 
The Cambodian state disintegrated as Lon Nol's admi-
nistration abandoned large areas (9). The economy nose-
dived as military expenditure soared and the rubber planta-
tions - the main foreign exchange earner - were destroyed 
by American bombing. Inflation soared (10). Only massive 
United States assistance really kept the Lon Nol regime 
going. All this and the continued corruption and living-it-
up of the Lon Nol elite greatly disappointed many of those 
who had initially welcomed the coup. 
But the small scattered FUNK guerillas could hardly 
have taken so much of Cambodia so quickly without the 
assistance of the NLF/NVA. On the eve of the war the KR had 
perhaps 1.000 to 2.000 guerillas, mainly holed up in the 
mountains of the southwest, the border areas with Vietnam 
and the northeast (11). By the end of April NLF/NVA troops 
had penetrated deep into Cambodia in the name of FUNK. A 
USA intelligence report estimated that in September 1970 
there were 20 "Khmer VC" battalions and 5 "mixed" Khmer -
Vietnamese battalions, whilst there were 80 Vietnamese 
communist battalions in Cambodia (12). At the outset of the 
war in Cambodia it would seem that the Vietnamese, the 
Sihanoukists, known as Khmer Rumdoah (Khmer Liberators), 
and the KR had a common interest in combining to fight 
their mutual enemies. 
The KR, however, distrusted the Vietnamese. Initially 
both Hanoi and Beijing had not reacted to Lon Nol's coup, 
waiting to see if he would continue Cambodia's neutralist 
policy. The spreading of war to Cambodia pushed NLF/NVA 
communication lines and sanctuaries further into Cambodia. 
Vietnamese communist policy, as Porter argues, had always 
been to exploit the Cambodian (and Lao) revolutions to 
serve the Vietnamese revolution. The Vietnamese communists 
only made a serious effort to organize a Cambodian communist 
movement in the midst of two resistance wars (1949-1953 and 
1970 ff), when all else had to be subordinated to their own 
struggle against larger powers (13). The Vietnamese now 
needed a Khmer guerilla movement to help protect their 
longer lines of communication running through Cambodia. But 
the stronger such a movement grew the more independent it 
was likely to become. Hanoi naturally preferred to see a 
regime sympathetic to it achieve power in Cambodia. From 
Hanoi's point of view their is a whole series of very sound 
arguments for wanting close co-operation between the Indo-
China states (14). It would entail some amount of domination 
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by Hanoi, as the case of Laos clearly illustrates. To point 
out that Vietnam had already dropped the concept of the 
Indo-China federation back in 1951 and only wanted a 'spe-
cial' relationship, is semantic when one sees the type of 
relationship Vietnam has with Laos. That relationship is 
obviously quite close to what Hanoi really wanted (15). 
So Hanoi started participating in the Cambodian revolu-
tion. Control was asserted by sending back the few thousand 
Khmer Vietminh who had been trained in Hanoi to command 
troops and undertake political and military training of new 
recruits (16). The Vietnamese communists supplied the Hanoi 
returnees and the forces under them with the same sort of 
modern weaponry and other material they themselves used, 
making it very attractive for Khmers wanting to join the 
guerilla to join them. The 'domestic' KR (those who had 
been active inside Cambodia, as opposed to those who had 
been in Hanoi all that time), on the other hand, claimed, 
probably correctly, that they received too few and inferior 
weapons (17). The domestic KR in general resented Hanoi's 
attempts to assert control. Even the domestic ex-Khmer 
Vietminh, the East zone cadres, felt this way. So Phim et 
al. had opposed the Vietnamese communists coming into 
Cambodia to fight Lon Nol after his coup. They only wanted 
weapons, on the grounds that it was their country. According 
to an East zone cadre, the Vietnamese told them 
"if we did not agree it would be harmful to their 
country, and they would go in anyway. They said 
that without their help we would not be able to 
liberate our country" (18). 
If Hanoi was not pursuing its own interests but really had 
their interests at heart, would these Hanoi trained cadres 
not have been able to return earlier, the domestic KR 
reasoned. They mistrusted the Hanoi returnees, convinced 
that they were under strong influence of the VWP, if not 
outright puppets. Having been in Hanoi for so long condemned 
them in advance, the circumstances under which they returned 
only aggravating this. Already before the Lon Noi coup, 
after the beginning of armed struggle, a split had started 
to develop between the domestic Khmer Vietminh and those in 
Hanoi because the latter did not return to Cambodia to help 
the struggle (19). According to Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan had 
told him in 1978 that those Khmer Vietminh cadres and 
officers had "neither the mind nor the heart of a Khmer" 
that they had become spies of the "Vietminhs" and conse-
quently "we were obliged to rid ourselves of them" (20). 
The massive influx of cadres was bound to interfere 
especially with the Pol Pot group's aim of gaining sole 
power. Arrogance and paternalism on the part of the Viet-
namese towards their 'younger brothers' hardly improved 
matters either (21). Even some of the Hanoi returnees 
expressed strong resentment against the Vietnamese for 
treating them as inferiors (22). It is a measure of espe-
cially the Pol Pot group's rigidity that they were complete-
ly impassive to this sort of nuance. 
After Sihanouk founded the FUNK the KR had immediately 
joined. But this was tactical. They had no intention of 
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giving up their aim of overthrowing him. As Heder puts it: 
"The party was forced to develop even more radical 
and nationalist standpoints to set itself apart 
from the nationalist and reformist monarchism 
displayed by Sihanouk in his united front role. 
As head of state, Sihanouk had repressed the 
Kampuchean Communists with ferocious brutality 
and the party could not allow the united front to 
become a means of protecting Sihanouk's political 
power, which drew strength from his popular image 
as the embodiment of Kampuchean nationalism" (23). 
KR nationalism and anti-Vietnamese feeling were strengthened 
even more as Lon Nol and his allies accused them of being 
instruments of Hanoi. 
So right at the start of the war what should have been 
a firm alliance was already lacerated by the seeds of 
dissension, both between the Vietnamese and Cambodian 
communists and within the Cambodian united front itself. 
Right from the start Sihanoukists and Vietnamese communists 
competed with the KR for control over people joining the 
guerilla. 
Even the Khmer communist movement itself was divided. 
There were differences over questions of strategy in the 
struggle against the number one immediate enemy. United 
States imperialism, and against local reactionaries, but 
the main contradiction was about the attitude towards 
Vietnam. In practice the line at this time was drawn between 
those communists who had gone to Hanoi in 1954 and only 
rejoined the struggle in 1970, on the one hand, and those 
who had more or less remained active within Cambodia during 
this period. This, therefore, included those who had been 
under the influence of the Vietminh up to 1954 but had 
stayed in Cambodia, either underground or in the 
Pracheachon. Not having had close contact with Vietnamese 
communists for so long it is not unlikely that their atti-
tude and opinion vis-â-vis the Vietnamese had changed. 
Some had probably even evolved into cultural revolutionists 
or Pol Pot adherents. But most of them probably belonged to 
a third tendency, which, although agreeing with the other 
domestic KR in principle in their attitude towards the 
Vietnamese and the Hanoi returnees, differed in degree, 
generally being less averse to co-operation. They were also 
less averse to co-operation with the Khmer Rumdoah and less 
inclined to radical and terrorist methods. But, once again, 
this is all a matter of degree not of principle. Although 
the connotation of subservience to the Vietnamese is there-
fore misleading, I will, for want of a more apt name, refer 
to them as domestic Khmer Vietminh. 
Furthermore, as far as the three tendencies within the 
domestic KR are concerned, we must remember that they were 
hardly organized as such, nor were they homogeneous. Rela-
tions between these conglomerations were fluid, separating 
or joining depending on the issue or the circumstances. 
Within these groups tendencies and alliances also fluc-
tuated. Individuals representing one or other tendency, 
too, could change their opinion and switch alliance. Region-
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alization of power and poor communications certainly 
strengthened this centrifugal drift. For lack of a more 
appropriate terminology, however, I will continue using 
this trichotomization. 
The various tendencies had developed regional bases, 
the Pol Pot group in the northeast, the cultural revolution 
group predominant in the southwest and the domestic Khmer 
Vietminh in the east. The Northeast zone, where Saloth Sar, 
the CPK's secretary general, had also been party secretary 
since 1968, was the only region to be directly administered 
by the party's CC. All the others were administered by zone 
committees. Usually the zone secretary was the most powerful 
person in that zone. The North zone had been headed by Koy 
Thuon since the mid-1960's already, assisted by Sreng, a 
former student follower of Hu Nim in his electoral district, 
and Ke Pauk (Ke Sam, Ke Vin), an ex-Issarak from peasant 
background who had been jailed by Sihanouk in the 1950's, 
as military commander. Muol Sambath led the Northwest zone, 
with Khek Penn, a former teacher from Phnom Penh who had 
taken to the jungle with Tiv 01 a few years earlier, as his 
deputy, and Keu, one time youth activist recruited by Vorn 
Vet in 1961, as military commander (24). 
Initially the FUNK, under NLF/NVA supervision, simply 
took over those areas in the countryside abandoned by the 
Lon Nol regime. They did not at that time implement politi-
cal programs. During this period until about mid-1971, both 
the Vietnamese and the FUNK, in which the KR were still a 
minority, were concerned to behave in an exemplary fashion 
towards the local people. The Vietnamese communists, anxious 
to dispel traditional peasant dislike and fear of the 
Vietnamese and taking care to stress that they were fighting 
to help Sihanouk, carefully avoided actions which might 
antagonize the local population. They conveyed the impres-
sion of having the true interests of the peasants in mind. 
They had been issued with orders to this end, as well as to 
behave correctly towards their Khmer "brothers", comrades 
in arms (25). 
The FUNK, too, helped the peasants and behaved correct-
ly towards them. They gained considerable sympathy from the 
local peasantry who supported them. According to a United 
States intelligence report of September 1970 the population 
supported the FUNK and the NLF/NVA because 
"(a) they have appreciated not being submitted to 
taxation and excesses by the invaders who, for 
propaganda purposes, are well-behaved and respect-
ful of the needs and cares of the population. In 
some cases they have been supported by the Bud-
dhist monks because they have always avoided 
attacking religion; 
(b) aerial bombardments against the villagers 
have caused civilian loss on a large scale..." 
(26). 
By mid-1971 FUNK organizational strength was estimated at 
40.000 to 60.000 people, including main force units of 
5.000 to 15.000, holding control over some two to three 
million people in Cambodia. A political apparatus was set 
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up. The general situation in mid-1971 showed the KR some-
times using coercion, intimidation and assassination 'where 
necessary' . But on the whole they attempted to avoid acts 
which might alienate the population. The behaviour of 
NLF/NVA soldiers was exemplary when compared with the South 
Vietnamese troops, according to a United States Defense 
Intelligence Agency (US DIA) appraisal of July 1971 (27). 
Most reports also suggest at least some sympathy and support 
by the populace for the NLF/NVA (28). 
The KR, however, were worried. NLF/NVA forces were all 
over Cambodia, even as far as the ruins of Angkor. The KR 
had needed the help of the Vietnamese (and the Sihanoukists) 
but they did not want to share power. It was time, they 
decided, to assert themselves. In order not to bring their 
war-effort against the Lon Nol regime and its allies into 
danger, however, they would have to move carefully. Develop-
ments up to early 1973 show the KR, growing in numbers and 
self assurance, demanding sovereignty over the border areas, 
starting to break away from Hanoi's control, taking over 
the FUNK and beginning their program to change society. But 
on the whole their main concern during this period was to 
bring an end to the Lon Nol government's presence. Only 
with Lon Nol's troops out of the way could they effectively 
begin to take over control of an area. 
At a party congress held in July 1971 at Saloth Sar's 
headquarters, now in the North zone, a new, enlarged CC was 
elected. Among the newly elected were Chou Chet, 
ex-Pracheachon and secretary of the Southwest zone, Kang 
Chap and So Doeun. Hou Youn and Hu Nim became candidate 
members, it seems. Also present at the congress were, inter 
alia, Saloth Sar himself, Nuon Chea, Vorn Vet, So Phim, 
Mok, Son Sen, Koy Thuon, Muol Sambath, Ney Sarann, Non 
Suon, Phuon and Ke Pauk, as well as some Hanoi returnees. 
Some important resolutions were adopted concerning the 
introduction of production co-operatives, the elimination 
of markets, the evacuation of towns. There was some dis-
agreement it seems, with Youn, Nim, Ney Sarann (a former 
teacher, Issarak and Pracheachon member), Koy Thuon and 
Khieu Samphan critical of the economic resolutions, finding 
them too radical. It was also resolved that Vietnam was the 
long term "acute" enemy of Cambodia. It was decided to 
purge the "veterans of the struggle" (as the Hanoi returnees 
were honorifically referred to within the VWP and among 
themselves), to start campaigns to expel Vietnamese experts 
and armed forces from Cambodia and to win over Cambodian 
troops and cadres who had been recruited in Cambodia by the 
Vietnamese and the veterans. According to Heder these 
campaigns 
"were quite willingly and even enthusiastically 
implemented by all the 'domestic' Region (...), 
Party Committees (...) and (...) Sector Party 
Committees, including those under the influence 
or domination of Party cadres recruited or co-op-
ted by the Vietnamese in the 1945 - 1954 period 
who had not 'regrouped' in Vietnam..." (29). 
To expel the Vietnamese negotiations were held between 
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local KR cadres and NLF/NVA troop commanders. This is more 
or less confirmed by Sihanouk, who says that already in 
1971-1972 Saloth Sar had asked the Vietnamese to transfer 
all Cambodians to him and stop training them (30). according 
to Non Suon's Tuoi Sleng 'confession'. Vorn Vet, secretary 
of the Special zone, had told his subordinates to "avoid 
using arms, if possible" in throwing the Vietnamese com-
munists out in order to "preserve our people and military 
forces. Use politics preferably" (31). If the negotiations 
did not have the desired results 'popular demonstrations' 
were organized against the Vietnamese presence. This mostly 
took place in the latter half of 1972 and early 1973 (32). 
If the Vietnamese still remained KR troops would attack 
them. This occurred mostly between the end of 1972 and 
mid-1973. But as early as September 1970 local KR troops in 
Kp. Thom Province had fired on Vietnamese communist forces 
from behind while the latter were attacking a Lon Nol unit 
(33). In 1970-1971 clashes also took place in Kandal Prov-
ince (34). According to Mrs. Nguyen Thi Cu, a Vietnamese 
living in Cambodia at the time, the KR started harassing 
the Vietnamese communists in the rubber plantations of Kp. 
Cham in 1971 (35). According to former inhabitants inter-
viewed by Heder, not only the Vietnamese communists but 
also Vietnamese residents were driven out of eastern Kp. 
Cham in early 1972 (36). The aforementioned US DIA July 
1971 appraisal pointed out that especially in the northeast 
"the populace is dissatisfied under the Vietnamese occupa-
tion" (37), probably a reference to the 'popular demonstra-
tions'. In Kandal Province there were also armed clashes 
when KR cadres objected to Vietnamese purchasing of draft 
animals, which they feared was diminishing local agricul-
tural potential, and to Vietnamese taxation of river traffic 
(38). 
It is possible that already before 1970 there had been 
conflict between the KR and the Vietnamese communists in 
the northeast, both sides trying to woe the tribals who had 
started a rebellion against the Phnom Penh regime in 1968. 
In 1972 a full-scale battle is supposed to have taken place 
near Siem Reap between "KR units and their erstwhile allies 
who refused to leave the place and abandon the local cadres 
whom they had imposed" (39). Khmer antipathy and fear for 
the Vietnamese sometimes led to co-operation between Lon 
Nol troops and KR units against the Vietnamese. The Lon Nol 
government was probably the KR' largest provider of weapons 
(40). For instance, in 1972 Lon Nol troops supplied the KR 
with weapons to keep all Vietnamese out of the Kirirom and 
Kp. Speu area (41). We must, of course, remember that the 
element of corruption in Lon Nol's Khmer Republic also 
played a part here. 
The Vietnamese, too, sometimes let ethnicity prevail 
over ideology. In August 1971 in the province of Svay Rieng 
there was, according to Allman, a silent agreement between 
the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to leave each other 
in peace whilst the former would attack the KR and the 
latter the Lon Nol troops. At the same time the local KR 
attacked South Vietnamese units although they had been 
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ordered to attack a convoy on the way from Kompong Som to 
Phnom Penh to provision the Lon Nol regime (42). 
These incidents are not confined to one particular 
zone. Domestic KR were busy implementing their anti-Viet­
namese communist policy in areas all over Cambodia. To do 
this they first needed to achieve control in such an area. 
I will now discuss how this was done. 
3.2 KR Organization, Methods and Approach 
The clearest picture we have on KR organization, politics 
and method of achieving power comes from Ith Sarin, a 
candidate for party membership who became disillusioned 
with the KR and returned to Phnom Penh in early 1973. He 
was stationed in Kp. Speu Province, west of Phnom Penh in 
the Southwest zone (43). The other major source is Kenneth 
Quinn, an employee of the United States State Department, 
assigned to Vietnam, who did research on the KR take-over 
in the southern and eastern border districts from 1971 to 
early 1974 (44) . 
Orders flowed from the party CC to the zone, the sector 
{damban, a new administrative unit replacing the province 
but not necessarily having the same boundaries), the dis­
trict (srofc), the village (khum), the hamlet (рЛшп) and 
finally the inter-family group (45). At each level there 
was a committee including members with functional tasks: 
supply and economy, instruction and education, health 
services and so on. They were officially FUNK organs but 
controlled by the party. A series of parallel organizations 
matched each one from the front, termed "patriotic", with 
another from the party, termed "democratic". The latter 
recruited members of the former whose political conscious­
ness had developed. There were patriotic organizations for 
monks, women, youth, intellectuals, workers and peasants 
(46). According to Quinn, these associations seem to have 
had a primarily political and psychological role, not an 
administrative one. They were not part of the KR' chain of 
command (47) . 
Until mid-1971 most important jobs in the lower or­
ganization, even up to sector level, were held by 
Sihanoukists, most of whom had been picked by the Viet­
namese. They generally lacked "political education", accord­
ing to Sarin. In 1972 there were still committee members 
and chairmen at village and hamlet level who "believed they 
were making the revolution simply to hand authority back to 
Sihanouk" (48). These khum committees were assigned a 
political commissar to monitor their activities and ensure 
party control. "As for phum, the party leaves them to the 
desires of pro-Sihanouk elements" (49). This is confirmed 
by Quinn, who reports that 
"(i)n most cases there was no separate party 
existence, nor were there political cadres at the 
village level or at any level below" (50). 
Village and hamlet chiefs, as well as association chairmen, 
were democratically elected, all candidates being local 
33 
residents. These elected chiefs selected the remainder of 
their staffs. The lowest level of government, the inter-
family group comprising 10 to 15 families headed by a group 
chairman appointed by the hamlet chief, was, at the same 
time, one of the KR' most important means of carrying out 
its programs. From district level up the CPK had more 
control. Party membership was a prerequisite to the post of 
chairman or deputy of the district committee. The first 
party political cadre or commissar was found at this level. 
He was more powerful than the district chairman, as he 
controlled the district military force. KR government 
maintained administrative offices from village level up, 
but at district level most government and party business 
was located in a secret area. From sector level up KR 
government was only accessible to district cadres and 
officials. The chairman or secretary of each zone was always 
a member of the party's CC. Zone secretaries had much 
influence in their areas, with all political, administra­
tive, economic, military and social responsibility. The 
only one who could approach their power in the zone was the 
zone's military commander. 
The CPK also established military control from top 
down. The military were organized in village guerillas, 
regional troops and regular troops (51). According to Quinn, 
the regular troops had first priority on available equip­
ment. Their main mission was to fight Lon Nol troops. The 
intermediate level troops had, inter alia, to defend the 
district, control the population and enforce unpopular 
political decisions. The village guerilla or militia (as 
well as hamlet militia) had more or less the same task at 
their level (52). From company level up the commander of 
each unit was flanked by a political commissar whose autho­
rity over combatants was undisputable. But the party still 
only inadequately controlled the vital FUNK military command 
structure at least as late as end 1973. 
Already in 1971 the KR were starting to get rid of 
pro-Sihanouk cadres methodically in areas where they had 
established control. By the end of 1972 they had taken over 
the front organizations (53). Sarin considered the KR -
Sihanouk coalition to be a fraud. The party followed its 
own program. The FUNK program was a dead letter. The party 
was still not referred to publicly, however, not even in 
the liberated areas. At the local level, according to Quinn, 
they did start to openly call themselves Khmer Krahom (Red 
Khmer), no longer using the term Khmer Rumdoah. They also 
sought to do away with references to Sihanouk and the old 
society, such as dropping the term "Royal" from the title 
of their opposition government and replacing it with капа 
(or kanak), which means party or committee. Some KR were 
already openly attacking Sihanouk (54). In one instance at 
least this provoked popular demonstrations on Sihanouk's 
behalf, forcing the KR temporarily to change their approach 
(55). There was continuing support for the prince, especial­
ly among elderly villagers. It was clear that the KR still 
needed to exploit his political credit. Privately they 
admitted as much (56). But peasants were starting to keep 
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their attachment to the prince secret (57). 
The great drawback for the Sihanoukists was that they 
did not have an independent national organization in the 
countryside. This was a measure of their own powerlessness. 
Just after the 1970 coup they had outnumbered the KR by 
perhaps as much as 50:1. Large areas were under their 
control as partners of the Vietnamese communists. They 
counted many military officers, intellectuals and functio-
naries in their ranks but they appeared to be incapable of 
setting up an effective organization. Not taking the initia-
tive they were slowly but surely eliminated (58). 
In a thinly populated country like Cambodia control of 
manpower is more essential than control of territory. For 
the KR it was essential to achieving power. Both for produc-
tion, especially food production, in the base areas and to 
replenish and expand the armed forces with new recruits 
manpower was needed. In part the KR were able to win the 
peasants by their actions. Cadres were taught to respect 
the people, protect their interests, learn from them, be 
simple and not dictatorial (59). They dressed in black with 
krama, the traditional Khmer peasant scarf, so as to be 
modest and one with the people. They ate the same food. 
They helped the peasants with their work on the land, 
building houses and roads and 
"if a peasant (...) is sick (they) will often go 
to the house to give an injection or leave medi-
cine even at night or in a storm" (60). 
They helped the poorest peasants most of all. 
But there was a great lack of cadres (61). Political 
education (socialist indoctrination) of the peasants would 
have been difficult even if the KR had had the time and the 
people (quantity and quality) to do this. The peasants, as 
Sarin noted, liked Angkar (literally the "Organization", 
the name behind which the CPK hid its true identity) because 
they received help, not because of political propaganda. 
Kuong Lumphon, who accompanied Ith Sarin in the maquis, 
noted peasant support for the KR because of their economic 
policies, such as the introduction of mutual aid teams, a 
fair division of production, and the lowering of interest 
rates, taxes and rents. Also the decrease in corruption, 
crime, bribery and extortion was favourably received. 
Reports in this period generally indicate the KR to be 
popular with the population under their control (62). There 
was very little political education of the people. The KR 
turned traditional ceremonies into meetings at which there 
were always artistic performances and revolutionary songs. 
But the message was limited to encouraging the villagers to 
work harder, raise production and to instilling a boundless 
bloody hatred for and enrage the people against the enemy. 
People were mobilized for these meetings through their 
associations (patriotic organizations). An important func-
tion of these meetings was to raise donations for the armed 
forces or for families of KR soldiers, according to Quinn. 
He also mentions village propaganda meetings being held 
twice a month, where the people were informed about KR 
policies and programs, and questions about them were 
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answered. At hamlet level political education was conducted 
only once or twice a year (63). One method employed to 
control the population was to have peasants monitor each 
other's activities in their own teams. Once a week a "life-
style" meeting was held in which criticism and self-
criticism took place. "To be able to conduct this criticism 
and self-criticism requires that the KR and villagers check 
up on one another". Sarin notes (64). 
The party also exerted control through collectiviza-
tion. It was, of course, also introduced to increase agri-
cultural production, especially as feeding the army was a 
major problem during the war. But control was the crucial 
factor. In an interview in January 1972 leng Sari said that 
in FUNK controlled areas only land belonging to traitors 
was actually confiscated and redistributed among landless 
peasants or became common land under the pouvoir populaire 
(65). Land belonging to owners forced to be absent for 
reasons other than treason, including those fighting for 
the FUNK, was either let out to peasants without land for a 
small rent or was farmed under management of the liberation 
forces. Land-rents were much reduced and usurious interest-
rates forbidden. The formation of consumption and production 
co-operatives was encouraged. For agricultural production 
mutual aid teams were developed. This would point to the 
institution of lower level agricultural production co-opera-
tives, according to Carney, in which the redivision of 
produce depends on the amount of capital and tools the 
members initially provided (66). In 1972 land redistribution 
was carried out in all villages of Kp. Trach district of 
Kampot. 
"(N)o person was allowed to retain over 5 hectares 
of riceland or 1 hectare of gardenland. Riceland 
over that limit was given to people with fewer 
than 5 hectares or to people's associations in 
the village. Orchards and gardenland were not 
redistributed, instead they were kept under 
district government control. In Kandal, where 
riceland is less abundant, all land was confis-
cated and then parcelled out, with each family 
getting 1 hectare", 
according to Quinn (67). 
At this stage of collectivization families retained 
individual responsibility for buying seed, plowing, planting 
and caring for a particular piece of rice-land. But the 
inter-family group harvested together and stored the paddy 
at a central place. The group chairman distributed an equal 
daily ration of rice. Within the village an amount of rice 
sufficient to feed everyone till the next harvest was 
retained. The village government bought the surplus, for-
warding it to the district to feed the army or other groups 
whose harvest was insufficient. The inter-family group 
chairman kept the money from the sale of rice for special 
needs such as medicine or farm equipment (68). Sarin noted 
a more advanced stage of collectivization: common store-
houses, paddies, small groups of villagers living in collec-
tivity and working in teams. He also mentions peasants from 
36 
a rear base area in Kp. Speu successfully withdrawing from 
the collective experiment, which indicates that peasants 
were not always enthusiastic about having collectivization 
imposed on them (69). 
Because the take-over by the KR did not occur uniform-
ly, the communization process did not either. Programs in 
villages that had been under KR control since 1970 or 1971 
were further along than those the KR only succeeded in 
taking over in 1972 or later. In the period we are discus-
sing, up to 1973, the KR initially dealt with newly libera-
ted areas much less strictly than after a year of control. 
This did not apply to relocated villages. Need of and 
control over manpower being so essential the KR started 
raiding Lon Nol controlled territory after population and 
evacuating and relocating entire villages by force. This 
also decreased the Lon Nol army's possibilities of reple-
nishing its losses. In mid-1972 there were reports of 
villagers being kidnapped in Kandal and Takeo provinces 
(70). Quinn mentions forced relocations of villages in 
Kampot as early as 1972 (71). In Kp. Thorn Province it seems 
there had been relocations as early as 1971 (72). 
Relocation involved a total uprooting of the community, 
physically and psychologically. It meant a severe break 
with the past. Usually people could only take with them 
what they could carry, the KR confiscating the rest. Their 
homes were sometimes subsequently burned. The eradication 
of the traditional village's social structure and the 
attendant disorientation of the villagers enabled the KR to 
skip directly to a more advanced stage of collectivization. 
In relocated villages the people lived together in large 
shelters. Old customs, songs and modes of dress were forbid-
den. Monks were defrocked and ordered to work. Religion was 
not allowed. Working hours were long. There was more politi-
cal indoctrination. Land was held in common and all aspects 
of rice-growing took place collectively. Here, too, new 
farming methods were introduced, such as the use of fer-
tilizer and building bigger and more effective dikes. "As a 
result", Quinn notes, "production has outstripped previous 
individual efforts" (73). An additional reason for forced 
relocation of villages in the border area was to remove 
them from Vietnamese communist influence (74). Although the 
KR approach was less radical in unrelocated villages here, 
too, they immediately started their 
"program of economic levelling - reducing the 
amount of material possessions of some so that 
all citizens had roughly the same degree of 
wealth" (75). 
Fancy dress, unusual hair-dos and the wearing of jewelry 
were prohibited. The traditional multi-coloured sarong had 
to be exchanged for plain black shirt and trousers. Elabo-
rate wedding ceremonies and most of the religious and 
national festivals were outlawed (76). Even aimless chatter 
was prohibited (77). 
In principle everyone, regardless of education and 
qualifications, had to do manual work. This was an important 
part of the process of re-educating members of the bour-
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geoisie, necessary to "socially level" them and to "oblite-
rate class lines" (78). Farm activities, besides rice 
production, were brought under strict regulation, but not 
yet collectivized. Another key element in establishing 
control was the introduction of a system of passes and 
travel permits and the restrictions on travel outside one's 
own village. Breaches of KR directions were punished, but 
up to 1973 the use of brutality and terror was limited. 
According to Quinn, the chief of a village in Kampot told 
him that less than ten people in his village had been 
arrested as Lon Nol spies in this period. He did say, 
however, that people in Kampot Province who were arrested 
were sent to a "jail from which few people ever returned". 
This confinement centre was located in a malaria infested 
area. Few people survived even three months, and since the 
usual sentence was six months, it was in effect a death 
sentence. As even a minor offence could result in a six 
month sentence and as people were generally aware of the 
jail's reputation, there was strict adherence to even the 
most minor rules (79). leng Lim, a Hanoi returnee, noted 
that although in 1971 KR cadres were generally able to win 
the allegiance of the villagers, local KR cadres at Baray 
in the province of Kp. Thorn arbitrarily executed peasants 
for minor infractions (80). 
From the above we can already get some idea of the KR 
and their ideology. Sarin, having been a candidate for 
party membership, gives us a clear picture when he deals 
with cadre training, a picture that also reveals much about 
the KR' attitude towards ordinary people. The changes the 
KR demanded in Cambodian society and in the individual's 
personality reguired inculcating new values under a dis-
cipline unknown to modern Cambodia. "Criticism and self-
criticism are practiced at all echelons and social strata". 
They are the most important tools of Marxism-Leninism. Each 
member is required to participate in manual labour. This is 
a prime necessity in "building yourself to become a prole-
tariat (to achieve) a revolutionary consciousness". Angkar 
continually exhorts cadres to discard individualistic traits 
and to replace them by a collective spirit. Manual labour 
helps them get rid of their non-revolutionary traits, "such 
as the traits of intellectuals". All that is not revolution-
ary is forbidden. Everyone must eat, drink, walk, talk and 
behave as he or she is told. To and fro movement between 
bureaus was forbidden. There was little contact, let alone 
exchange of opinion with others. Each member had the duty 
of checking on his fellows. Judging each other and abandon-
ing these personal characteristics 
"is in the interest of educating the members to 
become socialists. This is a step in 'taming' a 
man to become a 'machine'. Each member must 
'freely' hand himself over for the Organization 
'to build'". 
Self-reliance is stressed. Discipline, which is extremely 
strict, demands it. One has to make the revolution by 
oneself, not depend on others or foreigners. If an indivi-
dual failed to achieve the desired result when executing an 
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Angkar order, it was always the individual's fault. Only he 
was then to blame. He was inept, had violated discipline or 
taken authority on himself and taken the name of the Or-
ganization as a screen for his deed. "One must trust com-
pletely in the Angkar because the Organization has as many 
eyes as a 'pineapple' and cannot make mistakes" (81). 
The Khmer Communist Youth Alliance monthly magazine 
Revolutionary Youno Men and Women, in its first issue, 
August 1973, stressed similar values. The magazine aimed to 
instill precepts of unremitting struggle both with the 
enemy and with nature and in building oneself in order to 
fulfil duties which the party assigns. Youth had to develop 
a high spirit of collectivity, rid itself of individual 
interests, serve the nation and people, especially in the 
base areas, increase its understanding and desire for manual 
activities, and in general change its old world view and 
adopt a new revolutionary world view (82). KR cadres were 
trained to be austere, even ascetic. Food was often lacking. 
They had to learn to endure, be without hunger and conquer 
wants (83). In the emphasis on manual activities, on prac-
tice, on "serve the people", on the development of a collec-
tivist mentality and on self-reliance one can sense the 
strong influence of Maoism, especially the Great Leap 
Forward (GLF) and the CR. Political education of cadres was 
considered very important. Military strength was considered 
only an instrument of political strength. Full party member-
ship took two to three years and a long period of training 
and education preceded the assumption of responsibilities. 
But demand of rapidly expanding control and lack of cadres 
caused the party to accelerate stages of membership. It 
therefore pushed attempts to indoctrinate and assimilate 
Sihanoukist cadres (84). 
3.3 Dealing with Allies and Internal Differences 
Political persuasion was also applied to Cambodians recrui-
ted by the Vietnamese, Khmer troops fighting in Vietnamese 
units or under Hanoi returnee command and Hanoi returnees 
themselves to come over to units controlled by the domestic 
KR. According to Heder, this campaign, which was begun in 
earnest early 1972 and intensified up through mid-1973, 
seems to have been successful. Those who refused, however, 
were classified in the same category as the Hanoi returnees, 
as being "outside the movement" (85). 
The available evidence would suggest that in practice 
there was not much 'political persuasion', at least not 
with success. According to Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan told 
him, in 1978, that, after discussions, the Vietnamese had 
agreed to turn over to the KR the Khmer Vietminh cadres and 
Sihanoukist units formed by the Vietnamese. The 
Sihanoukists, according to Samphan, had sold themselves to 
the Vietnamese body and soul. These cadres and units were 
supposed to be 'Pol Potized' but most of them 'proved' to 
be 'incurable' and therefore had to be liquidated (86). A 
Khmer student who had joined the communists after the Lon 
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Nol coup had, together with nine other youths, been trained 
by the Vietnamese in the province of Kratie. After some 
months eight of them went to work with the KR. Six of them 
were killed by the KR because of their Vietnamese training. 
He also recalled a comparable incident. Vietnamese troops, 
briefly quartered in the village of Baray in 1971 had 
generally enjoyed good relations with the Khmer peasants 
there. After they moved out KR units threw grenades into 
the homes of those peasants who had hosted Vietnamese 
soldiers, killing a number of entire families (87). 
These seem to have been exceptional incidents during 
this period. But the purging of Hanoi returnees was starting 
to develop momentum. The purge method used was one the Pol 
Pot group was to use more and more often against all real 
and imagined "enemies of the Kampuchean Revolution" in the 
following years. Hanoi returnees, especially those in 
positions in which they were geographically and bureaucrati-
cally isolated from other returnees and from the Vietnamese 
communists, were quietly liquidated by calling them to 
meetings, study seminars or celebrations from which they 
never returned. Their identification and liquidation seems 
to have been the exclusive task of the State Security 
(Nokorbal) branch of the party. The method used 
"gave the least possible indication of what was 
going on both to other potential purge victims 
and to anyone who might organize opposition or 
employ force to prevent the continuance of the 
purges", 
as Heder says. Thus there were no public and often no 
intra-party denunciations of the purge victims, no explana-
tion of what the problem was. 
"There was simply disappearance under routine 
circumstances followed by almost certain and 
almost always secret death, which, because it was 
a secret death required no mass level or even 
party level ideological justification... (Indeed 
for a certain period it could be plausibly denied 
that the victim was dead.)" (88). 
Most Hanoi returnees were assigned combat positions, whereas 
the local KR held political positions within the local 
organizations (89). In late 1971 already 
"underground party spokesmen in Phnom Penh noted 
that of 1.500 returnees half of them were already 
dead; they were uncertain of the cause of their 
death" (90). 
According to a Khmer communist refugee in Vietnam in 1978, 
of the thousand cadres that had gone from Hanoi to Cambodia 
between 1970 and 1973, 900 were eliminated (91), but this 
is certainly an exaggeration. 
The purge could obviously not be kept secret. By early 
1973 widespread disappearances and rising anti-Vietnamese 
pressure made most of the surviving veterans realize that 
they were in danger. They either fled Cambodia or put 
themselves under protection of the remaining Vietnamese 
units, most of which were being withdrawn from Cambodian 
territory at this time (92). But a number of Hanoi returnees 
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were critical of Hanoi, as we have seen, and at least some 
of them had achieved high-ranking positions within the CPK 
(93). Rat Samoeun, French educated close friend of leng 
Sari during their Paris days, returned from Hanoi in 1970 
and held a co-ordinating function with the Lao and Viet-
namese communists (94). Keo Meas was the FUNK's ambassador 
in Beijing for a while, Keo Moni became district chief, Yun 
Soeun, former fellow student of Saloth Sar in Paris, became 
deputy secretary of sector 22 in the East zone, Yos Por (Li 
Yang Due), who had also been trained in China, a member of 
the sector 35 (Kampot) committee in charge of education and 
information. Other Hanoi returnees held such posts as chief 
of the important cadre training school at Amleang in the 
Southwest zone, secretary of sector 25, and member of the 
party committee for sector 31 in the North zone (95). 
The evidence presented so far shows many similarities 
in the approach and programs implemented by the domestic KR 
in different regions. To what extent then did the various 
tendencies within the domestic KR, with their own regional 
power-bases, really differ? What was the power equation 
within the KR at this time? The Southwest zone was the 
biggest, had the largest troop strength and the most impor-
tant leadership cadres, both dominating the GRUNK (French 
acronym for the FUNK government) and the CPK's CC, at least 
quantitatively. A look at who the Southwest's leading cadres 
were shows what would seem to be an alliance between cul-
tural revolutionists and ex-Pracheachon people (96). The 
seeds of discord, however, were already sown. According to 
Vorn Vet's Tuoi Sleng 'confession', when he visited the 
Southwest zone office in 1971, he noticed strong animosity 
by Prasith, Chou Chet, and in fact "throughout the office" 
against Mok. Partly because he himself had been "friends 
with Mok from the beginning", he tried to mediate (97). 
According to Sarin, the CPK in the Southwest co-operated 
with the Vietnamese communists but their relationship was 
less favourable than that with China. There was distrust of 
North Vietnamese intentions. Hou Youn had said, according 
to Sarin, that the CPK "has foreseen all in preparing for 
danger from the VC/NVA". Sarin himself noted that 
"most of the higher cadres of the party are 
pro-Chinese socialists. The Party also sees in 
China a counter-weight to the Vietnamese danger. 
(It) is absolutely not under the guidance of the 
Vietnamese communist party" (98). 
A series of CPK documents dating from early 1971, including 
copies of a newspaper edited by Thuch Rin, seem to take a 
similar, if more radical position, stressing "self reliance 
and dependence on our own forces", not mentioning Vietnam 
by name but adding "even if in the accompaniment with 
others" (99). Sarin's only reference to Khmer Vietminh is 
the arrival from Hanoi of a few doctors who started to work 
at the large Special zone hospital (100). According to 
Kiernan, however, over 100 Hanoi returnees had been assigned 
to the Southwest zone (101). 
In some places the debunking of Sihanouk had already 
begun, as we have seen, but according to Mam Lon, a can-
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didate member of the party in Kp. Chhnang, Sihanouk was 
said to be a "leader against the US, a patriot". He also 
mentioned that "co-operation between the three countries of 
Indo-China" was emphasized, something Chou Chet and Fouk 
Chhay also stressed, according to Lon, although they were 
very critical of Sihanouk's defunct regime (102). In some 
parts of the Southwest zone the KR were starting to enforce 
harsher policies, as Quinn noted. A Chinese woman, who fled 
from sector 37 to sector 11 (both Koh Kong Province) in 
1972, said that the KR in the latter sector were much less 
strict and more liberal (103). 
The East zone was a domestic Khmer Vietminh base, its 
party organization having been built up during the I960's 
by its secretary, So Phim, member of the Politburo since 
1962, and his deputy, Phuong, member of the CC, who had 
been promoted in 1971 and made head of the zone's economic 
committee. The zone's party committee also included, inter 
alia, Chhouk, former teacher and Vietnamese trained Issarak, 
now party secretary of sector 24 (southern Prey Veng Prov-
ince) and Chan, a local villager and ex-Issarak, who had 
succeeded Phuong as secretary of sector 21 (eastern Kp. 
Cham Province). Both Chhouk and Chan had, like so many 
East zone cadres, in the late I9601 s sought refuge in 
Vietnam from Sihanoukist harassment. According to former 
inhabitants of the area, Chan had been friendly with Nuon 
Chea and Saloth Sar in the I960's (104). After Chan took 
over there seem to have been more instances of hard handed-
ness (105). The man in charge of the zone's day to day 
administrative affairs was Peam (or Pheam), a teacher and 
former fellow student of Saloth Sar who had been introduced 
to the KPRP by him in the 1950's and had, it seems, also 
taken to the jungle about the same time. 
The East zone's attitude towards the Vietnamese was 
somewhat ambiguous. According to the East zone Party History 
(1973) its authors recognized and valued co-operation with 
the Vietnamese communists. It was necessary to "learn from 
the experiences of foreign parties (...) and the interna-
tional Communist and workers movement". But their inter-
nationalism was muffled by strong Khmer nationalist senti-
ments. 
"(T)he party also has numerous bad experiences 
resulting from the leaning and copying of foreign 
experiences. On the one hand it made us completely 
ignorant; on the other hand, it hindered and even 
sometimes destroyed the revolutionary movement 
and progress in organizing the Party. (More 
concisely) the influence of revisionism abroad 
(...) gave rise to confusion of political ideas 
and weakened the revolution's situation (...) It 
was the period of revisionism which destroyed our 
Party". 
The reference here is to the late 1950's when Khrushchev's 
Soviet Union took a turn towards "peaceful coexistence" 
with the USA and the split with the People's Republic of 
China clearly surfaced, as Kiernan suggests. The East zone 
Party History considered the 1960 Party Congress an "impor-
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tant organizational breakthrough in the context of 
'straightening out activities', after a series of setbacks" 
(106). The "bad experiences" and "the influence of revisio­
nism" mentioned above clearly refer to the lack of support 
the North Vietnamese (and other socialist countries) gave 
the Cambodian communists and the disastrous results follow­
ing the VWP's line had had for the Cambodian communist 
movement. Here the East zone Party History has no disagree­
ment with either Pol Pot or the cultural revolution tenden­
cy. The East zone had also, in 1971, taken the decision to 
expel all Vietnamese communists (107). 
The Pol Pot group's attitude towards the Vietnamese 
was more inimical, concomitant to their radical policy of 
self-reliance. Even in their official FUNK capacities 
(remember that at the national level they strongly advocated 
the united front even whilst destroying it in practice at 
lower levels) this is quite evident. For instance, in an 
interview with the Vietnam Courier. leng Sari, when discus­
sing communist victories over Lon Nol's Chenla I and II 
military operations, does not say a word about NLF/NVA 
support or involvement. All honour is accorded to the 
FAPLNK, the FUNK's armed forces. In fact the Vietnamese 
played a major role in breaking up these operations. While 
countries like China, Korea and Cuba are mentioned as giving 
aid, Vietnam is not. Only in the last paragraph of his 
interview does Sari mention struggling shoulder to shoulder 
with the fraternal Vietnamese and Lao people (people not 
partyl). It must be remembered that this was in an interview 
with an official VWP magazine in early 1972 (108). Similar­
ly, Khieu Samphan, in an article in Le Monde Diplomatique 
in November 1974, stated that 
"the FUNK, GRUNK and the FAPLNK consolidate 
themselves day by day through a patriotic, in­
dependent and sovereign struggle without any 
dependance or subordination with regard to the 
outside world whatsoever" (109). 
There does not seem to have been much disagreement in 
the various tendencies' attitude towards Sihanoukists and 
Khmer Vietminh. According to the East zone Party History 
the party "took the position of strength, attacking finally 
and chasing absolutely the third force which was the ob­
stacle" (110). The third force was, as Yos Рог said: 
"Sihanoukists and former members of his adminis­
tration on the one hand, and communists who had 
been regrouped in North Vietnam on the other" 
(111). 
All this dovetails with Heder's assertion that all 
middle and upper level domestic KR enthusiastically par­
ticipated in purging the Hanoi returnees (112). The East 
zone Party History and the Pol Pot group agreed on the 
1960-1968 period, not only as far as the first Samlaut 
Rebellion and the starting of armed struggle by the party 
was concerned, but also both considering Sihanouk's rejec­
tion of United States aid and the cutting of diplomatic 
relations with the USA as important victories (113). 
There was difference of opinion as far as the primacy 
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of the proletariat over the peasantry was concerned. The 
East zone Party History adopted the position that peasants 
were a "very powerful force" but they needed to develop a 
"working class nature". Without a "proletarian class army, 
proletarian class policy and proletarian class strategy" 
the struggle was bound to fail (114). Here Hanoi's influence 
was visible. This same document, however, does recognize 
the peasants as the most important group to base the revolu-
tionary movement on, e.g. when it speaks of a "revolutionary 
movement of all social levels, above all the farmers", or 
when it notes that whereas the people in industrial coun-
tries are the workers, in the underdeveloped agricultural 
countries they are the peasants (115). Both the cultural 
revolutionists and the Pol Pot group followed Mao in stres-
sing the peasantry as the major revolutionary agent, at 
least in practice. 
Officially the KR leaders avowed the united front 
policy of "unite and mobilize all social classes and strata" 
against the Lon Nol clique and imperialism (116). But on 
various occasions (a May First radio broadcast, a GRUNK 
publication) the leading role of the proletariat was stres-
sed (117). The CPK's youth magazine Revolutionary Young Men 
and Women. which radiated the same radical revolutionary 
sentiment as the party's cadre training in the Southwest, 
the zone dominated by cultural revolutionists, also stressed 
"proletarian internationalism" (together with "proletarian 
nationalism", whatever that might be), just as the East 
zone Party History did (118). 
For communists these are very serious issues. It is 
highly unlikely they were merely mistakes. It is clearly 
another indication of the lack of a homogeneous and central-
ized revolutionary leadership. 
For some unknown reason sector 25 was, in 1971, de-
tached from the East zone and attached to sector 15 to 
become the Special zone. Vorn Vet became its secretary and 
Non Suon secretary of sector 25, and a member of the new 
zone committee. Of Non Suon, Vorn Vet was later, in his 
'confession', to say that he had been friendly with Chou 
Chet, agreeing, in 1970, to fight Mok (119). According to 
Kiernan, the CIA's former Cambodian analyst, Sam Adams, 
told him that 
"during the 1970 - 1973 period the Khmer communist 
leader "Pol" regarded the revolutionary organiza-
tion in the Kandal area as challenging to his 
control" (120). 
Perhaps that was the reason for the administrative rearran-
gement. According to Non Suon's 'confession', sector 25 was 
"not a solid base area". "Contradictions (were) stronger 
there than elsewhere", the situation "very confused". The 
former chief of sector 25 and his colleagues did not accede 
command. For some months in 1971 the sector was run by 
competing administrations, with conflicts ensuing and cadres 
going over to Non Suon, until the old secretary left for 
the East zone and disappeared. The Vietnamese were driven 
out of sector 25, sometimes involving clashes, as noted 
earlier. Suon is reported by his erstwhile courier to have 
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held the Vietnamese as the historical enemy of the Khmer, 
although others claim he had no strategical differences 
with the Vietnamese communists (121). He certainly differed 
with them on the issue of Sihanouk, having spent so long in 
a Sihanouk jail. 
So in the period up to 1973 the ideological differences 
within the domestic KR undoubtedly did not lessen, but the 
unifying factors were still much stronger. Between the 
cultural revolutionists and the Pol Pot group, also in-
fluenced by the CR, although especially infatuated by the 
GLF, there were hardly any ideological differences (122). 
Even in the method of implementation there were, as yet, 
few differences, although this would later lead to serious 
conflicts. 
Given the very dispersed and decentralized nature of 
the CPK's administrative and military organization, however, 
it is very likely that Saloth Sar already felt unsure about 
the loyalty of many Cambodian communists to him, as party 
secretary-general, to the policies and the method of im-
plementation he envisaged. Too many had political histories 
in organizations and areas, and with affiliations, outside 
of his control. He was, however, if he already had the 
intention at this time, not yet in a position to oust the 
other tendencies. On the five man Politburo leng Sari was a 
Pol Pot man and Vorn Vet had probably been a Pol Pot stal-
wart since 1954. But was Nuon Chea already a Pol Pot loya-
list at this time? So Phim, the fifth member of the Polit-
buro, although not having clashed with Saloth Sar, as far 
as is known, was certainly not in his group. The Pol Pot 
group only had two members in the GRUNK, Sari and Son Sen. 
Khieu Samphan was still, most likely, outside the group. 
None of the zone secretaries in the CC, Chou Chet (South-
west), Muol Sambath (Northwest), Koy Thuon (North), and Ney 
Sarann (Northeast), were in the Pol Pot group. Nor were the 
Northwest and North zone deputy secretaries, Khek Penn and 
Sreng, respectively. It is unclear whether the zones' 
military commanders. Keu and Ke Pauk, and Mok in the South-
west, were, but all were to play important roles in the Pol 
Pot group's ascendancy to power. 
The KR were achieving results in taking over the united 
front and the revolutionary armed forces as well as in 
eliminating Vietnamese and Khmer Vietminh influence. Their 
control over the ordinary people was spreading and the 
first giant steps on the road to a radical collectivization 
of society had been taken. Although still only sporadically, 
the KR did already resort to terror. From the meagre infor-
mation available, it seems that parts of Kampot and Takeo, 
the Baray area of Kp. Thorn and perhaps parts of Koh Kong 
and Kp. Cham provinces were already getting some experience 
of what was shortly to happen to the whole country. It is 
important to establish this so that it will be clear that 
the events of 1973, with which we will now deal, although 
enormously radicalizing the KR' attitude and approach, were 
not the original cause of their use of terror. 
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3.4 The Bombing and After (1973-1975) 
As of 1973 the heavy-handed treatment of the population by 
the KR was to become more and more common. Sometime in 1973 
it seems the party apparently decided to accelerate its 
program to alter Cambodian society. The events of 1973 
certainly influenced this decision. 
In his talks with Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese 
spokesman, to find a peace settlement, Kissinger, the United 
States' secretary of state, insisted that the North Viet-
namese should press the KR to negotiate with Lon Nol, as 
they had done with the Pathet Lao in Laos. This attitude 
was based on the erroneous idea that the KR were dependent 
on and controlled by Hanoi. Kissinger attempted to make the 
aid for reconstruction that Nixon had secretly promised to 
Hanoi conditional on a cease-fire in Cambodia. Hanoi did 
try to pressure the KR into talks. Sihanouk indicated a 
certain willingness to negotiate peace but the KR repriman-
ded him. All domestic KR tendencies, even the East zoners 
and moderates like Hou Youn, rejected the idea of negotia-
tions outright (123). The prince had to retract. Instead 
the KR launched the major assault on Phnom Penh Hanoi -
which sought, like Washington, only a stalemate war in 
Cambodia - had studiously declined to mount. 
The signing of the Paris Peace Agreement did not 
achieve a cease-fire but it did release large numbers of 
American bombers formerly operating over Vietnam. While 
Cambodia and the revolutionaries were being "bombed back 
into the stone age" (124), Hanoi scaled down its arms 
supplies to the KR. This the KR saw as another sell out by 
the VWP. For once Sihanouk agreed with them (125). 
The KR launched a suicidal attack on Phnom Penh. Some 
estimates put KR losses at well over half their assault 
force. Extrapolating these figures to the entire army this 
would still amount to a death toll of 25%. "There is", as 
Shawcross points out, "a military rule of thumb (...) that 
units cannot sustain losses of more than 10% without suffer-
ing often irreversible psychological damage" (126). The 
effect of the bombing is impossible for us to grasp com-
pletely. Shawcross paints a vivid picture of 
"peasant boys and girls (...) moving slowly 
through the mud half crazed with terror, as 
fighter bombers tore down at them by day and 
night after night (...) Week after week they 
edged on (forever digging in, attacking government 
outposts, losing comrades) urged on by their 
commanders, a small group of hardened zealous 
men who had lived up to ten years in the isolation 
of the jungles, whose only experience of alliance 
was betrayal (...) 1973 confirmed a historic 
conviction that survival, let alone victory, 
could be guaranteed only by absolute independence 
and an astonishing fixity of purpose. They faced 
an enemy who at least appeared to have enormous 
support from his sponsor, while they themselves 
could not trust even their own leader, let alone 
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their friends. Their attack on Phnom Penh was a 
madness born of desperate isolation, which bred a 
dreadful hatred of their enemy and a contempt for 
the attitudes of the outside world" (127). 
The bombing, the shortages of ammunition (because of the 
indifference of their allies) and the lack of troops (the 
result of tremendous losses) stopped them from a final 
assault on Phnom Penh before the start of the rainy season. 
Fear that the Vietnamese would sell them out in a final 
solution to the war in Vietnam before the next dry season 
made conditions suitable for a renewed offensive, certainly 
influenced their 1973 assault on the capital. After the 
signing of the Paris Peace Agreement most NLF/NVA troops 
left Cambodia except for the eastern border areas. But 
Hanoi very carefully regulated military aid for the KR, all 
of which had to pass over the Ho Chi Minh trail, to prolong 
the fighting. Sihanouk expressed reservations about Hanoi's 
support (128). It did not daunt the KR, on the contrary. To 
take Phnom Penh before Saigon was liberated, win the war 
and make their revolution as quickly as possible now, more 
than ever, became their overriding goal. 
In February and March 1973 Sihanouk visited some of 
the liberated areas in Cambodia. This visit sharpened the 
party's awareness of his continuing popularity among the 
peasantry, thus still posing a serious political threat. 
Sihanouk himself was well aware of this (129). 
These three factors; the Paris Peace Agreement and its 
implications which the KR felt as another Vietnamese betra-
yal, the traumatic American bombing and Sihanouk's visit, 
all worked together to move the KR to radically accelerate 
their program to gain sole power and change Cambodian 
society. 
Although their 1973 offensive against Phnom Penh failed 
they succeeded in effectively eliminating the presence of 
Lon Nol troops from most of Cambodia. In November 1973 the 
GRUNK was shifted from Beijing to the liberated northeast 
of Cambodia. The northeast had been one of the first areas 
to be liberated and a political structure had already been 
operating for a while. All important ministerial posts were 
held by men and women based in Cambodia, none of whom were 
Sihanoukists or Hanoi returnees. 
The KR actively started propagating anti-Sihanoukism. 
He was accused of living well in Beijing while the people 
suffered. The people were not to talk about or show sympathy 
for the prince anymore. No reasons were given for this 
change in directives, but transgression could result in 
death (130). The purging of Sihanoukists from positions of 
power was accelerated, even affecting village chiefs and 
minor functionaries. Because of this Sihanoukists were 
actively seeking Vietnamese aid against the KR. As the KR 
had stepped up their efforts to drive the Vietnamese out of 
Cambodia the number of KR - NLF/NVA clashes along the border 
area increased (131). The purge of Hanoi returnees also 
continued unabated. 
At the same time younger cadres began to appear, 
trained at the CC's party and military cadre schools, 
47 
described by refugees as "fanatics" who allowed no dissent 
or questioning. They replaced older, less violent cadres 
who supposedly had pro-Vietnamese sympathies or were just 
not tough enough (132). As the purges continued and the 
united front policy was, at grassroots level, more and more 
abandoned, the CPK started more and more to seek its social 
base amongst the poor peasants and most especially poor 
peasant youth. It deliberately selected those who were 
"poor and ignorant to be head of something (because it) 
believe(s) they are honest men" (133). Party candidates had 
to be from the lower class such as poor and lower middle 
peasants, according to a party document captured in 1975 
(134). The party believed that those who knew how to read 
and write were already corrupted by the old system. Ith 
Sarin mentions that officers who rallied to the FUNK were 
viewed with a jaundiced eye (135). In the same way the 
older people were past the stage of redemption. Quinn, for 
instance, noted that, at hamlet level, all boys were re-
quired to join the militia and undergo basic training. In 
some areas girls were also required to join, but adults 
were only involved to a lesser degree (136). Youth were 
still mouldable. The party 
"educated, watched, nourished and built youth as 
the central force in the revolutionary movement 
of each era and (...) for future national con-
struction" (137). 
From early 1973 on young people were trained for two or 
three weeks in remote centres. When they returned they 
fiercely condemned religion and the "old ways", rejected 
parental authority, were passionate in their loyalty to the 
party, showed a militant attitude and a marked confidence 
in mechanical weapons. They still lived at home but worked 
the fields that were under direct control of the youth 
association (138). The party used its youth organization 
"as cutting edge and prime source of recruitment" (139). It 
formed the reservoir from which these new cadres were drawn. 
It was these sons of peasants who were given command over 
military units. 
Little is known about these tough cadres. They were 
austere and well disciplined, living frugal lives. But 
their ideological training must have been severe indoctrina-
tion. They had even less finesse than the cadres they 
replaced. They gave no explanations. They did not deviate 
from their prescribed course of action. Just as they obeyed 
orders they expected their orders to be obeyed unquestion-
ingly. If not, severe punishment was likely to follow. They 
seem to have operated as efficient tools in the hands of 
the CPK leadership. This impression is given extra weight 
by the fact that these cadres were outsiders who had no 
ties to the community where they were stationed. 
Following the arrival of these younger, tougher cadres 
the relocation of villages was stepped up considerably. 
Even whole towns were now being evacuated, not only for 
military-strategic reasons but especially to shatter social 
organization and disable in advance any organized opposi-
tion. Furthermore, as many people as possible had to do 
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productive work (140). Forced collectivization was also 
accelerated with the general introduction of solidarity 
groups for increasing production (141). To increase produc-
tion water control was necessary. For the building of dikes, 
dams and irrigation canals the peasants had to be organized 
in teams. Collectivization made possible an autarkic war 
effort. Everyone had to participate in production. No work, 
no food, was the motto. 
By the strict regulation of all movement and the 
establishment of co-operatives stores the KR gained control 
over trade. Before 1973 the Vietnamese and merchants 
"paid more for rice than we wanted to pay. So we 
had a food problem and the people did not want to 
give their children to our army to fight US 
imperialism. We solved this problem by (creating 
co-operatives, controlling trade and reducing the 
use of money)", 
Pol Pot later said in an interview (142). These co-opera-
tives handled all major commercial transactions and all 
imports and exports. They did not replace local markets 
but established a monopoly on trade from the village to the 
outside and vice versa. A system of permits, enforced by 
constantly patrolling and checking local militia, regulated 
the moving of any commodity outside the village. The co-op-
erative store bought all local produce at a low price, the 
people in KR controlled areas having no other place to 
sell their surplus. Thus the co-operatives could also sell 
at a high price, inter alia to South Vietnamese merchants. 
In other cases all rice was collected in common grain 
stores. There are reports of the people themselves receiving 
very little rice (143). Through the collection and rationing 
of supplies, collectivization, in theory, ensured a minimum 
subsistence for all villagers, thus releasing the able-
bodied, now no longer needed to support their families, for 
the army, according to a party member (144). According to 
leng Sari, the co-operatives made it possible for the young 
men to fight at the front 
"assured that their families would be well cared 
for. Without the co-operatives the price of rice 
would have suffered a terrible inflation and our 
troops would have had little to eat" (145). 
With the introduction of production and consumption 
co-operatives, starting in relocated villages, a beginning 
was also made with the abolition of money (146). Relocation 
and collectivization not only gave the KR far greater 
control over the population. Opening up of jungle land, 
whose virgin soil is extremely productive, is also rational 
in times of war and food shortages. Ploughing is not neces-
sary thus eliminating the need for water buffaloes, whose 
number are inevitably reduced in times of war. Jungle rice 
is faster ripening and yields are much higher (147). 
In the course of 1973 the attack on religion also got 
under way (148). To undercut the influence and authority of 
Buddhism monks were forced to do manual work, to become 
"productive members of the community", inducted into the 
army and defrocked. It was forbidden to address monks by 
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their honorific titles. In order to overcome resistance to 
these measures, the KR established a KR controlled monks' 
association to replace the Sangka, the traditional Buddhist 
organization. Wats, the Buddhist temples and monasteries, 
were reorganized and placed under control of monks approved 
by the KR. The KR also established a re-education centre 
for recalcitrant monks, especially for those attempting to 
avoid being drafted into the army. Joining military units 
constituted a direct violation of their religious vows. 
Practically all religious ceremonies were prohibited. But 
in unrelocated villages wats were not yet closed to in-
dividual use. In relocated villages the attack on religion 
was complete, foreshadowing what was soon to come for the 
rest of the country. With the closure of the wat the social 
and ideological centre of Khmer village life was broken 
(149). 
The austerity program and the restructuring of tradi-
tional culture were also continued. In this context special 
mention must be made of KR policy towards minorities, taking 
the Islamic Cham as an example. As with religion, tradition-
al culture was at odds with KR ideology. It could even 
become the rallying point for opposition against the KR, 
especially in the case of such a strong community as that 
of the Cham. A North zone party document, Decisions concern-
ing the line on Cooperatives, stated; 
"concerning fraternal Islamic Cham, delay having 
them join (co-operatives) ... it is necessary to 
break up this group to some extent, do not allow 
too many of them to concentrate in one area". 
Chinese foreign residents and Vietnamese were not allowed 
to join co-operatives (150). This document dated from 1974, 
the year the dispersal and assimilation of Cham was begun. 
All the above-mentioned measures also applied to them, even 
more so. Their religion was completely outlawed, as were 
all their festivals. They were forced to attend the only 
two remaining Khmer celebrations, Cambodian New Year and 
Prochum Ben. The new hair style regulations - hair had to 
fall naturally - were particularly bothersome to Cham women 
who traditionally wore their hair up. In some Cham areas 
young girls were forced to join the militia, a direct 
violation of the Cham tradition that unmarried girls must 
be kept cloistered at home. But in other areas Cham were 
harassed less and mosques remained open even in 1976. 
There were circumstances which favoured the use of 
thoroughly indoctrinated, tough, loyal and obedient cadres 
and therefore the use of coercion and force over a more 
moderate approach of political education and persuasion. 
There was a tremendous lack of even moderately qualified 
cadres. The devastating American bombing had dealt the 
organizational capacity of the KR a serious setback. But as 
they gained control over more and more of the country and 
its population their need for cadres grew correspondingly. 
There was no time for more than superficial training, 
however. At village and hamlet level there were few, if 
any, cadres. 
Yet the KR were able to establish control and have 
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their policies executed. Partly this was because of their 
poor and lower-middle peasant line which, although erroneous 
as analysis, did, in its implementation, win them support 
from, notably, the poorer peasants. It favoured the latter 
more than other groups, raised their standing, gave them 
respect and leverage with those who had always stood above 
them on the social scale. They were put in charge at the 
lowest levels. They would appreciate egalitarian policies. 
The hatred and desire for revenge evoked by the devas-
tating bombing was another important reason for supporting 
the KR (151). The KR were the ones determinedly fighting 
guerilla warfare under the most horrendous conditions, 
conveying an image of self-sacrifice and patriotism that 
surely won many a peasant's respect (152). The massive 
suffering, outrage and hatred which the American bombing 
provoked amongst the peasantry made it more sensitive to 
the KR' extreme militancy and nationalism. The possibility 
of revenge especially attracted the young to the KR. Also, 
the bombing had mainly affected the central rice plain, 
home of the vast majority of peasants, smallholders, des-
troying much of their economic base, radicalizing them and 
making them more susceptible to KR ideology, less resentful 
of collectivization than they perhaps otherwise would have 
been. 
But if co-operation was not forthcoming voluntarily 
the KR were quick to use force. Local leaders such as 
village chiefs and inter-family group chairmen were told, 
for instance, that if anyone of their group escaped during 
a forced relocation they would be killed in their place. 
Furthermore, district level cadres regularly inspected the 
implementation of programs in the villages and hamlets, 
checking on subordinate echelons. And then, of course, 
there was always still Nokorbal, with its spies in the 
villages who reported anyone carrying out anti-KR activity. 
From 1973 onwards people started 'disappearing', that 
is, people who were arrested were never heard of again. A 
person could be arrested for speaking out, questioning or 
not complying with KR orders, no matter how insignificant. 
There seems to have been a degree of arbitrariness in 
punishment, comparable offences sometimes being punished 
lightly, at other times with death. Some massacres seem 
already to have occurred. After the evacuation of Oudong, 
according to refugees interviewed by Kirk, the KR killed 
all schoolteachers and government officials in a nearby 
forest. Oudong had been captured by a combined force of 
Southwest and North zone troops under Mok and Ke Pauk (153). 
The village of Sar Sandam, near Siem Reap, was, according 
to Catholic Relief workers, burnt by the KR and 60 peasants 
brutally killed in 1974 (154). Although few people seem to 
have witnessed executions, refugees questioned by Quinn 
believed that those taken away and never heard of again 
were not sent to jail but executed. Refugees indicated that 
even within the confines of their own homes people were 
afraid to discuss KR policies critically for fear of being 
overheard (155). The use of terror was becoming an ever 
more important instrument for the CPK. 
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These new developments did not occur everywhere at the 
same time or with the same degree of harshness. The scanty 
evidence there is suggests that from mid-1973 onwards the 
border areas of Kampot, Takeo, Kandal, Prey Veng and Svay 
Rieng provinces, certain parts of the southwest and the 
Baray area in Kp. Thorn Province, were affected most, and in 
1974 also areas around Phnom Penh, parts of Kp. Thorn, Kp. 
Cham and the northwest (156). It was, however, a 'spotted' 
development. There are also reports from the same areas and 
provinces as well as from other areas under KR control that 
indicate a more moderate implementation of policies, and a 
reasonably satisfied and happy population. It seems clear 
that the harsh approach was not effectuated everywhere 
although wherever the KR gained control the same policies 
were put into practice (157). Furthermore, the KR had not 
wrested control from the Khmer Rumdoah or the Khmer Vietminh 
in all areas yet. They regularly encountered opposition and 
resistance from the people and from Sihanoukist military. 
At the end of 1973 there were several armed clashes between 
Khmer Rumdoah and KR members of the same military units, 
the former sometimes being joined by local villagers, over 
forced relocations, collectivization of the rice harvest 
and the insulting of Sihanouk (158). 
I have already dealt with opposition to KR attacks on 
Sihanouk and religion. Another peasant reaction was migra-
tion, the time honored rural answer to repressive govern-
ment . In spite of tough control measures and rigorous 
discipline many peasants managed to flee to Vietnam or to 
Lon Nol held towns. The devastating bombing and the war in 
general were important reasons. But after the bombing 
stopped the stream of refugees did not lessen, nor did many 
refugees return (159). 
There are also reports of forces who seem to be more 
difficult to place. There were reports, e.g., of armed 
forces known as White Khmer, whose leaders were break-away 
KR cadres, active in the East zone, who were sometimes 
joined by communist troops who fought with the NLF/NVA 
against South Vietnam and also, on occasion, clashed with 
the KR (160). It is often difficult to tell to which ideo-
logical tendency a group belonged. In practice the lines of 
opposition and antagonism were blurred. Some of the more 
moderate communist groups were old Khmer Vietminh rank and 
file who had remained in Cambodia after the Geneva Con-
ference and who had resumed guerilla warfare with the 
outbreak of the war (or perhaps already with the outbreak 
of the Samlaut Rebellion). Although probably abiding by the 
CPK's line it is quite likely that some of them were not 
considered tough enough and, although not Hanoi returnees 
or Sihanoukists, were mistrusted by at least the Pol Pot 
group and therefore purged. 
The centre was strengthening its position. From 1973 
onwards the new young cadres from the CC's training schools 
arrived in the various zones to assume positions of leader-
ship in the party's administrative bodies, displacing 
political and administrative personnel at sector and zone 
level. Saloth Sar had become chairman of the powerful party 
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Military Commission in 1973. His group also controlled the 
army high command, Saloth Sar, Nuon Chea and Son Sen being 
members, besides So Phim, Та Mok and Khieu Samphan. The 
position of the latter two was still unclear. According to 
Etcheson, while the Southwest, West and North zone troops 
attacked Phnom Penh in 1973, the East zone troops under 
Khieu Samphan and led by cadres loyal to Saloth Sar, held 
back and waited. The Southwest zone troops suffered the 
highest casualties in the June offensive. Apparently this 
was part of an attempt by Saloth Sar to take over the 
Southwest zone. Samphan, he says, gained at least partial 
control over Vorn Vet's liberation forces in the Special 
zone (161). I have no confirmation of this report, but 
according to Quinn 
"in December 1973, the Khmer communists in Kandal 
(sector 25 of the Special zone - RB) dropped 
their masquerade of supporting Sihanouk and 
publicly identified themselves as members of the 
Communist Party led by Khieu Samphan. (I)t is 
only from Kandal that we have had reports of 
propaganda cadre referring to him as head of the 
Khmer Communists" (162). 
Samphan had been a parliamentary representative of the 
Saang area in Kandal in the 1960's and Qu inn also notes 
that he is believed to have originally served as party 
chairman for Kandal Province. But Non Suon had been party 
secretary of sector 25 from about October 1971. If correct, 
the implication of these reports is unclear. They could 
indicate that Khieu Samphan had, by this time, moved into 
the Pol Pot group. In his 'confessions' Non Suon notes that 
up to 1973 his feelings were no different than the party 
line. Then "Chhouk (secretary of sector 24, Prey Veng - RB) 
spoke of all the former Pracheachon Group men around, and 
the need to develop forces...". In another 'confession' he 
says 
"from April 1973 onwards Chhouk kept bringing up 
the matter of the Pracheachon party being in 
conflict with the present party. This undermined 
my attitude..." 
Because of his Pracheachon connections the Party was watch­
ing him, Chhouk warned. Suon also mentioned that although 
he had worked with Mok in the 1945-1954 period "we were not 
close friends". He "never interfered in the South-West 
outside sector 25 because I was afraid of Mok". In spite of 
his doubts, however, Suon, still according to his 'confes­
sions ', "decided to follow the present Party and get rid of 
my treason". Life for the people became harsher in sector 
25; collectivization, anti-Sihanoukism, expelling Vietnamese 
communists, evacuations, low food rations, all the policies 
also being executed elsewhere. But collectivization was 
introduced in a "cautious" manner. This moderation was 
probably frowned on by the centre, because the cadres from 
the district committees were removed and put in offices 
near the sector headquarters, as noted in Suon's 'confes­
sions ' (163). 
Meanwhile Mok was gaining ascendancy in the Southwest 
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zone, as was the Special zone secretary. Vorn Vet. Already 
in the period up to 1973 there had been reports that seemed 
to indicate that Mok followed harsher methods than did Chou 
Chet, Prasith and Pouk Chhay, to name but a few (164). In 
1973 the transfer of subdistrict and sector cadres began. 
Then Chou Chet and Pouk Chhay went (or were transferred) to 
the western part of the Southwest zone. Part of the con-
flict, according to a Communist Youth Alliance member, 
could be imputed to Mok's background of "forest resistance" 
in contrast with Pouk Chhay's "urban resistance" and the 
fact that he and Chou Chet were intellectuals. Sangha Hoeun, 
the number four man on the Southwest zone committee, and 
many of his followers were arrested by Mok's troops and 
probably executed. In 1974 Prasith was executed and Vorn 
Vet assumed control of sector 11 . Following these moves 
life became harsher for the ordinary people (165). If the 
afore-mentioned reports on Khieu Samphan's activities are 
correct, Mok and Vet were strengthening their fiefs against 
the centre. Their policies, however, were identical to Pol 
Pot's. 
In the North zone, too, there was evidence of conflict 
between the party secretary and his military commander, Koy 
Thuon and Ke Pauk. Already before 1973 there is evidence of 
a harsher regime in the Baray area, Ke Pauk's base, but not 
further north in Kp. Thorn where Thuon had his headquarters. 
Although the KR regime became harsher everywhere following 
the 1973 bombing, things were still considerably worse in 
Pauk's area. Later, after he had already been executed, Koy 
Thuon and his group were accused of holding back the revolu-
tionary movement in the North zone during the war, a clear 
reference to his less harsh approach (166). 
With KR forces closing in on Phnom Penh the Northeast 
zone became strategically less important. Kratie became an 
autonomous region, supposedly led by Tiv 01, whilst Ney 
Sarann became secretary of the Northeast zone. His deputy, 
appointed in 1974, was Un Neng, also a senior Pracheachon 
member. Secretary of Stung Treng sector was Chea Keo, a 
Khmer Vietminh. Why the Pol Pot group let the Northeast 
zone slip from its control is unclear. After the war it set 
about correcting matters. Chea Keo was executed in 1975, 
Ney Sarann in 1976, Tiv 01 in 1977 and Um Neng in 1978 
(167). 
As far as the East zone is concerned, Kiernan suggests 
a more humane, moderate approach there. Although this seems 
to have been the case relative to some of the other parts 
of the country where more brutal and harsh policies were 
being implemented, even a lot of the evidence Kiernan 
presents indicates a harsh, even brutal approach, the 
occurrence of virulent anti-Sihanoukist and anti-Vietnamese 
actions even against ethnic Vietnamese civilians, local 
resentment of Hanoi returnees and their purging, low rations 
and hunger, hard work, repression of religion, and ill-
treatment, even massacres, of Cham. Nor does this evidence 
only come from Chan's sector 21, supposedly a worse area 
because Chan was (or was to become) a Pol Pot loyalist. 
Over 10.000 people fled into South Vietnam from Svay Rieng, 
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for instance, after co-operativization had begun in 1973. 
These refugees also complained of the repression of Bud-
dhism, denial of free speech and the prohibition of support 
for Sihanouk. Also in Svay Rieng large numbers of communist 
troops broke away from the KR to form White Khmer units 
which at times even clashed with KR troops. A peasant from 
sector 22 recalled how food was short and people eventually 
only ate rice gruel after co-operatives had been introduced 
in 1973 and rice was stored in collective storehouses. So 
Phim sanctioned the bloody suppression of two Cham revolts 
in sector 21. Phuon is reported to have told a meeting of 
Hanoi returnees that the 1945-1954 anti-French struggle was 
meaningless because "we were just following the Vietnamese" 
and to have derided them for staying in Vietnam after the 
party had started armed struggle against Sihanouk (168). 
There are also reports indicating a less harsh regime in 
sector 21. A Cham who lived there from 1970 to 1979, e.g., 
noted that up to 1975 
"life was normal, there was no persecution yet... 
In 1974 suffering was imposed in some places, 
like Trea village. But it was not yet severe, 
only when Buddhism and Islam were abolished at 
the end of 1975" (169). 
On the whole the East zone party organization seems to have 
been more cohesive, or better able to withstand attempts at 
take-over by the centre or groups from within, than in the 
North, Southwest and Special zones at this time. One reason, 
as Kiernan suggests, could be that So Phim's East zone 
committee, under pressure, acquiesced in the centre's 
directives. As long as one executed the centre's policies 
vigorously, enthusiastically and successfully the chances 
of running foul of the Pol Pot group were lessened con-
siderably. 
There does not seem to be a discernable geographical 
pattern in the take-over by the new, tough young cadres. 
There are reports not only indicating differences in treat-
ment of people and in the way policies were executed between 
areas, but even between neighbouring villages. The 'spotted' 
take-over pattern can in part be explained by the fact that 
the decimation of revolutionary cadres by the bombing and 
the war and the purge of Sihanoukists and Hanoi returnees 
would leave political and military vacuums that had to be 
filled. Sometimes a local autonomous group could fill such 
a vacuum. Usually it was done by the new, tough young 
cadres, fresh from the party's training centres. It is even 
possible that, in some cases, the conflict between them and 
the older cadres they came to purge was partly a generation-
al one. Their authoritarian heavy-handedness, result of 
their youth and training, clashed with the more flexible 
and experienced older communist cadres. 
Because the party leadership, especially the Pol Pot 
group, wanted to achieve power as quickly and absolutely as 
possible it would more and more resort to these new self-
effacing, extremely disciplined and obedient cadres and to 
a system of terror that they personified. Already this 
system of terror, as the means by which the CPK would 
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achieve its aims, was beginning to crystalize. The traumatic 
1973 bombing certainly stimulated this development. 
One factor that helped mould the young KR troops and 
cadres into a well oiled machine was their isolation from 
the masses. During late 1973 and 1974 the war underwent a 
change from guerilla warfare to a more conventional war. 
The KR troops were now confined to front lines and produced 
their own food. They had hardly any contact with the people 
anymore; no longer swimming as fish in the sea. The new, 
tougher cadres were also outsiders. Clearly the CPK leader-
ship did not want its troops and cadres to be one with the 
people. Fraternization could only inhibit the ruthless 
implementation of policy. The harshness of the war and 
their indoctrination into a completely new way of life 
independent of the masses also helped give them an elitist 
attitude, scorning the apathetic peasants, making it easier 
for them to treat the people brutally. 
On the 1st of January 1975 the KR again started a 
massive offensive against Phnom Penh. Again their losses 
were enormous. There was a great lack of medicine, malaria 
was widespread, moral seems to have been slipping and 
desertions increasing (170). The ease with which the party 
leaders sacrificed their troops and the indiscriminate 
rocketing of Phnom Penh showed a callous indifference to 
human life and an obsession with the need to achieve their 
goal at all costs. 
The 1975 offensive was successful. Phnom Penh was 
liberated on the 17th of April, a few weeks before Saigon. 
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4 
IDEALS AND IDEOLOGY 
The country the KR gained control of on the 17th of April 
1975 was a ruin. Bombed more thoroughly than all of Europe 
during the Second World War, more than half the population 
(in 1975 estimated to be between 7 and 7.5 million) refu-
gees, about one seventh dead or wounded and life completely 
dislocated (1). Much of the little infrastructure the 
country had, bridges, roads, railways, paddy-land, draft 
animals and orchards, had been damaged or destroyed (2). 
John Swain, one of the foreigners who were evacuated after 
liberation, said: 
"(T)he war damage here, as everywhere else we saw 
is total. Not a bridge is standing, hardly a 
house (...) The entire countryside has been 
churned up by American B-52 bomb-craters, whole 
towns and villages razed. So far I have not seen 
an intact pagoda" (3). 
Visitors to Cambodia in 1976 were struck by 
"the unprecedented destruction in the rural areas. 
One can hardly imagine how devastated the rural 
areas are (...) Towns and villages on the map in 
reality don't exist anymore" (4). 
Phnom Penh had grown from a city of 600.000 in 1970 - of 
which about 150.000 were ethnic Vietnamese who left that 
year because of Lon Nol's anti-Vietnamese pogrom - to about 
2 to 3 million (5). The great majority of them lived in 
squalor on the verge of starvation, threatened by epidemic 
diseases. It is conservatively estimated that 250 starved 
to death every day (6). Phnom Penh was almost completely 
dependent on rice imports, while Cambodia had been a rice 
exporter before the war. 
The almost insurmountable problems that the KR were 
faced with are well described in a 1975 US AID report. It 
is noted, inter alia, that 
"without large scale external food and equipment 
assistance there will be widespread starvation 
(...) Slave labour and starvation rations for 
half the nation's people (...) will be a cruel 
necessity for this year and general deprivation 
and suffering will stretch over the next two or 
three years before Cambodia can get back to rice 
self-sufficiency" (7). 
According to Dr. Penelope Key of the Protestant World Vision 
Organization, malnutrition was going to affect the numbers 
of children and their mental capacities (8). Washington 
predicted that one million Cambodians could die of starva-
tion after the war (9). The war itself had been a very 
savage one on both sides, with few prisoners being taken. 
With the United States' withdrawal the Lon Nol govern-
ment had completely disintegrated. Socially and psychologi-
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cally, too, there was upheaval, disintegration and chaos. 
The Cambodian nation was polarized. For the more than half 
of the population not already in liberated areas feelings 
of relief now that the brutal war was over mingled with 
anxiety and uncertainty, and for some also fear, for their 
almost unknown liberators and for the future. 
The KR themselves had sustained severe losses. Their 
organization was decentralized with only a weak central 
control. Real power was in the hands of the zone party 
committees and especially their secretaries and military 
commanders. They all had their own zone party organizations 
and their own troops. The liberation movement was itself 
internally lacerated by warring factions. Even within the 
domestic KR factional struggle and dissent was starting to 
appear. Cambodia, with its Buddhist culture, lacked the 
frame of a society with the qualities of organization, 
discipline and constancy such as Vietnam, with its Confucian 
tradition, did have. Since the destruction of the Angkor 
Empire Cambodia had been a highly decentralized state. Even 
in 1970 it was still basically a collection of isolated 
villages. No Khmer government had ever exerted a penetrating 
influence at the local level. We have seen that class 
antagonisms were not really developed. It was only the 
violence of war that uprooted Cambodian peasant society, 
giving the CPK the chance to achieve power. 
Although there was widespread support for the anti-Lon 
Nol resistance, support for the KR on other grounds was at 
best uncertain. So was the KR' control over the population. 
Now that liberation had more than doubled the population 
that fell under their administration, these issues of 
support and control became extremely problematic. To create 
a cohesive and disciplined political movement within this 
framework was a very difficult task. Even for a well or-
ganized, trained and experienced revolutionary 
organization the situation would have been desperate. 
4.1 What the KR Wanted, and Why 
Before turning to what the KR did we will first discuss 
what they wanted. To understand the KR it is essential to 
realize how strongly they were imbued with ultra-nationalist 
feelings. They felt their historical mission to be to return 
to the Khmer nation and people their self-esteem, to finally 
end the centuries of humiliation. 
"For thousands of years the colonialists, imperia-
lists and reactionary feudalists have dragged us 
through the mud. Now with victory we have regained 
our honour, our dignity, now we smell good again", 
said Khieu Samphan over Radio Phnom Penh. Now "we have 
retrieved the glory of our people, recovered the unique 
quality of our nation" (10). For the KR' leaders it was 
also a personal matter. They themselves had been belittled, 
deceived and nearly eradicated. They were obsessed with the 
idea of creating an independent, sovereign and self-reliant 
state, a strong state, so that they would never again have 
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to bow to alien powers. 
This obsession went much further. They disassociated 
themselves and their revolution from all outside influence 
or support that might even vaguely be interpreted as depen-
dency, moral or material. According to Pol Pot, in a speech 
for revolutionary army representatives, 
"(W)e have won total, definitive, and CLEAN 
victory, meaning that we have won it without any 
foreign connection or involvement (...) We have 
waged our revolutionary struggle basically on the 
principles of independence, sovereignty and self-
reliance (...)" (11). 
They considered their revolution to be unique. 
"The Cambodian Revolutionary experience is un-
precedented. What we are trying to bring about 
has never occurred before. That is why we are not 
following any model, either Chinese or Viet-
namese", 
according to leng Sari in an interview (12). They were 
going to be the first nation to create a completely com-
munist society in one great leap forward, without wasting 
time on intermediate steps, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen told 
Sihanouk on one occasion (13). They had their own source of 
inspiration, the greatness of the old Angkor Empire. It 
formed a rallying point for their nationalist sentiment, a 
symbol of the revolution. It is portrayed in the national 
flag of Democratic Kampuchea. Watercolours, oil-paintings 
and photographs of Angkor adorned the halls of every build-
ing, according to a visitor (14). This tradition, too, was 
considered unique. 
"Our civilization is 8.800 years old and we have 
a tradition of being independent, sovereign and 
self-reliant (...) The civilization of Angkor is 
not a copy of any civilization, not its architec-
ture, not its engineering or its irrigation", 
according to Thiounn Mumm, co-director of Democratic Kam-
puchea's main technical institute (15). Or, as comrade So 
said, "Angkor brings glory to the traditions of the Kam-
puchean people" (16). But the new Kampuchea would make 
Angkor pale by comparison. 
"For the heroic Kampuchean people the 17th of 
April is a glorious victory of greater far reach-
ing significance than the prestigious Angkor 
era" (17). 
Understandably victory had greatly enhanced their 
self-esteem, but it led to extremes, to a fantastic self-
overestimation. Listen to leng Sari, for instance, speaking 
at the non-aligned conference in Lima, Peru, in August 
1975: 
"The 17th of April 1975 will go down in the 
history of Kampuchea as well as the history of 
all mankind as a most exceptional exploit. For 
the first time ever a small, underpopulated and 
poor country beat the leader of world imperialism" 
(18), 
or, as was mentioned elsewhere more specifically, 
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"the arrogant and allegedly invincible US im-
perialism, the most powerful, the most cruel, 
the most tenacious imperialism in all the world 
ever" (19). 
This victory "has not been won by chance (but) because we 
made perfect preparations in an all-round manner..." (20), 
"we" being "the correct and farsighted leadership of the 
Revolutionary Organization of Kampuchea". 
Still, at this time they did, on many, mostly diplo-
matic, occasions, "thank sincerely fraternal countries and 
friends near and far for their multiform aid and support". 
In the following years Pol Pot was, on a number of occa-
sions, to publicly praise Maoism as a great source of 
inspiration for the CPK since 1957 at least. In privately 
circulated party documents there were references to 
Marxism-Leninism as source of inspiration and guideline. 
One source even mentions the singing of the International, 
together with the national anthem, before lessons began and 
at the start of big political meetings (21). 
As we will see further on when discussing the Pol Pot 
group's ascendancy to power, the more it gained control, 
the more it would retrospectively 'clean' its history to 
establish further and confirm its unique, self-reliant and 
independent course right from the very beginning. The KR 
leaders did place themselves in some type of historic per-
spective, albeit in rather abstract and idealist terms as 
can be seen in the references to Angkor, to glory, honour 
and dignity being regained, retrieved and recovered. And 
although the party leaders would have denied it, there was 
more ideological continuity between Son Ngoc Thanh and his 
followers, at least up to the Geneva Conference, Sihanouk, 
Lon Nol and the KR pertaining to Angkor, the Vietnamese as 
national enemies, and their chauvinism and self-regarding 
view (22). 
The KR leaders were, however, trying to make as near 
complete and radical a break with the past as possible. 
This approach was facilitated by the underdeveloped state 
of the Cambodian economy and the massive destruction and 
disintegration at all levels caused by the war. It created 
as near a vacuum as is imaginable without implying total 
destruction, leaving nothing from which to create a new 
society. For the KR Cambodia was a laboratory situation in 
which they thought they could put their ideas into practice 
more or less uninhibited. 
The new society was to be based on egalitarianism, 
collectivism and self-reliance. It was to be, as Pol Pot 
said, "a new, independent, equal, collective and socialist 
production order" (23). Concretely, the realization of KR 
ideals was to be achieved through heavy emphasis on agricul-
ture, especially the production of rice. Given the nature 
of Cambodia's economy this was not surprising. 
"Our economic policy entails taking agriculture 
as the base and industry as the leading factor. 
Agriculture furnishes the primary means for 
industry, which in its turn, serves the develop-
ment of agriculture. Our objective is to make our 
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country a modern agricultural and industrial 
country", 
said leng Sari (24). And Pol Pot added: 
"Our motto is 'when we have rice, we can have 
everything'. When the people have stilled their 
hunger, we will have rice for export and we will 
be able to import products (...) When we have 
solved the agricultural problems, then other 
sectors such as industry, handicrafts, the social 
and cultural sectors can develop as well" (25). 
To increase the rice yield control over water would have to 
be achieved. 
"We used to rely on (...) nature alone to grow 
rice, but now we must try to control the water 
all year long, in dry and rainy seasons alike; we 
must ensure our victory over nature in order to 
become masters of our fate" (26). 
So the whole population was put to constructing a vast 
network of dikes, dams and canals. Cultivation of rice had 
to be intensified to the utmost by putting more land under 
cultivation. Forests had to be cleared so as to increase 
the amount of arable land. "All our people are working day 
and night to reconstruct the country. Cambodia looks like 
one immense worksight", leng Sari proudly told an inter-
viewer (27) . 
The old Angkor Empire was a source of inspiration in 
more than one way. Under the Angkor kings a highly efficient 
irrigation system had been developed, making possible up to 
three rice crops a year which formed the basis of and 
ensured the country's power. Slave labour had built this 
system but it was destroyed by foreign invasions. 
In his doctoral thesis Khieu Samphan had already indi-
cated that if Cambodia wanted to achieve an independent and 
self-reliant economic development it would have to be shut 
off from the outside world. To break the grip of interna-
tional capital it would have to opt out of the world capi-
talist system into which it had been integrated in a subser-
vient position, so that, through an autonomous development, 
the real needs of the people would be answered. He had also 
suggested that the 80% of town people that were non-produc-
tive should be shifted to more productive sectors of the 
economy, mainly agriculture. Only through expansion and 
development of agriculture could the foundation be laid 
for industrialization, according to Samphan. There is a 
strong similarity between his theoretical analysis and that 
adopted by the CPK, but not in the (suggested) means of 
execution. Khieu Samphan had advocated various reformist 
measures, including using the national bourgeoisie, to 
achieve these ends (28). But then between conception and 
execution a brutal war had taken place which had brought 
the KR to power. For the CPK, autarky 
"meant neither self-isolation nor the declared 
will to live in autarky and to cut oneself off 
from international co-operation, nor yet the 
rejection of all foreign aid" (29). 
This was basically the position Samphan took in his thesis, 
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that some autarky was necessary as a means to real develop-
ment, not as an end in itself. 
Initially, however, no aid was accepted, nor imports 
allowed. The KR felt it would have been a sure sign of 
weakness and dependency even though it would certainly have 
alleviated some of their most urgent problems. They only 
accepted aid from China and North Korea. 
The major tasks the KR leadership dictated were 
"to launch an offensive on all production fronts, 
especially agriculture (and) to keep high our 
revolutionary vigilance to defend our country 
(and) our independence..." (30). 
The key to development and the KR' prime concern was, as 
Pol Pot said, 
"the broadmass movement (...)(I)f we can generate 
a stirring mass movement, there will be bright 
prospects for economic rehabilitation and steady 
national construction" (31). 
To realize all this a new type of human being was needed. 
Its creation was at the same time also one of the goals of 
the revolution. Angkar would teach the people to 
"endure all hardships (...) to show respect for 
freely accepted discipline and democratic centra-
lism (...) and (sacrifice) all to the interests 
of the nation and the revolution" (32). 
Everyone had 
"to become a perfect tool of the revolution, an 
irreproachable militant... The perfect revolution-
ary must submit to Angkar. (He) must have no 
feelings (...) We had but one duty: think of the 
collective and purify ourselves" (33). 
The population was to be modelled on the young, tough KR 
soldiers. These were still trained as Sarin and Quinn had 
described for the war period (34). 
"Rain or wind, in sickness and in health, day and 
night, you must do, correctly and without com-
plaining, what Angkar orders you to do", 
they were taught, as one KR soldier remarked (35). Attach-
ment to material goods, to family and home, had to be 
broken, old ways of thinking, pride, individualism and 
contempt for others gotten rid of. 
Means and ends were inexorably intertwined. To achieve 
a classless, egalitarian society and a new, pure type of 
human being major 
"contradictions between the cities and the 
country-side, between the workers and the pea-
sants, between physical workers and the intellec-
tual workers (...) between the economic infra-
structure and the supra-structure, between the 
cadres and the masses..." 
had to be solved (34). In solving these contradictions the 
new revolutionary human being would, at the same time, be 
formed. The KR held that mentality changes through practice, 
and all knowledge comes from practice; 
"Producing rice is a very great lesson. City 
people do not know what farming is, do not know 
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what a cow is (...) Now they know and understand, 
they are no longer scared of cows and buffaloes. 
Our lesson's subject is real work. Real work 
provides experience: if we have the experience, 
with additional measures it would become scien­
tific" (35). 
A Radio Phnom Penh broadcast said : 
"The young are learning their science from the 
workers and peasants, who are the sources of all 
knowledge (...) No science can be higher, more 
worth while or more useful than that which has to 
do with production, agriculture, industry, and 
the experiments and techniques of production. And 
this science is possessed by the peasants and 
labourers alone" (36). 
According to another broadcast, "there is no need to import 
machines built in foreign countries, the only worthwhile 
ones are those invented by peasants" (37). 
Here the dark side of their ultra nationalism and 
self-reliance policy becomes apparent; a strong anti-intel­
lectual and xenophobic streak. They had a very broad defini­
tion of 'foreign', in fact including everything not under 
their control. Foreign influences were corrupting influen­
ces. Angkar distrusted people who had been exposed to this 
type of influence. It played an important role in their 
view of and attitude towards the different classes and 
segments of Cambodian society. Much available knowledge 
and capital was discarded because it was considered foreign. 
When in 197Θ a Swedish delegation asked why those trained 
in the old society were so little used the answer was: 
"Those who were educated in the old society were 
not trained to cope with the new situation, to 
rely on our own forces. They could only think 
about how they could get hold of foreign spare 
parts and experts. Now they must learn from the 
people" (38). 
Non worker-peasants had to be integrated into the co-opera­
tive system not only because that was where society was 
being transformed and collectivization implemented but 
also because there the "good virtues of the masses of 
workers (and) peasants are gathered..." (39). 
It is a closely interlocking, multi-pronged campaign. 
Non workers and peasants participate in productive labour, 
their mentality is changed, production is raised and the 
economy further developed, capital input (with the exception 
of labour power) minimized, independence and self-reliance 
enhanced and the afore-mentioned contradictions solved in 
the process. 
4.2 The KR' Class Analysis 
During the war, within the framework of the FUNK, the KR 
had expounded united front policies. As the Democratic 
Kampuchean representative in the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) said: 
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"Our revolutionary Organization was able to 
organize and mobilize the peasants into a broad 
and solid united front. This was the key to our 
victory. One has to add however that this victory 
was made possible by the alliance between the 
working class and the peasants (...) They were 
able to unite with the revolutionary intellectuals 
and the patriotic monks: they held out their hand 
to all layers of the population: from the petite 
bourgeoisie to the nationalist capitalists, 
patriotic and progressive personalities. They 
were all involved, without in the least holding 
their past against them" (40). 
This implies that non-workers-peasants were condemned by 
their past in the eyes of the revolutionary elite but the 
latter were magnanimous about it. Reality was a different 
matter, as many would soon find out. 
As the workers and peasants had born the greatest 
burdens during the war they should profit most from the 
revolution, according to the KR. After victory the non-work-
ing class categories were abolished. Radio broadcasts and 
texts only referred to the people as either workers, pea-
sants or fighting men and women. Only these categories were 
represented in the National Assembly. It implied a distinc-
tion between ordinary people (workers and peasants) and the 
Revolutionary Army, even though the latter "consisted solely 
of sons of workers and poor peasants" (41). This distinction 
was already becoming apparent during the war. 
The worker-peasant alliance does not feature in KR 
class analysis, however. It is the poor and lower-middle 
peasant class that forms the basis of their revolution. As 
we will see further on, the category of "workers" was 
future-oriented. Workers in Democratic Kampuchea were youth 
from poor and lower-middle peasant background, the first 
generation of the new, pure Khmer. 
According to the KR' class analysis they would receive 
support from the poor and lower-middle peasant class, but 
what about other classes? And if these supported the revolu-
tion, why? In a major speech in September 1977 Pol Pot went 
into these matters extensively (42). According to him, 
"the poor and lower middle peasant classes are in 
general content with and faithful to the collec-
tive system of the co-operatives, because in the 
past they and their families could eat for only 
two-five months (as heard) and, in order to 
survive the rest of the year, were forced to 
leave their villages and paddy fields behind and 
work as porters and pedicab drivers in the cities. 
Now they can eat all year round and become middle 
peasants". 
Here standard of living seems to determine peasant class. 
The classical Marxist definition, in which class is deter-
mined by the relationship to the means of production, has 
been abandoned, it would seem. The support the revolution 
gets from these peasants is based mainly on material incen-
tives; being able to eat all year round. An additional 
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reason for their support could be political. In the co-op-
eratives they receive health care and education, but 
"more important still, they have the right and 
power to control and manage the co-operatives. 
They are thus masters of the land, water and 
produce". 
But it is not clear whether this is only a benefit or also 
a reason for support. 
"These former poor and lower middle class peasants 
make up 75% of the entire population. This force 
is most important and powerful as a numerical 
entity and, in particular, as a revolutionary 
strength. As for those who are former middle 
class peasants and bourgeois of all kinds they 
are also content with the collective system of 
the co-operatives. In terms of rice as food they 
can live at a similar standard as they did under 
the old regime. Moreover, their standard of living 
has been much improved and is much more secure as 
they and their families enjoy a sufficient and 
sure supply of food equal to that of a middle 
peasant". 
They, too, support the revolution for material reasons; 
improved standard of living and security. Furthermore, 
"they enjoy the right and power to participate in 
the management and control of the co-operatives 
in accordance with democratic centralism". 
In this political aspect there is a clear distinction with 
the poor and lower-middle peasants who have the right to 
control. The former middle peasants and bourgeois of all 
kinds (what ever that may be) are only allowed to partici-
pate in accordance with democratic centralism. For the 
latter class there is also an ideological reason for their 
support of the revolution. Thanks to "daily education" they 
"become increasingly knowledgeable, revolutionary and 
patriotic citizens of new Cambodia". This class 
"constitutes 20% of our entire people. Thus, 
adding these 20% to the above-mentioned 75%, 95% 
of our population comprises a politically, ideo-
logically and organizationally dedicated force 
which is also quite capable in all kinds of work, 
especially in production and national defence. 
This is also an attractive force to coax the 
remaining 5% of the people, who are also patriotic 
and want to join the revolution, into joining the 
mainstream. In material terms, the standard of 
these 5% has dropped somewhat, since the standard 
of living of the present-day co-operative members 
is only that of a middle class peasant. (But) 
what is important is that they can now see that 
the country is independent, the people are coura-
geous, the countryside is undergoing an earth-
shaking change and the future of the Cambodian 
nation and people is radiant. They feel assured 
by the new regime of the revolution which will 
lead their children to become patriotic citizens 
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who will contribute to defending and building a 
prosperous and glorious country which, in the old 
days, they never thought of even once. Out of 
these 5%, at least 3 or 4% have joined the revolu-
tion". 
Clearly they have done so out of ideological reasons. 
Support for the revolution, therefore, comes through mater-
ial or ideological incentives or both depending on one's 
'class'. The implication it seems is that the 'lower' class 
are considered to already have had a correct ideological 
attitude. The 'middle' class and even more so the 'upper' 
class have been given correct consciousness through educa-
tion and practice. This, a new ideological outlook (one in 
accordance with the KR' ideas), was the only way to get the 
latter class to support the revolution. 
This speech by Pol Pot confirms the status of the poor 
and lower-middle peasants as the most favoured and trusted 
class, the one in which the CPK finds its base. It was 
posited that nearly everyone, 98 to 99% of the population, 
supported the revolution. This had even less bearing on 
reality than did the CPK's class analysis which promised 
them the support of the poor and lower-middle peasants. Its 
function, too, was ideological, legitimizing what ever the 
CPK did automatically, having decreed the vast majority's 
support beforehand. Opposition could now never be more than 
a tiny minority and this opposition was, furthermore, per 
definition detrimental to the well-being of the vast major-
ity. 
At the heart of this issue lay the CPK leaders' convic-
tion of being right. What the mass of the people felt and 
thought was of no concern, only the revolutionary elite 
really knowing what the people needed and wanted. Angkar, 
the revolutionary organization, was omnipotent and clair-
voyant. It could bear no dissent. It was owed absolute 
obedience. It is "believed in", "loved", "thanked for the 
good it had done us". "Thanks to Angkar everyday is a 
holiday" (43). 
In fact the party distrusted the majority of the 
people, as the following party statement on eligibility for 
party membership makes clear: 
"Candidates who desire to join the party must 
have a good and clean personal history and must 
be from the lower class, such as poor farmer of 
(sic) middle farmer especially of the lower 
stratum. We must (...) ensure that those who do 
not have a good clean personal history, such as 
former soldiers, agents, sub district chiefs, 
militia members or those who were in contact with 
the enemy, do not join the party" (44). 
On the one hand class is used as a criteria, but the main 
reason presented for non-acceptance is former "contact with 
the enemy". This was considered polluting. To a greater or 
lesser extent all those who had been in contact with what 
the CPK considered 'foreign' and 'enemy' influences (foreign 
and urban powers, knowledge, technology, but also ideas, 
beliefs and customs inimical to the CPK's ideology) were 
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considered corrupted. This even applied to elder peasants, 
whose ideas had already been formed, who had already been 
influenced by religion and the worship of Sihanouk, who had 
already been partially integrated into the market system 
and peasants who had fled to the city during the war. It 
did not apply to the French educated KR leaders themselves, 
of course. 
Class and social background, however, determined the 
measure in which someone was considered corrupted. Indivi-
duals belonging to segments considered to have held high 
positions in the Lon Nol apparatus were singled out for 
elimination directly after liberation. This did not apply 
to middle level cadres and the middle class or to lower 
civil servants, ordinary soldiers and lower class people as 
a category. The categories that did not have to be elimi-
nated were to be re-educated. It was irrelevant what one's 
personal ideas, attitudes or actions had been. Only one's 
social background counted. 
On the basis of class background and political at-
titudes a person was placed in one of three categories. 
From at least as early as 1973, when the party started 
founding co-operatives, people were given either full 
rights, candidate or depositee status. The full rights 
group received the full theoretical food ration (or more), 
had the right to join the party and the army and hold any 
political position. The candidate group was entitled to low 
ranking political positions. They received smaller rations. 
The depositees were treated worst (45). 
The party's idea that through manual labour and submis-
sion to Angkar all these 'corrupted' people would attain 
correct political consciousness seems very mechanistic. 
There is some indication that the party leaders themselves 
were not very convinced. 
"The bourgeoisie have nowhere to go. They have 
become satellite to the worker-peasant power. 
They have been forced to carry out manual labour 
like the peasants. These people are new peasants 
coming from the bourgeois (...) Their economic 
foundation has already collapsed, but THEIR VIEWS 
STILL REMAIN, THEIR ASPIRATIONS STILL REMAIN. 
Therefore, they continue to contradict with the 
revolution. Whether they can carry out activities 
against us is the concrete condition which prompts 
us to continue the revolution" (46). 
This statement was closer to reality. There are many such 
ostensible contradictions in KR thought. To give but one 
more example, the people were told to "(t)ake your destiny 
firmly in hand (...), (h)elp yourself, (r)ely on yourself" 
and develop a spirit of inventiveness (47). But how to 
reconcile this with the need to wipe out individualism, 
with the stress placed on the collective spirit and complete 
submission and obedience to Angkar? 
On the whole the Pol Pot group does not seem to have 
been convinced of the redeemability of those already 'cor-
rupted' by 'foreign' influences. In fact, as we have seen, 
it put its faith mainly in youth of poor peasant background, 
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with little previous education or contact with the cities. 
They were still impressionable, mouldable and had something 
to gain (48). 
At the heart of the CPK leaders' thinking lay a volun-
taristic and idealist conception. With correct consciousness 
all obstacles could be surmounted. leng Sari had in 1972 
already said that "(m)an is the determining factor in the 
victory and his political consciousness is the decisive 
weapon" (49). Considering that, possessing limited means 
and knowledge, they had still emerged victorious from a 
struggle against a far better equipped and technically more 
advanced military machine led by highly qualified officers, 
it is understandable that they attributed this to correct 
political consciousness. As Nuon Chea had said in a speech 
commemorating the ninth anniversary of the founding of the 
Revolutionary Army: 
"Did we have planes to conquer the American im-
perialists? (...) No. We did not even have boats 
or tanks and the few cannons we possessed were 
the booty of war. Our army (...) had barely enough 
munition! But we won. Why never forget the cir-
cumstances in which we achieved the great victory? 
To grasp well that our Army is powerful. Wherein 
lies its power? Its power lies precisely in its 
ideological, political and organizational level 
and in the correctness of the line of struggle". 
Ideology was superior to technology (50). 
Concomitant with their voluntarism was the speed with 
which they wanted the revolution executed. According to Pol 
Pot, "(w)e won the war and won the victory rapidly" (51). 
And the CPK's magazine, Tung Padevat. in its August 1976 
issue said: 
"We want to build socialism quickly, we want to 
transform our country quickly (because) we want 
our people to be glorious quickly. But especially 
this is to prevent the enemy from harming us" 
(52). 
Once again security turns out to be the major issue. The 
CPK still felt threatened by the USA wanting revenge (the 
Mayaguez incident for instance), by Lon Nol remnants and 
Khmer Serei units operating from safe sanctuaries in Thai-
land, by Thailand and Vietnam (both traditional enemies), 
by not yet purged Sihanoukists and Hanoi returnees, by the 
Cambodian population now under KR domination and by the 
seeds of dissension within the CPK itself. The KR' rapid, 
radical approach had up to then admittedly been most suc-
cessful in terms of achieving power. From a motley bunch of 
backwoods guerillas to state power in just over five years 
is indeed a 'great leap forward'. 
Their most important experience was with waging violent 
military and class struggle, not with administration. Their 
military success in the war predisposed them to military 
tactics and solutions instead of other means. This is very 
evident in KR propaganda. The worksite is a "battlefield" 
where the people "struggle to plant strategic crops, strug-
gle to solve the fertilizer problem (and) struggle to invent 
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and manufacture medicine", to mention but a few. The best 
form of struggle is the offensive. The people all over the 
country are "resolved to launch another violent and relent-
less offensive (to) develop production, (to) make networks 
of dikes and canals". They are engaged in an "unceasing 
offensive aimed at a very spectacular great leap forward". 
Achievements are proclaimed as victories. The people have 
won "brilliant victories in the work of rebuilding the 
economy". Workers, often called fighters, struggle with a 
"combative spirit" and "work with a combative zeal" (53). 
To summarize KR theory, their more or less stated 
intentions, the party leaders, strongly influenced by ultra 
nationalism, supreme self-confidence and an alarming suspi-
cion, imbued with a powerful voluntarist ideology, wanted 
to build a strong, independent and 'pure' Cambodia rapidly 
by means of an agriculturally based autarky with heavy 
reliance on ideologically motivated human power. Simul-
taneously a large part of this labour force, to varying 
degrees depending on social background and measure of 
pollution by 'foreign' influences, was distrusted and 
despised. In principle, through manual work, it could be 
remoulded, but the Pol Pot group particularly was not 
convinced. Even in KR theory one can sense that these people 
were to be used to build Democratic Kampuchea but considered 
lost for the revolution. Youth of poor peasant background 
were to be the first generation of 'pure' Khmer, Angkar's 
hope for the future. 
The key issue for the CPK was control. To realize 
their ideals they needed to have power. I presume the use 
of violence always to be a second choice. Considering the 
KR' views, beliefs, mentality and approach, and the chasm 
that separated them in this respect from the majority of 
the people, as well as the gigantic problems facing the KR 
and the limited means at their disposal, it seems clear 
that wartime policy - resorting quickly to coercion and 
violence 'if necessary' to achieve their aims - would be 
continued on a far larger scale. 
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5 
PRACTICE, 1975-1977 
In the description of the events during the Democratic 
Kampuchea period relevant to the theme of terror I have 
distinguished three lines: 1. what happened to the people 
(chapter 5), 2. the conflicts and struggle within the party 
and armed forces (chapter 6), and 3. the external relations 
of the party and the country (also chapter 6). In the first 
I will extensively describe how the KR effectively estab-
lished control over the population, moulding it into the 
productive machine the party deemed necessary for the deve-
lopment of the country. First I will deal with the general 
working and living conditions up to the end of 1975 and 
then discuss the developments up to 1977. 
5.1 The Evacuation 
Many city people (1), unaware of the KR' intentions, wel-
comed their victory. Very little was known about the KR. 
Many people were fed up with war, with Lon Nol's bungling 
and corrupt administration and his warmongering allies 
responsible for the war. Most Cambodians, however, had no 
explicit idea about what Cambodian society should actually 
look like, nor were they well grounded in politics. They 
were probably willing enough to serve the new rulers. Those 
who were not so sure at least meant to behave as though 
they were, the KR being the new masters. Stories from 
peasants who had fled KR controlled areas because of KR use 
of terror were not heard or not believed. 
Among the more politically concerned there were suffi-
cient people, motivated by some sort of social democratic 
or humanitarian socialist ideology, prepared or even anxious 
to help build the new Cambodia into a more just society. 
They were willing to have their talents used to build a 
stronger Cambodia, help social and economic development, 
banish corruption and strive for a more egalitarian dis-
tribution. On the whole, however, support for the KR was 
based on nationalist sentiments. Still, potentially the KR 
had at least the tacit support of a large part of the 
population (2). 
Jubilation over the ending of the war was short lived 
on that 17th of April 1975. KR troops, looking grim and 
fatigued, moved into Phnom Penh from all sides, telling 
everyone to leave the city at once and return to their 
native villages. The Americans were going to bomb the town, 
the people were told, if they were given any reason at all. 
leng Sari, in an interview with Newsweek, gave two 
reasons for the evacuation: 
"(T)he first was foodstuffs (...)(T)he Americans 
had been bringing 30 to 40.000 tons of food into 
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Phnom Penh each month. We did not have the means 
to transport the same amount of food to the capi-
tal. Also, the population must go and look for 
food themselves where it is to be found. We had 
to feed that population whilst preserving our 
independence and dignity without asking aid from 
any country whatsoever". 
The second reason concerned security. According to Sari, 
"many Lon Nol soldiers who had surrendered were 
in reality hiding their weapons. They planned to 
attack us after we had taken Phnom Penh (and) 
they intended to corrupt our fighters and blunt 
their combative spirit with women, alcohol and 
money" (3). 
Furthermore, the CIA and the Lon Nol regime had left agents 
in Phnom Penh who were to ferment trouble within the popula-
tion. This would be made possible because the new regime 
would not be able to feed the city people. So the first 
reason, feeding the people, was really also a security 
issue. This was the KR' major concern. On various occasions 
KR leaders themselves made this clear. According to Pol Pot 
the evacuation 
"was decided before victory was won, that is in 
February 1975, because we knew that before the 
smashing of all sorts of enemy spy organizations 
we were not strong enough to defend our revolu-
tionary regime" (4). 
And leng Sari : 
"By removing the whole population to the country-
side - including thousands of spies and agents -
the counter revolutionary networks would be 
destroyed" (5). 
The KR were not capable of replacing the old state apparatus 
immediately. They had too few trained and experienced 
cadres. They were outnumbered by Lon Nol soldiers. They 
felt they were too weak to control the cities, let alone to 
reform them. 
"It was true that we were stronger and had more 
influence than the private sector when we were in 
the countryside. But in Phnom Penh we would have 
become their satellite", 
the party admitted (6). 
The health and food situation in Phnom Penh prior to 
liberation was indeed terrible, as noted (7). There are, 
furthermore, indications that the city possibly might have 
had a corrupting influence on the young, peasant KR (8). 
The security threat aspect is confirmed by ex-CIA agent 
Frank Snepp. According to him, the evacuation of Phnom Penh 
and other towns destroyed all CIA spy rings (9). 
Although valid for Phnom Penh, not all of these argu-
ments hold good for the other towns. They were much smaller, 
the food problem there was slight. Yet they, too, were 
evacuated. The evacuation was, in fact, a direct attack on 
the contradictions between town and countryside and between 
mental and manual labour. With one stroke the whole popula-
tion became agricultural labourers, more than doubling the 
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rural labour force. Even more important, it effectively 
destroyed all traditional social, organizational structures 
and networks. The city people were uprooted, separated from 
one another, splintered. Any organized opposition was thus 
indeed eliminated and potential attempts to organize opposi-
tion were practically made impossible in advance. 
This must be understood in its broadest sense. For the 
KR cities were the culmination of all evil, the focus of 
'foreign' influences. People who had lived in cities had 
been exposed to and corrupted by these 'foreign' influences, 
thus forming a threat to the CPK's aims. Evacuation and 
integration into the co-operative system not only neutral-
ized this threat, but effectively brought these people 
under KR control. The anti-urban sentiment of the KR was at 
least shared, if not influenced by, the peasantry. Towns 
belonged to the ruling class, to strangers. They meant 
extortion of surplus in all its multiformed ways and un-
desired interference with peasant life. KR fear and hatred 
of 'foreignness' sometimes took on fetishist forms, such as 
the destruction of furniture, TV sets and other electrical 
appliances, the burning of books and leaving cars to rust. 
'Foreign' food and drinks were not to be had anymore, at 
least not by the ordinary people. Picq, French wife of a 
high Democratic Kampuchean official who returned to Cambodia 
from China in 1975 and worked at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs till the fall of the Pol Pot regime, mentions many 
instances of KR' anti-foreign, anti-urban attitude. At a 
certain moment, e.g., she is forbidden to practice acupunc-
ture anymore, which she had learned in China and had put to 
good use in Phnom Penh a number of times. As a foreign 
practice it is an affront to Kampuchean pride. Kampuchea, 
she is told, can do everything better than others, elsewhere 
(10). The abolishment of money might be defended as rational 
in the light of the KR' autarkic economic development policy 
and their wish to control. But even foreign exchange was 
sometimes thrown away or destroyed by KR cadres. Slavko 
Stanic, one of the Yugoslav journalists who visited Demo-
cratic Kampuchea in 1978 remarked on this 
"irrational radicalism and (...) strange kind of 
'puritanicalism' in the Kampuchean revolution. In 
the midst of shortage of essential consumer goods 
and raw materials, 'frozen' capital lies unused 
and left to decay (...) Unopened iron safes still 
lie in the ruins of the former National Bank in 
Phnom Penh (...) Our hosts assured us that so far 
no one had even attempted to check on their 
contents, because the watchword is for the new 
society to be built by means of newly earned 
resources" (11). 
Contrary to the general impression conveyed by the media 
the destruction of 'urban' luxury goods was not general. 
Actually there was little looting. Some reports mention 
that the poor were allowed to break into food stores and 
take what they wished before leaving Phnom Penh (12). Radios 
were confiscated but stored, not destroyed. Most houses 
were just locked up and left like that. On returning to 
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Phnom Penh after the Vietnamese invasion, Bunheang Ung, a 
political cartoonist who stayed in his family's village in 
the East zone after the evacuation, e.g., found his home 
intact, his valuables all as he had left them four years 
before (13). A lot of the 'evidence' of a ransacked Phnom 
Penh seems to come from people who saw the city in 1979. 
Most looting, theft and destruction in fact occurred in 
that year, by Cambodians moving into Phnom Penh and by the 
Vietnamese selectively taking things and trucking them back 
to Vietnam (14). 
It must be remembered that the majority of city people 
were peasant refugees, most of whom probably wanted to 
return to their land. But although there may have been 
sound reasons for the evacuation it was a forced deporta-
tion. The rigorousness and speed of its execution confirm 
that security and the establishment of control were the KR' 
overriding concern. 
People left Phnom Penh in all directions, depending on 
what part of town they had been in and where their native 
village was. More people went to the southwest region than 
elsewhere as more people had originally come from there or 
had relations there. It is Cambodia's most populated region. 
People were given little or no time to organize or pack 
things. For most it was a traumatic experience, not least 
for the weak, the old and the ailing, the hospitalized, the 
sick and wounded. Everyone had to leave. No explanations 
were given. But the KR themselves used little force. Fear 
made most people obey. The one or two who resisted were 
usually dealt with on the spot. All foreigners were expelled 
from the country. Within a week Phnom Penh was to all 
purposes a ghost town. The same happened to the other towns 
(15). How many evacuees died on the way to their rural 
destinations is impossible to tell, but certainly exhaustion 
and sickness took their toll among those already weak. A 
few weeks after liberation, moreover, a cholera epidemic 
seems to have broken out southwest of the capital. 
Right from the start the KR were looking for old regime 
cadres. At roadblocks on every road leading out of the 
capital, at halting places on the way and at sorting centres 
the evacuees were reguested to register their profession, 
to write autobiographies and to indicate to which category 
they belonged, roughly as follows: military, civil servant 
or intellectuals, ordinary people. Those who told the truth 
would not be punished by Angkar, the people were told. 
Officers, civil servants, engineers, teachers, ministers, 
members of parliament and other such notables were invited 
to come forward at once to return to Phnom Penh and help 
Angkar organize the country, train people and so on. An-
other, similar ruse, used more later on during the year, 
was to invite these old regime cadres to come and welcome 
Sihanouk. Those gullible enough to respond to these invita-
tions were sorted out into their respective categories. 
Officers, higher civil servants and other high ranking 
persons were often separated, quietly taken away and, 
generally, killed it seems. Non-commissioned officers, 
soldiers, lower civil servants, various types of intellec-
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tuais and other middle class people were also separated, 
sometimes killed but usually sent to special villages or 
re-education camps for indefinite periods, where some were 
to die or be executed later anyway. Sometimes wives and 
children of condemned people were also executed (16). 
Because official FUNK propaganda had always only proclaimed 
a death sentence over "7 traitors" (including Lon Nol) and 
promised the rest reunion and co-operation (17), many old 
regime cadres responded to the invitations, sometimes even 
earnestly hoping to be of use to the new regime. 
The Ordinary' people were sent to existing villages 
or ordered to make new settlements. There was a vital 
difference here. For most Cambodians Democratic Kampuchea 
seems to have been divided into two clearly differentiated 
and, for some, opposing groups, each comprising roughly 
half the population. The people who had been liberated 
before the 17th of April 1975 were known as 'base people' 
(from liberated base areas or from the basic classes of the 
revolution, the poor and lower-middle peasants). The second 
group was formed by those newly liberated on the 17th of 
April 1975 and subsequently evacuated from the urban areas. 
They were known as the 'new people' (18). Official CPK 
policy was, as we have seen, the categorization into full 
rights, candidate or depositee status (19). Most 'new 
people' fell into the depositee category. They were in fact 
less than prisoners of war, for the latter still have rights 
to food and protection from arbitrary execution. Horizontal 
mobility was rare, but possible. A poor evacuee with a low 
class background who co-operated with the new regime could 
make it to candidate status. A poor 'base person' peasant 
who opposed even part of the party's program could fall to 
depositee status. But this threefold categorization was 
really only known in higher party echelons. Almost everyone 
knew and used the 'base people' - 'new people' categoriza-
tion, for one because shared experiences tied them together 
into one or other category (20). 
When they arrived at their destinations 'new people' 
had once again to recount their life story so that the KR 
could uncover old regime cadres. They also wanted to find 
out a person's social background and political standpoint 
so that he or she could be classified according to the full 
rights - candidate - depositee categorization. But, in 
practice, they were merely classified as 'new people'. As 
they started realizing the dangers involved, 'new people' 
started more and more to hide their true identities. They 
began to keep secret their education, the fact that they 
could speak foreign languages. They got rid of their glasses 
(21). The KR took measures to at least foster outward egali-
tarianism. The 'new people' had to rid themselves of "all 
imperialist, feudalist and colonialist appearances" (22), 
to adopt the manners and attitudes of poor and simple pea-
sants. Long hair was cut, spectacles had to be discarded, 
gaudy clothing got rid of and modest clothing generally 
painted black. At the various roadblocks and in villages on 
the way they had to hand over books, watches and other such 
valuables considered "imperialist objects" (23). 
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The evacuees were incorporated into a functioning 
structure. Work was organized, seed-rice and equipment 
available. It was clear that orders were being carried out, 
that some plan was being executed. This, too, indicates 
that the evacuation had been planned in advance. But the 
arrangements made for the reception of evacuees were inade-
quate. 
5.2 Work, Food, Health, Culture and Minorities 
Some of the co-operatives in liberated zones had already 
been transformed into high level co-operatives (24). But 
most were still of the "solidarity group for increasing 
production" type (25). 
There were three work forces. The first, the mobile 
work brigade, consisted, in principle, of all unmarried 
people roughly between the ages of 15 and 45, divided into 
male and female groups. They were officially attached to 
Angkar and could be sent anywhere. They seem, however, to 
have operated only within a zone or smaller administrative 
unit. Considered to be "shock troops" in the front line of 
the "production struggle", they were supposed to set an 
example building dams, canals, dikes and such. Here soldiers 
were in charge, contrary to the communes and villages, 
which were looked after by civilians. Mobile brigades were 
organized into teams of 100 persons, usually with their own 
kitchen. They generally received larger food rations. These 
brigades could consist of up to 20.000 people, depending on 
the work under construction. Sometimes they would be dis-
solved or broken into smaller brigades. When necessary they 
assisted villagers with work such as at harvest time. 
Sometimes members would not see their families for months 
on end, sometimes once a year and sometimes never (26). 
The second force consisted of all other people with 
the exception of young children and old aged people. They 
also worked in sexually segregated teams, cultivating the 
land near the village. Men, and sometimes women also, could 
be sent away for periods ranging from a week to perhaps two 
or three months to work on some project or help somewhere 
else. In practice such a group would become very much like 
a mobile work brigade group. The elderly did light work 
around the village. Children were also organized into work 
teams to do the usual type of light work in which peasant 
children had always engaged. 
Work within a community was done by that community. 
Larger projects, which covered a number of co-operatives, 
were done by larger groups compiled from work groups out of 
each community concerned. Besides the cultivation of rice 
and other foods nearly all labour time was spent in building 
agricultural infrastructures, in clearing forests and waste 
land and bringing them under cultivation. In order to 
rationalize agriculture the small irregular parcels of 
paddy land were made into large one hectare squares, old 
dikes broken and new ones built. It made rice cultivation 
easier and more efficient, but where the terrain was not 
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exactly horizontal or had not been levelled, too much water 
collected at the lower parts, too little at the higher 
parts of the field. The new squares were introduced in 
every sector, although sometimes the old paddy field system 
was retained as well, and sometimes returned to if the new 
system turned out to be a failure (27). 
The KR did not make much use of available technical 
knowledge in building these infrastructural works, even 
though there were plenty of engineers and other technically 
qualified people around. Martin mentions two cases of 'new 
people' engineers used on such projects, in Prey Veng and 
Kp. Cham (28). Up to 1977 KR engineers were sometimes used, 
as were Chinese and North Korean engineers. But Cambodian 
intellectuals and technicians were 'foreign' influenced, 
potential opposition whose consciousness and mentality had 
to be changed so that they would become willing servants of 
Angkar. "Diplomas can't get you anything to eat", the KR 
said (29). So dams would sometimes give way causing damage 
and loss of time and energy. Still, quite a lot of the 
infrastructural and irrigation works were still in operating 
order after the Vietnamese invasion and some were still 
being used. Ung mentions the building of a big dam which, 
through trial and error, was eventually erected and subse-
quently withstood the unusually high floods of 1978 (30). 
Most reports stress long working-hours, tough 
working-conditions and often night work as well. Concrete 
evidence on actual working-hours, however, shows a variance 
from seven to up to twelve hours and more of actual work a 
day. I would estimate nine to twelve hours of actual work a 
day probably to be average. Official KR information men-
tioned eight hour working-days, not including the mid-day 
break when lighter types of work were (sometimes) done. 
Officially it seems one day in ten was a holiday, but, as 
with many such things in Democratic Kampuchea, practice was 
far more irregular. Szymusiak, e.g., daughter of well to do 
parents, twelve years old at the time of the evacuation of 
Phnom Penh, spent most of the time in the Maung area in 
southeast Battambang, a 'bad' area. She mentions sometimes 
having one free day, sometimes three in a row and then 
again many weeks with no free day at all (31). City people 
were not used to this kind of manual work. What they con-
sidered hard was often, in fact, the normal situation for 
peasants. These did not find work so hard, but rather 
stressed the lack of leisure and individual freedom in 
their work, the regimentation and supervision of the new 
collective, military approach. There are some reports that 
mention a more leisurely working pace and not particularly 
severe working conditions. One refugee found work in a 
Melbourne factory a lot harder (32). Working hours were 
flexible, determined more by the sun than by the clock. 
Often people were called on to work extra hours, up to ten 
o'clock at night, by torch or moonlight, to finish some 
irrigation work in time before the rains, or to reap the 
harvest in extra quick time. There are very few reports of 
armed surveillance over work (33). 
Outside of working hours people were, subject to 
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certain conditions and regulations, allowed (some people 
say "ordered" ) to look for food for themselves and go 
fishing. They would look for small crabs, edible roots, 
snails, fruits and such like. They were also allowed to 
cultivate food and raise pigs and poultry. In some places 
it seems these side-line food products had to be shared 
within the inter-family group. The basic food ration con-
sisted of rice and salt. The size of food rations varied. 
Some refugees mentioned sufficient and even more than 
sufficient rations (34), while others mention unbelievably 
small amounts (35). In one and the same district both 
situations could occur. On the whole rations would seem to 
have been something like 250 grams of rice per person per 
day (36). For comparison; a poor family south of Phnom Penh 
in the late 1950' s had an average of 400 grams of rice per 
person per day, 70 grams of fish and 16 grams of pig or 
chicken meat (37). During the last weeks of the war many 
people in Phnom Penh were getting 150 grams of rice per day 
(38). With the large variety of edibles to be found in many 
parts of Cambodia lack of rice was not necessarily the same 
as malnutrition or starvation. City people, however, wanted 
white rice and looked down on, even loathed, all sorts of 
foodstuffs normally eaten by the peasants to supplement 
their diet. Vickery, e.g., mentions examples of 'new people' 
disdaining to eat much more nourishing food such as mixtures 
of corn, water morning glory and banana flowers (39). 
In the course of 197 5 there was a reduction in rations. 
As the main harvest falls in December and January this was 
to be expected. It is a common phenomenon in most peasant 
communities that the food supplies start to run out as the 
next harvest nears (40). In the case of Democratic Kampuchea 
the existing stocks were clearly not enough to feed the 
evacuated population as well as the 'base people' and the 
KR. Radio Phnom Penh admitted conditions were bad in some 
areas. But, according to Shawcross, the refugees coming 
into Thailand in this period were not in a sorry condition 
(41). Rice was smuggled from Thailand to Cambodia. It was 
noted, however, that in the course of 1975 the KR were 
paying considerably less than before, indicating increasing 
KR control over the situation (and not necessarily an 
improved food situation) (42). From Battambang, where the 
rice arrived, it was distributed further, partly within the 
Northwest zone and part of it going to Phnom Penh (43). 
Mostly distribution of rations took place everyday, 
but there are reports that mention once every two or three 
days, up to once a month. Sometimes individuals or families 
received the rations, in other places they were given to 
the inter-family group (44). In some cases people would 
occasionally get meat or fish. Szymusiak, who spent most of 
her time in a 'bad' area as is apparent from her testimony, 
on many occasions mentions getting sugar (45). Cooking and 
eating were done in the family. But lunch was had at the 
worksite. 'New people' either lived with 'base people' or 
had to build their own huts. 
Nearly every village had a medical centre, every group 
of villages a hospital. But most of the time the Democratic 
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Kampuchean national health system was, for most ordinary 
people, a disaster. The expertise of old regime nurses and 
doctors was rarely used. They were sent to work in the 
fields like everyone else, to reconstruct themselves through 
labour. Medical personnel consisted of "people's doctors", 
trained for six months in simple health care, and nine to 
13 year old nurses from peasant background, trained for 
three months. Traditional local medicine was made and used. 
There are reports about the distribution of western type 
medicine (quinine tablets, cholera injections) during the 
evacuation and the first month or so after the KR' victory. 
After that ordinary people hardly ever saw western-type 
medicine. In medical care, too, the party's policy of 
self-reliance was followed. Picq, e.g., as noted earlier, 
was forbidden to practice acupuncture to help her fellow 
workers because it was not originally Khmer. There seem to 
have been a few standard practices for nearly all ailments; 
some pills and two types of injections. The nurses and 
their injections were notorious. The use of non-sterilized 
needles often caused abscesses or worse. Conditions in 
wards were often abominable. Quite a few reports indicate 
that it was sometimes more dangerous to be treated than 
left alone when sick. Ung, who was in the East zone for the 
whole Democratic Kampuchean period, felt that KR medical 
personnel had a callous disregard for patients. The sick 
were never refused admission to hospital, but their rations 
were halved. "Only those who work, have a right to get 
food", was the KR adage. Hospitals were often no more than 
passing-through stations from life to death. Sickness and 
disease, especially malaria, caused many deaths (46). 
That was nothing new. According to a French demographic 
study completed in 1972, more than one million people in 
Cambodia were affected by malaria (47). Meyer mentions that 
pre-1970 infirmaries in the provinces were stocked with 
only a few tubes of aspirin. In the northeast province of 
Mondolkiri 5.000 quinine tablets had to last 15.000 people 
for six months (48). And, as noted earlier, conditions in 
Phnom Penh hospitals before the evacuation were atrocious 
(49). In his interview with the Vietnamese news agency in 
June 1976, Pol Pot indicated that "as far as we know, more 
than 80 per cent of our work force was affected by malaria 
in the past" (50). The regime certainly seems to have 
achieved some success in combating malaria, although it is 
questionable if it had, by 1977, eradicated it for 70 to 
80%, as Pol Pot claimed (51). As the city people were not 
used to the health situation in the rural areas, their 
systems not adjusted and hardened like the peasants, they 
were much more vulnerable. They also had a bias against the 
peasantry's traditional medicine. International Red Cross 
medical staff in the refugee camps confirmed the effective­
ness of one such medicine in reducing malarial fever, but 
the more 'westernized' refugees resisted such traditional 
medicine (52). One of the two types of injections used in 
Democratic Kampuchea consisted of coconut milk as serum. Of 
this concoction Ung, a 'westernized' intellectual from 
Phnom Penh, said: "not surprisingly most did not recover". 
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But according to western medical personnel it is an accep-
table substitute for intravenous serum (53). And there are 
reports of cases where one or other traditional medicine 
was effective, of better treatment and kind medical person-
nel. Szymusiak, e.g., describes very bad conditions with 
people dying in hospital and being thrown into mass graves. 
She also, on numerous occasions, mentions better conditions, 
rations not being lessened and sometimes even better than 
at the worksite, receiving extra Chinese medicine for her 
family, the use of mercurochrome, of tablets and other 
medicine that were effective and kindness and help from KR 
medical personnel. And she reported from a notorious 'new 
people' area in the Northwest zone (54). Some 'new people' 
medics were used. Vickery reports the case of a high school 
student who was trained as a paramedic in Battambang, by 
seven 'new people' doctors (55). Doctors were found at 
sector and zone level hospitals, where operations were per-
formed, conditions were better and which also had some 
modern medicine, mostly from China. 
Khmer language mirrored Khmer custom in its intricate 
courtesy forms emphasizing social rank, status, kinship, 
age and quality of the person speaking and the person spoken 
to. This permeated all Khmer language, not just the forms 
of addressing someone. The KR revolutionized the language 
to rid it of its inegalitarian, hierarchic contents. It, 
too, had to be purified. According to Ponchaud, 
"(t)he word 'hop' for example has singlehandedly 
supplanted a whole host of terms designating the 
act of eating, with all their shades of meaning 
determined by the age and social condition of the 
persons concerned and the respect felt for the 
person addressed" (56). 
In Khmer one designates oneself and the person one is 
speaking to by some appellative indicating position in the 
complex social hierarchy. These were now forbidden. Everyone 
was known as mit (or mitr), meaning something like comrade, 
or friend, plus the last syllable of the first name. Expres-
sions denoting subjugation of and derogatory words for 
people were changed, new words introduced and others adopted 
to suit the needs of the KR' revolution. What used to be 
"commands" now became "suggestions". Crude ex-pressions 
were discouraged, begging and arrogance not allowed. Foreign 
words were forbidden. The transformation was rapid and 
thorough. Many refugees continued to use the new revolu-
tionary language even after they had fled Cambodia (57). 
Religion was abolished. Officially, according to the 
constitution, everyone had "the right to worship according 
to any religion". But "all reactionary religions which are 
detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea and the Cambodian people 
are strictly forbidden" (58). All religion (all ideologies, 
other than that of the KR) were considered detrimental. 
After liberation a small number of Buddhist leaders were 
immediately executed. Monks were evacuated with the rest of 
the population, carrying their own luggage. Wats not dest-
royed by the war were changed into storehouses, training 
centre's or jails, or, during the evacuation, used as 
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halting places and sorting centres. Many objects of the 
Buddhist faith, especially temple images, were destroyed. 
Buddhism being such an integral part of Khmer life it 
is difficult to imagine the disruption this caused. The 
general impression that the KR destroyed all wats and temple 
images, however, is incorrect. The destruction by the war, 
as noted earlier, was immense, for one. Furthermore, as 
Vickery has noted, the most important temples in Phnom 
Penh, Battambang and Siera Reap, e.g., remained standing. 
The evidence also suggests that the destruction of wats by 
the KR, in whole or in part, was not just for desecration's 
sake. Construction material was needed elsewhere and the 
CPK, being opposed to religion, had no qualms about tearing 
down religious buildings. The evidence, according to 
Vickery, also suggests that it was mainly poor peasant KR 
cadres who were responsible, cadres from more backward, 
peripheral areas of Cambodia where Buddhism had not gained 
much influence among the poor peasants. He also gives exam-
ples of temples destroyed or partly torn down after the 
demise of Democratic Kampuchea in search of building mate-
rial. The use of wats for other than religious purposes was 
not a KR innovation. Lon Nol, who had called for a religious 
war against the enemies of Buddhism, had used temples as 
military recruiting stations. After their successful inva-
sion of Democratic Kampuchea the Vietnamese and the PRK 
government used wats as schools and offices, and to house 
state employees, soldiers and even a whole Vietnamese 
garrison (59 ) . 
Quite a number of monks had become KR cadres. During 
their visit in 1978 the minister for culture, information 
and propaganda, Yun Yat (Son Sen's wife), told the Yugoslav 
journalists that 
"'Buddhism is incompatible with the revolution' 
and that (...) it had been an instrument of 
exploitation. Buddhism is dead, and now the ground 
has been cleared for striking the foundations of 
a new revolutionary culture" (60). 
KR cadres would sometimes make remarks such as "believing 
in Buddhism doesn't make the rice grow", but otherwise 
there was little anti-Buddhist propaganda. It was never 
mentioned on Radio Phnom Penh. During 1975 the enforcement 
of anti-religious measures was not very strict. Occasionally 
monks were allowed to remain in their monasteries. Most 
Buddhist ceremonies were forbidden, but in some places 
monks were allowed to celebrate Buddhist holy days (once 
every eight days) (61). Nearly everywhere, however, monks 
had to work. 
Still, KR attempts to root out Buddhism were not 
completely successful. When the Yugoslav journalists visited 
Angkor Wat 
"some of our guides rushed to touch the Buddha's 
stone countenance as a sign of respect (...) Some 
high-ranking members of the Party greeted us in 
the Buddhist manner (...) and one Buddhist priest 
who had exchanged his saffron robes for a revolu-
tionary uniform (...) told us that both Buddhism 
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and communism had humane aims and that there was 
no great contradiction between them" (62). 
Other religions more or less underwent the same fate. 
It was forbidden to show emotions towards one's family. 
"In any contest between duty and dedication to 
Angkar and any claim on the individual by family 
or friends, Angkar had to come first. The focus 
of any alternative commitment had to be undermined 
- and that meant, above all, a weakening of 
traditionally strong family ties" (63). 
It was also, especially, prohibited to show signs of affec-
tion towards the opposite sex. KR sexual morality was 
extremely strict and puritanical. Extra-marital sexual 
intercourse was punishable by death. KR themselves could 
even be, and were, executed merely for flirting. It still 
occurred, it seems, especially by 'base people' men towards 
'new people' women, according to Yathay. Becker also men-
tions flirting, most likely also by 'base people' (64). 
'New people' generally did not have the energy to think of 
such things, as many 'new people' interviewed testify. Many 
'new people' women no longer menstruated, in consequence of 
the privations and psychological stress (65). Still, even 
'new people' women successfully gave birth, as these same 
sources indicate (66). Marriages were mass ceremonies, 
conducted a few times a year and only sanctioned between 
people of the same political class (67). Permission was 
needed from the authorities. Some reports mention forced 
marriages. It must be remembered, however, that arranged 
marriages were part of Cambodian tradition. Especially the 
reports on forced marriages between KR and 'new people' are 
contradictory to the strict Democratic Kampuchean regula-
tions concerning marriage within one's political class. 
In principle minorities were treated the same as 
ordinary Khmer. The Chinese Cambodians are an example of 
this. But when a minority resisted Khmerization and its 
culture became a rallying point for resistance, it was 
singled out for special treatment. The Islamic Cham are a 
case in point. They resented and often resisted being forced 
to raise pigs, eat pork, abandon their marriage customs, 
change their dress and hairstyle, see their unmarried 
daughters have to work out of doors and so on. For the KR 
it was not the differing culture of itself, but the compet-
ing loyalty it represented that they could not tolerate. 
Some Cham leaders were executed straight away. Protesters 
were killed. Cham villages were evacuated, Cham communities 
dispersed over Khmer villages and extended families sepa-
rated and made to live among Khmer people, thus effectively 
breaking their specific cultural community. It is unclear, 
however, whether all Cham villages were thus affected. Once 
integrated into Khmer communities, the Cham lived under the 
same circumstances and received the same treatment. This 
was also true for Chinese and Vietnamese families living 
among Khmer people. For not all Vietnamese had left the 
country (68) in the special evacuation of Vietnamese Cam-
bodians and Vietnamese nationals in Cambodia carried out in 
the summer of 1975. This exodus, affecting about 250.000 to 
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300.000 people, seems to have proceeded relatively peace-
fully. 
People were not allowed to travel from one village to 
another without official written permission in the form of 
a laisser-passer. Even within the village a person had to 
be able to give a clear account of his or her movements to 
the satisfaction of any KR cadre happening to ask. There 
was no postal service. Maintaining relations with family 
and friends not in one's own village was impossible. There 
was no mass communication system apart from Radio Phnom 
Penh and one or two KR magazines which many ordinary people 
never got to see. Angkar used its military communication 
network. All transport was in the service of Angkar. 
5.3 Education and Re-education 
Youth, as we have seen, played an important part in the KR' 
plans. Special attention was paid to their development. On 
them the new culture had the biggest impact. They were fed 
better than adults (69). The old education system had been 
completely abolished. There were some new schools for young 
children, up to about ten years of age, although not in all 
areas. These schools seem to have been introduced in the 
course of 1976 and 1977. In the old base areas they some-
times may have been set up during the war. When Ung came to 
the 'base people' village in the East zone where he stayed 
during the Pol Pot regime, schools were already functioning 
(70). Children were taught some reading and writing, some 
arithmetic and especially revolutionary songs and dances. 
School-hours varied from one to four hours per day. But 
even the delegations who visited Cambodia in 1978, who were 
presented with a polished picture of the country, did not 
see many schools. 
Children's education was mostly practical, which meant 
work. Teachers were people trusted by Angkar, from peasant 
background but often with minimal education themselves and 
no real teaching experience. Children were taught to have 
no regard for their parents (71). They were used as spies, 
seeing nothing wrong in informing on their parents and 
correcting them. Although reports differ it seems that 
youth of about seven or eight years old up to about 13 or 
14 were organized in separate work teams. From about that 
age they could be enrolled in mobile work brigades. The 
factory workers in Democratic Kampuchea seem invariably to 
have been young children, some as young as eight or nine, 
as far as visitors could guess. When asked their age, 
however, visitors were always told that it was 13 or 14. 
The reverse side of this medal is what happened to the 
original workers, the class KR propaganda mentioned first 
and on which it claimed, together with the peasants, to 
base its revolution. In the months after liberation they 
were steadily replaced by young 'base peasant' children, 
after these had learned how to operate the machines. The 
original workers were sent to the rural areas and treated 
as 'new people'. They were 'new people', the little industry 
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the country had having been concentrated in or around those 
towns that were only liberated in April 1975 (72). The new 
young workers who replaced them had to learn the necessary 
technical skills to keep industry running. At a technical 
school in Phnom Penh, where electrical engineering was 
taught, these children spent most of their time working. 
The teachers were former workers who had graduated from the 
"school of revolution" (73). 
The choice of youth from peasant background was a 
question of trust. Their practice-oriented education betra-
yed the CPK's conviction concerning the creation of a new 
type of Khmer with a correct revolutionary mentality. 
Because the party wanted to build the country quickly and 
reinforce national defence, the party's policy, according 
to Pol Pot, was aimed at the rapid formation of technicians 
and scientists through a number of shortcuts. At the techni-
cal schools reading and writing, technology and science 
were taught at the same time. Learning and practice went 
hand in hand. After each education cycle the new technicians 
went to factories to apply their knowledge. Young worker 
technicians were also sent to friendly countries, such as 
China, to study petrol refining (74). Children had sometimes 
to climb onto some platform to reach the machines they were 
working on. The crews of the fishing trawlers that the 
Yugoslavs saw in Kompong Som harbour were "mere children, 
war orphans, and for the most part they saw the sea for the 
first time in their lives..." (75). The KR army also con-
sisted largely of teenagers. It would, however, be one-sided 
to condemn the use of child labour in Cambodia without 
taking into consideration the child labour situation in 
other developing countries, or, for that matter, in nine-
teenth century Europe during the industrial revolution. 
Although little was done in the line of political 
education, meetings were held frequently. Every evening, 
once every three days or twice a week group meetings were 
held to discuss the progress of work, how it could be 
improved and the next day's or week's orders. Group members 
were told what they were and were not supposed to do. They 
had to submit themselves to criticism/self-criticism. One's 
failings would be cited, such as not working hard enough, 
looking sad, being late or grumbling. This was done to 
"construct" a person. Group members were admonished to work 
harder, to struggle to increase production and to love 
their work. Morale had to be improved, individualistic 
traits gotten rid of. Once every ten days there were larger 
meetings of the worksite or village. Men and women were 
separated and grouped according to marital status. A few 
reports mention cultural activities like revolutionary 
dances, songs and music done by revolutionary cultural 
groups as part of these meetings. Here, too, "work hard" 
was a favourite theme, as were "self-reliance" and "indepen-
dence". Angkar had to be respected and obeyed, personal 
attitudes and material goods renounced. The poor peasants' 
way of life and standard of living were the norm. What had 
been good enough for them was now also good enough for the 
'new people'. Tirades against United States imperialism do 
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not seem to have occurred very often. Discussions on socia­
lism, Marxism-Leninism or explanations of what was happening 
in Democratic Kampuchea were even less frequent. Occasional­
ly mass meetings were held, after some large work had been 
finished, for instance, or on holidays. At such meetings it 
seems people were given a good meal, sometimes even includ­
ing a sweet dessert. City people generally found the con­
tents of the meetings very simplistic, perhaps with the 
exception of the rare latter type mass meeting, when a KR 
cadre of district level or higher would speak (76). This 
probably, in part, reflects their traditional contempt for 
the peasantry. 
In the course of 1975 the initial spate of killings 
abated when the central authorities countermanded local 
cadres' original discretion to deal with urban evacuees as 
they saw fit, now forbidding them to kill at all without 
specific instructions from above. More people were being 
sent to re-education camps, which had been established 
during the second half of that year. 'New people' who com­
plained, made mistakes or did not obey orders, who "created 
contradictions" in other words, often disappeared. So did 
people who refused to adopt the manners and attitudes of 
the poor peasants and who shirked their work. Usually this 
happened only after repeated offences. They would be re­
quired to "report to Angkar" to "go and study" or just 
taken away. As they usually did not return people assumed 
they had been killed. It was not wise to enquire into the 
whereabouts of someone who had been "summoned to Angkar" or 
to mourn the dead. That would show a lack of love for and 
trust in the revolution. In fact there were very few eye­
witness accounts of actual executions (77). "Going to see 
Angkar" led to 'missing persons', but a 'missing person' 
was not always an executed person. Often such people were 
sent to re-education camps or merely put to work elsewhere. 
Many were released after "graduation" and sent to ordinary 
co-operatives (78). There are also many cases of people 
reported to have been killed who turned up alive (79). 
There were separate camps for soldiers, non-commis­
sioned officers, monks, intellectuals and civil servants 
(Θ0). The following example, Dr. Oum Nal's experience, 
gives some insight into the functioning of re-education 
camps and how the KR weeded out potential opposition. 
Shortly after liberation, at a sorting centre in Sisophon 
(Battambang Province), all specialists were asked to step 
forward as Angkar needed them. The doctor was recognized by 
a KR cadre who "advised" him to tell his true identity or 
risk punishment. Together with other specialists who revea­
led their identity, he was taken to a special camp, where 
they worked the land. One day they were taken to another 
village, where they were heartily received and well fed. At 
a large meeting they were requested to write their autobio­
graphies and even asked to give suggestions on how better 
to run the country. Quite a lot of them then criticized the 
regime. After the meeting the most outspoken critics were 
taken to a Sisophon prison but, as became clear later, not 
killed (81). The rest went back to their villages. After a 
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month Oum Nal and some others were taken to Battambang 
prison. This was in early 1976. They had again to write 
their autobiographies several times. Each time they were 
encouraged to tell the truth. Angkar knew the truth, they 
need not be afraid of Angkar. It did not want to kill them. 
By hiding the truth they were only showing they were not 
yet converted. During one such session an army doctor 
revealed his identity. A week later he disappeared. Now and 
then someone was summoned to a meeting. Sometimes they 
would not come back. After a while Oum Nal was again trans­
ferred to another prison, with 14 others. There they had 
re-education seminars and were subjected to constant inter­
rogation. After ten days they were given black clothes and 
a кг ama and sent back to villages to work in the fields 
(82). 
Not all monks, intellectuals and officers ended up in 
special re-education camps. Many succeeded in keeping their 
true identities hidden. There are also examples of 'new 
people's' background being known, among them doctors, 
intellectuals and technical specialists, who were not killed 
or sent to re-education camps (83). 
5.4 Relations between 'New People', 'Base People' and KR 
For the 'new people' the 17th of April turned out to be far 
from a liberation. It was life in forced labour camps for 
them. Death through disease, malnutrition and overwork was 
widespread. Fear dominated their lives. 'Base people', on 
the other hand, generally quite liked the KR, it was noted, 
although among the elderly peasants, especially, Sihanoukist 
sympathies remained strong. 'Base people' were treated 
better, allowed to keep their homes and most of their 
personal private property. They were not, or less severely, 
punished for mistakes, where a 'new person' was liable to 
be executed. They did the same work. Some reports mention 
'base' and 'new people' working side by side in mixed 
co-operatives or mobile work brigades, while others suggest 
they were kept separated. 'New people' who lived in a 'base 
people' village, their parents being peasants for instance, 
and who had, with the help of the villagers and the village 
chief, been able to pass themselves off as 'base people' 
were often more fanatically pro-KR than ordinary 'base 
people'. Few 'new people', however, were promoted to 'base 
person' status (84). A 'new person' could get better treat­
ment, or at least avoid worse treatment, if he or she did 
everything as asked, was modest, worked hard and generally 
adopted the manners of poor peasants (85). 'New people' 
and 'base people' were "segregated from each other at the 
social level". 'Base people' were warned to be "suspicious 
of the 'new people' and to supervise their activities at 
all times" (86). They could boss 'new people' about. Their 
treatment of 'new people' was ambiguous. There are numerous 
reports of 'base people' animosity towards 'new people', 
even where it affected family. "They would help them, but 
also get mad and throw insults at them", according to Hong 
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Var (87). Especially the more peripheral, isolated peasants 
could usually live reasonably well with what they could 
hunt, fish and gather, besides some cultivation and hus­
bandry. If they, why not the 'new people'? There was some 
malicious pleasure at seeing pretentious city folk brought 
down to their level. Long suppressed resentment, even hatred 
of the 'urban' thus manifested itself. 
The KR themselves enjoyed a better life than the rest 
of the population. All reports are unanimous about this. 
They always seemed well fed. Their food was better and more 
varied. There were hospitals for them, well equipped with 
western medicine and often foreign trained medical person­
nel . Being the most advanced part of the nation they ex­
perienced communalization long before the rest of the 
population. Among KR cadres there was less family life. 
Children were more often separated from their parents and 
couples from each other, than with the ordinary people. 
Angkar's egalitarianism was weighted. A person was 
treated in accordance with his or her social background and 
present status. Better or worse treatment, furthermore, was 
one of the means the KR used to achieve compliancy. 
Also within the KR there were differences. Groups with 
superior class background, political position and strategic 
importance were supposed to be privileged. KR who had fought 
in the war were more privileged. Those who had been in 
China and North Korea during the war were treated better 
than those who had been in France, the former having been 
more under control of, and having had more political educa­
tion from the party. Cadres in the offices received more 
and better food than people in the countryside, although 
for most it was still very simple (8B). Workers in state 
factories were better off than peasants. 'Base people' 
co-operatives were better off than 'new people' co-opera­
tives. People in units most closely linked to the organs of 
state power at the central and zone levels, such as national 
ministries and mobile youth brigades attached to zone party 
committees, were better off than ordinary co-operative 
members. Regular troops received better rations than regio­
nal troops and militia. Yathay, for instance, mentions a 
friend's cousin, the wife of an important Southwest zone 
provincial cadre, who would bring them sugar and salt and 
sometimes coconuts and cigarettes in 1975. Cigarette dis­
tribution to 'new people', as far as Yathay knew, only 
started in April 1976 (Θ9). 
According to Peang Sophi, the KR who liberated Battam-
bang were thin and pale, very young, 
"contemptuous and aloof 'looking us over, dis­
trustfully, from head to toe'. (They were) 'real 
country people, from far away' - illiterate, out 
of touch, and ill at ease (...) 'They were scared 
of anything in a bottle or a tin (...) I saw them 
eating toothpaste once, and (...) I remember them 
looking at documents upside down'" (90). 
The troops that entered Phnom Penh in April 1975 "neither 
talked nor smiled". The majority appeared to be between 12 
and 15 years old. "Many had probably never seen a city 
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(...) before" (91). KR rank and file were generally observed 
to be very disciplined. They were rather polite and cordial, 
"suggesting" things instead of ordering them. As Yathay 
remarks, they remained polite and courteous even when 
killing people (92). They spoke very little and when they 
did, in "short, clipped sentences" (93). They worked hard, 
setting a good example and compelling admiration. Picg 
found the young KR in Phnom Penh to be enthusiastic, happy, 
hard-working and conscientious (94). But they never gave 
any explanations, not even for executions. They showed 
little personal initiative, only doing what Angkar had 
instructed them to do. As Yathay discovered in a (rare) 
talk with a high placed provincial KR cadre, everything the 
man ventured was followed by "nothing is certain, everything 
is dependent on what Angkar decides". The only thing this 
high placed cadre knew for sure was that one had to do what 
Angkar said (95). Sometimes, when alone, some KR could be 
sympathetic, but in a group they would be surly (96). They 
watched each other, vying with each other to see who was 
the toughest, cruelest, most radical and revolutionary. 
Sentiment was considered a sign of weakness. They were not 
impressed by the hardships the 'new people' suffered. After 
all, they had suffered far more during the war. All this 
being said, there are also many examples of KR helping 'new 
people' and showing leniency (97). Also, committing atroci-
ties was not a KR inovation. Contrary to the gentle image 
of pre-war Cambodia brutality also occurrred then, although 
not quite on the scale of Democratic Kampuchea. In the late 
1960's Sihanouk and Lon Nol officials were guilty of such 
acts as sawing off the heads of children with palm-fonds, 
disembowlment, throwing tens of people handcuffed over 
cliffs, and so on (98). Earlier, in the 1940's, many Issarak 
considered "gratuitous brutality (a) normal way of dealing 
with their enemies", delighting in "inhuman torture" (99). 
At this basic level KR organization was two-fold, 
civilian (kamaphibals - the actual meaning is "cadre") and 
military (yothea). The military, if there was any, was 
housed outside of a village in the woods, separated from 
both 'base' and 'new people'. Soldiers cultivated their own 
fields. They had practically no normal contact with the 
people whatsoever. They would come into a village for 
security reasons, if necessary. "In case there are problems, 
the village chief can call on the KR military who maintain 
order in the ten villages of the sector", according to two 
ex-Lon Nol regime cadres (10O). By thus preventing the 
possibility of a tie developing between the military and 
the people, Angkar maintained a more effective controlling 
and executive apparatus. The lowest level of the KR military 
was formed by village militia ( chhlop) . They did not wear 
uniforms. Their task was, inter alia, to "spot intellectuals 
and ex-militarymen and keep an eye on what they did", 
according to a KR militia man, who later fled to Thailand 
(101). He said he was of poor peasant stock, had received a 
week's training but no political education. He had been 
given a gun and told to shoot if he was not obeyed. Accord-
ing to Yathay, every co-operative had one or two armed 
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chhlop, no more (102). As they also had to observe the 
behaviour of the other villagers and eavesdrop on their 
conversations most ordinary people spoke of them as spies. 
It did not take most 'new people' long to find out who were 
chhlop. Chhlop had their informants, however, often children 
(103). 'Base people' also "were all too ready to inform on 
the attitudes of 'new people'" Ung says. 'Base people' 
children would "creep under the houses of 'new people' at 
night to listen to what was said" (104). Even 'new people' 
would inform on each other to ingratiate themselves with 
their rulers in the hope of getting some small advantage 
(105). In this way the KR remained well informed and the 
people afraid and suspicious even of their next of kin. 
Civilian KR were considered less violent than military 
KR, but their standing in the KR hierarchy was also lower. 
Group and village leaders were appointed by Angkar and were 
very often local, illiterate poorer peasants who had proven 
their loyalty to the revolution. Refugees freguently pointed 
out that village chiefs were quite often ex-drunks, card 
sharks or such like types. Their appointment by the KR 
gave them the feeling of being someone, whilst before they 
had always been looked down on and pushed around. Frequently 
refugees reported these village chiefs to be brutal, in-
clined to throw their weight about indiscriminately, seem-
ingly enjoying the fear they could now instill and the 
power they had over people. City people often referred to 
them as "village idiots" (106). But their opinion of these 
poor peasant leaders was also, partly at least, coloured by 
traditional contempt for the peasantry. And again, there 
are numerous reports of KR also showing kindness and helping 
'new people' . 
5.5 The Limits of KR Control 
How were the KR able to retain control over the population? 
After all, they were numerically a small group. Shawcross 
mentions ratios of up to one KR for 250 ordinary people in 
some villages (107). Armed surveillance at the worksite or 
in the village was almost non-existent. The destruction of 
traditional social structures and their replacement by a 
collective system, the elimination of any form of communica-
tion and the restrictions on travel outside of one's own 
village, Angkar's monopoly of rice and salt distribution 
and communication, and its security network insured effec-
tive control. But most of all it was fear. People disap-
peared frequently enough for the remainder to be fully 
aware of the necessities of obedience and good behaviour. 
Nor did they want already meagre rations to be reduced even 
further. The best thing a 'new person' could do was to make 
him or herself as inconspicuous as possible. Notwithstanding 
all this, control was not absolute. Given the underdeveloped 
state of Cambodia's infrastructure, the nature of its 
outlying areas of mountains and forests, as well as the 
means the KR had at their disposal, it could not have been. 
People did move from village to village illegally. 
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They were received and taken care of in other villages 
quite easily. To go anywhere one had officially to have a 
pass. But if you managed to flee to another administrative 
unit 
"without being caught by one's own cadres or 
military of a subordinate level, there was a good 
chance of being taken on in another coop with few 
questions asked, since most units were short of 
labour: and because of the lack of communication 
among coordinate units, pursuit was difficult" 
Vickery notes (108). 
"A lot of the KR did not know how to read and 
those who could write did so very badly, so we 
wrote out our own laisser-passers, trying to make 
them as illegible as possible", 
according to one refugee (109). People also just went 
illegally to other villages to visit relations or friends. 
In the first year about 12.000 to 16.000 people managed to 
flee to Thailand. Refugees sometimes travelled hundreds of 
miles all over the country using main highways and even 
sometimes getting rides in KR trucks, staying in villages 
on the way, working there sometimes and getting their 
rations. The real difficulty was usually the border area, 
the last lap. There is, to give one example, the case of 
the Vietnamese engineer, speaking fluent Khmer as well as 
French, English, Thai and Lao, who, from February to April 
1976, walked 560 kilometres across Cambodia to Thailand. He 
encountered no problems, working in the rice fields getting 
food for two or three days and always walking at night 
(110). The more daring would steal food whenever they got 
the chance. Yathay's account of his two years in Democratic 
Kampuchea is full of ruses he employed to fool the KR to 
get food. 
Some sort of black market originated. It was officially 
prohibited of course. Only within the inter-family group 
was barter allowed. Sometimes it was condoned, sometimes 
individual KR would participate actively in this black 
market. In principle 'new people' would exchange whatever 
they had as valuables with 'base people' or KR for rice. 
Western medicine was also exchanged for food sometimes, or 
valuables for medicine. What people had grown or raised 
themselves or were able to catch or find whilst looking for 
food could also be exchanged. Rice for foreign money, gold, 
clothes or jewelry was, however, by far the most common 
exchange. A fluctuating rate of exchange developed. Depend-
ing on fluctuations in supply and demand, especially on the 
size of rations, a tin of rice could be worth upwards of 
$100,- or some such equivalent in gold, or less than $1,-
(111). Ironically enough the poorest 'new people' died 
first. They had no valuables to exchange to complement 
scanty food ration^. 
KR active participation in the blackmarket seems 
contradictory to their self-effacing and disciplined image. 
According to Heder, however, "cadres appropriated for their 
own benefit what was supposed to be collective, state or 
co-operative property" (112). Yathay confirms this when he 
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asserts that local cadres often did not report the dead 
because they received rice for distribution on the basis of 
the size of the population under them. The extra rice they 
thus received, and perhaps parts of the normal rations as 
well, they exchanged for valuables. This, and the fact 
that the KR obviously showed a taste for 'new people' 
clothes, gold and watches, throws a different light on 
their image. Heder suggests this attitude was due "to the 
lack of proper ideological education of the cadres as a 
whole". They had power but didn't know how to use it in a 
"socialist" way. "instead they thought: we have power; we 
take what we want" (113). However these "corrupt" KR must 
have been aware of their transgressions. How otherwise to 
explain the fact that they did not just search the 'new 
people' and confiscate the valuables they found? Why barter 
secretively? And what did the KR want with 'new people' 
clothes if Angkar proscribed modest and black clothing? 
What did they want with jewelry and gold if it could not be 
worn and currency had been abolished? 
For that matter, the wearing of black clothes was not 
strictly enforced, as the photos made by visitors and the 
official Democratic Kampuchean picture magazines clearly 
show. 
Occasionally there were even cases of opposition by 
ordinary people, criticizing Angkar, protesting against the 
lack of food and medicine, the inequality between ordinary 
people and the KR. Yathay witnessed a protest demonstration 
of a few hundred people under the direction of five 
teachers. They were able to present their grievances. But 
within a few days the leading protesters, the five teachers, 
disappeared. Szymusiak also mentions many examples of 
breeches of rules, people complaining, protesting, arguing, 
disregarding orders, refusing to work and lying that went 
unpunished (114). 
But Angkar had little to fear from the ordinary people. As 
Carney suggests, 
"Cambodia's small population may encourage party 
leaders to push 'proletarization', arguing that 
they can control any sharp popular reaction 
because they control internal communications and 
each area contains too small a fraction of the 
population to start a successful revolt" (115). 
The only challenges to the regime came from within the 
armed forces themselves, as we will see. 
5.6 Regional Differences 
The picture sketched so far must be nuanced. Just as during 
the war, heavy-handedness and terror were not everywhere 
used to the same degree. The early killings had certainly 
been partly inspired by revenge. The bombing, especially, 
had created strong feelings of hate among the KR soldiers 
(and the 'base people'). "KR cadre (...) admitted (...) 
that in the early days of liberation they were subject to 
"uncontrollable hatred"", according to one refugee (116). 
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The killing does not seem to have taken place every-
where to the same degree. Reprisals were heaviest in the 
northwest, the provinces of Battambang and Pursat (together 
the Northwest zone) and Siem Reap (117). Kiernan suggests a 
number of reasons for this. 
"(C)lass contradictions between rich and poor 
farmers are exceptionally sharp (...) The local 
KR organization in April 1975 was small and 
disorganized and (...) government control was 
much less certain and its influence much less 
penetrating (...) than elsewhere" (118). 
During the war this part of the country had been largely 
left to the Lon Nol regime, not being considered of great 
strategic significance by the KR. It had been "the safest 
haven for corrupt and wealthy members of Cambodian urban 
society and thousands moved there from Phnom Penh" during 
the war. The Battambang military commander had made a deal 
with the KR to exchange guns and access to rice supplies 
for peace and quiet in the province (119). Perhaps the 
quality of the KR in the northwest was lower than in other 
zones. 
But the suggestion, made by some sources (120), that 
the leaders of the Northwest zone seemed to have no other 
program beyond loyalty to Sihanouk, must be cast aside. Too 
many refugee reports from this zone indicate that KR propa-
ganda was the same as elsewhere in Cambodia, as were the 
measures they implemented. Requesting former Lon Nol regime 
military and civilian cadres to come and welcome Sihanouk 
and then taking them away and killing them does not indicate 
loyalty to Sihanouk. Furthermore, the instructions issued 
by the KR to people at meetings, as one refugee remembers 
them, stressed (1) solidarity and independence, (2) adhere 
to the political line, (3) adhere to the established order, 
(4) adhere to the rules and regulations of the organization, 
(5) carry out the plans set by the organization (121). 
Another refugee from the northwest was able to remember 
seven KR directions nearly identical to the above, also 
stressing respect, loyalty and obedience to Angkar (122). 
There is a very close resemblance between these directives 
and what Ith Sarin heard when he was with the KR in 1972. 
The KR in the Northwest were clearly 'real' KR. 
Blaming the violence on grassroots peasant "primitive 
anarchism", another explanation sometimes given (123), 
would only possibly be valid if it is limited to the KR, 
most of the rank and file being of poor peasant background, 
for I have come across no evidence whatsoever of ordinary 
peasants doing any killing. Because most of the Northwest 
zone only fell into their hands in April 1975 the KR had 
not been able to build much of a co-operative infrastruc-
ture. Many peasants there only fell under KR dominance at 
this time and were, therefore, not really 'base people'. In 
this situation the rather weak Northwest zone KR organiza-
tion had to absorb a relatively large number of urban 
evacuees and control a large area. Contrary to other zones, 
the not yet liberated towns in the Northwest were only 
evacuated a week after liberation. The KR needed this period 
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to prepare some form of reception for the urban people. To 
compound matters further, the Northwest zone had to cope 
with anti-Democratic Kampuchean activities launched from 
neighbouring Thailand. 
All this goes a long way to explaining the greater 
extent of killing in the Northwest following liberation. 
Possibly because nearly all other villages had been libera-
ted previously, the only reports of killing local abbots 
and wealthy villagers came from this region. Interestingly 
enough, the only reports mentioning central government 
orders to end the reprisals (in May 1975) also concern the 
Northwest. There was a general order to stop the killings, 
but that was only issued in October (124). This would seem 
to confirm the impression that it was specifically the 
Northwest zone where killing was considered too excessive 
by the central leadership. The Northwest was also less 
capable of feeding the urban evacuees. There had been no 
irrigation program and no storage of rice in most of the 
Northwest for the simple reason that it had not been under 
KR administration. Perhaps because of all these factors 
most refugees arriving in Thailand in 1975 and early 1976 
came from the Northwest. On the other hand it was also the 
zone nearest to Thailand. Most of these refugees were urban 
upper and middle class people as well as some rich farmers. 
Given the anti-urban and anti-upper and middle class nature 
of the regime they would have more reason to flee and their 
stories would tend to be more biased against the regime 
than would a poor peasant refugee's. 
Having said this, it is clear from all the available 
evidence that the executions, mostly of Lon Nol officers, 
were a nationwide phenomenon (125). Minimum guidelines had 
been handed down by the central leadership as to the type 
of people to be eliminated. But the way measures were 
implemented could differ from area to area, even from 
village to village. Local KR had quite some latitude in 
their interpretation and execution of the broad guidelines. 
The KR organization was rather decentralized, with an 
imperfect control on implementation. In some areas the 
revolutionary process had already been under way a number 
of years, in others it was brief and intense. So in some 
areas measures were introduced later, carried through faster 
and more ruthlessly. There were local differences to be 
reckoned with, conditions of terrain, availability of water, 
occurrence of endemic disease, proximity to jungle and 
mountains. Differences of opinion between various regional 
party leaderships, the real powerholders at this time, also 
played a role, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Quite a lot depended on the discretion and arbitrari-
ness, the humanity, confidence and political approach of KR 
rank and file, group leaders and village headmen. The 
difference between a sympathetic and a cruel village chief 
was often enough the difference between life and death. Pin 
Yathay, e.g., stayed in about eight or nine different 
villages, worksites and passing-through centres in the two 
years he lived under KR control. He clearly saw and ex-
perienced how orders were interpreted differently from 
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place to place by one cadre or another. How discipline was 
enforced was dependent on the KR chief. In one village in 
Takeo, according to Yathay, a village well known for its 
anti-Lon Nol resistance, the KR were better educated and 
had adapted their methods to the 'new people', in marked 
contrast to the village in Kandal Province where he had 
just come from. Working hours, working conditions, food 
rations and general heavy-handedness by the KR differed 
considerably from place to place, even within the same 
province, he noted. Rice rations in Leach, for instance, 
were much better than in Don Ey in the same period. Both 
villages lie in Pursat, quite close to each other. But 
Leach was a 'base people' village. In Leach Yathay even 
noticed marked differences between one work team leader and 
another (126). In some places festivals were still held. 
Sarun mentions celebrating Prochum Ben in Battambang, as 
well as being allowed home for three days with Buddhist New 
Year (127). 
One thing was clear. There where new villages had to 
be built, land reclaimed, new rice fields brought under 
cultivation, irrigation works laid out - always among the 
most strenuous of tasks - life would be harder. 'New people' 
villages were at a disadvantage. And most 'new people' 
villages were located in the northwest. 
It will be clear that this very general picture of 
life in Democratic Kampuchea was a continuation and genera-
lization of KR programs initiated during the war. I will 
now discuss the various changes affecting the ordinary 
people that took place up to 1977. 
5.7 Collectivization of Life Continues (1976-1977) 
Around September 1975 the KR started evacuating 'new people' 
from the Southwest and East zones to the northwest. They 
went on foot, by boat or by truck to assembly places. 
Usually they were allowed to take their luggage with them, 
although sometimes soldiers took away nearly everything 
they had. People were sometimes compelled to go, sometimes 
free to choose for themselves. But the evacuation involved 
nearly all 'new people'. Perhaps peasants who had fled to 
the city during the war were not included. Kiernan has this 
impression, although, as he says, "we only have evidence 
from a limited number of villages" (128). 
The evacuation could take long, people having to stay 
for days or weeks at one place or the next before moving 
on. At nearly every place they stayed their particulars 
were again recorded by the KR. Once past Phnom Penh many 
continued their journey by rail, crushed together like 
cattle in the wagons. From where they were dropped they 
went by cart, truck, tractor-hauled trailer or on foot to 
their destination. There they had to clean the ground and 
build themselves huts, the beginnings of a 'new people's' 
camp. Later on many more 'new people' would come to such a 
camp. The evacuees were set to work cleaning forests and 
bringing land under cultivation. Initially food was still 
93 
prepared and eaten in the family. 
This second evacuation, a gigantic enterprise involving 
the transfer of hundreds of thousands of people to destina-
tions planned beforehand, with a totally inadequate trans-
port system, was well organized. People had often to camp 
out, but they were given rice and salt rations on the way. 
"What we believe is happening, is that local 
control throughout the country, which had been 
the rule during and immediately after the war is 
diminishing and national, centralized control is 
increasing. These movements show excellent coor-
dination moving excess population of the country 
precisely to where they are most needed, where 
they are most economically effective", 
according to a Khmer-speaking western diplomat who spent 
much time analyzing Cambodian affairs (129). Still, it 
seems to have been more devastating than the first, as many 
people were already weakened and could not stand the hard-
ship involved. This second evacuation continued up to 
January 1976. After that people were still moved about, but 
mainly within their zone and on a much smaller scale. 
In general the description of life given earlier also 
applied to these 'new people' villages, accept that life 
here was much harder. These camps were located in rougher, 
more unhealthy environments, often in malaria infested 
areas. There was little infrastructure, no vegetable gar-
dens, livestock or wells. Collectivization was introduced 
immediately, contrary to 'base people' villages where it 
had been developed over a number of years. 
One reason for this second evacuation was that the 
Northwest had very rich agricultural potential but was 
underpopulated. The tremendous inflow of labour power might 
well still ensure a bumper harvest at the end of the year, 
the central leadership may have thought. But because KR 
control in the Northwest was relatively weak it certainly 
exacerbated that zone's problems, increasing the use of 
terror to enforce policies (130). 
Beginning at the end of 1975 and early 1976, a further 
and possibly final step was set in the reorganization of 
society with the introduction of communes, covering the 
khum. A commune, therefore, consisted of several co-opera-
tives (131). This process did not take place everywhere at 
the same time or in the same way. But by the end of 1976 
and the beginning of 1977 the process seems to have practi-
cally been completed. According to Radio Phnom Penh, 
"the function of 'peasant production cooperatives 
(...) now assuming the nature of a Phum (hamlet) ' , 
mobilized basic peasant forces to conduct produc-
tion work in all fields: handles communication 
and transport of its products; deals with educa-
tion, culture, welfare, and sanitation, barters 
for goods, ensures security, and inculcates in 
the peasantry the organization's political, eco-
nomic, military, social and cultural lines" (132). 
According to Pol Pot, 20% of the co-operatives consisted 
of 100 to 300 families, 30% of 400 to 600 families and the 
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rest of 700 to 1000 families (133). Whether these percenta­
ges are accurate I do not know, but there was certainly a 
large diversity in co-operative size. Some reports even 
mention co-operatives with 2000 families or 9000 members. 
In all likelihood, however, these were communes. A co-opera­
tive was usually divided into three or four camps, but 
sometimes more. Each camp consisted of 50 to 100 families 
with a communal kitchen, λ number of co-operatives made up 
a village (134). Towards the end of 1975 there are reports 
of the inter-family units being changed into work teams of 
30 persons with a tripartite leadership. Practically every 
organizational unit in Democratic Kampuchea had a tripartite 
leadership. Where Sophi was working three such teams formed 
another team of 100 people. Food was cooked in common for 
work teams whose members contributed their rations to a 
communal kitchen (135). Something similar happened in a 
village near Snoeung, also in Battambang Province. Here, 
however, families were taken, 30 forming a section, 120 a 
company and so on (136). This form of organization is very 
similar to that of the work brigades. It is not clear, but 
possibly these work teams or companies are identical with 
the camps the co-operatives were divided into. 
Communal eating was introduced, communal dining halls 
built and all private possession of cooking utensils forbid­
den. The eating of food privately or within the family was 
no longer allowed. Growing vegetables on private plots and 
raising livestock and poultry were still allowed but the 
produce now had to be handed over to the community. During 
his visit in early 1976 Björk was told there was no private 
property, not even small private plots as in China (137). 
But there are contradictory reports, notably from later 
visitors to Democratic Kampuchea, from 'base people' vil-
lages and from leng Sari (13Θ). There where privately 
produced food had to be handed over, very few people con­
tinued these side lines. This seems to have occurred mainly 
in 'new people' villages. How strictly this was imposed 
seems to have varied according to the whims of local cadres. 
The people in her co-operative, Szymusiak says, were told 
to plant corn and vegetables around their homes for them­
selves. On several occasions she mentions the private 
consumption of this produce, although at other times she 
notes that it is destined for communal use. Her family 
continued to eat among themselves it seems, collecting 
their rations from the communal kitchen. She even sometimes 
cooked her own rations (139). 
Looking for food was also forbidden. An important 
means of supplementing the one-sided diet was thereby lost. 
But this measure was not strictly enforced everywhere. In 
Szymusiak's 'new people's' co-operative it was still al­
lowed, for instance when the people were too weak to work 
and therefore did not receive their normal rations. And 
ex-Lon Nol soldier Onn Samar, discussing the reduction of 
rations since the end of 1976, said, "(t)o survive we had 
to forage for bananas and other wild fruits" (140). Communal 
eating was widely detested also by 'base people' who had 
previously supported the KR. Apart from the killing the 
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women Boua interviewed spoke most bitterly about collective 
eating (141 ). 
Curiously enough communal eating was not always intro-
duced simultaneously with the introduction of co-operatives. 
Yathay, for instance, underwent the introduction of communal 
eating in January 1976, directly after the new constitution 
was announced, but the co-operatives were only introduced 
in November of that year, as far as he knew (142). The 
inter-family unit seems to have lost its function. As 
working and eating was done in non-family based teams the 
family really only slept together. In some cases this even 
ended as large common dormitories were introduced. As usual 
there is some confusion on the issue, but it seems that 
generally 
"(f)amilies lived in individual houses except for 
mobile work-brigades and young, unmarried men and 
women, who lived in segregated dormitories" (143). 
There are some reports of children now also being separated 
from their parents at an earlier age (144). Among KR cadres 
it occurred at an early age, as Picq experienced (145). But 
among the ordinary people it seems on the whole to have 
occurred only during the day time. Where it had a more 
permanent character the children were at least eight or 
nine, at which age the party considered them capable, inter 
alia, of working in factories (146). 
Every unit had to be as self-sufficient as possible. 
Each co-operative had to be able to provide its own food, 
water, tools and such. It had considerable autonomy to 
regulate its internal affairs, as long as the overall 
directives from above were carried out. In each co-operative 
there was a Peanich, a branch of the Central Distribution 
Organization of Angkar. It ran a storehouse where food and 
other goods were kept. Through it the state requisitioned 
rice from the co-operatives and distributed goods to the 
people (one pair of black clothes per year, cigarettes (one 
a month, according to Yathay) and perhaps some other artic-
les as well). According to Dudman, who had the system 
explained to him, 
"all rice or rubber or other products given to 
the state were assigned a value in riels, figured 
at four riels to the U.S. dollar, on the basis of 
the current price of the commodity on the world 
market. Every product supplied by the state to a 
co-op - such as a suit of clothes, sheet metal or 
tiles for roofing, or an irrigation pump - was 
also assigned a price in riels. When a co-op 
ordered medicines or clothes produced in Phnom 
Penh, or when it ordered one of the tractors 
supplied by Yugoslavia or a truck from China, the 
value of those items was charged against the 
credits held by the co-op. Although the state 
made some outright grants to poor co-ops, the 
system provided generally that the successful 
co-ops could obtain more goods from the state 
than the poor ones (...)(T)he records of these 
transactions were kept by a central agency, which 
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also adjusted the assigned prices of imported 
goods from time to time to reflect changes in the 
world price of rice" (147). 
The end of year crop was very good under the circum­
stances and food rations increased again (Ί4Θ). Killings 
diminished considerably. The Vietnamese engineer who walked 
right across Cambodia could not believe the massacre stories 
he heard on arrival in Thailand. "I saw no sign of killing 
or mass extermination and nobody I spoke to told me of it", 
he said (149). In April 1976 a Japanese newsman, Naoki 
Mabuchi, able to speak some Khmer, entered Cambodia illegal­
ly. He was held in detention in the border town of Poipet 
for a week. He was allowed to wander outside the building 
where he was kept, although he did not stray too far. "(T)he 
people he saw appeared to be well fed and in good health" 
(150). This picture is confirmed by many refugee reports. 
According to the Times extraordinary progress had been made 
in rice production in the course of one year (151). 
But in the course of the summer of 1976 rice distribu­
tions were stopped and the villagers called upon to make a 
renewed effort to achieve self-sufficiency. Rice requisi­
tions by Angkar were introduced in villages where before 
there had been none, and stepped up in other areas (152). 
This led to a strong reduction in food rations. Naito 
Yasuko, who lived near the Thai border, reported that 
"in May 1976 a convoy of 30 trucks drove away 
virtually all their rice supplies and that there­
after thorough collectivization commenced. Two 
meals of rice gruel in the communal mess was the 
rule, and the gruel grew thinner and thinner" 
(153). 
Other refugees from Battambang confirm this, stating that 
not only were 
"strict food rations continued after the first 
harvests after the war (but also that) much of 
the rice they grew was taken away by the Khmer 
Rouge to some unknown destination" (154). 
Yathay had already encountered diminished rations and rice 
gruel instead of rice in March when his work team was sent 
to go fishing on Tonle Sap (the Great Lake). He also noted 
that by August even the 'base people' started getting 
smaller rations (155). In some areas there had been no 
improvement after the first 1976 harvest. According to Hong 
Var, who stayed in Phnom Srok district of Battambang Prov­
ince between December 1975 and April 1976, food was very 
scarce there. That was why the KR moved 2000 families to 
near-by Thmar Puok district where food was more plentiful 
(156). In other areas, on the other hand, there does not 
seem to have been any deterioration in food rations at all 
during 1976. 
Overall there does seem to have been a diminishing of 
food rations during the course of 1976 and a change from 
rice to rice gruel. Together with the official prohibition 
of foraging and cultivation for private consumption this 
led to an even more one sided and insufficient diet, espe­
cially in 'new people' villages. This seems to be confirmed 
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by an unsuspected source. During his speech commemorating 
the second anniversary of liberation on the 17th of April 
1977, Khieu Samphan said that that year workers should have 
enough food and sufficient rest, suggesting that this had 
not been the case in 1976 (157). 
Since the end of 1976 the eradication of religion had 
also been stepped up. All monks were now forced to aerobe, 
leave their wat and work. From about February Angkar was 
ready to receive those Cambodians living outside the country 
who wanted to return. On arrival in Phnom Penh some were 
apparently immediately taken away and executed, and a few 
were put into advisory or technical positions. Most, how-
ever, were sent to special re-education camps in the prov-
ince or to model co-operatives belonging to one or other 
ministry. These intellectuals had been eager to return to 
assist the revolution in their beloved country. Now they 
were made to work in the fields like everyone else, instead 
of having the skills and expertise for which they had been 
trained put to good use. Still, according to one student, 
who, together with 300 others, returned from France in 
1976, they believed in a classless society, in reconstruct-
ing themselves through labour and were proud to be working 
and living as peasants. Those "not optimistic" however, 
were called away (158). Some were executed for criticizing, 
some for no given reason, but the majority, according to 
Vickery, survived. Their backgrounds were known, but it is 
not clear whether leftist intellectuals ran less risk than 
Lon Nol officers who returned from abroad ( 159 ). Most of 
these returnees probably became embittered with constantly 
having to criticize each other and themselves, with watching 
their colleagues disappearing and with the extremely autho-
ritarian regime. 
Under these circumstances the revival of an old Khmer 
disaster myth should not surprise us. It had been prophesied 
that once Cambodia would be overtaken by an evil era. 
Terrible times would befall the people and religion would 
be forbidden. Only the deaf and mute would survive (160). 
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6 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICTS, 1976-1977 
After having discussed how the KR established control over 
the people through a system of terror I will now turn to a 
discussion of the source of these terrorist policies, the 
CPK. More specifically I will try to trace how the Pol Pot 
group attained sole power at the expense of the other 
tendencies. 
It is very difficult to get a clear picture of what 
went on within the party. It was probably the most illusive 
and secretive conununist party in existence. But it is also 
clear that the internal party struggle influenced the 
measure of terror used. 
After victory the party had to set up a state appara­
tus. It was, not surprisingly, mirrored on its military 
organization. The army's basic unit was a group of ten. 
Three such groups formed a section, three sections a company 
and so on. At each level there was a tripartite leadership. 
Party cells might have been found at village and co-opera­
tive level. Party branches could be found at district level 
as well as in the army at company or battalion level. Beyond 
the district level there was no civilian administration. At 
sector, zone (phumipheak) and autonomous zone level (1) all 
administration was run by the military. Industrial produc­
tion fell directly under central authority. Small factories 
and workshops fell under zone and local control. Each 
industrial unit also cultivated its own food. Industrial 
units and other non-agricultural economic activities, such 
as transport, docks and salt production, were personed by 
ex-KR soldiers or by youth from poor peasant background. KR 
soldiers also cultivated their own food on special state 
farms (2). According to Ponchaud, these state farms fell 
directly under control of the district committee. Its entire 
production went to the state. On these farms tractors were 
used. Mobile work brigades could also be called on to work 
here for fixed periods of time. There were many of these 
state farms in the fertile area around Phnom Penh. They 
formed a protective ring around the capital. 
Officially legislative power was vested in a People's 
Representative Assembly which was elected in March 1976. It 
consisted of 150 peasant, 50 worker and other labourers and 
50 armed forces representatives. This proportional over-
representation of the armed forces underlines their role 
in Democratic Kampuchea. On the 10th of March Radio Phnom 
Penh announced that all those over 1В years old who had not 
become culpable since the 17th of April 1975 were enfran­
chised (3). As a matter of fact most ordinary people, or at 
least the 'new people', did not notice the elections or 
were not allowed to participate (4). The results were known 
the day after the elections, a remarkable feat in an under­
developed country devastated by war. So was the turnout of 
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98% of a 3,6 million strong electorate (5). The Assembly 
only met once to select the members of its Standing Commit-
tee, the Cabinet and the State Presidium. After that its 
members had to return to their units to work and live like 
everyone else (6). The only function the elections and the 
People's Assembly had was to help legitimize KR control of 
Cambodia. Before separating the Assembly accepted Sihanouk's 
'resignation' (7). The KR had no more public use for him. 
The fact that he was allowed to resign himself, thus saving 
face, is, in the light of KR contempt of traditional values 
and customs, another indication of their concern with some 
semblance of legitimization. There were more signs. 
The FUNK officially held its Third Congress in December 
1975, to endorse the new constitution, preparing the way 
for the elections. The GRUNK government was only dissolved 
after the elections, whilst in fact the united front had 
lost its powers back in 1972/1973. The Assembly elected 
Khieu Samphan as president of Democratic Kampuchea because 
he was a widely known and admired personality, with whom 
the public could identify. He was not one of the consequen-
tial party leaders. His role was (and still is) not much 
more than that of a figurehead. Even the adoption of a 
constitution, of which Samphan said "it was our people, the 
workers, peasants and Revolutionary Army, who wrote this 
constitution with their own hands" (8), was no more than an 
attempt at legitimization. For all purposes it was the 
party's Standing Committee which governed the country, 
through the armed forces (9). 
6.1 Internal Party Dissension 
The leadership, however, was not homogeneous. After libera-
tion the Pol Pot group found itself in Phnom Penh dominating 
the central leadership of the party (and therefore the new 
state) but lacking a sufficiently strong power base of its 
own. It dominated the Standing Committee of the party's CC, 
with Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, leng Sari, and Son Sen as junior 
member. Pol Pot chaired the party and the Military Commit-
tee, seconded in both cases by Nuon Chea. The Pol Pot group 
could, therefore, formulate the party's general policies. 
It also dominated the Cabinet, with Pol Pot as prime minis-
ter, leng Sari as vice-prime minister in charge of Foreign 
Affairs, Son Sen as vice-prime minister in charge of 
Defence, Thiounn Thioenn (Health), leng Thirith (Social 
Affairs) and Yun Yat (Culture and Education). It controlled 
the centre's cadre and military training schools run by 
Chea and Son Sen. 
But real power was in the hands of the zone party 
committees and their secretaries; Koy Thuon (North zone), 
So Phim (East zone), Ney Sarann (Northeast zone), Vorn Vet 
(Sok Thuok, Special zone), Muol Sambath (Nhim Ros, Northwest 
zone) and Mok (Chhit Choeun, Southwest zone). They all had 
their own separate political and administrative structures 
and their own troops. What exactly Mok and Vorn Vet ' s 
positions were in relationship to the Pol Pot group is 
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unclear, but with their own power bases and at this time 
still in accord with (nearly) all of the centre's policies 
they were probably more like good colleagues, with Pol Pot 
as primus inter pares, than subservient dependents of the 
strong leader. The others were not affiliated to the Pol 
Pot faction. Although not certain, it is likely, however, 
that Pol Pot already had followers in high positions in 
some of these zones; Ke Pauk as military commander of the 
North zone under Koy Thuon, Keu in a similar position in 
the Northwest, Chan and Peam in the East zone. All zone 
secretaries seem to have been members of the party's CC and 
some, at least, also of its Standing Committee. They also 
had a finger in the pie at central party and government 
level. So Phim and Muol Sambath were first and second 
vice-presidents of Democratic Kampuchea. Nguon Kang (another 
Mok pseudonym) was first vice-president of the People's 
Assembly's Standing Committee, which looked after affairs 
between its plenary sessions. One of its members was Chou 
Chet, ex-chairman of the Southwest zone and now secretary 
of the West zone. Its president was Nuon Chea. So Phim and 
Та Mok were also on the party's Military Committee. The 
cultural revolutionists Hu Nim and Touch Phoeun were mini­
sters of Information and Propaganda and Public Works respec­
tively. Vorn Vet was vice-prime minister in charge of 
Economic Affairs. As such he supervised six economic commit­
tees; Agriculture headed by Non Suon, Industry (Chey or 
Cheng An), Communication (Mey Pran, or Prang), Rubber 
Plantations (Phuong), Commerce (Chea Doeun (10)), and Energy 
(perhaps Thiounn Mumm (11)). 
On the day of victory it seems a special meeting was 
held with all cabinet ministers, zone and sector secre­
taries. Pol Pot presented eight points; the evacuation of 
towns, the abolition of markets and Lon Nol currency, the 
withholding of the revolutionary currency that had already 
been printed, defrocking of monks and sending them to work, 
the execution of all Lon Nol regime leaders, the establish­
ment of higher level co-operatives with communal eating, 
the expulsion of the Vietnamese minority and the dispatching 
of troops to the borders, especially that with Vietnam. 
There seems to have been some disagreement, especially 
concerning the establishment of higher level co-operatives 
with communal eating, and also about the abolition of 
markets and currency. Some of those attending the meeting, 
furthermore, preferred re-education to execution. Among 
those voicing disagreement were Hou Youn (as usual), Chhouk, 
Ney Sarann and Koy Thuon, who "argued for money, schools 
and religion" (12). 
In order to establish firmer control the Pol Pot 
faction faced the problem of centralizing the governmental 
apparatus and neutralizing those who might oppose it's 
policies, especially within the party. Besides the relative 
autonomy of the various zones, the centre was also faced 
with varying ideological tendencies within the party. Still, 
up till liberation the domestic KR had basically accepted 
the general policy as formulated by Pol Pot. One indication 
of this acceptance by the zone party committees is the 
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whole-hearted evacuation of Phnom Penh and the other towns 
by troops from all zones, although there is some evidence 
suggesting that troops from the North zone were harsher 
than those from the other zones (13). The way the evacuation 
was executed was similar in all areas, whether one was sent 
to the east, the northwest or the southwest. Variations 
that occurred were, as note previously, mainly due to the 
interpretation given to the general guide lines by local 
KR. Basically the cultural revolutionists and the Pol Pot 
group agreed on ends. But the cultural revolutionists 
generally favoured a more "mass democracy" approach, em-
phasizing the involvement and welfare of the people. The 
domestic Khmer Vietminh, too, basically agreed with the 
ends, but generally stressed a more moderate approach even 
than the cultural revolutionist tendency. Although not 
pro-Vietnam, they respected at least some of the methods 
and goals of the Vietnamese revolution. 
But it became increasingly clear that Pol Pot's general 
line was unworkable. The co-operative structure the KR had 
built up in the liberated areas was not as strong as they 
imagined it to be. It had, after all, only been established 
for two years, at the most. Housing was a problem and it 
was very difficult for the 'base people' to produce enough 
food for everyone. This problem was most acute in the 
northwest region as we have seen. But cadres all over the 
country were put under enormous pressure to solve these 
problems. They had to feed the ' base ' and ' new people ' as 
well as providing surplus for the centre. If they failed in 
this they were liable to be accused of incompetence. In 
Democratic Kampuchea this was tantamount to treason. And 
treason demanded the death sentence. 
When in the course of 1976 the last stage of collec-
tivization was introduced and co-operatives were supposed 
to have become self-sufficient entities, these problems 
became more acute. Whilst the co-operatives could expect no 
more help from the centre, the requisitioning of surplus 
continued. The central authorities only had a vague idea of 
what was happening in most co-operatives. It determined the 
quotas to be delivered by each co-operative, sector and 
zone and cadres had to find a way to fullfil these. Given 
the centre's priorities in "building socialism quickly, 
with a Great Leap Forward" along the line of independence 
and self-reliance, the storage and export of crops at the 
expense of current and local consumption took on extreme 
dimensions. This was aggravated by the unequal division of 
the fruits of agricultural and industrial production. In 
the existing conditions in Cambodia, in which it was dif-
ficult to produce a surplus, the centre's broad guide lines 
went at the expense of the very labour force on which these 
policies placed maximum reliance. 
Many regional cadres began increasingly to doubt the 
attainability and even the correctness of the centre's 
policies. The centre, or at least the Pol Pot group, in-
sisted that its policy was correct and viable. Although it 
gradually realized something was wrong, it did not (want 
to?) recognize the problem to be its insistence to implement 
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a practically impossible policy. Instead it blamed the 
failures on the people who were supposed to execute it. 
These cadres and those criticizing the centre's line, 
suggesting improvements or changes, were branded traitors. 
So cadres sometimes sent in reports designed to cover up 
the real situation. They would let the people go hungry in 
order to fulfil the quota. Other places held back more 
food, sending less, admitting that the plan could not be 
fulfilled. Both causing malnutrition and not fulfilling 
the set quotas caused the centre's displeasure. As long as 
the centre thought its quota target was feasible tension 
was inevitable. 
According to the Pol Pot group part of the problem was 
the strength and relative autonomy of the zones (14). The 
centre's relative weakness made it imperative for the Pol 
Pot group to seek allies. Mok, the Southwest zone party 
secretary, proved to be that ally. How this alliance was 
conceived and why specifically with Mok is unclear. The 
Southwest zone was still one of the most powerful in spite 
of the losses it had suffered during the latter years of 
the war. Just after the war the West zone had been separated 
from the Southwest zone, Mok's rival. Chou Chet, becoming 
its secretary. Pouk Chhay, another cultural revolutionist, 
was removed from his post as political commissar of the 
Southwest zone ' s armed forces and sent to work at Phnom 
Penh airport. Mok was thus left in control of the most 
populous area in Democratic Kampuchea. Beth, another South-
west zone military commander, became his deputy. During the 
war they had already shown a proclivity for heavy-handed 
and radical action in concurrence with the Pol Pot line. 
Furthermore, according to Heder, the general line formulated 
by Pol Pot: 
"all power to the poor and lower middle peasants 
and rapid collectivization of economically irra-
tional small holdings with a crash irrigation 
program, all based on minimal external inputs and 
maximum reliance upon a labour force living at 
barely subsistence levels", 
would have been relatively compatible to the situation in 
the southwest, because some parts of this region were 
"generally considered to be the poorest in Kam-
puchea. It had a higher % of landless, poor and 
lower middle peasants than other parts of the 
country". 
The rice-to-people ratio had, before the war, been the 
least favourable, the peasants generally poorer and perhaps 
therefore the willingness for radical change greater (15). 
The second evacuation could have been part of a deal 
between Mok and Pol Pot. According to Heder 
"(t)here are some indications that the SW-regional 
party committee consciously dumped the problem of 
urban evacuees on the NW-committee" (16). 
The influx of 'new people' had created great difficulties 
for the various zones in terms of production of food and 
surplus for the centre, as well as the reception of 'new 
people' in general. In exchange for an alliance with Pol 
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Pot, Mok's Southwest zone party committee perhaps demanded 
the evacuation of 'new people' from its zone. That would 
ease the situation in the Southwest but at the expense of 
the Northwest, in this case. Question remains why 'new 
people' were also evacuated from the East zone. 
Besides the already forwarded general argument of 
developing the relatively underpopulated Northwest zone's 
rich agricultural potential, the isolation of 'base people' 
from 'new people' to prevent 'infection' by 'foreign' ideas 
and customs, could well have been another reason. Whatever 
the reasons, the second evacuation placed the Northwest 
under even more strain than it already had to cope with. 
According to Heder, from evidence he was able to collect, 
the Northwest was never able to send any rice to the centre, 
giving the centre sufficient reason to vent its wrath on 
the Northwest zone's cadres (17). 
There is more evidence that points at these rising 
differences and frictions within the party. In August 1975 
Khek Penn, secretary of sector 4 and responsible for the 
economic office of the Northwest zone, apologized to 600 
peasants and evacuated city people in An Long Vil district 
of Battambang Province that they had to live on rice por-
ridge. He promised that the city people would be able to 
return home in eight months time and that schools and 
currency would be reintroduced (18). In that same month a 
KR chief told a meeting in Takeo Province that money would 
be reintroduced at the end of that year. He gave a list of 
the principal goods that would be taxed. Each good was to 
have a fixed price. He even showed the list with all the 
prices (19). Also in that period an important KR official 
told Yathay: 
"First you have to re-educate yourself and forge 
new morals. This phase of your re-education has 
not been finished yet. We think to be able to 
call on all specialists, technicians in a year's 
time" (20). 
Before the 1976 elections the number of war victims was 
constantly given as 600.000 dead and 600.000 wounded. But 
directly after the elections this invariably became 800.000 
dead and 240.000 wounded and invalid (21). Far more telling 
is the enormous secrecy that surrounded the CPK. No one 
knew who Prime Minister Pol Pot was, for instance. This 
name was first heard in April 1976, when it was announced 
that Pol Pot was the new prime minister of Democratic Kam-
puchea. Saloth Sar had not been heard of since February 
1975. Never was it said that Saloth Sar and Pol Pot were 
one and the same person. Pech Lim Kuon, a helicopter pilot 
who flew KR leaders around the country until he fled in 
1976, was of the opinion that Saloth Sar and Pol Pot were 
different persons. He was not even aware of the existence 
of a communist party (22). Even Thiounn Prasith, director 
of the Asian Department of Foreign Affairs seriously misin-
formed the members of Democratic Kampuchea's mission in 
France about the new prime minister (23). Membership of 
the party remained secret, even in 1978. The rural popula-
tion was generally unaware who in their midst were party 
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members. Very little was known about most KR leaders, partly 
as a result of the noms de guerre they adopted. Naturally, 
the underground and war period had necessitated secrecy. 
The movement and the persons involved had to be protected. 
Victory, however, did not change this. KR cadres were still 
known only by their nicknames. Party instructions "forbid 
people to contact one another without permission" (24). 
This rule even applied to high-ranking cadres. Most people 
knew no more than that Angkar ran the show. According to a 
party document dated December 1976, one reason the party 
did not come out into the open was because 
"(e)nemies wanted us to (do so - RB) so that they 
could observe us clearly and make things easy for 
the accomplishment of their objectives. Bringing 
the party into the open caused problems for the 
security of the central leadership... (D)oing so 
might give rise to disagreements with certain 
people" (25). 
It is quite likely that part of the enemy the central 
leadership (the Pol Pot group) is referring to here was 
internal. Already in August 1975 "Pol Pot had urged members 
of the CPK to root out enemies implanted in its ranks" 
(26). Another reason for the party to hide behind the banner 
of Angkar could be that it lacked support for communist 
policies, most people only having supported the KR for 
nationalist reasons. In view of the CPK's general lack of 
concern for what the people felt this seems unlikely. The 
third reason is that communism and communist parties were 
foreign inventions. Expressing adherence to such a system 
publicly would contradict their policy of independence, 
sovereignty and self-reliance. leng San lent weight to 
this when he told reporters that the movement leading 
Cambodia was not communist at all but revolutionary (27). 
6.2 External Relations and Conflicts 
One source of conflict within the party was the attitude 
towards Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Thailand The 
question was not whether or not there existed a threat from 
Vietnam, but what the best way was of facing this threat. 
This probably expressed itself not only in differences of 
opinion concerning national defence, but also concerning 
foreign policy. It is quite likely that these differences 
also affected views on national and socialist construction, 
for instance in deciding which part of the surplus was to 
be used for national defence and even how much surplus had 
to be extracted from the people to be able to fulfil the 
desired goals. 
Relations with Vietnam and the VWP had been strained 
for a long time. Publicly they kept up the facade of com-
rades in arms. To cite just one example, in his speech to 
the non-aligned conference in Lima in August 1975, leng 
Sari said: 
"In the national liberation struggle, the people 
of Kampuchea united closely with the Vietnamese 
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and Lao people to let the cause of independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity triumph. It 
was this solidarity, bound in a spirit of equality 
and in reciprocal respect by Kampuchea, Vietnam 
and Laos that made their victories possible". 
In the same speech he expressed "our militant solidarity 
with the Vietnamese people in their reconstruction work and 
the reunification of their country" (28). The first item on 
the list of Democratic Kampuchean demands was the admittance 
of both Vietnams to the UN (29). But to connoisseurs of 
communist phraseology it will be evident that these and 
similar statements lack the exuberance communist parties 
generally bestow on a fraternal party. For one, mention was 
mostly of the Vietnamese people and country. The party and 
leaders were rarely mentioned. 
In fact, just weeks after the liberation of Phnom 
Penh, the KR and Vietnamese forces were at each others 
throat again over some islands. On the one hand the border 
issue is secondary to the Cambodian - Vietnam conflict 
because, as Heder notes, "it is only a symptom of wider 
disagreements and because only a relatively small area is 
in dispute". At the same time it is also crucial 
"because of its role as a barometer for the 
Kampucheans. The government uses it to gauge 
Vietnamese attitudes and the population employs 
it to measure the regime's nationalist creden-
tials" (30). 
This had already been the case under Sihanouk. He had 
decided to shelve ethnic and historical claims and accept 
the, for Cambodia grossly disadvantageous, French colonial 
frontiers. But, to settle Cambodia's fear of being slowly 
gobbled up, its more powerful neighbours would have to 
accept the non-negotiability of these borders. Furthermore, 
Cambodia reserved the right to unilaterally resolve am-
biguities in the French delineation of the borders, minor 
adjustments in Cambodia's favour, involving about 100 square 
kilometres. Both diplomatically and in terms of popular 
domestic perceptions this was considered the minimal posi-
tion. Saigon and Bangkok refused, but in 1967 Hanoi and the 
NLF accepted these proposals. 
The KR adopted Sihanouk's position on the border issue. 
By accepting the French maritime border legacy they even 
made concessions in comparison to Sihanouk, in so far as he 
had purposefully remained vague on the maritime border 
issue in order to renew Cambodian claims on some small 
islands at some later date. The small scale skirmishes that 
took place on the Cambodian - Vietnamese border in 1975 
occurred when NLF/NVA troops did not immediately withdraw 
from what the KR (and Sihanouk) considered Cambodian ter-
ritory. But no real attempt was made to forcefully evict 
the Vietnamese. The CPK still hoped to achieve this through 
negotiations. 
After a number of top level discussions relations did 
indeed seem to improve. The Vietnamese assisted in the 
evacuation of Vietnamese from Cambodia and returned most of 
the Khmer who fled to Vietnam. Both sides agreed to the 
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reopening of embassies. The June 1976 issue of Tuna Padevat 
stated that "(f)rom March onwards the situation has softened 
considerably" although the enemy had carried out several 
activities before that (31). Radio Phnom Penh broadcast 
Vietnamese news items. A Vietnamese delegation of jour-
nalists was allowed to visit Cambodia and interview Pol 
Pot. In this interview Pol Pot even expressed "our grati-
tude" to the VWP. He said that the relations between the 
leaders of both countries were "marked by friendly senti-
ments and mutual understanding" (32). But these formulations 
still show plenty of room for improvement in their mutual 
relations. Whereas the VWP consistently stressed the need 
to strengthen co-operation, the CPK's messages stressed the 
need to respect each others independence and territorial 
integrity. 
In May 1976 both sides met to prepare a high-level 
meeting in June on the border issue. Here it became apparent 
that the Vietnamese came back on their 1967 agreement with 
Sihanouk. For the KR, feeling they had already offered the 
maximum possible, this was unacceptable. They adjourned the 
meeting, thereby also cancelling the June talks. The KR 
probably hoped that the Vietnamese would revise their 
negotiating stance. As the months went by and nothing 
happened they grew more impatient. The Vietnamese, mean-
while, were probably waiting for the Cambodians to reopen 
the talks. A substantial dose of pride and haughtiness on 
both sides only aggravated the situation. 
Democratic Kampuchea's relations with its other neigh-
bour and traditional enemy, Thailand, were also problematic. 
On this border, too, clashes occurred shortly after the KR 
victory. Here, too, talks were held and the tension dimini-
shed. In fact, it seemed that Cambodia took a more pragmatic 
and less hostile attitude towards Thailand than did either 
Vietnam or Laos (33). Thailand seems to have done the same, 
initially. It was one of the first to recognize Democratic 
Kampuchea. But in October 1976 the extreme right wing Thanin 
came to power in Thailand on the wave of a bloody military 
coup (34). Relations deteriorated as Thanin considerably 
increased Thai support to the Khmer Serei on the border. 
Serious border clashes started to occur. It is imaginable 
that the possible threat posed by Thailand was evaluated 
differently within the CPK. The Northwest zone, bordering 
on Thailand and therefore most exposed to anti-regime 
activities coming from Thailand, possibly demanded a larger 
part of the defence effort to deal with this problem, 
perhaps arguing against an exclusive or even dominating 
concentration on the Vietnamese threat. 
Even the closeness of relations with China may have 
given rise to differences of opinion. It was the only other 
state that could play a role in Democratic Kampuchea's 
development. Its ideological influence was unmistakable. 
The GLF and the CR left deep traces. There were more mate-
rial influences as well. In spite of the autarkic policy 
the CPK claimed to follow, many Chinese advisors and tech-
nicians as well as millions of dollars worth of Chinese 
aid poured into the country. North Korea, too, sent aid and 
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technicians, but it does not seem to have played a role in 
the issues that concern us here (35). 
China's foreign policy was basically anti-Soviet Union. 
Beijing did not want to see an Indo-China dominated by 
Vietnam or an anti-Chinese Vietnam - Soviet Union alliance. 
It therefore tried to strengthen its alliance with Demo-
cratic Kampuchea whilst trying to prevent a deterioration 
in its relations with Vietnam. A major conflict between 
Cambodia and Vietnam was not in its interest as this would 
force it to choose sides. But, contrary to popular belief, 
money can not buy everything, as the Chinese were to ex-
perience to their detriment. Pigheaded, self-conceited, 
arrogant Khmer (and Vietnamese) nationalism were going to 
queer the pitch. 
In the past KR - Chinese relations had not always been 
smooth. When the KR began their armed struggle against 
Sihanouk back in the 1960's, the Chinese had not concurred. 
During the war they established relations with the USA, the 
KR' main enemy. They also recommended the KR to seek a 
negotiated cease-fire in 1972-1973. In August 1975 the KR 
did sign a joint communiqué with China in which "hegemony" 
(Chinese communist jargon for the Soviet Union) was con-
demned. But during the banquet in honour of the Democratic 
Kampuchean delegation at which Deng Xiaoping attacked the 
Soviet Union as the "super power spreading its evil ten-
tacles out to southeast Asia", Khieu Samphan stressed 
Democratic Kampuchea's non-aligned foreign policy (36). 
Thereafter the KR refrained from any public polemic against 
the Soviet Union or against hegemonism. 
Zhou Enlai was reportedly unhappy about KR radicalism. 
Chinese experts in Phnom Penh also expressed, in private, 
their reservations, according to a refugee who worked with 
them (37). It was one reason the Chinese had tried to play 
the Sihanouk card, to temper KR radicalism and polish up 
Democratic Kampuchea's international image. By having 
Sihanouk return from Beijing, making him resign and putting 
him under house arrest the KR thwarted Chinese intentions. 
Beijing only announced Sihanouk's resignation a week after 
it had been broadcast over Radio Phnom Penh - a sure sign 
of Chinese displeasure. 
The KR, on their part, also expressed reservations 
about their relations with China, even before Mao's death 
and the fall of the left radicals (the "gang of four"). 
Sihanouk says he was not allowed to send a condolence 
message at Mao's death in 1976, and up to 1978 he received 
no Chinese visitors. They were not even sure if he was 
stiil alive (38). 
6.3 The September 1976 Events; A Pol Pot Victory 
Not only with her neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand, and 
with her principal ally, China, but also inside the party 
tensions were building. In September 1975 Radio Phnom Penh 
stopped broadcasting for two days. Later leng Sari claimed 
a coup attempt had taken place at that time (39). The Black 
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Book maintained that the enemy had organized three or four 
fighters of an East zone unit to plot and assassinate the 
CPK leaders. They failed because they did not know the 
party leaders (40). 
When the new cabinet was made public after the March 
1976 elections. Hou Youn, eloquent and non-conformist former 
GRUNK minister for the Interior and cultural revolutionist 
cadre from the Southwest, was missing. So was the post of 
Minister of the Interior. How and when exactly he had been 
purged is unclear, but it was most likely because of his 
outspoken opposition to certain aspects of the centre's 
policies (41). Chea Keo, ex-Khmer Vietminh and party secre-
tary of sector 104 in the Northeast zone, was executed in 
1975. 
The next high-ranking KR to go, as far as is known, 
was Koy Thuon (Khuon), secretary of the North zone, arrested 
in April 1976 (42). During the war he had been deputy 
minister of Economy and Finance in the GRUNK and a member 
of the CPK's CC. He,too, was not a member of the new cabi-
net. According to the Black Book Koy Thuon had been a CIA 
agent since 1958 and on orders from the CIA and the Viet-
namese, given through Men San (Ney Sarann), a high-ranking 
CIA agent recruited by the Vietnamese in 1946 already and 
at this time secretary for the Northeast zone, he and his 
wife had wanted to poison Pol Pot and Nuon Chea in 1970. 
But they had not been able to carry out this plan. All this 
had come to light when Koy Thuon was arrested (43). In the 
'confessions' of Hu Nim, arrested in early 1977, Thuon is 
only called a CIA agent. There is mention of the "wicked 
Khuon (...) group" which indicates that he was considered 
to have been ring leader of some counter-revolutionary 
network (44) . 
One of the moves the Pol Pot group made to centralize 
control was the amalgamation of the various zone armies in 
July 1975 at the "ceremony of the founding of the Revolu-
tionary Army of Kampuchea throughout the country" (45). 
Henceforth the training of KRA units and the appointment of 
political officers would be the prerogative of the party's 
CC. At that time the East zone's First Brigade was under 
Chan Chakrey, a former monk from Phnom Penh who had par-
ticipated in the 1967 uprising before seeking sanctuary in 
Vietnam from Sihanouk's harassment, returning in 1970 (46). 
Together with one other of the five East zone brigades, the 
First was transferred to Phnom Penh and became the 170th 
Division. The other brigade became the 108th Division. 
Chakrey retained his command and was also appointed deputy 
chief of the general staff under Son Sen. But on the 19th 
of May 1976 he was arrested, supposedly after some sort of 
coup attempt. Two of his staff were arrested with him (47). 
Under torture Chakrey implicated Ly Phen, political commis-
sar of the East zone forces, in a plot to take towns in 
Prey Veng and Svay Rieng, while Chakrey took Phnom Penh, or 
so Hun Sen, then a KR military commander, later told Kiernan 
in an interview (48). Ly Phen was subsequently arrested in 
July 1976. On the 6th of August Deuch, formally Mok's deputy 
in charge of Southwest zone security who had, after the Pol 
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Pot - Mok alliance, become head of Nokorbal for the party's 
CC, finished his report on Chakrey (49). One of those 
mentioned was Chhouk, secretary of sector 24. He was arres-
ted on the 28th of August. In his first 'confession', 
written on the 1st of September, he praised So Phim, but 
also mentioned fearing him. On the 13th of November he 
signed his 32nd and last 'confession', a "list of names of 
traitors in IX network" (i.e. Ney Sarann's network) (50). 
From here the purge was to spread further and further 
into the East zone administration. Already in late 1975 
Chan, secretary of sector 21, had become deputy secretary 
of the East zone, second to So Phim, replacing Phuong, who, 
in April 1976, had become minister of Rubber Plantations. 
Peam, too, was elevated in the East zone hierarchy (51). So 
Phim accepted the changes. Although it was not to really 
gain momentum till 1977, Ung already mentions the purge of 
village officials in his mainly 'base people' village on 
the 6th of September 1976, concomitant with the introduction 
of communalization. Various East zone district and zone 
officials were also arrested at this time (52). 
The June 1976 issue of Tuno Padevat gives the impres-
sion that by mid-1976 things were reasonably secure. "(W)e 
have destroyed the enemies within our country and scattered 
many of them. They have no strong forces". And further on: 
"The enemy's hesitant towards us" (53). But things were 
brewing. At the end of August the CPK's CC discussed a 
"comprehensive development plan for the years 1977-1980 
which called for the complete collectivization of the 
country". It also called for 
"the intensification of class warfare, the trans-
formation of the peasantry into an unpaid rural 
proletariat and the doubling of party membership 
within a year, so that newly recruited cadres 
could supervise the country's transformation" 
(54). 
This plan presumably again created differences of opinion, 
aggravating already existing divergences, because in Septem-
ber 1976 things seem to have come to a head. 
At the beginning of the month leng Sari attended a 
reception in honour of Vietnam's national day. At this time 
a Democratic Kampuchea women's delegation was on an official 
tour of Laos and Vietnam (55). At Mao's death, on the 9th 
of September, CPK leaders sent sympathy telegrams to their 
Chinese counterparts in which they exalted the pure line of 
Chinese communism as inherited from Marx, Engels, Lenin and 
Stalin (56). At a meeting in Phnom Penh on the 18th of 
September, Pol Pot praised Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong-
thought and Mao as the most eminent teacher of the interna-
tional proletariat since Marx, Lenin, Engels and Stalin. He 
also praised the squatting of the Liu Shaogi - Deng Xiaoping 
headquarters. Angkar was said to be a Marxist-Leninist 
organization (57). On the 20th (or 21st) a regular air-link 
between Phnom Penh, Hanoi and Vientiane was opened. On the 
same day, however, Ney Sarann, the Northeast zone secretary, 
former Pracheachon member and already implicated by both 
Koy Thuon and Chakrey's 'confessions', was arrested. So was 
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Keo Meas, an ex-KPRP and Pracheachon leader who had spent 
many years in Hanoi and in 1976 worked in the office of the 
party's CC, on the 25th (58). Non Suon, ex-leader of the 
Pracheachon, was arrested shortly afterwards at the airport 
on returning from abroad (59). On the 27th Radio Phnom Penh 
announced that Pol Pot had been authorized to relinquish 
his post temporarily for reasons of health. Nuon Chea was 
to stand in for him (60). On October the 1st a CPK con-
gratulatory telegram on China's National Day again attacked 
Deng Xiaoping (who had been sacked six months earlier, at 
which time the CPK had made no comment), and Liu Shaogi 
(61). On the 30th of September, however, the "gang of four" 
had been arrested in Beijing and early in October Deng was 
back. On the 22nd of October a telegram, signed by Pol Pot 
as prime minister, was sent to Beijing, strongly denouncing 
the "gang of four". A week earlier Keo Moni had been arres-
ted. Like Keo Meas, he had been a Khmer Vietminh and only 
returned from Hanoi in 1970. At the time of his arrest he, 
too, worked in the office of the party's CC (62). Altogether 
this was a rather confusing sequence of events. 
In this period the purging of people who had returned 
to Cambodia from abroad after the KR victory was also begun. 
Of a list of 106 students and civil servants who returned 
from France and ended up in Tuoi Sleng, the Pol Pot regime's 
most important interrogation and extermination centre, the 
first 17 were arrested between the 1st of September and the 
12th of October. Coming from abroad, these intellectuals 
were considered 'foreign' influenced and a potential danger 
to the regime. 
In its September 1976 issue Revolutionary Young Men 
and Women, the CPK's youth magazine, celebrated the party's 
twenty-fifth anniversary, noting that it had been estab-
lished on the 30th of September 1951 (63). An October 1976 
TCP radio broadcast cited a Cambodian newspaper which also 
gave this date as the founding of the Kampuchean Revolution-
ary Organization (64). In a speech allegedly delivered on 
the 30th of September by a "representative" of the CPK, 
probably Pol Pot himself, and printed in the September-
October special issue of Tung Padevat. the party's sixteenth 
anniversary was celebrated (65). According to a party member 
who was captured by the Vietnamese in 1977, preparations 
had already been underway to celebrate the party's twenty-
fifth anniversary when 
"(w)e received an urgent message from higher 
authorities ordering us to suspend preparations. 
Later on a circular informed us that the party 
had been founded on Sept. 30, 1960" (66). 
What was going on? The special issue of Tung Padevat ex-
plained the change in birth dates as follows: 
"Last year we informed people attending the big 
meeting on September 30, 1975 that our Party was 
twenty-four years old. Previously we had celebra-
ted this day as the twentieth, twenty-first, 
twenty-second and twenty-third anniversaries, 
right up to the twenty-fourth. But now we celeb-
rate the sixteenth anniversary of the Party, 
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because we are making a new numeration. What 
rationale is there for this? The revolutionary 
organization has decided that from now on we must 
arrange the history of the party into something 
clean and perfect, in line with our policies of 
independence and self-mastery" (67). 
In his 1974 version of the party history, however, leng 
Sari had already referred to the 1960 Party Congress as the 
first, whereas the East zone Party History said it was the 
second (68). The Dossier Kampuchea, the Vietnamese counter-
part to the Black Book quotes a Khmer Vietroinh cadre who 
says : 
"In its September 1976 issue, "Red Flag", the 
Communist Youth organ, dealt with the CPK's 
history, pointing out it had been founded in 1951 
and had benefitted from important aid on the part 
of fraternal parties, notably the Vietnamese 
party. On the other hand, the "new forces" af-
firmed at the same time in "Revolutionary Flag", 
organ of the Central Committee of the CPK that it 
had seen the light of day in 1960 and that it had 
developed along a specifically Khmer line, relying 
solely on its own forces" (69). 
Interestingly enough the cadre quoted had been, according 
to Dossier Kampuchea, a member of the ICP and "after that 
of the KPRP before it became the CPK in 1960" (70). 
In fact the party changed its name to CPK only in 
1966, but 1960 saw the election of Pol Pot to the party's 
CC. That, therefore, was, in the eyes of the Pol Pot group, 
the beginning of the party's history. The Pol Pot group 
wanted to erase the Khmer communist movement's Vietnamese 
parentage by disassociating itself from the party's pre-1960 
Vietnamese involvement. The purpose of this 'cleaning', 
this reinterpretation of history, was to legitimize the Pol 
Pot group's bid for power, confirming its revolutionary 
status and unique, self-reliant and independent line from 
the very beginning, whilst exposing its (real or imagined) 
opponents as counter revolutionary foreign agents, dependent 
on foreign powers (71). One of the 'confessions' Keo Meas 
was made to write after his arrest, for instance, was 
entitled "1951 or I960?". In another he denied having been 
secretary of a rival party (72). From Non Suon's 'confes-
sions' it was evident that his interrogators' major concern 
was his activities as a communist before 1960, not alleged 
failures in his official KR capacities (73). The implica-
tions were clear. As far as their interrogators were con-
cerned their association with the Khmer communist movement 
before 1960 placed them in the 'unclean' camp of those 
polluted by the Vietnamese communists. As the Black Book 
noted, the KPRP had been "secretly organized" by the Viet-
namese "without the knowledge of the revolutionaries of 
Kampuchea" (74). It was construed that they were pro-Viet-
namese and therefore traitors; guilt by association. 
Party memberships dating from before 1960 were to be 
made invalid and new party members had to be selected from 
the 18 to 28 year-olds, according to the aforementioned CPK 
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member who had been captured by the Vietnamese in 1977 
(75). The issue of the party's birth date was an ideological 
weapon used to justify the elimination of rival factions 
and opposition. It was a determinant of trustworthiness. 
But it was a dangerous weapon, in so far as many associates 
of the Pol Pot group, including Pol Pot himself, also had 
had connections with the pre-1960 Khmer communist movement, 
with both the KPRP and the Pracheachon, and with the Viet-
minh. 
There is more evidence of a crisis within the party. 
According to a party document, all through 1976 
"(ffriendly parties begged us to bring our party 
into the open... (I)n September and October we 
were on the point of deciding to come out. From 
then on, however, documents reveal that our 
enemies were trying to defeat us, using every 
method at their disposal" (76). 
Although somewhat cryptic, the central leadership obviously 
felt it needed to keep the party's existence secret to keep 
itself in power. 
Pol Pot's sick leave was intended to put the opposition 
off guard, to lure them into the open. He was following the 
example of other communist party leaders before him, who, 
when entwined in internal party struggles, had disappeared 
for a while only to return in stronger control. He was, in 
fact, at this time touring the provinces, sizing up the 
situation, fathoming the extent of opposition, calculating 
how best to crush it and push through centralization (77). 
Although much of what happened in this period will 
probably never be unravelled, the Pol Pot - Mok alliance 
succeeded in retaining the upper hand in this internal 
party struggle and strengthening its hold on the party and 
the state. 
6.4 The Purge System 
Having strengthened its position the Pol Pot regime could 
now turn to the thorough collectivization of the country as 
envisaged in the comprehensive development plan for 
1977-1980 that the party's CC had discussed in August. The 
Pol Pot - Mok alliance also set about cleaning the party of 
all 'opposition'. No discussion being possible, anyone 
trying to point out that general policy could impossibly be 
implemented was considered to be creating 'contradictions'. 
Whatever went wrong was blamed on traitors. For Pol Pot it 
was a matter of state security. All these 'traitors' had, 
therefore, to be dealt with by Nokorbal. The Pol Pot - Mok 
alliance planned a massive purge of the party. The Viet-
namese quote a veteran Khmer communist cadre who had fled 
to Vietnam, who said that towards the end of 1976 
"we received a C.C. directive headed 'Service 
870' (...) dealing with the purging of members 
(...) not sympathetic to the line being imple-
mented: those who 'lacked confidence in the Khmer 
leadership' would be sent to do manual work, 
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under supervision, while the 'avowed dissidents' 
would be expulsed from the party and handed over 
to Security" (78) . 
Material emanating from the Vietnamese, in fact from every 
party to a conflict, must be treated very cautiously. In 
this case it would seem to be confirmed by Ponchaud, who 
mentions a refugee who had been able to read about this 
plan in a brochure that had fallen into his hands by chance. 
"This plan, this 'second revolution', was ap-
parently instigated by a secret circular, 'No. 
870', emanating from Pol Pot, and distributed to 
cadres who had made an oath of allegiance..." 
(79). 
Nokorbal had representatives at all but the lowest 
(village and co-operative) levels of the administration. 
Village or co-operative leaders informed Nokorbal. Yathay, 
for instance, tells how special agents of the secret police 
could arrest anyone, even KR cadres, in the name of state 
security. They were not the local chhlop but came from the 
central government. They had the right over life and death 
without appeal (80). One Nokorbal task was the investigation 
of 'new people' who had played a role in the old regime. 
But its most important task was the purifying of the party 
itself. The purge techniques employed were precisely the 
same as those used during the war. There was no warning 
beforehand, no prior debate or real analysis about the 
differences of opinion, no public or even intra-party 
post-purge criticism or explanation. When the purge was 
eventually admitted all that was said was that the victims 
had been traitors. But at Tuoi Sleng the interrogators went 
to great lengths to gather information from the arrested to 
prove their 'guilt'. Prospective victims were simply called 
for a "meeting", to "study" or to a "celebration" (81). 
They would be interrogated for shorter or longer periods 
more or less brutally and forced to admit their guilt. They 
had to name all their supporters, friends, relations and 
colleagues, implicating them in conspiracies as well. This 
was done mostly by having the suspects write and rewrite 
their autobiographies. As Thion remarks, this writing of 
one's autobiography is the essential tool of police work 
and a more or less permanent enterprise for the members of 
communist bureaucracies. At each stage of their career they 
are called on to write another version. It really only 
becomes important when "security" examines and compares the 
various drafts that have followed each other in the course 
of the years. On the basis of minute analysis more accuracy 
and new drafts are demanded. Depending on the measure in 
which this method had been generalized in the party, its 
attractiveness lay in the fact that each detail, no matter 
how small or seemingly unimportant, could be linked with 
details in the biographies of other persons. 
This method permits the evaluation, in a very precise 
way, of all an individual's social and political relations 
and to see which role he or she has played at which crucial 
moment or in which party crisis. It enables the users to 
construct whole networks of persons involved. The biography, 
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to a certain extent, abolishes time, as all elements of the 
past are reinterpreted in the light of the necessities of 
the present. It is necessary to have never committed a 
mistake, to have never been associated in anyway with anyone 
who has later become suspect. All retrospective culpability 
is evidence of present deviation. 
The Chinese had given this method a pedagogic exten-
sion: re-editing one's biography meant penetrating into the 
faults one had committed and, at the same time, taking the 
long and arduous road of moral regeneration. The KR extended 
it to outside the party. It was used on the 'new people' to 
uncover old regime cadres. Nokorbal and its methods were 
certainly no unique Cambodian phenomenon. We have only to 
recall Lenin's Cheka to realize we are dealing here with an 
old and accepted institution in the communist movement 
(82). 
The conflicts that were the cause of the internal 
party struggle were kept closely within the party. As far 
as differences concerning general policy or socialist 
construction of Cambodia were concerned things are rather 
unclear. If various factions within the CPK had their own 
regional power bases the differences of opinion do not 
become evident in the execution of divergent policies in 
the various zones. The general line as dictated by the 
centre seems to have been executed similarly in all regions. 
Neither in the East zone, with its less anti-Vietnamese 
history, nor elsewhere were the Vietnamese mentioned during 
political meetings (83). 
In all zones political education was practically the 
same as far as content, frequency and method was concerned. 
The same goes for commands and prohibitions in general, for 
collectivization and communization, differing status and 
treatment between 'base' and ' new people', regulations 
governing work, food rations and eating, relations between 
and division of sexes, separation of children from parents, 
use of mobile work brigades, separation of KR military from 
ordinary people, choice of people from poor peasant back-
ground as village and team chiefs, searching out of old 
regime cadres and the method by which this was done, medical 
and educational practices, and so forth. In all zones 
killings and executions occurred, although the intensity 
could vary considerably from one area to another. In the 
East and Southwest zones, for instance, thousands of Khmer 
who had fled to Vietnam in 1975 and 1976, to be returned by 
the Vietnamese communists, were subsequently killed by the 
KR. Heng, a student from Phnom Penh, who had been sent to 
Svay Rieng Province and who reported this, also mentioned 
that Vietnamese wives of Khmer husbands were separated, the 
former being sent back to Vietnam (84). 
Life in the Northwest zone was generally harsher, as 
we have seen. But this was not because the Northwest cadres 
belonged to a more brutal faction within the KR. Besides 
the character of individual, local KR leaders, the real 
dividing line between more or less heavy-handedness and 
better or worse living and working conditions lay in the 
difference between 'base' and 'new people' villages. During 
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his visit Stanic noted the difference between co-operatives: 
"Everywhere that villages existed before, the 
individual plots allowed for cultivation are much 
larger: the peasants even have 'their own' cows 
and pigs or poultry, and there are not so many of 
those huge prefabricated barracks serving as 
communal dining halls in which all the members of 
the cooperative and their families have to take 
their meals. The most undeveloped cooperatives 
are in the recently established economic zones 
where the former townspeople live who began their 
rural lives without anything and where even today 
hundreds of thousands of families are still living 
in stilt dwellings or make-shift barracks" (85). 
After the second evacuation the large majority of 'new 
people' villages were located in the northwest (Pursat, 
Battambang, Siem Reap) and due to the specific situation in 
the northwest 'new people' villages there were worse of 
than elsewhere. This is confirmed by the fact that in 'base 
people' villages in the northwest life was not so hard. 
Khem Sou, for one, noted that in the village of Takuth 
Takrey, near the Thai border, which had been in KR hands 
some years before victory already, life was better for the 
people (86). Furthermore, 'new people' living in the South-
west or East zones generally lived in 'base people' co-op-
eratives with cadres from the local people. So their situa-
tion was less harsh than that of the other 'new people', 
especially if the ratio of 'new' to 'base people' was low 
and the latter did not hate the 'new people'. But some of 
the least worst areas to live during the Democratic Kam-
puchea regime were in the Northwest zone's sector 3 (87) 
whilst Ung, e.g., mentions a 'base people' village in sector 
22 in the East zone which was in a very bad state, very 
poor and with widespread, severe malnutrition. Only the KR 
cadres there were well fed (88). 
According to Vickery, who has researched the issue of 
regional variations extensively, KR cadres tended to show a 
more tolerant attitude in areas producing more food (rich 
soil, plenty of other sorts of food besides rice and plenty 
of forage opportunities), where people could work better, 
disciplinary infractions were less frequent and cadres 
could therefore afford to treat breeches of regulations 
more lightly. But this was not universal as benign cadres 
could also be found in the worst areas (as noted earlier), 
and brutal cadres in supposedly better areas (89). Ung's 
account of his stay in sector 22 and other testimonies from 
the East zone contain many references to vicious and brutal 
cadres. On the whole the Northwest zone knew extreme varia-
tions in living conditions, whereas the Southwest and East 
zones were more uniform, obviously better organized and 
more consistently administered. 
During the course of the first one-and-a-half years 
after liberation serious differences of opinion had arisen 
concerning the method and speed of implementation of general 
policies that had originally been widely accepted. Cadres 
forwarding criticism and advocating changes could have been 
116 
influenced in this by a cultural revolutionist or Khmer 
Vietminh background. But this was by no means necessarily 
so. Nor did such an ideological past necessarily make 
someone an opponent of the Pol Pot group. It is often 
unclear for what reason exactly a cadre was exposed as a 
'traitor', but it does not seem to have been merely a 
person's Khmer Vietminh, Pracheachon or cultural revolutio-
nist background. These were useful labels, convenient 
excuses with which the elimination of an already condemned 
cadre could be legitimized. On the other hand, having one 
or other of these backgrounds did make one more suspect in 
advance in the eyes of the Pol Pot group. 
It was the Pol Pot faction's incapacity or unwilling-
ness to see that its policies were not feasible, and its 
resulting identification of every failure and every criti-
cism as a sign of treason that could only be dealt with by 
violence, that was really creating opposition. 
117 
7 
THE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE, 1977-1979 
Although the internal party struggle of September - October 
1976 had been decided in its favour, the Pol Pot - Mok 
alliance was not convinced it now had complete control. On 
the contrary, it would seem it began more and more to see 
opposition everywhere. Instead of considering all KR organs 
loyal until proved otherwise, Pol Pot considered them 
potential traitors unless under his firm control. This was 
cultivated by the Pol Pot group's interpretation of failures 
as the work of traitors. At the same time the system of 
creating networks from the biographies of the purged prog-
ressively ensnared more and more people in the web of 
terror. 
So the system of terror was generalized, over the 
ordinary people to enforce the production of surplus for 
the centre's development needs, and turning inward to 
achieve full control over the executive organs of state 
power, the KR organization itself. But as it purged more 
people the centre felt more threatened. This facilitated 
the escalation of conflict with Vietnam, as did the legiti-
mization of the purges by asserting that those purged were 
traitors working for foreign powers, Vietnam in particular. 
The external and internal conflicts thus became indissolubly 
intertwined. I will now turn to the development of these 
conflicts, the generalization of the terror system. 
7.1 The Purges Continue 
At the end of January 1977, Touch Phoeun, minister of Public 
Works and a longstanding associate of Hou Youn, was arres-
ted. Under torture it seems he disclosed the names of people 
involved in the preparations for a coup. Picq had heard he 
was a member of Koy Thuon's clan, the former North zone 
secretary who had been arrested in 1976. It would not be 
unreasonable to suppose these plotters to have been North 
zone cadres. According to Chek Win, a KR defector, planning 
for a coup had begun in February 1976 when Soth, the com-
mander of sector 106 (Siem Reap) called a clandestine 
meeting in Siem Reap town to discuss creating "rebellion 
that would allow people to go back and work as they did 
before the capture of Phnom Penh". This rebellion was 
planned for the 17th of April 1977 (1). Soth's adjutant, 
Hien, a brigade general of the North zone named Poll and 
perhaps the provinces of Oddar Meanchey and Kp. Cham were 
also involved. The plot was discovered. Perhaps Koy Thuon 
had already implicated the plotters before Touch Phoeun 
did. Between January and March 1977 32 North zone (including 
Siem Reap) cadres were hauled of to Tuoi Sleng (2). 
On the 11th of March an uprising was started by the 
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leader of Chikeng, a village in Chikreng district in Siem 
Reap Province, which spread over all of the neighbouring 
district of Staung. Perhaps there were also uprisings 
elsewhere in this region. In any case, also on the 11th of 
March, four planes landed at Siem Reap airport, according 
to refugees, and about four days later all the soldiers of 
the garrison were disarmed. New troops and cadres were sent 
from Phnom Penh to crush the uprising. The people were told 
that the uprising's three leaders were traitors, but other­
wise, initially, left alone. Another version has it that in 
April the people rose in revolt, killing the old cadres in 
Chikreng district, who had been disarmed but not yet remo­
ved. East zone troops came to suppress the revolt at the 
cost of 8.000 to 10.000 dead. Then Southwest zone troops 
arrived and arrested the East zone troops, accusing them of 
treason (3). 
Soth was sent to Kp. Cham where he was executed with 
his associates Has, chief of the Kp. Cham area, and Seng, 
secretary of Kp. Thorn. Seng perhaps was Sreng, Koy Thuon's 
deputy for the North zone. According to a witness at the 
Tribunal, in 1977 newly arrived Southwest cadres rounded up 
and eliminated all the groups of Hou Youn and Hu Nim in 
Prey Chhor district of Kp. Cham (4). Other members of Koy 
Thuon's 'clan' were arrested, among them Chea Doeun in 
February 1977 (S). Khek Penn, friend of Keo Moni and respon­
sible for the economy in the Northwest zone, was also 
arrested, as was the secretary of the Northwest zone's 
sector 2, in March. In February In Voon, commander of the 
battalion protecting the CC, had been arrested (6), followed 
on the 10th of April by Mau Khem Nuon, deputy chief of the 
general staff attached to the CC (7). 
Hu Nim was arrested on the same day. Like most other 
suspects he was made to rewrite his autobiography a number 
of times before being "crushed to death" in July 1977. Most 
of his 'confessions' tell how he had been a CIA agent since 
1957, working undercover to achieve capitalism in Cambodia 
and destroy the CPK, all of which is, of course, ridiculous. 
Occasionally, however, these 'confessions', and the others 
salvaged at Tuoi Sleng and translated, do throw light on 
what was going on inside the party. At one point we get a 
glimpse of the possible reason for Hu Nim's arrest. He says 
that he "found himself disturbed and tormented by theoreti­
cal documents about collectivization produced at a party 
session" (8). Was this the "comprehensive development plan 
for the years 1977 - 19B0" mentioned in chapter 6? Most 
likely, towards the end of 1976, Hu Nim, too, was having 
doubts about the radicalism and speed with which the Cam­
bodian revolution was being executed. According to a KR 
defector, Hu Nim and the Northwest party secretary, Muol 
Samba th, had in 1976 already been arguing against the 
regime's heavy-handedness (9). He was also, just like Keo 
Meas, supposed to have formed a secret party within the 
party in order to "seize power and rule Kampuchea in the 
form of a capitalist state (...) to change the line of the 
CPK into a revisionist party" (10). This party, which only 
had two other members, Phouk Chhay and Van Тер Sovan, only 
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held one meeting, in 1967. In fact Phouk Chhay was arrested 
that year by Sihanouk's police and Van Тер Sovan killed. Hu 
Nim escaped to the maquis. Phouk Chhay joined the guerilla 
in 1970 after being released from jail. The KR had arrested 
him on the 14th of March. Hu Nim's confessions also claimed 
that in 1970 a meeting had taken place in the maquis between 
him and Koy Thuon, at which the latter invited the former to 
merge their parties. Thuon had been arrested in 1976. Hu 
Nim agreed, as both had the same aim, to overthrow the CPK, 
according to the 'confessions'. After liberation Koy Thuon 
convinced Hu Nim to depart from Angkar's rules on eating 
and to feed the radio performers well, giving them vegetab­
les, fish and meat, which he would deliver. 
Then a really interesting network surfaces in the 
'confessions'. How much of it is true or gives a real 
indication of the conflicts is difficult to assess. It 
dealt with opposition building up against the national 
line. Apparently there was a first meeting of which Hu Nim 
knew, but at which he was not present. 
"Brother Nhim (Muol Sambath - RB), who did not 
agree with the 'self-reliance policy' and wanted 
to obtain 'materials, machinery and tractors from 
other countries' held a meeting in Phnom Penh 
with brothers Phim, Khuon and Doeun, where they 
agreed to 'rule Kampuchea as a revisionist country 
(...) Later the organization took measures to 
deal with Khuon (after he had committed a moral 
transgression with a woman). Brother no 2 (...) 
told us about (Khuon's) corrupt history'" (11). 
This meeting must, therefore, have been held before Khuon's 
(Koy Thuon) arrest in April 1976 (12). This meeting would 
imply quite a formidable opposition, with the secretaries 
of the North, Northwest and East zones present. Who Doeun 
was is unclear. Probably he was Chea Doeun, minister for 
Commerce in Vorn Vet's Ministry of Economy, and present at 
the meeting as envoy and substitute for Vorn Vet. He was 
reported to have been a member of Koy Thuon's clan, as 
noted above. The Southwest zone secretary, Мок, was ex­
cluded, which would indicate that the other zone secretaries 
were aware of his alliance with Pol Pot. 
Apparently one main point of conflict was the centre's 
self-reliance policy. In his 'confessions' Hu Nim mentions 
that in January 1977 
"Brother no 1 (Pol Pot - RB) requested a new 
orientation in radio broadcasts. He encouraged me 
to emphasize as models any district or region... 
which mainly uses labour and not too much machi­
nery. Brother no 1 suggested examples, poor 
regions where the land is dry and infertile (such 
as Kp. Chhnang) where they use no machinery at 
all, only labour" (13). "Kompong Chhnang (...) 
was supporting the state much more than the North­
ern or Northwestern zones. (This) made me realize 
that Nhim's stand, for a system of plenty, was a 
great deal different from the Party line" (14). 
The North and Northwest zones in general, and Nhim Ros in 
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particular, were being implicated in a 'counter-revolution-
ary ' network. 
One gets the impression that the centre's policy was 
strongly against obtaining machines and such from other 
countries. Even their use was forsworn. This is intriguing 
for many official Democratic Kampuchea publications contain 
pictures depicting the use of machines of all types, includ-
ing steamrollers, tractors and factories in operation. Most 
of the visitors to Cambodia mention seeing various types of 
machines being used, including dredgers and tractors, 
observations confirmed by refugee reports. Refugees and 
visitors also report how car and other engines had been 
rebuilt to be used for water pumps and rice husking machi-
nes. New factories were set up and in the course of 1977 
and 1978 production was resumed in some that had been closed 
due to war damage. There are testimonies of people who 
worked in factories all through the Democratic Kampuchea 
period (15). The Democratic Kampuchean authorities, in an 
October 1975 broadcast, called on the peasants to "use 
modern and scientific methods and technology" (16). 
Besides the enormous amount of aid being given by 
China and North Korea, Democratic Kampuchea was also slowly 
and carefully putting out economic feelers to the outside 
world. Since August 1975 it had traded dried fish with 
Thailand for engine parts and corrugated iron, according to 
Ragos-Espinas, although official trading was only resumed 
in August 1976 (17). In January 1976 leng Sari visited 
Belgrade, where the Yugoslavs promised him tractors and 
mechanical equipment worth $3 million, which were sent a 
year later. Stanic mentions seeing them during his 1978 
visit. In October and November trade delegations were sent 
to Albania, Rumania and again to Yugoslavia. The Albanians 
exchanged tractors for rubber, coconuts and wood. At the 
same time the Reng Fung company was opened in Honk Kong to 
organize trade with non-socialist countries. In the last 
three months of 1976 $1 million worth of spare car parts 
and motor pumps were imported. In October 400 tons of DDT 
were imported from the USA through this company. Democratic 
Kampuchea also accepted anti-malaria equipment from a Quaker 
organization, the American Friends Service Committee, and 
bought 2 million francs worth of anti-malaria equipment 
from France. In the first three months of 1977 Reng Fung 
Co. bought $3 million worth of goods mainly from France, 
England and the USA. In March and April, Sari visited 
Malaysia, where he is said to have asked the Malaysian 
government to help Cambodia locate European outlets for its 
rubber. In that same year imports of industrial goods, 
chemicals, petroleum products, construction material and 
materials for processing agricultural goods, spare parts 
for cars and machines and film equipment totalled $19 
million, whilst exports valued $680,000. This included 
rice, black pepper, kapok, dried fish and rubber. In the 
summer of 1977 four Thai concerns were officially given 
permission to trade with Cambodia (18). 
The export of rice must not be taken as a sign of 
improved food consumption for the ordinary people. On the 
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contrary, rice exports aggravated their food situation. 
In 1977 and 1978 imports, trade and diplomatic and 
economic contacts with other countries only increased, 
although the Pol Pot group was then much more in control 
than before. Clearly then, "obtaining materials, machines 
and tractors from other countries" was, up to a certain 
extent, a policy that was started in 1975 and continued 
after the Pol Pot group had more or less established domi-
nant control over the state, in fact even increasing sub-
stantially every year. But even in the 1975-1976 period 
such a policy could not have been effected without the Pol 
Pot group's support. Furthermore, the export of agricultural 
goods in order to import capital goods was the key to the 
KR' economic policy. At the most, therefore, the conflict 
was about the extent of dependence on this type of trade 
that the country should tolerate. It is quite likely that 
some of the zone secretaries were willing to import more. 
They were also then perhaps more inclined to make use of 
technicians and intellectuals trained under the old regime, 
something Pol Pot vehemently opposed. 
Still, not only in the Northwest and East zones, even 
in the Southwest zone, which, since the alliance with Mok, 
was the most secure and Pol Pottist zone, a few old regime 
specialists and technicians were retained after the war. 
One report even mentions Lon Nol officers retained at a 
machine shop because of their expertise in tractor main-
tenance. In Phnom Penh all the technicians at the railway 
machine shop were 'new people', as were many in the electri-
cal and water works. At the Phnom Penh tyre factory 30 to 
40 skilled technical workers were retained, some of whom 
were still there in 1982. Most of these specialists who had 
been retained, however, were sent to work in co-operatives 
or liquidated in 1977 and replaced by poor peasant young-
sters. According to one Tuoi Sleng list of victims, 324 
technical workers were killed up to early 1978, most of 
them from the railways and electrical services (19). In 
part it was a real issue dealing with the way the economic 
development of the country should be undertaken. In part it 
was fear of remainig dependent on the knowledge and exper-
tise of people whose loyalty Pol Pot was not sure of. But 
it was also "any stick to beat a dog", another justification 
for eliminating supposed opposition whithin the KR whilst 
again underlying the Pol Pot group's revolutionary purity 
(20). 
The pattern of purges indicates that although the Pol 
Pot - Mok alliance clearly was dominant, they did not yet 
have full control. The day after Hu Nim's arrest there was 
a meeting of the CC's Standing Committee, according to a 
document made public by the Vietnamese. Present were Pol 
Pot, Nuon Chea, So Phim, Mok, Muol Sambath, Vorn Vet, Van, 
Khieu and Ken. According to Thion, the latter three were 
probably leng Sari, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen (21). Van 
could also have been Van Rit, who had replaced Chea Doeun 
as president of the Foreign Trade Committee. Also, leng 
Sari had left the country in March on a visit to Burma, 
China, Sri Lanka, Singapore and Malaysia and it is not 
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unlikely he had not yet returned. The list of persons 
attending this meeting indicates there was at this time 
still some sort of uneasy equilibrium between the power-
holders at the centre and most of the zone party leaders. 
Sometime between April and July 1977 Pol Pot would have 
been informed, through Hu Nim's 'confessions', of the zone 
secretaries' oppositionary meeting. Yet it would be at 
least another year before the dissident zone secretaries 
were purged. It seems the Pol Pot - Mok alliance was elimi-
nating supposed opposition bit by bit, taking their time 
before arresting the really important people. Nokorbal 
worked very methodically. Nokorbal agents took the time to 
make a watertight case and prepare the purge of a party 
cadre carefully. 
In June 1977 Tiv 01, another cultural revolutionist, 
was arrested. In May and June five more North zone cadres 
were sent to Tuoi Sleng and between June and September 
another 35 Northwest zone cadres. Even Nokorbal cadres 
themselves were not safe anymore. In October Chan Phat, the 
Nokorbal chief of the North zone was arrested. Less than 
three months later his successor, Ban Sarin, followed (22). 
Together with the purging of individual ranking cadres 
the centre also started bringing the supposedly dissident 
regions under its control. Starting from about April onwards 
to about August, new, tougher cadres, including many women, 
mainly from the Southwest zone's Kampot and Takeo provinces, 
started purging Northwest, North and East zone cadres en 
masse. In some cases, in S i era Reap and Battambang provinces, 
the purges seem to have started in February already (23). 
People seem to have been aware that something was afoot. 
Early 1977 Yathay noticed an increasing amount of rumours 
circulating about conspiracies and uprisings against the 
regime. Even some KR wanted to join the maquis because they 
found the regime too heavy-handed. In the Northwest zone 
many urban refugees believed the KR there were planning to 
revolt against the centre because of their objections to 
the brutal conditions being imposed on the people. And 
people in the Chikreng district at the time of their revolt 
believed Pol Pot was finished and Sihanouk about to return 
(24). Not only were leading cadres in the regions purged, 
"but whole strings of their supporters allies, 
friends, relatives, associates and colleagues, 
reaching far down into the party administrative 
and military structures for which they were 
responsible" (25). 
These purges do not seem to have affected the regular 
troops. Most of the constructing of networks through the 
suspects' autobiographies was done at Tuoi Sleng. In 1977 
6,330 prisoners were taken in. In 1976 this had 'only' been 
2,250, according to the archives found at Tuoi Sleng after 
the Vietnamese invasion (26). The purge machine was gaining 
momentum. 
There was some logic to this approach. As Thion says, 
these strings of personal relations between activists bound 
by common organizational origins, by shared experiences or 
old relations of subordination that had proved themselves 
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in the trials of the underground or the guerilla, are the 
structural elements of this type of movement, devoid of any 
internal democracy, by principle but also by necessity. The 
individual's political choice centres on questions of per-
sonal loyalty more than on an identification with the 
political line. Conflicts within the top leadership about 
general policy, ideology, the exercise of power and other 
such issues that seem purely political at that level, lose 
more and more of their political character and become more 
and more a question of loyalty as they descend down to the 
lowest echelons (27). That is why whole strings were purged. 
Not all those purged were killed. There were many 
cases of suspension or expulsion from the party, often com-
bined with imprisonment or labour reform. Many of those who 
were simply suspended or expelled from the party, or retur-
ned alive from imprisonment or labour reform, continued to 
live more or less as ordinary people (28). They were usually 
also demoted to depositee status, which meant smaller 
rations and loss of all rights. Not all the old cadres were 
purged. In many places they managed to hold on. 
Mok was not the only one whose position was strength-
ened by the purges. Some local cadres, very likely Pol Pot 
stalwarts, also emerged more powerful than before, like the 
military commanders of the Northwest and North zones. Keu 
and Ke Pauk. Ke Pauk it seems had already had his followers 
in strategic position in sectors 41 and 42. When Southwest 
zone cadres came and purged the North zone they were subor-
dinate to Pauk. Tul, originally a Southwest zone cadre who 
had become secretary of sector 42 (western Kp. Cham) after 
the war, was arrested in 1977 and replaced by Pauk's 
brother-in-law, Chhoeun. Siem Reap was renumbered sector 
44. Sectors 41, 42,and 43 were now separated from the North 
zone to become the central zone, with Pauk as secretary, in 
effect giving him his own power base. Another former South-
west zone cadre, Kang Chap, who had become deputy secretary 
of sector 43 (Kp. Thorn) and who probably was the commander 
of the Southwest zone troops who took over in Chikreng, 
became secretary of Siem Reap. 
In the meantime the purging of the East zone continued. 
Implicated by Chakrey's 'confessions' Hak, commander of the 
170th Division's Third Brigade, was arrested at the end of 
1976, followed by about 200 of his officers as well as some 
from the Fourth and Fifth Brigades. Many of the Third 
Brigade's rank and file were replaced by Central zone 
troops. Lists of East zone cadres implicated by people 
interrogated at Tuoi Sleng had been sent to So Phim, the 
zone's secretary, "to take action in Region 20, 21 and 22" 
according to an East zone KR cadre. Apparently So Phim, 
having known those implicated to be good revolutionaries, 
decided not to take action against some or most of them. 
This "hiding traitors" increased Pol Pot's suspicions of 
him. Chan, the zone's deputy secretary who had been made 
secretary of the twin sectors 23 and 24 following the arrest 
of So, secretary of sector 23, on the 17th of March 1977, 
was empowered, it seems, to extend the purges. He called in 
Yin Sophi, his head of security when he had still been sec-
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retary of sector 21, as executioner. The purges were vetoed 
by Peam as head of the East zone office. Once Chan had con­
solidated control over sectors 23 and 24 the purges were 
extended to the other sectors of the zone. During 1977 as 
many as half of all sector and district level cadres were 
replaced by young fanatic Southwest zone cadres, personally 
loyal to Chan rather than to the zone committee (29). 
Chou Chet ' s West zone was also being eroded from the 
inside. Again it was the zone's military commander, in this 
case Paet Soeung, who was the centre's hatchet-man. He had 
been commander of the Southwest zone's First Brigade during 
the war and loyal to Мок. He was probably more powerful 
than the zone's secretary. He, for instance, signed the 
death warrants in the zone's prison. In July a party repre­
sentative from the centre, addressing a West zone cadre 
meeting, warned that 
"a 'fair number' of cooperatives in the Western 
Zone were controlled by 'enemies and various 
classes' other than poor peasants (...) This was 
'no way to build socialism' (...) The backgrounds 
of all Party officials had to be reviewed, includ­
ing those at Zone level" (30). 
This was a serious critique of Chou Chet himself. 
Even the Southwest zone was not free of the purge 
waves racking the country. The secretary of Kandal e.g. had 
been arrested on the 15th of March, and in Kampot the chief 
and the administrative committee of a re-education camp 
were also purged (31). 
In many areas the 'new people' initially welcomed the 
Southwest and CC cadres. For them it was good news that 
starvation and killings were to be halted and the "traito­
rous" cadres responsible for these crimes to be purged. 
Perhaps the centre genuinely considered these zone and 
lower level cadres to be incompetent in not feeding the 
population in their areas adequately and producing enough 
surplus for the centre. Many testimonies remark that the 
new Southwest zone cadres claimed they had purged the old 
cadres for not treating the people correctly and "trying to 
curry favour with the centre by sending out too much rice, 
instead of holding back enough for consumption" (32). 
There may be some unsuspected confirmation that, 
besides the internal party power struggle, these issues 
were also involved, in the fact that life in the Southwest 
zone, the Pol Pot zone par excellence, was not so bad, 
comparatively speaking. It was probably the best organized 
and most consistently administered, and although discipline 
was generally strict, the worst periods of executions seem 
not to have been directed at 'new people' but at the KR 
themselves. In this zone the "miseries associated with (Pol 
Pot) policy were less manifest than elsewhere", Vickery 
summarizes his research on regional variations. Starvation 
was not a serious problem, although it did occur at certain 
places and times. This zone was also the most important 
supplier of rice for the centre (33), indicating that as 
far as the economy was concerned it must obviously have 
performed reasonably well. 
125 
Following the purges there was sometimes a short period 
during which rations did indeed improve, medicine was 
distributed and discipline slightly slackened. The people 
were asked about their problems. They also had to recount 
their personal histories. But the new cadres were faced 
with the same difficulties as their predecessors in meeting 
the centre's demands. After they had consolidated their 
position things often became worse than before (34). 
It is difficult to asses the food situation in early 
1977. According to western intelligence the 1976-1977 
harvest was mediocre (35). A United States satellite survey 
showed that rice-growing areas had dropped 25 to 50% from 
1975. Food production fell drastically in 1976 (36). One 
report mentions aerial reconnaissance showing a good winter 
harvest, but indicates that many areas were short of food 
as a result of bad distribution (37). Already low food 
rations were cut even more as more rice was requisitioned 
by Angkar, to fund its infrastructural construction program, 
for export and, increasingly, for the military. Ung, for 
instance, noted that after the 1977 purge more food was 
carried away by army trucks as the centre set higher quotas. 
In spite of greatly increased production too little was 
left for the village to last until the next harvest. In 
terms of food 1977 was, according to many testimonies, the 
worst year (38). 
There were some improvements. The continued import of 
medicine and anti-malaria equipment also benefited the 
ordinary people. In 1977 two or three types of modern 
medicine were being used in the co-operatives for the first 
time and people were starting to get Chinese made quinine 
tablets. Collectivization and communal dining were now 
imposed in those few areas where this had not already been 
done. 
The only real policy change that occurred seems to 
have been that in the mobile work brigades and youth groups 
there was a shift from the collective basis on which work 
targets had been fixed to an individual basis. According to 
people interviewed by Kiernan a particular amount of earth 
had to be moved or a particular area of forest cleared per 
day by each worker. Sometimes fulfillment of the target 
entitled a worker to a higher ration, sometimes a worker 
would only receive his or her normal ration if the target 
for the day had been fulfilled. The use of food rations as 
stimulant (reward or punishment) was general practice, of 
course. Ponchaud also mentions daily norms demanded from 
workers on infrastructural work which tends to confirm the 
above. One refugee's testimony even notes this change in 
the labour system to individual work targets for transplant-
ing and harvesting, work done by all but the very young and 
old. Szymusiak experienced this in 1976 already in the 
southeast of Battambang Province. According to Kiernan, 
this change in labour system was mentioned by many refugees 
from different parts of Cambodia. However, nearly all the 
examples he and Ponchaud cite come from one area, sector 5, 
the north of Battambang Province (39). Szymusiak mentions 
individual work targets in road construction in sector 4, 
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and according to Martin it was used in the restructuring of 
traditional paddy fields into one hectare squares (40). How 
general this shift to individual work targets was is there-
fore unclear, and even if it was a policy change following 
the 1977 purges. It did atomize people further, giving the 
regime even more control over the population. It is a method 
of getting more work done but it also needs more control to 
check whether the targets have been met. 
By September 1977 Pol Pot felt confident enough to 
publicly announce the existence of the CPK in a five hour 
speech. He also mentioned the existence of internal con-
tradictions. Although 98 to 99% of the population supported 
the revolution (41), the remaining 1 to 2%, a 
"very small handful of reactionary elements (were) 
enemy agents belonging to various imperialist and 
international reactionary espionage networks who 
occupy themselves with hostile activities against 
our revolution (...) Some of them have camouflaged 
themselves and try to pass as belonging to the 
masses, some agitate openly. But we don't consider 
these intruders, these contra revolutionary 
elements, to be part of the people. They are 
enemies of Democratic Kampuchea, of the Kampuchean 
revolution and the Kampuchean people" (42). 
The Pol Pot regime was quite capable of dealing with such 
elements. This confidence was confirmed by a report on the 
activities of the CPK in 1977, dated November 8th, 1977: 
"We have attained an important victory in 1977. 
Because we have decided to select and purify 
adequately and systematically enemy elements, 
even to eliminate their grand base. Towards the 
end of 1976 we decided on this plan and at the 
beginning of 1977 we have liquidated a fairly 
large number of members of the enemy leadership 
(...) As far as organization is concerned, the 
important points of this year are the singling 
out, the rounding up and the complete purification 
of elements susceptible to be camouflaged enemies 
and cells in the organization". 
Only parts of this document, captured by the Vietnamese, 
have been translated and made public at the Tribunal (43). 
Probably this plan, that was decided on towards the end of 
1976, refers to the circular "no. 870", dealing with the 
planned purges (44). Also according to the Vietnamese, the 
April 1977 issue of Tuno Padevat notes: 
"We have succeeded in identifying (the espionage 
networks) and have in the main eliminated them 
during the course of the first third of 1977" 
(45). 
This self-confidence did not herald a slackening of the 
purges, however. On the contrary, both internal and external 
conflicts continued to escalate. 
127 
7.2 Increasing External Conflicts 
The increasing problems along the Thai - Cambodian border 
could partly have resulted from the purges and internal 
party struggle in Democratic Kampuchea. During 1977 there 
were a series of serious border clashes. Here, as on the 
Vietnamese - Cambodian border, KR patrols were sent into 
zones the regime considered Cambodian but occupied by the 
Thai. This was part of Cambodia's unilateral border adjust-
ment policy. It happened all along the border, but only led 
to serious clashes involving the massacre of civilians in a 
small stretch of open land around the Thai border town of 
Aranyaprathet. 
As the Thai - Cambodian border conflict is not central 
to my discussion it will not be dealt with extensively 
here. Suffice to say that it was more than merely a question 
of Phnom Penh asserting sovereignty by terrorizing the 
border population out of the area and replacing it with KR 
soldiers. The border tension hurt the KR as it cut off the 
smuggling trade with Thailand, nearly all of which passed 
through the Aranyaprathet area, bringing vital supplies to 
Cambodia. Amongst those who had an interest in discrediting 
the KR were the Khmer Serei, whose centre of activities lay 
in this area. The clashes also helped to justify the rigid 
anti-communism of Thai prime minister Thanin. The day after 
the reports of the July clashes, in which 17 Thai were 
killed, the new national budget, with considerably higher 
defence spending, passed through the Thai National Assembly 
almost unnoticed. Certain Thai military commanders in the 
border area, too, stood to gain politically and personally 
by heightened tension, as did other rightist groups. A Thai 
investigation after the January massacre showed that Thai 
smugglers cheating the KR had prompted punitive action from 
the KR. Following this report a number of Thai customs, 
police and local officials were arrested and jailed for 
illegally trading with Cambodia. 
Another group involved was the TCP in the southern 
part of northeast Thailand. They were supported by the KR 
and had bases inside Cambodia, but the exact nature of this 
relationship or of the role these Thai communists played in 
the border problem is unclear. Even their relation with the 
rest of the TCP is unclear. All this makes it difficult to 
assess the cause of the clashes. They could have stemmed 
from growing disorder within Cambodia itself. A KR soldier 
who defected to Thailand in the first half of 1977 indicated 
that units in border provinces were low on rations. He had 
deserted because he could not put up with the hardships 
anymore (46). New units of hill-tribes from the northeast 
were sent to the northwestern border to handle the situa-
tion. These new hill-tribe units were unquestioningly loyal 
to Pol Pot. After the more moderate General Kriangsak came 
to power in Thailand through a military coup in October 
1977 both countries again started calling for negotiations. 
Chinese coaxing played a part here. Notwithstanding this, 
and a visit by Thai foreign minister Uppadit to Phnom Penh 
in January 1978, serious border clashes, said to have been 
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initiated by combined TCP and KR units, kept occurring 
(47). 
Meanwhile, on their other troubled border, the KR were 
losing patience with the Vietnamese. In December 1976 they 
had sent a telegram, but no delegation, to the Vietnamese 
Fourth Party Congress, at which it changed its name to 
Vietneunese Communist Party (VCP). As of March 1977 East 
zone troops started attacking Vietnamese border villages, 
later supported by Central zone troops. The Highway One 
front, in sectors 23 and 24, was under Son Sen's command, 
that of Highway Seven, in sectors 20 and 21, under So Phim, 
who was also chairman of the Front Committee to coordinate 
military operations against the Vietnamese. Ke Pauk became 
So Phim's deputy on this committee (48). The Cambodians 
considered the ambiguous areas to be Cambodian territory, 
but saw that these remained occupied by the Vietnamese. 
Their attacks were to show the Vietnamese that they could 
not continue to commit what the KR saw as de facto aggres-
sion, the occupation of Cambodian territory, without facing 
a Cambodian challenge. The message was simply that they 
were willing to make it costly for the Vietnamese if the 
latter wished to continue relying on superior military 
strength to maintain a status guo. As an East zone report 
put it: 
"If the enemy commits aggression... we must cross 
into and stop and smash him right on his land. 
This is intended to further increase his difficul-
ties... He will no longer dare to repeat his 
aggression against us; rather, it will be his 
turn to strain to stop us" (49). 
It also, rhetorically, asked 
"do we solve (the problem of Vietnamese designs 
on Kampuchea - RB) in accordance with the line of 
our Party or (...) according to the cowardly 
position of a group of traitors who kneel down 
and work as lackeys of the Vietnamese" (50). 
The Vietnamese saw this as outright aggression. 
In April the KR withdrew from the border liaison 
committees. About this time, too, KR patrols began to 
initiate military activities not only inside what they 
considered Vietnamese occupied Cambodian territory, but 
also into Vietnamese territory. Although much of the Khmer 
attitude towards the Vietnamese and the border question can 
be understood and even appreciated, it is quite clear that 
they were again resorting to violence to solve 'contradic-
tions'. From May onwards the Vietnamese army and airforce 
launched limited counter-attacks (51). In June the VCP's CC 
sent a letter to its Cambodian counterpart proposing talks. 
The CPK replied with its own proposal, including a withdra-
wal by both sides to create a demilitarized zone of one to 
two kilometres. Neither side seems to have gone into the 
other side's proposal and so these new diplomatic initia-
tives came to nought. 
The Vietnamese position also hardened due to what they 
saw as KR intransigence and continued border friction caused 
by KR troops. In May they had already proclaimed a 200 mile 
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limit to their sea boundary, partly lured by off-shore oil 
prospects. In August they denied that the Brevié line (the 
maritime border the French had left) had any relevance to 
the question of sovereignty (52). They only recognized the 
Brevié line as demarcation line between the islands, not as 
maritime border (53). Phnom Penh published a map showing 
the Brevié line as Cambodia's national sea border (54). 
Hanoi was of the opinion that this "testified to (Cambodian) 
land greed and territorial ambitions" (55). Looking at a 
map of the area with Vietnam's 200 mile sea claim drawn in, 
it is immediately clear that this leaves Cambodia very 
little maritime territory. The Brevié line seems to be a 
much fairer maritime border, even though it, too, favours 
Vietnam somewhat by leaving it Phu Quoc island. To underline 
Hanoi's implicit warning to the KR that it was serious 
about taking major military action, Vietnam's minister of 
Defence, General Vo Nguyen Giap himself, visited the border 
area (56). But Vietnamese attacks only elicited more violent 
KR reprisals. The conflict was rapidly escalating. 
Here, too, as in the case with Thailand, the Chinese 
tried to exert a moderating influence on the KR. At the end 
of September Pol Pot and leng Sari visited Beijing and 
received a high level reception. Pol Pot again praised 
Mao's thought, stressing how it had led the Cambodian 
revolutionaries. He called Chairman Hua Kuo Feng a worthy 
successor of Mao. But the extremely privileged treatment 
the Cambodian delegation received did not prevent Pol Pot 
from stressing Democratic Kampuchean independence. Not once 
did he mention "hegemonism", agree to the inevitability of 
war or mention the "three worlds" theory - points explicitly 
stressed by Hua Kuo Feng. Pol Pot, rather, stressed the 
five principles of peaceful coexistence (57). During the 
private meetings it is quite likely the Chinese tried to 
encourage the KR to reopen negotiations with the Vietnamese. 
They also seem to have approached the Vietnamese with an 
offer to mediate. Phan Hien, the Vietnamese border-negotia-
tions expert, visited Beijing at this time to negotiate. 
But nothing came of it (SB). 
At a press conference during his September 1977 visit 
to China, Pol Pot admitted the occurrence of a number of 
border incidents, attributing them to enemies wanting to 
overthrow the Democratic Kampuchea regime. But in spite of 
these border clashes, he said, it was impossible for them 
to attack Cambodia from the outside and occupy it (59). The 
immediate danger lay more in what the enemy would do on the 
inside. The report of the East zone conference, cited 
earlier, noted that 
"(w)e must continue to be on guard and be prepared 
to do battle with and smash the enemy at all 
times... If the enemy commits aggression... we 
must cross into and stop and smash him right on 
his land (...) However, we will not act upon 
this guideline precipitously: its implementation 
must be delayed. Only when the time comes that we 
must do battle will we bring it up: we must first 
generalize our unity" (60). 
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This gives the strong impression that internal opposition 
was seen as a greater immediate threat and its solution had 
a greater priority than the conflict with the external 
enemy. 
It is conceivable that the East zone's slightly defen-
sive attitude towards the enemy (the Vietnamese) was not 
shared by the centre. If this is an indication of differen-
ces between the centre and the East zone it is meagre 
indeed. Going by this document the East zone still makes an 
explosively anti-Vietnamese impression. The East zone report 
goes on to say that 
"the enemy attacks us everywhere, in all fields 
and especially in the economic field. His aim is 
to drive our people into misery and hunger so 
that they will lose faith in the party" (61). 
This, seeing the failures of the centre's economic policies 
as the work of traitors working for foreign powers, was 
precisely the Pol Pot group's attitude to failures (62). 
Going by this East zone document, therefore, there was no 
disagreement between the centre and the East zone on these 
important issues of internal and external enemies. The East 
zone troops also seem to have been as vicious and indis-
criminate as other KR units, making no distinction between 
Vietnamese military and civilians. 
Their artillery bombardments of Vietnam's important 
New Economic Zones and the insecure situation in the south 
of Vietnam also played a part in making Vietnam decide to 
launch a massive invasion of Cambodia's eastern regions. 
This invasion began in mid-December 1977. The Vietnamese 
calculated that it would either make the KR give in and 
negotiate on Vietnamese terms or face losing a large part 
of their armed forces, as well as having their frontier-area 
administration replaced by one sympathetic to Vietnam. The 
Vietnamese, well aware of the internal opposition facing 
the KR leadership, also expected their massive but limited 
invasion to create enough Shockwaves to topple the Phnom 
Penh regime through internal rebellions. Initially the 
Vietnamese were able to advance with relative ease, but as 
the KR recovered from the first shock they fought back 
(63). The Vietnamese were surprised by the fierce resistance 
they encountered and decided to retreat. Phnom Penh suspen-
ded diplomatic relations, made public the Vietnamese -
Cambodian conflict and denounced Vietnamese expansionism 
and its "aim to create an Indo-Chinese federation". 
For the KR it was much more than a border issue. They 
were convinced that Vietnam still harboured dreams of an 
Indo-Chinese federation in which Vietnam, naturally, would 
play the dominating role. As far as the KR were concerned 
the "special relationship" the Vietnamese talked about, was 
merely an euphemism (64). One reason Vietnam had her eyes 
on Cambodia, according to the Khmer, was economic. Cambodia 
was thinly populated and had a rich agricultural potential. 
It would be able to provide Vietnam with food as well as a 
place for Vietnamese to settle, thereby relieving the 
pressure on their densely populated homeland. This theme 
recurred constantly. For instance, according to the KR the 
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reason for the Vietnamese invasion at the end of 1977 was 
food shortages in Vietnam. Vietnamese officers supposedly 
told their soldiers if they did not fight Cambodia they 
would die of starvation. Otherwise they would be able to 
grab rice and have a chance (65). Even after the Vietnamese 
invasion and the fall of the Pol Pot regime this notion 
persisted. 
If Vietnamese relations with Laos are anything to go 
by the KR' fears, although exaggerated, were not unfounded. 
Developments after the successful Vietnamese invasion have 
confirmed this. In any alliance between a very underdevelo­
ped and thinly populated partner (Cambodia and Laos) and a 
powerful one (Vietnam), the latter inadvertently takes a 
dominant position. The KR were, therefore, inclined to 
interpret nearly every Vietnamese move as an attempt at 
subverting and overthrowing their regime. They would teach 
the Vietnamese that it was expensive to hold such arrogant 
conceptions about Cambodia. 
They launched strong counter-attacks on Vietnamese 
territory. Contrary to Hanoi's calculations the result of 
its invasion was not a willingness on the part of the KR to 
sue for peace, but a strengthening of their determination 
to withstand the Vietnamese. They were now, more than ever, 
convinced that the Vietnamese posed a threat to their 
regime. And their battlefield recovery reinforced their 
self-confidence. Their gross self-overestimation led them 
to claim that this was the first time the Vietnamese had 
suffered such a defeat and that between September 1977 and 
January 197Θ 29,200 enemies had been put out of action 
(66). 
The Chinese remained reserved, not wanting to choose 
sides (67). They tried to pressure Phnom Penh into talks, 
an approach that, in the case of the hypersensitive KR 
could only be counter-productive. The KR increased the 
intensity of their attacks into Vietnam, wanting to demon­
strate that the Vietnamese invasion had not been a military 
success. Nor did their negotiating stand budge one inch in 
a direction more acceptable to Hanoi. They stuck to their 
original position: the 1967 agreement of non-negotiability 
and Cambodia's unilateral right to make corrections, an 
acceptance of the Brevié line as maritime border, and, 
repeating what they had already proposed in June 1977, 
mutual withdrawal of military forces from the border and a 
cooling off period in which Vietnam must demonstrate good 
faith and peaceful intentions by refraining from further 
military initiatives and attempts to undermine or overthrow 
the KR regime (68). 
Hanoi, on the contrary, now clearly began to indicate 
its support for an overthrow of the KR regime when it had 
Khmer refugees and prisoners of war make derogatory state-
ments against the Pol Pot regime over Radio Hanoi. In this 
light Hanoi could have predicted the KR' reaction to its 
next proposal for negotiations, launched in early February. 
The proposal was not unreasonable as such and had the 
implicit backing of the Chinese (69). But it was clear 
that Hanoi still rejected the 1967 agreement as well as the 
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Brevié line as maritime border (70). Even before the Viet-
namese invasion and the radio broadcasts calling for the 
overthrow of the Pol Pot regime these proposals would, 
therefore, not have been acceptable to Phnom Penh. After 
January fighting continued, albeit at a lower level. Posi-
tions continued to harden. In the opinion of the Vietnamese, 
the KR had started the fighting yet they (the Vietnamese) 
had made concessions in their negotiation proposals. They 
were getting fed up with what they saw as the intransigence 
and impudence of their pig-headed, puny neighbours who 
obviously did not know their place. By the end of March the 
Vietnamese had started creating an ethnic Khmer guerilla 
force recruited from refugees, prisoners of war and ethnic 
Khmer (Khmer Krom) living in southern Vietnam (71). They 
also started to augment their forces along the Cambodian 
border, using them to tie and wear down Cambodian forces, 
and especially to occupy and hold pockets of Cambodian 
territory that would serve as bases for a Khmer guerilla 
against the Pol Pot regime. And they stepped up their 
propaganda war (72). CPK leaders were portrayed as renegades 
who had usurped power from 'true' communists who had been 
associated with the Vietminh in the anti-French struggle 
and who had really led the revolutionary movement that had 
defeated Lon Nol and the USA (73). This was, of course, 
done to prepare the way to justify the overthrow of the Pol 
Pot regime and its replacement by another, led by Khmer 
Vietminh cadres. 
The Chinese, meanwhile, had begun shipping fresh 
military supplies to the KR including, for the first time, 
long range artillery which enabled the KR to shell Viet-
namese territory more accurately and destructively (74). 
Because of this the VCP concluded that the Chinese were 
really behind the continuing uncompromising KR attitude, 
even though the Chinese had just signed a new economic aid 
agreement with Hanoi, supported its negotiation proposals 
and tried to pressure the KR into talks. The Chinese did 
not respond immediately to the Vietnamese polemics. But 
they stepped up the provision of military supplies to 
Democratic Kampuchea. The rising tension between Vietnam 
and China had roots in the past, the former often having 
felt threatened by the latter, and was now aggravated by 
rival claims to islands (the Spratleys and Paracels) and 
territorial waters, and by "the Hoa exodus (ethnic Chinese 
fleeing to China from Vietnam because of persecution). A 
clear indication of the seriousness of the deterioration 
was China ' s accusation that Vietnam was no more than an 
Asian Cuba - a pawn in the Soviets' international strategy 
(75). 
7.3 Massacres and Propaganda 
The December 1977 Vietnamese invasion and its aftermath had 
devastated large areas in the East zone and the border 
areas of the Southwest zone. The continued fighting also 
hampered agricultural production. The East zone had, there-
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fore, been unable to meet its rice quota to the centre. 
Because of this and the fact that East zone leaders perhaps 
advocated a temporary (or permanent) settlement to end the 
fighting, the centre felt they were traitors. It decided 
that attempts to take over the East zone from the inside 
were not having the desired results. A military take over 
of the East zone by Southwest and Central zone troops and a 
total purge of all those cadres in any way connected to So 
Phim was called for. So Phim had been dropped from the 
Politburo in December 1977. The Tuoi Sleng records show 
that by April 19th, 1978 there were many times more East 
zone cadres there than from any other zone (76). In April 
the commanders of two centre divisions stationed in the 
East zone were arrested. Apparently the centre had gotten 
wind of opposition being organized against it by party and 
army units in the East zone. Given the contents of Hu Nim's 
'confessions' it is likely that the Pol Pot group had 
already been watching So Phim closely for quite some time. 
The centre struck before So Phim was ready, but was not 
able to prevent a rebellion from breaking out. 
In May Ke Pauk started summoning the commanders and 
political commissars of East zone and sector brigades to 
his headquarters and had them executed, followed by the 
zone, sector and lower echelon staff. The executions num-
bered in the hundreds (77). These purges heralded a chaotic 
period during which, somewhere along the line. So Phim lost 
his life after being arrested, by committing suicide as 
rumour has it. One second-hand report mentions a rebellion 
in sector 22 breaking out. People stopped eating communally 
and KR fled for fear the people might kill them (78). Ung's 
testimony tends to confirm this rebellion. It occurred 
after the old cadres had been led away, but no new cadres 
had yet taken their place (79). Another refugee mentioned a 
popular uprising in Prey Veng Province when the systematic 
arrest of KR cadres began in the province in 1977 (80). As 
there are no other reports of anything like this happening 
in 1977 in Prey Veng the refugee may just have confused the 
year, something that happened quite often in the testimo-
nies. After all, most ordinary people had little or no way 
of keeping track of the date in Democratic Kampuchea. 
By July the centre had recovered. New cadres, mostly 
from the Southwest zone, were installed and a massive purge 
of the East zone commenced. It was to a large extent an 
evacuation, often of whole villages. It involved ordinary 
peasants and 'new people', but also disarmed KR soldiers. 
They were sent mainly to Pursat Province and the Maung area 
of Battambang, bordering Pursat, where they were dispersed 
over the co-operatives in the area. A few were sent to 
Kandal Province and some dispersed within the East zone 
itself. They were told that they were considered "traitors 
(with) Vietnamese minds" (81). Merely living in the East 
zone, close to Vietnam, was enough to consider them under 
Vietnamese influence and therefore traitors. They were 
badly treated. Often groups of them would be taken away, 
not to return. Many were executed, many died of hunger and 
disease. According to an ex-Northwest zone party cadre, a 
134 
veteran of more than 30 years of revolutionary activity in 
Cambodia and vehemently opposed to the Vietnamese occupa-
tion, 
"the executions in the east were even worse than 
in the northwest. Everyone was a KGB agent. Those 
who were brought from Svay Rieng (East zone-RB) 
to Leach (Pursat Province-RB) were being killed 
and killed" (82). 
Although living conditions in the East zone had generally 
been somewhat better than in the Northwest zone, from the 
summer of 1978 onwards it was more dangerous to be from the 
East zone. Some informants even say that the KR made it 
clear they were going to kill all the 1975 evacuees after 
they had finished killing all the East zone evacuees (83). 
It has been stated, inter alia by the Vietnamese, that 
the East zone cadres and combatants were actually pro-Viet-
nam. There is little evidence for this. The East zone 
cadres, as we have seen, shared in principle the same 
attitude towards the Vietnamese held by KR cadres in the 
other zones. This was also true of "socialist construction". 
The differences were of degree and method. As one ex-East 
zone cadre put it: 
"(T)he three main tasks after 1975 were national 
construction, national defence and socialist 
revolution. National construction meant economy 
and economy meant rice. National defence meant 
guarding the border from Vietnamese attacks and 
destroying Vietnamese armed forces. Socialist 
Revolution meant constructing a collectist (sic) 
society and suppressing reactionaries and enemy 
agents. The East region did all these things 
well. We grew a lot of rice and sent the surplus 
to the Central (sic). We fought the Vietnamese 
bravely and effectively (...) When the Vietnamese 
attacked again in late 1977 we killed many of 
them. Pol Pot even came to praise our combatants 
after the January 6th victory (...) Our coopera-
tives were solid and no reactionaries and any 
agents were able to raise their heads (...) Then 
we became traitors (...) We had done everything 
correctly and then they came and killed everybody 
(...) They said we were doing the opposite of 
what we were doing (...) We fought the Vietnamese 
and they killed us for not fighting the Viet-
namese" (84). 
Some potential purge victims escaped by taking to the 
forest. Some formed small resistance groups. One of those 
who took up arms was Mat Ly, a Cham KR who had been a member 
of the Standing Committee of the Peoples National Assembly. 
Most of these tried to rally opposition on a dual anti-Pol 
Pot, anti-Vietnam basis. According to Heder, the most 
important example, former East zone Fourth Division secre-
tary Heng Samrin (who replaced Pol Pot as prime minister in 
the Vietnamese installed Cambodian government) and who went 
into the maquis in May 1978, 
"initially proclaimed to mass meetings in the 
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forest that his movement to overthrow the 'trai­
torous ' Pol Pot and his 'henchman' Son Sen was 
based on the principle of 'independence/self 
reliance' (...) and that he was well aware of and 
opposed Vietnam's designs on Kampuchean territory 
and desire to control Kampuchea politically. He 
added that he had personally led troops in battle 
against Vietnamese aggressors" (Θ5). 
But he, like many other KR who were opposed to the Viet­
namese, were being forced into a position of either being 
liquidated by the Pol Pot - Mok alliance or of going over 
to the Vietnamese. As the CC and Southwest zone troops 
closed in on his resistance group and news of massive and 
indiscriminate purges in the East zone filtered through to 
them, Heng Samrin was more or less forced to make a deal 
with the Vietnamese in order to survive. To save its people 
Cambodian independence had to be forfeited. This gave the 
Vietnamese more body to their Kampuchean 'liberation move­
ment'. Pol Pot's purges were thus essentially achieving 
the opposite of what they were intended for. 
As the border conflict escalated KR nationalism, 
already virulent, became even more strident, bordering on 
blatant racism. A May 1978 Radio Phnom Penh broadcast 
reviewing the 1977-1978 border fighting said: 
"In terms of numbers one of us had to kill 30 
Vietnamese (...) So far we have succeeded in 
implementing this slogan of 1 against 30 (...) 
using these figures (...) one million Kampucheans 
are equal to 30 million Vietnamese (...) For this 
reason 2 million troops should be more than enough 
to fight the Vietnamese because Vietnam has only 
50 million inhabitants. We don't need 8 million 
people. We need only 2 million troops to crush 
the 50 million Vietnamese: and we would still 
have 6 million people left" (86). 
This would seem to be a call for a genocidal war against 
the Vietnamese. 
The KR' preoccupation with Khmer purity, their self-
overestimation and their fear for the extinction of the 
Khmer race form part of the framework in which this increas­
ing racism can be understood. Racism in Cambodia had strong 
historical roots. The Black Book makes clear that the Viet­
namese were responsible for all the ills that have ever 
befallen Cambodia. It is shown that right from 
"the feudal period, through the time of the French 
colonialists, the American imperialists and the 
present period of Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese 
have not changed their true nature, that is their 
nature of aggressors, annexationists and swal-
lowers of other countries' territory" (87). 
Also, it is asserted that 
"Yuon is the name given by the Khmer people to 
the Vietnamese since the epoch of Angkor; it 
means 'savage'. The words 'Vietnam' and 'Viet­
namese' are very recent and little used by the 
Kampuchean people" (88). 
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"The Viets", according to Pol Pot, "want to exterminate our 
race" (89). 
According to Kiernan quite a number of people he 
interviewed mentioned KR cadres saying they were going to 
fight to recover Kampuchea Krom (Cochin-China) from Vietnam, 
as well as a number of provinces that once were part of 
Cambodia from Thailand. Already during the war Mok, backed 
by Kang Chap, was reported to have said this at a meeting 
in Kampot for those who had studied abroad, also accusing 
them of selling Cambodian territory to the Vietnamese (90). 
This policy was not official, according to a former Khmer 
interpreter for North Korean advisors to the Pol Pot regime, 
but "right through 1978 (...) everybody I met in the army 
was talking in these terms" (91). Sihanouk seems to confirm 
this when he says that KR leaders on various occasions from 
1975 onwards made clear to him that their troops wanted to 
win back these lost territories. Although they themselves 
did not indicate this to be their aim, Sihanouk conveys the 
impression that these KR leaders were not unhappy with 
their soldiers' attitude. Vickery also notes that lower 
level KR cadres were enthusiastic about this prospect, but 
the top leadership did not mention such a goal (92). 
It is unlikely the KR leaders themselves believed in 
this reconquering of Kampuchea Krom (93). It was demagogy 
meant to incite the KR troops. It had the same function as 
their anti-Vietnamese racist propaganda, to mobilize the 
people even more, to stir them to greater heights in build-
ing socialism and defending Cambodia. For the Pol Pot regime 
defending the country from outside enemies, being vigilant 
towards counter-revolutionary traitors and building socia-
lism were all indissolubly linked. All the resolutions 
condemning Vietnamese aggression passed at meetings of all 
kinds of units (fighters, cadres, co-operatives, trade 
unions), therefore naturally included paragraphs extolling 
the pure revolution, condemning individualism and libera-
lism, calling for more discipline and promising to economize 
more, pay more attention to maintenance, develop production 
with a collectivist proletarian spirit and defend the party, 
the people and the country (94). That this was internal 
propaganda meant to mobilize the people is confirmed by 
Khieu Samphan. Asked by Sihanouk the reason for the KR' 
anti-Vietnamese racist propaganda he answered without any 
reserve: 
"To realize a perfect union of compatriots around 
the party, to get from the workers the largest 
return out of their productive capacity and 
increase the value and combative spirit of the 
soldiers, there is nothing better than inciting 
them to hate the Yuons, everyday more" (95). 
The effect of this violent chauvinism, fanning already 
existing Khmer dislike for the Vietnamese to a fever pitch, 
can be seen in the savage attacks by KR troops on ordinary 
Vietnamese villages, razing them to the ground and butcher-
ing women and children. 
We must relativize here, however. Quite often a dis-
tinction was made between the Vietnamese people and their 
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leaders. In a speech in September 1978 for instance, Pol 
Pot told the Vietnamese people that the powerholders in 
Hanoi must not continue to bring them and the Cambodian 
nation more misery. Elsewhere he said that there were 
problems in Vietnam due to the exploitation of its people 
by the regime in Hanoi. It should cease its aggression 
against Cambodia and start to alleviate the situation of 
its own people (96). 
Up to the Vietnamese invasion of December 1977 Vietnam 
had not even been publicly identified as the foreign enemy 
for whom the 'traitors' worked. In Hu Nim's 'confessions' 
the only mention of Vietnam is a reference to enemy agents 
in Cambodia working to "rule Kampuchea as a revisionist 
country like Vietnam, toeing the line of the Soviet Union 
and accepting aid from (...) especially the US". Nowhere is 
Nim or any other person in these 'confessions' identified 
as a Vietnamese agent (97). The only evidence in terms of 
documents, radio broadcasts and such like, that this connec-
tion between 'traitors' and Vietnam was already being made 
before the first Vietnamese invasion comes from the Viet-
namese themselves, quoting captured KR documents, in publi-
cations printed in 1978 or later (98). The ordinary people 
did not hear anti-Vietnamese propaganda in the villages and 
co-operatives (99). If they heard a reason for the purges 
it would be in the manner of "they had contact with traitors 
who wanted opposition" (100). The first direct verbal 
attacks on the Vietnamese in meetings with the ordinary 
people do not seem to have occurred before the summer of 
1978. According to Chanda, for instance, recently arrived 
refugees "for the first time mention suspected pro-Viet-
namese elements as (...) targets (for purges)" (101). 
Lastly, the more sophisticated Vietnamese were not 
able (or willing) to stay clear from using racist insinua-
tions either. This is not, nor can it ever be meant as an 
excuse for KR racism. It is only meant to sketch the atmos-
phere, in which both sides were fast throwing all caution 
to the wind. For the Vietnamese China was the monster behind 
all the Pol Pot regime's aggression. One main reason they 
gave for why the KR regime was a pawn in the hands of 
Beijing was the fact that Pol Pot and leng Sari were them-
selves half Chinese (102). They also claimed the Pol Pot 
regime was committing auto-genocide on the Khmer population 
so that it could be replaced by millions of Chinese (103). 
This absurdity was often repeated after the fall of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea by Cambodians inside Cambodia asked to 
explain the Pol Pot killings (104). 
7. 4 Pol Pot's Rapidly Diminishing Social Base 
The more the border conflict escalated, the more the Pol 
Pot group was convinced of Hanoi's evil designs towards 
Cambodia, the more all internal problems were blamed on 
Vietnamese agents. For the centre to admit, as Heder says, 
"that the problem was something more than sinister 
infiltration of the party by foreign agents would 
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be to open up opportunities for debate on the 
party line in which not only might Pol Pot be 
defeated, but the whole party might unravel" 
(105). 
More and more cadres, formed before and during the war 
against Lon Nol, were being arrested or expelled and degra­
ded to depositee status. They were replaced by young cadres 
fresh from the Southwest zone and CC's party and military 
schools run by Nuon Chea and Son Sen and situated in Kp. 
Chhnang Province. The Pol Pot group was also increasingly 
resorting to females, also from poor peasant background and 
by most accounts "very tough". According to У Phandara, an 
intellectual who returned to Democratic Kampuchea in Febru­
ary 1978, "leng Sari had always maintained that women were 
more loyal and determined to serve the party than men" 
(106). 
At this time there was also a new wave of purges in 
the Northwest and North in which Southwest troops and cadres 
strengthened their hold further. Again the same procedure 
was maintained, people encouraged to air their grievances, 
whilst the new cadres at the same time tried to discover 
their backgrounds. Then more people were arrested. 
Szymusiak, in the Maung area of southeast Battambang, 
records that the new cadres, from Takeo and Prey Veng, told 
them they had come to help them. Too many had starved to 
death. Rations did in fact improve, but later foraging was 
again forbidden (107). There is also mention of West zone 
cadres, especially from Kp. Chhnang Province, among the 
new-comers. According to Vickery, there had been a purge of 
West zone cadres just before the West zone moved in to 
purge Pursat (108). It seems that these Kp. Chhnang cadres 
generally acted in accordance with the Southwest cadres and 
troops (109), although there is one report, from the north 
of Battambang Province, which maintains they purged the 
Southwest zone cadres who had previously replaced Northwest 
zone cadres (110). Pursat was again purged in 1978, by more 
brutal and murderous West zone cadres, although this seems 
to have applied mainly to those people brought there from 
the East zone after May 1978. 
The emergence of cadres from Kp. Chhnang Province 
should not be a surprise. From Hu Nim's 'confessions' it 
was apparent that it constituted one of Pol Pot's favourite 
areas, a province where they did not use machines and yet 
were able to meet all the centre's requirements. During the 
war against Lon Nol it had been an important CPK base. Vorn 
Vet had had his Special zone headquarters there, at Amleang. 
But that was before Pol Pot and Mok had established their 
dominance over the Southwest. According to the Black Book. 
at that time, during the war, the CPK did not dispose over 
important armed forces in the Southwest zone. The Viet­
namese, however, were very active there. They had their 
headquarters at Amleang, where they also had their liaison 
committee with the party's Southwest zone committee (111). 
This is in sharp contrast with what Ith Sarin and others 
had to say, as we have seen (112). But then many of the CPK 
cadres prominent during the war (ex-Pracheachon members and 
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cultural revolutionists mostly) had by now been purged. 
According to Sihanouk, the Pol Pot group showed a marked 
preference for soldiers from the Aural Mountain area in Kp. 
Speu. Mount Aural actually lies in Kp. Chhnang Province, 
close to the border with Kp. Speu. It was one of the main 
bases the KR fell back on after the fall of the Pol Pot 
regime in January 1979 (113). The area and the people 
Sihanouk refers to are obviously partly from Kp. Chhnang. 
In the 1960's, Sihanouk goes on to say, the peasants in 
this isolated, neglected area had given themselves body and 
soul to the KR revolution, more spontaneously than any 
other group. They showed the greatest spirit of self-sacri-
fice to achieve victory for the Pol Pot cause. They with-
stood the first Vietnamese invasion the best, but also 
showed themselves very efficient in purging KR troops in 
other regions (114). 
Pol Pot was differentiating more and more between the 
"unconditionals" (6 divisions) who protected the CPK leader-
ship, and who formed the internal security apparatus, and 
the other units, the "less sure", who had to fight at the 
front and were treated and equipped less well, as Sihanouk 
also noted. 
I have already discussed the training and indoctrina-
tion these young KR soldiers and cadres received. But 
because of their importance as executioners of the Pol Pot 
regime's system of terror and because they were fast becom-
ing the only group the regime could still rely on, it can 
do no harm to listen to Sihanouk as he tells us some more 
about their training and mentality. 
First of all, according to Sihanouk, only youth from 
poor peasants and hill-tribes were recruited, people living 
in the most isolated areas, neglected by the old regime. 
Through indoctrination hatred was fanned in them against 
the higher classes, those who had more, lived well, dressed 
well and were able to send their children to school instead 
of having to keep them at home to work in the fields or 
look after the animals. Those youngsters were taken from 
their parents and started their military careers at the age 
of 12. They were quickly convinced that the party conveyed 
them the greatest honour by calling them the "dictatorial 
instruments of the party". They could now commandeer all 
those who used to be above them. And it was fun to play at 
being soldiers with real weapons. They enjoyed better 
treatment than the other people. They had no reason to 
detest the Pol Pot regime. Right from the start they were 
made used to cruelty, so that they would be crazy about 
killing, would want to kill and make war. In the three 
years of his house arrest, Sihanouk says, he often noticed 
how the soldiers who had to guard his "camp" played cruel 
games with all types of animals and how they complained 
about not being allowed to go to the front to smash Viet-
namese. It is certain that the best gift the regime could 
give its soldiers was to send them to the front lines to 
face the enemy. They, who could so easily kill, were imper-
vious to fear of death or being wounded. They were indif-
ferent to their own suffering. When they got back from the 
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front, Sihanouk says, he heard them boasting about how 
many enemies they had killed, how many enemy tanks and 
planes they had put out of action with ordinary weapons. He 
was struck by their innocent, sometimes even cherubic 
appearances, on the one hand, and the bloody fantasies, 
based on their actual experiences, on the other (115). 
Sihanouk is not always the most trustworthy source, 
often freely interpreting events, not shunning sensationa-
lism and always with a sharp eye for his own role. But the 
essence of his expose rendered above dovetails with what we 
have already described in earlier parts of this work. It 
gives a fair insight into the mechanisms behind KR cruelty. 
The hill-tribes Sihanouk alluded to were really the 
only other group Pol Pot could count on. The basis for 
their loyalty was laid in the 1960's when Pol Pot had his 
base in the rugged northeastern mountain areas. The Pol Pot 
regime's attitude towards these tribes is made very clear 
in the Black Book. In the 1960's, in 
"the North-East of Kampuchea the Vietnamese had 
difficulty in applying their strategy because of 
the presence of the CPK leadership. They tried to 
win the population for them, but in vain (...) 
The population of the North-East is certainly not 
very numerous (30 to 40.000 inhabitants) but the 
Vietnamese feared them very much because they are 
very loyal to the Kampuchean Revolution. In the 
region of the plains, the Vietnamese did succeed 
in winning certain elements from among the popula-
tion and cadre" (116). 
Pol Pot told Yugoslav journalists that because his base had 
been in a hill-tribe region he knew these national minori-
ties very well. They used to live in poverty, dressed only 
in loincloth. They did not even have salt. But now, accord-
ing to Pol Pot, they live like everyone else and one cannot 
distinguish them from others (117). Kiernan mentions a 
re-education camp in northern Kp. Cham Province for over 
200 intellectuals who had returned from France in 1976, who 
were 
"supervised by 30 soldiers led by a 24-year-old 
north-eastern tribesman named Kan; according to 
one of (these intellectuals) Kan was not educated 
but had a "very strong revolutionary standpoint. 
Pol Pot employs many hill tribe people because 
they are faithful"" (118). 
No problems arose about ethnicity, customs and such as 
these tribes were apparently voluntarily Khmerized. Pol Pot 
must have alluded to this when he said that now "one cannot 
distinguish them from others" (119). 
So the waves of purges that had swept the country left 
the regime with very little support. Cadres and soldiers 
who survived the purges expressed bitterness at a leadership 
which had demanded and received the utmost from them, even 
including the readiness to kill and to die, only to turn 
around and betray them with charges of treason and massacre 
them unmercifully (120). A veteran of 30 years of revolu-
tionary activity in Cambodia and vehemently opposed to the 
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Vietnamese said that 
"after 1975 all kinds of friends became enemies, 
everybody was attacked. The party has weapons, 
its strength comes from weapons not from popular 
support" (121). 
Many 'base people' were alienated. Not only was life also 
becoming harder for them in the purged regions, they also 
sometimes had ties of kinship and friendship with purged 
and executed cadres and soldiers. An intellectual, who had 
joined the KR in 1970 after the Lon Noi coup, said 
"(e)veryone hated the name of Pol Pot (...) The 
KR had an army but no popular support. I have 
talked to the people and know this was an incor-
rect regime" (122). 
On the one hand it would seem that the Pol Pot group 
felt quite confident. In a speech commemorating the eigth-
teenth anniversary of the party in September 1978 Pol Pot 
said that 
"more than 99% of our people are united with the 
CPK. The enemy agents who persisted in fighting 
the Kampuchean Revolution (...) consist of only a 
small handful and they have been completely 
isolated within the nation and the people" (123). 
This is more or less a halving of the number of reactiona-
ries compared to his speech the previous year, when he had 
said that there were 1 to 2% reactionaries. Was this an 
unintended cynical reference to the massive purges that had 
taken place? On various occasions during 1978 Y Phandara 
was told, both by young KR workers and relatively high 
placed cadres, that the traitors within the party, even 
those within the highest ranks, had been eliminated since 
the beginning of 1977 and only their agents remained (124). 
But it seems that this optimism was more for public 
consumption. The internal enemy, as far as the Pol Pot 
group was concerned, although consequently linked to the 
outside enemy, mainly Vietnam, now posed the main threat. 
An April 1978 broadcast asserted that if one did not hold 
onto the "clear line" separating the Kampuchean Revolution 
from all others "the enemy's view and ideology will creep 
into your minds (...) It is possible that several of our 
comrades have fallen into this trap" (125). A CPK Politburo 
document, dated 2-8-1978 and made public by the Vietnamese 
at the Tribunal, distinguishes three periods of enemy 
activity. The first ended when American imperialism suffered 
a strategic defeat, forcing it 
"to cooperate with Annam. Subsequently the major 
role was played by Annam, supported by the 
U.S.S.R... The Annam, U.S.S.R., U.S.A. clique 
took the decision to definitely annihilate us 
towards the end of 1977. In the third period, 
from the beginning of 1978 to the present Annam, 
supported by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., still 
plays the principal role on the outside, but the 
most important role is played by the gang inside 
the country, which in the past used exterior 
forces to bring us to our knees, by the gang of 
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the so called Phim (So Phim-RB) and the gang of 
the so called Choairing... Military-wise we can 
deliver the enemy ten blows to his one. In the 
southwest we can attack the enemy for the major 
reason that our troops are pure, our base organ-
izations are pure, not 100% pure, but basically 
pure which also holds for the 24th zone (Prey 
Veng Province, in the Eastern zone). The enemy 
can attack us there where our army is not pure, 
our base organizations are not pure... If the 
machinations are also foiled this fourth time, 
the enemy will fall into a passive strategy, 
leaving him only the defensive and we will move 
into an offensive strategic position which won't 
necessitate much effort on the tactical plane. 
For the immediate present as well as for the long 
term future, the direction to take consists of 
resolving the great problem of the reorganization 
of the base; if we do not succeed in constructing 
the base, we will not be able to vanquish Annam" 
(126). 
Pol Pot may have hinted at this in his September 1978 
speech. There have always been good, mediocre and weak 
elements in the party, he said, and the number of good 
elements were preponderant. But where cadres are weak, 
reorganization was called for, cadres had to be formed and 
their qualities developed (127). 
If the party cadres, the revolutionary organs and the 
army were 100% trustworthy, in other words, the Vietnamese 
enemy would have no leverage over the Pol Pot regime. Pol 
Pot was apparently still convinced that the Vietnamese by 
themselves were an easy match for the KR. It was the inter-
nal uncertainty that might give the enemy a chance. Even 
the Southwest zone, which was clearly indicated in the 
Politburo document as a Pol Pot group stronghold, was not 
considered completely reliable ("100% pure"). Prey Veng, 
interestingly enough, part of the East zone considered by 
the centre to be pro-Vietnamese, fell in the same category 
as the Southwest zone. Chan had assumed control here, as we 
have seen, as well as in the bordering province of Svay 
Rieng (sector 23), which, however, was not mentioned favou-
rably. The great East zone purge seems to have mainly 
affected Svay Rieng and Kp. Cham provinces. The new KR 
cadres who, in the summer or autumn of 1978 purged that 
part of the northwest where Szymusiak was staying, were 
from Prey Veng and Takeo (128). 
7.5 Attempts to Broaden National Support 
The situation was rather confusing. In those parts of the 
northwest (mainly Pursat Province) where East zone people 
were sent after So Phim's mutiny had been smothered, 'new 
people' started receiving better treatment. They were put 
in charge of East zone workers. 
"In fact the KR stopped executing us and started 
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executing the Svay Rieng people; they also gave 
us more to eat than we'd had before and gave very 
little to the Svay Rieng people, who died from 
disease and starvation in large numbers", 
according to Lim Vanny (129). In the Staung (Stung) area of 
Kp. Thorn Province 'new people' were elevated to 'candidate' 
status over East zone people who had been exiled there 
(130). 
At this time, too, the official division of the popula-
tion into full rights, candidate and depositee was reported-
ly abolished. Anyone could be put into a leadership posi-
tion. One did not have to be a party member or a full rights 
person. People were told that 'base' and 'new people' were 
now equal and this classification was dropped (131). But it 
is doubtful whether many people noticed this change. It may 
have been the reason for the better treatment the ' new 
people' received in Pursat Province, as mentioned above, 
and in southeast Battambang, where new KR cadres had told 
the people to go back to their old ways, wear jewelry again 
and stop calling each other comrade, as Szymusiak records. 
"Eat more rice", they were told. And in fact rations im-
proved. This does not seem to have been merely the easing 
of conditions that usually occurred for a short while 
following a purge. One girl who had followed up the new KR' 
encouragement to again wear jewelry, was executed, but only 
because she wore too much, which was a sign of showing off 
and trying to be different (132). Ragos-Espinas notes that 
as of November families were allowed to raise chickens for 
their own use, and Picq says that in the course of 1978 
women were allowed to start wearing colourful clothing and 
dresses again (133). Perhaps the centre, realizing that its 
social base was fast crumbling, was trying in this way to 
disorganize potential opposition and create new groups it 
could rely on by giving them better treatment than they had 
enjoyed before. 
Phandara tells how this happened to people who had 
returned to Democratic Kampuchea to help build the country, 
only to be shut away in re-educational work camps. In June 
1978 a high placed cadre visited the camp near Phnom Penh 
he had been sent to. After listening to the camp leaders' 
report this cadre said he only believed 50% of it. The camp 
inmates were invited to give their opinion about whatever 
they wanted. This was, as we have already seen, a much used 
method to uncover people disagreeing with the regime and 
its policies. Still, a number of inmates carefully voiced 
their criticisms. Although the KR cadre only made some 
vague allusions, daily life in the camp did subsequently 
improve. Furthermore, the camp leaders disappeared, executed 
at Tuoi Sleng as became clear later on. The new camp leader 
explained that his predecessors were traitors and respon-
sible for all the ill-treatment the intellectuals had 
received. Sometime in August some 60 intellectuals from a 
similar camp as Phandara's, in Kp. Cham Province, were 
sent to Phnom Penh and luxuriously welcomed before being 
sent to Phandara's camp. A couple of days later leng Sari 
himself visited this camp. He, too, invited the inmates to 
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voice their opinions on how the camp could be better run. A 
number of inmates again criticized the camp leader's regime. 
In response leng Sari apologized, saying he had not been 
aware that the intellectuals were treated so badly, and 
blamed all mishaps on traitors, agents of the Vietnamese 
who had infiltrated the party. They had to turn their anger 
against the Vietnamese, responsible for all wrong. Angkar 
needed them to fulfil other duties, to help build the 
country. 
Phandara says he suspected that there had been a change 
in tactics towards the intellectuals returned from abroad. 
Indeed, a separate camp was installed for those of them who 
were destined to be integrated into the KR apparatus. Here 
they spent very little time doing manual work. Life now 
became far more bearable for them. A dispensary was opened, 
equipped with medicine. A number of old regime doctors and 
medical students were posted at the new dispensary. Food 
rations improved, working hours diminished. In November 
they got a library and were even allowed to read foreign 
books (134). Some intellectuals were brought in from the 
paddy fields to work in the administration and given tasks 
commensurate with their skills. One of these was Thiounn 
Chum, the only one of the Thiounn brothers who was not 
already a high-ranking KR cadre. He was recalled from the 
countryside to Phnom Penh in 1978 to organize the country's 
finances. After the fall of the Pol Pot regime he became 
Minister for Economic Affairs in the exiled Democratic 
Kampuchea government. A student, who had returned from 
France in 1976 and had been sent to work in a co-operative, 
was, in 197Θ, set to work in the Foreign Ministry after a 
three-day study seminar led by leng Sari himself. Picq 
mentions that her department of the Foreign Ministry was 
reorganized in 1978 to include re-educated intellectuals 
who had been sent to work in the rice fields in 1975 (135). 
She also mentions another change that occurred; the restruc­
turing of education, started in the spring of 1978. It 
enabled her to start teaching (French, Spanish and typing) 
nine and ten year old peasant children, who had been sepa­
rated from their parents and sent to school in Phnom Penh. 
Vickery mentions a seminar, held in October, on the develop­
ment of a new education system that would include univer­
sities (136). 
There were other indications that the Pol Pot regime 
was aware that all was not well, that it was trying to 
unite the population behind its policies. Sihanouk's name 
re-surfaced. A letter written by him after the Vietnamese 
invasion of December 1977 was broadcast, condemning Viet­
namese aggression and giving support to the CPK. In April, 
on Democratic Kampuchea's third anniversary, this was 
repeated (137). From then on Sihanouk's support for the 
Pol Pot regime against the Vietnamese could be heard more 
often. In September 1978 Radio Phnom Penh even announced 
that he had attended an "intimate banquet to honour pat­
riots". Furthermore, his picture was now made public (138). 
As the regime had no love for the prince these announcements 
were obviously aimed at bolstering the regime's image inside 
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the country "to rally the moderates behind the same cause 
as the masters of the country", as Phandara noted (139). 
Khieu Samphan said as much when he made it clear that 
Sihanouk's reappearance was designed to further mobilize 
the Cambodian population in preparing for another large 
scale Vietnamese attack (140). In August the prince was 
taken on a tour of the country, accompanied by high level 
KR who kept telling him in what high esteem the KR and the 
people held him. It was, he says, part of a plan, most 
probably at Chinese instigation, to show him to the people 
to reassure them and gain their support (141). 
His re-surfacing was also meant to improve the regime's 
image to the outside world and win some international 
support, although not even the Chinese were permitted to 
visit him and had, till late 1977, not even known whether 
he was still alive. The admittance of foreigners was in-
tended to sort the same effect. In December 1977 the Swedish 
ambassador to Thailand paid a visit to Phnom Penh, followed 
in March by a group of Yugoslav journalists, in what were 
the first of a series of such visits by foreign groups. In 
October the UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim even accepted 
an invitation to visit Democratic Kampuchea in February 
1979. On the 27th of December, two days after the beginning 
of the definite Vietnamese invasion, the first of what was 
supposed to have become a regular tourist flight from 
Bangkok to the ancient ruins of Angkor Wat took place (142). 
Diplomatic relations were established with Switzerland, 
Japan and Indonesia. Democratic Kampuchea also expressed 
its willingness to have an Australian embassy opened in 
Phnom Penh (143). 
These rather cosmetic efforts to mobilize support were 
coupled with a seemingly more self-critical and realistic 
approach to the problems besetting the country. In March 
1978 Radio Phnom Penh said that 
"imposing party discipline on the masses, for 
instance by threatening with punishment or tor-
ture, had to be avoided at all costs" (144). 
In June Radio Phnom Penh admitted excesses perpetrated by 
"some bad personnel", who had now been instructed to provide 
the population with regular hours for work, study and rest. 
Sufficient amounts of rice had to be allocated for feeding 
the country's manpower at all times (145). It was also said 
that some bad cadres were causing some lack of popular 
support (146). During a press conference in Tokyo in June, 
leng Sari even admitted that many people had died of starva-
tion, although he denied that hundreds of thousands had 
been slaughtered (147). On the occasion of the CPK's eigth-
teenth anniversary resolutions were adopted to "reject bad 
cadre who refuse to improve, and to eliminate authoritaria-
nism, bureaucratism, functionalism and opportunism". Another 
resolution called for the party to rely firmly on the 
proletariat and 
"maintain close unity with all national forces 
and win them over to the side of the revolution 
so as to utterly isolate the handful of enemies" 
(148). 
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Were these signs of a softening on the part of the regime 
in order to create a broader united front? Perhaps. 
But the party leadership was still convinced it had 
not made mistakes. There was no fault with the party line. 
According to the Pol Pot group, it was the followers of 
Vietnam who were responsible for the massacre, for the 
coercive measures and the excesses. Since the summer of 
1977 the government had become conscious of this situation, 
it said, and begun a campaign to explain to the intellec-
tuals that these excesses and arbitrary actions against 
them were not part of, but, on the contrary, deformations 
of its policy (149). Moreover, right in the middle of a 
Kampuchean - Thai rapprochement these elements, it con-
tinued, stage-managed border incidents in which Kampuchean 
soldiers fell upon Thai villagers. The worst excesses had 
also taken place in this same province, Battambang. After 
this Vietnamese network had been smashed, the government's 
real policy could finally develop, with an egalitarian 
society and a flourishing economy, according to the Pol Pot 
regime (150). 
So, as far as the Pol Pot regime was concerned, there 
was nothing that could block a full-hearted support for its 
policies anymore. Yet it remained suspicious of most groups 
other than the young KR soldiers from poor peasant back-
ground. Even though the Pol Pot regime was facing increasing 
manpower problems, the training of pilots, tankcrews and 
artillerymen by the Chinese was only open to barely educated 
teenagers, incapable of assimilating the complex techniques 
involved in this (relatively) modern equipment (151). This 
seriously reduced KR military effectiveness. Modern Chinese 
military hardware and tactics based on the use of this 
hardware could only very partially be deployed. This would 
be one of the reasons why it is highly probable the Chinese 
exerted pressure on the Pol Pot regime to undertake steps 
towards a broader united front. The increasing tension 
between Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam, sucking China 
into a conflict it preferred to avoid, was another. 
Hanoi joined the Comecon. China responded by suspending 
all aid projects to Vietnam. The VCP accused Beijing of 
having bought the Phnom Penh rulers body and soul and having 
turned them into instruments of Chinese counter-revolution-
ary global strategy. Both sides began to build up their 
forces along their mutual border. Probably at the instiga-
tion of Deng Xiaoping, leng Sari, during a visit to Beijing 
in June, met with the former Thai foreign minister, 
Chartichai Choonhavan. This led to successful negotiations 
being concluded in Bangkok in July. The cause of the border 
incidents was imputed to a "third force" which was not 
further identified. Hereafter there were no more clashes on 
the Thai - Cambodian border. If it had only been a matter 
of Chinese pressure, however, it is doubtful if the obsti-
nate KR leaders would have complied. But they, too, were 
aware of the deteriorating situation on the Vietnamese 
border (152). Troops were withdrawn from the Thai border 
and sent to reinforce those on the Vietnamese border. At 
this time the number of refugees reaching Thailand increased 
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considerably over the previous period - indicating a slack-
ening of control in the northwest as well as the renewal of 
purges already discussed above. 
Although Beijing was backing the KR more, strains 
remained. The Chinese reportedly criticized the CPK for its 
failure to create a broader national united front inside 
the country. They also indicated that the CPK should not 
expect any direct Chinese intervention even if the military 
situation worsened considerably (153). The CPK was also 
critical of the Chinese. Picg heard cadres criticizing the 
Chinese in 1977 and again in July 1978, saying China wanted 
to colonize Cambodia. Democratic Kampuchea was the only 
really good country, they held (154). leng Sari had gone on 
another international jaunt, visiting the ASEAN countries 
(the Association of South East Asian Nations), lobbying for 
support. At the end of May the Rumanian prime minister 
Ceausescu visited Cambodia (155). But these were efforts 
directed at the outside world. Inside Democratic Kampuchea 
Beijing was convinced more was needed than the token re-
emergence of Sihanouk. When Nuon Chea visited Beijing in 
September the Chinese again voiced their displeasure. 
Meanwhile, beginning in early August, a massive Soviet 
arms airlift to Vietnam had gotten underway. The Vietnamese 
increased their military activity, occupying pockets of 
Cambodian territory in the border area. Hanoi claimed that 
a consolidated resistance movement now existed in Cambodia, 
fighting the Pol Pot regime (156). Vietnamese bombing was 
taking a heavy toll of the KR army (157). The Vietnamese 
also continued their troops build-up in southern Laos. All 
this was enough for the CPK to conclude that another large 
scale invasion was perhaps on the Vietnamese agenda. The KR 
began to prepare for a possible return to the maquis. Rice 
and other provisions were stockpiled at bases throughout 
the country. In early November the state of emergency was 
proclaimed for Phnom Penh and the province of Svay Rieng. 
Hanoi, on its part, also felt compelled to take certain 
measures. Faced with Chinese threats - Deng Xiaoping had 
warned Hanoi that the results of a Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia, although China would not intervene militarily in 
Cambodia, would not be limited to that country (158) - it 
signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the 
Soviet Union. This provided for reciprocal assistance in 
case either party were attacked, with a view to eliminating 
that threat. Beijing now had to reckon with Soviet interven-
tion in case it decided to take punitive action against 
Vietnam (159). 
Immediately following the signing of the Vietnamese -
Soviet friendship treaty Wang Dongxin, chief of the Chinese 
Praetorian guard, a specialist in security and party organ-
ization, visited Phnom Penh. Again discord between China 
and Cambodia was evident. Even the sending of Wang, who was 
purged in 1980, and not a higher placed Chinese leader, 
could be seen as an "indication of Chinese embarrassment 
over the Phnom Penh regime" (160). But for the Chinese 
leaders there was no turning back. With the Vietnamese now 
in the Soviet camp they would back the capricious KR. And 
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the Pol Pot regime became more and more dependent on China, 
especially for its military support. It is difficult to 
imagine that the Pol Pot regime was unaware of the catas­
trophic collision course the country was on. Still, its 
leaders were too proud. As long as they remained convinced 
of the correctness of their policies, and only capable of 
blaming all mistakes and excesses on 'traitors', they would 
never be able to achieve a broad united front against 
Vietnam. The spiral of purges and violence had developed 
something like a momentum of its own, making the party 
leaders, already endowed with a more than average doses of 
suspicion, even more paranoid (161). The more they purged, 
the more traitors they saw, the more people turned against 
them, the more they were inspired to trust even fewer 
people. 
7.6 Paranoia-Fed Terror Gets out of Hand 
The Tuoi Sleng intake in the first five months of 1978 was 
5,765 persons, nearly the same as for all of 1977. Even 
high-ranking CPK members were being eliminated, including 
the zone secretaries not considered 100% loyal to Pol Pot. 
The Northwest zone's military commander. Keu, in a move 
similar to Mok and Ke Pauk's ascendancy, took over the 
Northwest zone when Muol Sambath (Nhim Ros) was (probably) 
arrested with his aides in June (162). In March Chou Chet, 
the West zone secretary, was arrested by Paet Soeung, his 
military commander, after supposedly having attempted to 
organize an armed rebellion and, together with ten of his 
co-conspirators, taken to Tuoi Sleng (163). Subseguently 
Soeung, a Mok loyalist, went on to replace Kang Chap, 
secretary of the North zone, who was arrested in August. 
Kang Chap had still been around during Ceausescu's visit, 
having welcomed him at Siem Reap when the Rumanians went to 
visit Angkor Wat. Ever since its installation in 1976 he 
had been in charge of the mysterious Judiciary Committee. 
In a system without penal code or courts its function was 
unclear. He had also, since 1971, been a member of the 
party's CC. Considering his career and the remarks he is 
reported to have made, together with Mok, during the war, 
concerning the recapture of Kampuchea Krom, he must have 
been in line with the Pol Pot group (164). So the purge 
machine now seemed to be really turning inward. Even South­
west zone cadres, who had been given responsibility over 
other regions after these had been purged, were falling 
victim. 
Among the KR leaders participating in the talks with 
Wang Dongxin and his delegation was Nguon Kang, who had 
last been heard of in April 1976 when he had been appointed 
first vice-president of the Standing Committee of the 
People's Assembly. Now he was assistant secretary general 
of the party. Nguon Kang was in fact Та Mok. Another impor­
tant participant in the talks with Wang was Ke Pauk, one of 
the architects of the assault on Phnom Penh in 1975, the 
man in charge of the evacuation and massacre of East zone 
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people in mid-1978 and a member of the party's CC. After 
the successful Vietnamese invasion Ke Pauk was to become 
under secretary general of the Supreme Committee of the KR' 
armed forces (165). Although Chan had become party secretary 
of the East zone in May (166), Pauk'β activities there as 
well as his higher party standing presumably indicate that 
he controlled the East zone or shared its control with Mok. 
Keu, the Northwest zone chief, had been promoted to the 
Politburo in 1977 (167). 
So it seems Pol Pot had entered into three alliances 
that now gave him control over the zones, with Mok, Ke Pauk 
and Keu. Mok was clearly the foremost among the three, with 
most of the new cadres coming from the Southwest zone. He 
had now become the chief governmental representative in 
three of the seven zones, adding the North and West zones 
to the Southwest zone which he already controlled since the 
war (168). According to Chanda, Mok had personally led his 
men in the purging of these regions (169). Although he was 
higher in the party hierarchy, Keu does not seem to have 
been active outside his own zone, contrary to Ke Pauk. In 
fact, a power struggle between the two expansionist zone 
secretaries, Mok and Pauk, may have been in the offing. 
Besides these alliances there were now two triumvirates 
ruling Democratic Kampuchea, one political (government, 
diplomacy) consisting of Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and leng Sari, 
and one military (army, militia, security and intelligence) 
consisting of again Pol Pot, Та Mok and Deuch. The secret 
to Pol Pot's power, according to Thion, lay in his longtime 
control over the army's Political Committee. It was there 
he got the cadres to replace all those purged (170). This 
committee controlled both the CC's and the Southwest zone's 
party and military schools. 
But the purges did not slacken, on the contrary. Late 
1978 Vorn Vet, the minister of Economic Affairs, long time 
Pol Pot stalwart and friend also of Mok, was arrested (171). 
During Ceausescu's visit less than six months earlier. Vorn 
Vet and three of the committee presidents resorting under 
his ministry, Mey Prang, Cheng An and Van Rit, had featured 
prominently (172), suggesting a strengthening of his posi­
tion. He had accompanied Pol Pot and leng Sari during their 
historical visit to Beijing in 1977. It seems he was, like 
most of the party leaders, strongly influenced by the 
radical strains in Chinese communism, but most of all a 
nationalist (173). 
Recalling my supposition that Chea Doeun, the then 
president of the Commerce Committee resorting under Vorn 
Vet's Ministry of Economic Affairs, had attended the dissi­
dent zone party secretaries' meeting mentioned in Hu Nim's 
'confessions' as a stand-in for Vorn Vet, one can again 
wonder why it took so long for compromised high-ranking 
party cadres to be purged. After studying Tuoi Sleng docu­
ments Heder has come to the conclusion that it was not 
unusual for there to be a lapse of a year or more from the 
time an 'enemy agent' was first identified to the time of 
his arrest. This period 
"was spent in building an 'airtight case' (to 
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satisfy the Pol Pot leadership's pathologically 
perverse sense of due process) and in preparing 
the practical groundwork for the tricky task of 
purging large numbers of very often quite powerful 
party figures" (174) . 
In that intermediate period Vorn Vet was even able to rise 
in the party, which either indicates his relative power or 
that the Pol Pot group had not linked him to the dissident 
zone party secretaries' meeting. It was Picq's experience 
that cadres would invariably be promoted before their 
arrest, but it is unclear how general this procedure was 
(175). 
Just as there were regions that were more prone to 
being purged than others, so there were ministries, commit­
tees and other organs that were safer than others. This of 
course was a consequence of the conspiracy theory the Pol 
Pot group adhered to, purging not only individuals, but 
whole strings. So together with Vorn Vet, Mey Prang and 
Cheng An were also purged (176). Phuong, the president of 
the Plantations Committee, also resorting under the Ministry 
of Economics, had already been arrested in June, but that 
was probably a consequence of the purging of the East zone, 
following So Phim's abortive mutiny, Phuong also having 
been a member of the East zone committee. It is not clear 
whether this lot also befell Van Rit. He was not mentioned 
in the December 1979 KR line up when the KR held their 
first congress after having been forced back into the 
guerilla (177). But at the end of December 1978 he was 
named as the minister of Commerce by plant and warehouse 
managers when asked by Dudman. According to Dudman, "Western 
sources had understood that a person named Chor Doeun (Chea 
Doeun - RB) held this post" (17Θ). This is no guarantee Van 
Rit had not also been purged. Not only were various commit­
tees resorting under Vorn Vet's Economics Ministry purged, 
but also cadres responsible for factories. According to 
Heder, there was some armed resistance in Phnom Penh against 
these purges. Factory workers 
"engaged in some street fighting and hit and run 
battles with central committee and southwest 
region troops loyal to Pol Pot and Та Mok" (179). 
On the night of the 23rd of December Malcolm Caldwell, 
British left-wing scholar, was assassinated in Phnom Penh 
in the guest-house where he and the two American journa­
lists, Becker and Dudman, were staying. They were the last 
group of foreigners to visit Pol Pot's Phnom Penh. The Pol 
Pot regime blamed the Vietnamese for the killing, while 
the Vietnamese claimed that Pol Pot himself was responsible. 
Documents found at Tuoi Sleng, similar to Hu Nim's 'confes­
sions', implicate a faction or string ultimately headed by 
Son Sen, the minister of Defence, longstanding Pol Pot 
loyalist who had finally, in 1977, been promoted to the 
Politburo. The actual murder was supposedly master-minded 
by Ny Kon, chief of protocol and number three man at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (180). 
So even the 'safe' ministries, such as Defence and 
leng Sari's Foreign Ministry, were apparently no longer 
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safe. The question remains why Ny Kon and Son Sen were not 
purged? Ny Kon is, as far as is known, at present commander 
of the 320th Division of the KR and Son Sen is still mini-
ster of Defence (161). Probably their cases were still in 
the primary research stage at the end of 1978. After the 
Vietnamese invasion which began on the 25th of December, 
just a day or so after Caldwell's murder, the purges con-
tinued even though the Pol Pot regime had been forced to 
return to the guerilla. The party continued to explain all 
the defeats and disasters that occurred by the fact that 
there were too many ' traitors ' in the ranks of the party 
and army. More purges were necessary to pave the way to 
recovery and victory (182). 
But Nokorbal could not operate as efficiently as at 
Tuoi Sleng, which the Pol Pot regime had been forced to 
leave behind completely intact for the Vietnamese. After 
1979 Pol Pot, forced by the successful Vietnamese invasion, 
switched more and more to united front tactics to broaden 
support. Planned purges were therefore suspended and Ny Kon 
and Son Sen probably owe their lives to this. 
All this does not enable us to clarify Caldwell's 
murder, however. Like so many events during the Pol Pot 
regime it remains shrouded in mystery. This affair does 
indicate once more the extent of Pol Pot's suspiciousness. 
Even as the Vietnamese stood poised for their massive 
invasion "the Pol Pot leadership was actually intensifying 
its witch-hunt for internal scapegoats for the horrific 
policies it had imposed", as Heder says (183). Ironically, 
the main target of this latest witch-hunt, Son Sen, as 
minister of Defence, was primarily responsible for organiz-
ing Democratic Kampuchea's defence against the imminent 
Vietnamese attack. 
As far as the reasons for being purged are concerned, 
we have already seen that not belonging to the group that 
went with Pol Pot to the jungle in 1963 or joined him there 
shortly afterwards made one vulnerable. But it was clearly 
not a sufficient reason. Having belonged to the Vietnamese 
dominated and sponsored ICP made one suspect in the eyes of 
the Pol Pot group, but Nuon Chea had been a member and yet 
he is still a very high-ranking CPK leader (184). He had 
even gone to Hanoi following the Geneva Conference, but 
returned after a few months, together with So Phim and Ney 
Sarann (both liquidated). Pol Pot himself had joined an 
"ICP cell". Having been trained or educated in Hanoi was 
another point of vulnerability. But both Thiounn Thioeunn 
and Chum were Hanoi trained and became ministers, although 
Chum not before Democratic Kampuchea was exiled. Cultural 
revolutionists and those who only joined the guerilla in 
1967 or later also became suspect. But Mum and Prasith, the 
other Thiounn brothers, had fled Cambodia for France in 
1955 and 1962 respectively, only to return in 1975. Yet Mum 
became minister for Science and Prasith the exiled govern-
ment's ambassador to the UN. Paris trained Ok Sakun also 
fled Cambodia for France in 1962 and he, too, was still 
prominent after the fall of the Pol Pot regime. Thuch Rin, 
former teacher and cultural revolutionist who had only 
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gone to the jungle in 1967, became an important Southwest 
zone cadre and after 1979 minister for Information. He had 
even been implicated by Vorn Vet's Tuoi Sleng 'confession' 
as belonging to the Tiv 01 group in 1967, together with 
Khek Penn. Both Penn and 01 were executed. So even being 
implicated in Tuoi Sleng 'confessions', although usually, 
was not always lethal. Vorn Vet had also implicated Mok, 
after all, when he expressed sympathy for him ("we had been 
friends from the beginning" (185)). And Keu had been recrui­
ted into the party by Vorn Vet. Khieu Samphan had been a 
cultural revolutionist. Like Hou Youn he had even been 
critical of various economic resolutions passed at the 1971 
Congress. Now he is prime minister of the KR government in 
exile. According to the Black Book, the party had criticized 
those intellectuals who had joined the guerilla in 1967 and 
attacked Sihanouk (1B6). But further-on it says that when 
comrade Khieu Samphan joined the maquis the Vietnamese 
reproached the CPK for taking an erroneous decision (187). 
This is clearly a retrospective attempt to discern between 
Samphan, head of state, on the one hand, and his fellow 
parliamentarians who had also gone into the maquis in 1967, 
like Hou Youn and Hu Nim, but who had been purged, on the 
other. Khieu Samphan's role and position are clearly ex­
pressed by an intellectual who joined the guerilla in 1970. 
Remarking on the attempts by the Pol Pot group, after its 
overthrow and return to the guerilla, to create a broad 
united front and a more respectable image, inter alia by 
having Khieu Samphan replace Pol Pot as prime minister, 
this person said: 
"nobody believes in them anymore (...) (I) f you 
depend on the name of Khieu Samphan to bring 
intellectuals into the front I'm certain not a 
single intellectual will believe (...) Whatever 
they want 'Khieu Samphan' to do, they put a table 
in front of him and a title on him, but that's as 
far as it goes" (188). 
East zone cadres who had spent time in Vietnam were often 
very suspect, but Chan's position only strengthened during 
the Pol Pot regime. On the other hand, being an important 
non-cultural revolutionist Southwest zone cadre was no 
guarantee against being purged, as even a Pol Pot stalwart 
like Kang Chap experienced, λ non-intellectual rural back­
ground, like e.g. Mok, Ke Pauk and Chan had, could be, but 
was not always an asset, as the fate of So Phim, Non Suon 
and others indicates. The same holds for having been with 
Pol Pot since the early 1960's, as the case of Son Sen 
shows, although for other reasons he still is a high ranking 
KR. Vorn Vet, who had been close to Pol Pot since 1954, 
Muol Sambath and Koy Thuon, who both took to the guerilla 
in the early 1960's, although not in the northeast, all 
fell victim to Pol Pot's purge machine. Not all those 
leftists educated in France in the 1940's and 1950's sur­
vived. But even 'new people' could become high-ranking KR, 
see the case of Thiounn Chum. Similarly the KR spokesman in 
Bangkok after 1979 had been a Lon Nol engineer who had been 
sent to the countryside after the KR' victory (189). 
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All of this only goes to illustrate my point that the 
problem of factions and rivalling groups within the party 
is far more complicated than a simple tripartition into Pol 
Pot group, domestic Khmer Vietminh and cultural revolutio-
nists would suggest. One's background (as well as being 
caught up in a network) could be incriminating. But it 
always also functioned as part of the justification for 
being purged. 
This method of purging rapidly degenerated. The regi-
me's paranoid identification of all, even potential, criti-
cism and opposition, failure to achieve set goals, even 
mistakes, as the work of traitors in the service of foreign 
powers infiltrating the party, more and more created a need 
to invent enemy strings and networks. 
7 . 7 Partial Economic Success 
In spite of all this the country did not seem to be balanc-
ing on the brink of total collapse. On the contrary, there 
is some evidence that Democratic Kampuchea was achieving 
some measure of success in economic development. The various 
visitors to Cambodia in 1978 presented a far less grim 
picture than the refugees generally did. Among these visi-
tors were Marxist-Leninist and Kampuchea Friendship Associa-
tion delegations, but also more skeptical groups such as 
Scandinavian ambassadors, a Japanese Beijing embassy delega-
tion and Yugoslav, Japanese and American journalists. 
Obviously these eyewitness reports, just like the 
refugee accounts, have to be dealt with very carefully 
(190). But it would be just as silly to discard their 
stories as it is to negate the refugees' testimonies. As 
one of the visitors, the American journalist Dudman, says: 
"While the visit amounted to a conducted tour 
with strict limits on conversation with ordinary 
Cambodians and no opportunity to speak with any 
but a few top government officials there was 
plenty of opportunity for observation in tours of 
11 of the 19 provinces" (191). 
The members of the skeptical groups were 
"greatly disturbed by evidence they reported of 
the nature of the^political and social organiza-
tion of the regime. They were clearly not 'true 
believers' of the kind that swallowed whole the 
propaganda stories organized for them in the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed it is 
probably true to say they were looking for evi-
dence of failure", 
according to McCormack (192). Dudman, for instance, says it 
seemed evident throughout his visit that the 
"Cambodian version of communism had no place in 
it for anyone who wanted to read, write or even 
think independently or for anyone who wanted to 
own more than a bare minimum of personal property. 
At the same time the physical condition of life 
may well have improved for many peasants and 
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former urban workers - possibly the vast majority 
of the population, as the regime claimed. (The 
country was) one vast work camp, but its people 
clearly were not being worked to death" (193). 
The working pace was considered less than in Western fac-
tories, but comparable to other Third World countries. 
There is no mention of guards watching over work. Most 
eyewitness accounts mention workers stopping to look at the 
foreigners, smiling, waving and generally making a relative-
ly relaxed impression. One refugee report from a co-opera-
tive, however, mentions how people were instructed to smile 
and appear joyful, and how less able-bodied workers were 
kept out of sight when foreigners (Chinese, North Koreans) 
visited (194). 
Nearly all the visitors remark on 
"the great housing program, a sudden mass upgrad-
ing of the individual family homes (...) Although 
small and simple the new houses represent a big 
upward step for the peasants (and) probably meant 
better living too, for the hundreds of thousands 
of country people who were driven into the cities 
by the five years of war" (195). 
This housing program is rarely mentioned by refugees. Dudman 
"did not find the grim picture painted by the 
thousands of refugees (...) (T)hose who remain 
appeared to be reasonably relaxed at the height 
of the busy harvest season (...) I saw no evidence 
of starvation (...) My observation of hundreds of 
ordinary Cambodians suggested that they got an 
adequate diet if a plain one (...) (T)he human 
cost of increasing food production (...) includes 
the forced (...) evacuation of Phnom Penh and 
other cities, the strict regimentation of those 
who survived, and the concentration on agricul-
tural production at the expense of freedom to 
learn, read, travel, and practice religion. But 
on the simple question of economic viability this 
rich agricultural country once more appeared to 
be flourishing and potentially prosperous (...) 
(T)here were chickens and vegetable gardens 
everywhere". 
He makes clear that his 
"conclusion that ordinary Cambodians were ade-
quately fed rested on more than the rather clumsy 
propaganda efforts of the government (...) I 
could tell the state of nutrition by the common 
sight of playful small children (...) with none 
of the listlessness or protruding bellies that 
bespeak starvation or malnutrition (...) Hundreds 
of adults observed closely throughout our travels 
had the alertness, vitality and spontaneity that 
suggested generally good health. I saw many 
pregnant and nursing women, who appeared to be in 
good health" (196). 
This last remark referred to refugee reports that life was 
so hard that most women had become barren, menstruation did 
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not occur anymore and, if they did bare a child, mother's 
milk had gone dry. 
The other visitors present basically the same picture. 
Tadashi Ito mentions forced child labour and, although the 
private family unit has been maintained, homes that were 
little more than sleeping places, but 
"in our journey of more than 1000 kilometers 
across rural Cambodia the expressions of most of 
the farmers we saw along the road were bright" 
(197). 
Stanic, one of the Yugoslav journalists, however, says: 
"(T)he people do not go hungry, but they are not very happy 
either" (198). The Yugoslav journalists broached the subject 
of juvenile delinquency and prostitution, as well as certain 
irrational aspects of Cambodian reconstruction, not shrink-
ing from aggravating their hosts. Yet they, too, concluded: 
"We had the opportunity to see for ourselves that 
truly there is no more hunger in Kampuchea (...) 
There is enough food, especially rice, fruit and 
fish. (We saw) rice paddies that are green in the 
middle of the dry season and in some places are 
already producing up to three harvests a year" 
(199). 
Other visitors also mentioned how the irrigation system 
permitted two or even three crops a year. An economist, who 
was a member of the Japanese Beijing embassy delegation and 
who had been in Cambodia during the Lon Nol regime, observed 
that "rice production and irrigation are now better organ-
ized". This delegation, like the others, also mentioned 
that the people did not seem undernourished and that fruit 
and vegetables seemed plentiful (200). 
Sometimes the visitors remarked that the regime was 
debating the réintroduction of money, that intellectuals 
were again, to a limited extent, being used in their origi-
nal capacities and the cities, to a limited extent, being 
repopulated. This dovetails with reports noted earlier 
about the regime's efforts in 1978 at achieving a broader 
united front (201). Sihanouk corroborated the health picture 
as painted by the visitors in his first press-conference in 
Beijing directly after leaving Cambodia after the fall of 
Phnom Penh in 1979. During his house arrest he had been 
taken on a number of trips around the country. Sihanouk: 
"Yes, the population works hard, very hard. But 
they are not unhappy. On the contrary, they laugh 
(...) And the food in the cooperatives is not 
bad. Not as good as my food in Phnom Penh of 
course. But it is food (...) It is the real truth 
when I say the people are well fed. As you know I 
don't make propaganda for Pol Pot, I am not his 
best friend. But present (before the Vietnamese 
invasion - RB) living conditions are good" (202). 
Sihanouk also criticized the restrictions, the lack of 
basic rights. Obviously political strategy co-determined 
Sihanouk's remarks, certainly those positive for the Pol 
Pot regime. But probably his remarks about the food and 
health conditions can be taken at face value. After all, he 
156 
would not have been taken to 'new people' villages either. 
So the general mobilization of the population into building 
an agricultural infrastructure would seem to have had some 
success. As Stanic said: 
"(N)ot only has the internal topography of the 
country been changed (by the far-flung irrigation 
system - RB) but the problem of feeding a starving 
population has been solved" (203). 
After returning from his second visit in January 197B, 
Swedish ambassador Björk remarked that more land was being 
cultivated than in 1976. Traces of the war were still 
considerable, but less so (204). And Elizabeth Becker, who 
elsewhere said that the "human cost has been tremendous", 
is "forced to conclude (that) the economic system (...) 
seems to be working" (205). 
According to Lewis Simon, the claim that Cambodia, as 
compared to Vietnam and Laos, was in the better food posi-
tion was more or less supported by American State Department 
officials (206). In the summer of 1978 a very serious 
drought had hit all of Indo-China, followed in September by 
very heavy flooding, the worst in 70 years. It seems Cam-
bodia, where the floods were the largest in a very long 
time, was worst hit (207). But while the floods caused 
serious food shortages and led to serious problems in Laos 
and Vietnam, the effects do not seem to have been so bad in 
Democratic Kampuchea. The foreign groups touring the country 
at the time do not indicate that the flooding upset agricul-
tural production at all (20Θ). 
Even the Vietnamese agreed that the Pol Pot regime 
produced more than enough rice to be able to feed its 
population and still have exported a major share. They 
agreed with the refugees, however, that the regime did not 
feed the population adequately, estimating that one person 
received 100 kilograms of rice per year (209). This cor­
responds to Ito's computation, made on the basis of figures 
he was given in a co-operative in Takeo concerning the 
amount of rice that remained in the co-operative and its 
population. He calculated that co-operative members would 
be getting one-third of a kilogram of rice per person per 
day, instead of the nearly one kilogram the co-operative 
leaders claimed (210). On the basis of her study of rice 
production in Democratic Kampuchea, Martin concludes that 
it was again at a pre-war level. This achievement was not 
in the least thanks to the immense infrestructurai reor­
ganization and construction program the regime had under­
taken. Many of these works (canals, dikes, dams), although 
often built wittingly without available modern engineering 
knowledge, on a trial and error basis, were still standing 
after the Vietnamese invasion (211). 
So it seems that the system had become more productive. 
It has been suggested that because the Pol Pot regime was 
indeed beginning to show signs of stability and progress 
the Vietnamese decided that if they waited another year its 
"internal and international image would have been improved 
enough to make any Vietnamese drive very difficult if not 
impossible". They therefore struck before the Pol Pot regime 
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"had time to clear its bloody image" (212). The Vietnamese 
also seem to have been of the opinion that they should have 
intervened decisively back in 1970-1975, while the KR were 
still relatively small (213). Generally the ordinary people 
did not profit equally from the improvement. The refugee 
reports are conflicting. According to some, the food situa-
tion did not improve, although there had been an excellent 
1977-1978 winter harvest (214). But refugees also often, 
from 1977 onwards, no longer spoke of actual starvation, 
although they continued to complain of scarcity and hunger, 
mentioning between 250 and 500 grams of rice gruel per day 
(215). And many refugees noticed a marked increase in rice 
production, two, even three crops a year and overloaded 
rice barns (216). Regional differences partly explain 
differences in refugee testimonies concerning the food 
situation. The appalling state of transport was another 
serious problem. Stanic gives a clear example of this from 
Kampot Province. "Mountains of salt lie under the open sky, 
for there is no way of transporting it to the covered sheds 
in the nearby town" (217). But it was the requisitions by 
the state which took so much paddy out of the co-opera-
tives (something many refugees complained about in their 
testimonies) that made hunger inevitable. The centre's need 
for surplus weighed heavier than the direct needs of the 
people. Its demands even increased, its needs aggravated by 
the border war with Vietnam and the need for military hard-
ware. The KR were also stockpiling in case they were to 
return to the guerilla. Rice was also exported as an indica-
tion of the Pol Pot regime's ability to achieve self-suf-
ficiency in such a remarkably short time. 
So it is possible to reconcile the reports of flourish-
ing production and meagre consumption. But even if people 
were generally better fed than the refugees contend, the 
vast majority of the population did not support Pol Pot. 
Within a few weeks, under the weight of the Vietnamese 
invasion, the regime collapsed. On the 5th of January 1979 
Pol Pot announced a return to the guerilla and the KR 
evacuated the towns (218). 
It would seem the KR were quite taken by surprise by 
the ease with which the Vietnamese invasion forces cut 
through Cambodia. For instance, two days after the start of 
the invasion the first of what was to have become a regular 
tourist flight from Bangkok to Angkor Wat took place, as if 
there was no full-scale invasion taken place (219). It took 
nearly a year back in the guerilla before the CPK seriously 
switched to a broad united front policy to attract more 
support for its struggle against the Vietnamese invaders. 
Many young KR soldiers were convinced that only victories 
were possible, indoctrinated by the hortatory slogans and 
propaganda their leaders constantly fed them, all dealing 
with the greatness, uniqueness and invincibility of the 
party and the country. Perhaps the party leaders really 
believed what they had been saying all along; that they 
could easily beat the Vietnamese. In 1978 Pol Pot told 
foreign visitors that if his regime was as unpopular as the 
western press said it was, it would not last a second 
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against the Vietnamese. He did not realize how right he 
was. Still, given Vietnamese military superiority in num-
bers, equipment, training and especially airpower, KR 
resistance was considerable. By the end of January, however, 
the Vietnamese controlled the towns and major roads, had 
installed the Heng Samrin regime and had started mopping-up 
operations. Back in the guerilla the KR remained quite a 
formidable military force. 
But this testifies to the loyalty and fighting capacity 
of the hardcore of KR troops, estimated at 30.000. The 
overwhelming majority of the Cambodians, whether peasant or 
intellectual, 'base' or 'new people' and even many ex-KR 
soldiers and cadres, unanimously denounced the Pol Pot 
regime. They offered no resistance to the invading Viet-
namese. Very few Cambodians were happy with the Vietnamese 
presence. Even within the Heng Samrin government their was 
anti-Vietnamese sentiment (220). But on the whole it was 
clear that the people preferred even the Vietnamese, al-
though very grudgingly, to a return by the KR (221). As a 
KR soldier, who fled to Vietnam in the midst of the East 
zone purges of mid-1978, said: 
"They (the Pol Pot group-RB) killed hundreds of 
anti-Vietnamese fighters. I am a patriot. A 
patriot cannot work for the Vietnamese because 
the Vietnamese came not only to destroy Pol Pot 
but to dominate Kampuchea. But a patriot cannot 
work for Democratic Kampuchea either. They are 
traitors just like the puppets of the Vietnamese. 
Now Pol Pot and the others say the killings were 
the fault of the Vietnamese agents (...) More 
liesl Its they who were the killers. First they 
killed the people and then they killed the par-
ty.." (222). 
When Dudman, during his visit, asked about these killings, 
leng Sari did not bother to deny the charge. 
"He complained angrily (...) that outsiders always 
wanted to know about the '5 to 20 percent of 
Cambodians who were well off before the revolu-
tion' and seemed to lack any interest in the 
great majority who were poor. He said some killing 
could not be avoided after the 1975 'liberation'. 
But (...) considering the 'complicated situation' 
the (CPK) had 'solved the problem in a good 
condition, (and had) avoided many more killings 
(...) Maybe that is not your belief. But we are 
responsible and we grasp the concrete situation 
in our country. We carry out all our tasks in 
order to serve the rights of our people, not just 
the rights of certain groups'" (223). 
An ex-party cadre, expelled in 1977, summarized the feelings 
of many Cambodian communists when he said: 
"The cadre who were responsible for the ultra-left 
line and the killings (...) do what they want 
according to their subjective analysis of the 
situation (...) They don't accept any criticism 
or admit that they were wrong. They blame every-
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thing on others (...) They say everything depends 
on the concrete situation, but they're the ones 
who conclude what the concrete situation is and 
even sometimes create the concrete situation, 
like after 1975 when they screwed everything" 
(224). 
In short, after the Pol Pot - Mok alliance had secured 
its dominant position in late 1976 it set about the execu-
tion of the party's comprehensive collectivization scheme 
for the whole country. Simultaneously and in the eyes of 
the Pol Pot group necessary for the realization of its 
development plan, it began to centralize power. Through a 
series of purge waves in the regions of which it was not 
sure, as well as through the elimination of suspected 
dissenters and their strings within the party and govern-
ment, the Pol Pot - Mok alliance worked at establishing 
complete control over Democratic Kampuchea. The presence of 
'traitors' also formed an explanation for failures in the 
implementation of policy. As the regime justified itself by 
positing the support of the overwhelming majority of the 
population, opposition had to be a foreign inspired tiny 
minority. This coupled the internal conflict to the escalat-
ing one with Vietnam. The Pol Pot regime could not distin-
guish one from the other, caught up as it was in a paranoid 
spiral of terror and violence largely of its own making. 
Without the external factor, however, it is quite plausible 
that the Pol Pot regime would have survived. It was achiev-
ing some progress and stability in the field of economic 
development. But even then the system of terror would 
probably have continued to weigh heavy on the people. 
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DEAD SOULS 
Up to now I have mostly spoken of death through purges, 
executions, famine, disease, war and exhaustion without 
much specific quantification. I will now deal briefly with 
various attempts at quantifying the number of dead resulting 
from various causes. 
The death toll of the Pol Pot regime has been an 
important factor in the propaganda war waged over the heads 
of the Cambodian people. Before the Vietnamese invasion 
Western sources were claiming 3 million or more dead. The 
Vietnam sponsored Heng Samrin government, the Vietnamese 
and their supporters were also using the 3 million and up 
figure (1). It is generally accepted that the Cambodian 
population numbered about 7.3 million at the end of the 
1970-1975 war (2). According to Hun Sen, the former Heng 
Samrin government's minister of Foreign Affairs, Cambodia 
had 4 million people left in 1979 (3). In 19Θ0 this figure 
had risen to 5.5 million. In May 1981 the Heng Samrin 
government held a census in all the provinces before the 
elections, the result of which showed that the population 
had increased to 6.684.000 (4). By then it had already 
become established practice to speak of millions of victims 
under the Pol Pot regime. The Heng Samrin government no 
longer needed to exaggerate the number of those who had 
fallen victim to Pol Pot. In order to optimize international 
food aid it now would rather overestimate the size of the 
population. These figures do not include the refugees or 
those along the border with Thailand. 
On the eve of the Vietnamese invasion there were about 
30.000 Cambodian refugees in Thailand. In 1979 this figure 
rose to between 150.000 and 200.000, with another 550.000 
to 750.000 in the Thai - Cambodian border area. This situa­
tion changed little in the first half of 1980 (5). Even at 
the end of 1980 there were still about 150.000 Cambodians 
in Thai refugee camps and perhaps another 500.000 in the 
border area receiving food aid (6). I am not sure whether 
the 30.000 to 40.000 KR guerillas were included in these 
figures. In the same period there were about 150.000 refu­
gees in Vietnam and another 30.000 in Laos (7). This makes 
a total of nearly 900.000, not counting those who had found 
homes in third countries already, I presume. By May 1981, 
when the census was held, a few hundred thousand of these 
refugees had certainly returned to Cambodia proper. 
Kiljunen, in his well-balanced report on Democratic Kam­
puchea, notes that in May 1981 there were still more than 
300.000 refugees in Thailand and more than 100.000 in other 
countries (8). Some were encouraged to return by UN aid for 
repatriates and the improving conditions at home. Others 
were forcefully repatriated by the Thai military. But even 
making allowances for this addition to the population coun-
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ted by the census we are still left with an increase in 
the population of 65% in less than one and a half years, 
over the 4 million in early 1979. 
Tang Sarim, minister in charge of aid in Heng Samrin's 
government, did in fact state that there had been 1 million 
births over 1979 (9). One wonders what happened to the wide 
spread amenorrhea that afflicted Cambodian women. According 
to international agency officials and foreign doctors visit-
ing Cambodia, a large number of women had become infertile 
as a result of prolonged malnutrition. Osaba, head of a 
relief agency, in a report on his visit to Cambodia in 
September 1979, states that a very large percentage of the 
women suffered from amenorrhea. Infertility among women is 
also mentioned in the Tribunal held against Pol Pot and leng 
Sari. In line with this is the assertion that there were 
no, or very few, children under five years of age (10). In 
addition, according to the Heng Samrin government and 
others, the sex ratio had, as a result of the KR terror, 
changed drastically, the figures given varying from 20% or 
30% to 1:20 (11). That does not leave many men to see to 
procreation. 
The estimates of the number of refugees plus the 
results of the May 1981 census, although perhaps exaggerated 
to be eligible for more aid, indicate quite clearly that 
the figure of 3 million dead during the Pol Pot regime is 
bloated. What do the more serious students of Democratic 
Kampuchea have to say regarding the number of victims of 
the Pol Pot regime? 
Kiernan's estimates oscillate between about 2 million 
dead for the Democratic Kampuchea period and one million 
for the 1970-1979 period, about 1/8th of the population 
(12). Chandler concurs; "perhaps one million died of all 
unnatural causes in the 1970's" (13). Heder's estimate is 
about 2 million dead. He suggests that of a population of 
about 7 million in 1975 30% were dead in 1979. His break-
down, however, doesn't add up. First he says that a quarter 
of the 3.6 million urban people were killed, as well as 
more than 200.000 Sino Khmer and about 15% of the 3 million 
village population. That adds up to 1.550.000 dead, which 
leaves about 450.000 dead unaccounted for. His breakdown by 
cause of death leaves us with a similar problem. Of the 
urban dwellers, according to Heder, 500.000 died of starva-
tion, 330.000 of illness and 420.000 were executed, a total 
of 1.250.000. For the peasantry the figures are 130.000, 
120.000 and 190.000 respectively, for a total of 440.000. 
This latter figure is more or less equivalent to 15% of the 
village population dead, but for the urban population there 
is a gap of 350.000 people. If the 200.000 Sino Khmer Heder 
talks about were all urbanités then there would still be 
150.000 dead unaccounted for. Nor does the total of his 
breakdown by cause of death come near to the 2 million dead 
he estimated. According to Heder about twice as many people 
died of hunger and illness as were executed (14). In one 
report Amnesty International also postulates a maximum of 2 
million victims, but believes that only one tenth of these 
were executed (15). In a later report, however, it claims 
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that at least 300.000 people were killed in purges (16). 
Carlyle, in discussing various estimates of the number of 
dead, mentions 
"more recent estimates (that) have placed the 
total number of deaths from all causes at about 
500.000 of which roughly 50.000 - 60.000 resulted 
from executions by the Pol Pot government". 
His only reference, however, is to Vickery's critical 
evaluation of a CIA report on demographic trends during the 
Pol Pot regime (17). 
Most of this is no more than informed guesswork. The 
problem is a lack of reliable demographic data. The 1962 
census, the only nationwide census ever taken in Cambodia, 
indicated a total population of 5.729.000. The rate of 
growth between 1962 and 1970 is variously estimated at 
between 2.2% and 2.9% (18). Nigozzi estimated the population 
on the eve of the war to be 7.3 million, which is more than 
the 6.7 million in 1969 estimated by Leifer, or the 
6.968.000 in mid-1971 by the Encyclopaedia Britannica. But 
Migozzi, in his demographic study on Cambodia, considers 
the 1962 census figures to be too low. Otherwise, and using 
a more moderate rate of increase than he does, he says, the 
population would still have been 7 million in 1970 (19). 
Prud'homme also calculated that the population in 1970 
would be between 7 and 7.5 million, he himself preferring 
7.363.000 (20). The war effected the growth rate, which 
dropped to 1% (21). The number of war dead has generally 
been estimated at 500.000 to 600.000 (22). In spite of many 
uncertainties and a large margin of error a figure of 7.3 
or 7.4 million Cambodians at the time of the KR' victory 
has generally been accepted (23). About 250.000 Vietnamese 
were expelled from Cambodia in 1975, which leaves about 7.1 
million people at the start of the Pol Pot regime. Six 
years later a PRK census indicated about 6.7 million people 
inside Cambodia, not counting the refugees and those who 
had found new homes in third countries. Late 1980 UN and 
FAO estimates showed 6 and 6.5 million Cambodians inside 
the country, respectively (24), lending weight to the PRK's 
census figures. UNHCR figures indicate that, at the end of 
1981, 116.000 Cambodians had moved to third countries, 
330.000 remained in Thai refugee camps and another 20.000 
in Vietnam, a total of 466.000 (25). In other words, the 
total Cambodian population was more or less the same in 
1981 as in 1975. 
Some corroboration of these figures can be found in 
those for the Cham minority. It was reported to have suf-
fered out of proportion. Its numbers were supposed to have 
been reduced from 200.000 to under 50.000 during the Pol 
Pot years (26). But, according to Vickery, a Cham PRK 
official interviewed by Kiernan in 1986 told the latter 
there were 185.000 Cham in Cambodia (27). In 1970 the total 
Islamic community in the country had been 150.000, Migozzi 
notes (28), which would indicate that the Cham had fared 
slightly better than the population in general. 
In May 1980 the CIA released a report which appeared 
to be a very detailed attempt to calculate the number and 
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causes of deaths under the Pol Pot regime (29). It is not 
exempt from criticism. But, as Ea says in her article 
discussing this study, 
"these estimates, imperfect as they are, are in 
our eyes, preferable to a total statistical void, 
which opens the way to all sorts of speculations, 
often fantastic and devoid of any foundation" 
(30). 
This CIA study presents estimates of executions carried out 
by the KR for the first two years of the Pol Pot regime. It 
distinguishes a number of phases. In the first, from April 
17th to July 1st, 1975, a period of crisis, revenge, expul­
sion of most Vietnamese Cambodians, the evacuation of towns 
and the elimination of most high-ranking Lon Nol cadres, 
between 25.000 and 50.000 persons were executed. From July 
1st to January 1st, 1976 the situation eased slightly, but 
the Pol Pot regime continued its campaign of executions and 
subjugation of the 'new people', as well as the second 
evacuation of 'new people' from the southwest and east to 
the northwest. In this period the CIA study estimates 
another 10.000 to 30.000 executions. Over 1976 the estimate 
is another 15.000 to 20.000 executions. The report makes no 
mention of executions after January 1st, 1977, thereby 
ignoring or denying the killing and purges that occurred 
during 1977 and 197Θ. According to Ea, 
"(b)ecause of the proliferation of purges, 
revolts, and purification drives, and because of 
far-reaching attacks by the Vietnamese in December 
1977" 
the number of deaths by violence in the period from January 
1st, 1977 to January 1st, 1979 was in the neighbourhood of 
50.000 to 70.000 (31). Although it does not give figures, 
the Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination (etc.) 
of the UN Commission on Human Rights' analysis of the 
situation in Democratic Kampuchea presents a similar perio-
dization as above. Vickery estimated between 30.000 and 
45.000 executions for 1975-1976, for 1978 alone about 
100.000, mainly the result of the East zone purge (32). 
Without really indicating why, Ea prefers the high hypo­
thesis figures (incorporating the more favourable assump­
tions) given in the CIA report and so arrives at a maximum 
total number of violent deaths "including deaths attributed 
to the condition of war with Vietnam" of 120.000 (33). 
Western intelligence sources have estimated the number of 
casualties inflicted by the invading Vietnamese on the KR 
to have been 30.000 by the end of January 1979 (34). 
The CIA report itself favours the medium hypothesis 
which shows 100.000 violent deaths from April 17th, 1975 to 
January 1st, 1977. The only real figures we have on execu­
tions are those from the central interrogation centre Tuoi 
Sleng, where approximately 20.000 people were executed, and 
from Ta Chan security centre in Takeo Province, where 1500 
executions took place. Chandola mentions visiting a torture 
chamber in Prey Veng, the capital of Prey Veng Province, 
but does not mention documents that could indicate the num­
ber of people that perished there (35). Taking the report's 
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medium hypothesis and Ea's high estimate for the 1977-1979 
period leaves us with 170.000 executions for the Pol Pot 
regime period. The most generally used ratio between deaths 
from all causes and deaths by execution is 10:1. "Realistic 
estimates" range from 75.000 to 150.000, Kiljunen concludes. 
Vickery, however, on the basis of his assessment of sur-
vivors' accounts, attributes about 300.000 of the total 
number of deaths to executions (36). 
On a number of occasions I have indicated that certain 
widely held beliefs on Democratic Kampuchea appear to be 
exaggerated. The mass graves, discovered after the fall of 
the Pol Pot regime, are, or could be, a case in point. The 
macabre contents of these graves have all been attributed 
to the gruesome execution machine of the Pol Pot regime. 
Various refugee accounts, however, have noted that patients 
who had died in hospital as well as other people dying of 
hunger or illness were often dumped in mass graves (37). In 
the late 1960's mass graves were dug for the victims of the 
Sihanouk - Lon Nol repression (38). Some of the 500.000 or 
so war casualties were also buried in mass graves (39). 
Ea estimates the total number of non-natural deaths 
(executions, starvation, illness, exhaustion) to be between 
1 and 1.2 million. According to the CIA report about 10% of 
the approximately 4 million people who were evacuated in 
April 1975 died as a result of this evacuation. According 
to Vickery, in his critique of the CIA report, this first 
period cost the lives of 40.000 to 60.000 (above the normal 
death rate). Kiernan estimates that perhaps as many as 
20.000 died during the evacuation, Stuart-Fox perhaps as 
many as 35.000 above normal deaths in these first months 
(40). On the basis of my discussion of the evacuation I 
would concur with these latter estimates, disregarding the 
CIA figures as far too high. In the next period up to 
January 1st, 1976 another 400.000 died as a result of the 
second evacuation, hunger, malaria, other epidemics and 
general exhaustion, according to the CIA report. Vickery 
again estimates a figure between 40.000 and 80.000, mention-
ing also that the second evacuation involved about 400.000 
people altogether (41). The CIA report does not really give 
figures for the period from January 1st, 1976 onwards but 
posits a 4% decline from more or less natural causes from 
July 1976 to January 1977 and 2.5% for each six month period 
after that till January 1979. This was because the food 
situation had stabilized, albeit at a very mediocre level. 
Living conditions remained precarious but the survivors 
were learning to live under them. 
The medium hypothesis of the CIA report says that the 
population dropped from 7.38 million in April 1975 to 5.85 
million by January 1st, 1979. That would mean a deficit of 
1.53 million over the April 1975 figure. Taking the report's 
figure of 100.000 executions, 250.000 expelled Vietnamese 
and Vietnamese-Khmer, approximately 55.000 refugees and 
800.000 deaths up to 1 January 1976 leaves us with 327.000 
deaths through hunger and illness between 1976 and 1979. 
The report quite rightly discerns between 'new' and 'old 
(base) people'. According to the medium estimate, the number 
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of 'new people' dropped from 4 million on April 17th, 1975 
to 2.657.000 on January 1st, 1979, whilst the number of 
'old people' grew from 3.134.000 to 3.188.000 in the same 
period. Kiljunen estimated the number of dead in the group 
of 2.5 to 3 million 'base people' to be "perhaps a few 
percent, most of whom lost their lives in Party purges and 
as a result of military operations" (42). 
The extreme living conditions imposed on the populace 
could not but help disrupt fertility and lead to a reduction 
in the birth rate. Due to their different, more severe 
living conditions, the 'new people' would show a different 
demographic development. According to the CIA estimates, 
the birth rate declined as follows (births per 1000 per 
year): 
'base people' 'new people' 
17-4-1975 - 1-7-1975 43 32 
1-7-1975 - 1-1-1976 30 15 
1-1-1976 - 1-7-1976 30 10 
1-7-1976 - 1-1-1979 28 10 
Vickery, however, in his critique of the CIA report, argues 
that in the better areas of the country 'base' and 'new 
people' birth rates could not have varied so much. As noted 
earlier, many 'new people' women stopped menstruating. But 
quite a number of them also mention having a baby during 
the Pol Pot regime period. Here again there were regional 
differences, which may also explain why visitors to Demo-
cratic Kampuchea in 1978 mention seeing many babies (43). 
Other factors which influenced the decline in the birth 
rate among 'new people' were the separation of couples 
during evacuation, the fact that it was difficult for people 
of the opposite sex to meet, let alone to develop any sort 
of relationship, want or find time to raise a family, the 
puritanical KR sexual moral and a diminished inclination to 
procreation as a result of the very hard living conditions. 
Indirectly it is possible to get a vague idea of 
birthrates and the claim that male mortality was so much 
higher by comparing the figures on population distribution 
by age and sex in the refugee camps. It can, of course, be 
no more than an indication, data from refugee camps being 
highly biased. The data I have used comes from two of the 
larger camps, Khao I Dang and Sakeo. The latter is a KR 
dominated camp. In December 1981 Khao I Dang's population 
was approximately 45.000, that of Sakeo 25.000. More than 
8% of Khao I Dang's population was born between 1976 and 
1980. In Sakeo this was more than 7%. Not all of these 
children had been born after the fall of the Pol Pot regime. 
In November 1979 13% of the population was under five in 
Khao I Dang, and 8% in Sakeo. In both camps 4% was under 
the age of one. So of Khao I Dang's population at least 9% 
had been born during the Pol Pot regime and of Sakeo's at 
least 4% (44). This striking difference can in part, perhaps 
in large part, be ascribed to the much higher death rate as 
a result of severe hardships, hunger and disease encountered 
by the Sakeo group during the months it was forced by the 
KR, on the run from Vietnamese troops, to move from one 
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inhospitable area to another. It was the condition of these 
people when they finally moved into Thailand that shocked 
the world and set the international aid operation rolling. 
According to Vickery, on the basis of research he did 
at Khao I Dang, the birth rate under the Pol Pot regime 
would have been similar to that of Malaysia or Thailand. In 
mid-19Θ0 the number of children under five at Khao I Dang 
was normal for Southeast Asia, he says (45). Kiljunen, on 
the other hand, notes a gap in the age structure for child­
ren born between 1974 and 1979. Inside Cambodia this group 
may be relatively only half the number of children in the 
groups directly above and below it, he says (46), without 
mentioning his sources. However, the group born between 
1970 and 1974 would also have been smaller than normal due 
to the war, and the group born in 1980 and 1981 was extreme­
ly large, the Cambodian growth rate alone already being 
estimated at between 4.6 and 5.2%, one of the highest in 
the world (47). Most visitors to Cambodia in 1979 mention 
seeing many children whose age indicated they must have 
been born during the Pol Pot regime, as well as many breast 
feeding and pregnant women (48). 
Over 1981 49% of the Khao I Dang and 46% of the Sakeo 
population were males. In the first half of 1982 this had 
risen to 47.2% for Sakeo, that of Khao I Dang had barely 
changed. When looking at a breakdown by age group of the 
male and female population of both these camps it is inter­
esting to note that up to the age of 15 there is a male 
predominance. In Khao I Dang this is also true for the 
next age group, up to 20. After that there is a female 
predominance. To a degree this can be explained by the fact 
that some of the men where fighters with the KR (from the 
Sakeo camp) or with the various Khmer Serei groups (from 
Khao I Dang) (49). Inside Cambodia the sex ratio was ap­
parently more askew. On the basis of samples it was esti­
mated that women counted for 60% of the population, and in 
the age group over 20 this may have been as high as 75% 
(50). 
When computations of the number of Pol Pot victims 
take the May 1981 census figures as one of their anchor 
points (7.3 million in April 1975 being the other) it is 
obviously essential to also know the rate of growth in the 
1979-1981 period. The CIA report estimated that in 1979 
another 700.000 people were lost. Its conservative estimate 
was that for every Cambodian born during the second half of 
that year, ten died. Initially, in 1979, many observers 
were claiming hugh numbers of deaths due to the famine that 
ensued after the Vietnamese invasion, with people running 
all over the place looking for family, evading the fighting 
and trying to survive. More than 300.000 were supposed to 
have died (51). In fact it was only those people, perhaps 
30.000 to 40.000, who had been gathered up by the retreating 
Pol Pot regime and who had spent months and months moving 
away from the attacking Vietnamese, through inhospitable, 
malaria ridden country, with ever less food, who, when they 
finally moved into Thailand around September 1979, were in 
such a pitiful state. Few of the other refugees were starv-
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ing. The famine inside Cambodia was overestimated. The 
number of deaths did not exceed a few tens of thousands 
(52). 
The Heng Samrin government, on the basis of a survey 
in villages for the first nine months of 1981, claimed it 
found a 5.4% population increase. But Ang Samin, director 
of mother and child care at the Health Department in Phnom 
Penh, estimated a 4.8% birth rate for the whole country in 
1980. This is a remarkable difference, birthrate of course 
always being a higher figure than growth rate. The normal 
birth rate before the war was 4.6%. For 1981 Kiljunen notes 
a "very high natural growth rate of 4.6-5.2%". The CIA 
report, however, considers male and female fertility in 
this period to be very low, and infant mortality high. 
Vickery sticks to a 2.2% growth rate for the 1979-1981 
period (53). A 4.5 to 5% growth rate seems unlikely, cer-
tainly for the chaotic year of 1979, and taking into con-
sideration the high rate of infant mortality and the general 
lack of health care services, although the 1980-1981 period 
did see something of a baby boom. 
Both Kiljunen and Vickery have seriously attempted to 
calculate the number of deaths as a result of the Pol Pot 
regime, using the 1975 and 1981 figures mentioned above. 
Kiljunen takes 7.3 million as a starting point, not sub-
tracting the expelled Vietnamese. Assuming the natural 
growth rate to have stayed at the pre-war level of 2.8%, or 
to have declined slightly, the total population of the 
country in 1981 should have been about 8.3-8.5 million. It 
was, however, 6.7 million, to which must be added some 
450.000 outside the country and 250.000 Vietnamese who had 
left in 1975, which leaves a total of 7.4 million Cambodians 
in 1981. "Thus it can be estimated", he says, "that approxi-
mately 1 million people died during the period of Pol Pot". 
But if the natural growth rate had fallen during 1975-1979, 
which is very likely, then the number of people who died 
during this period would also be less. If the growth rate 
had dropped to 1.5% in this period, and gone up to 4% in 
1980-1981, then the population would have been approximately 
8.1 million in May 1981. This would mean that about 700.000 
people more than 'normal' had died under the Pol Pot regime 
(54). 
Vickery, using a 2.2% natural growth rate and starting 
from 7.1 million people inside Democratic Kampuchea in 
1975, calculates that there should have been 7.745.000 in 
1979. He then takes the 7.1 million Cambodians alive in May 
1981 as point of departure, assumes an annual national 
growth rate of 2.2% since early 1979 and calculates that 
there were 6.7 million Cambodians alive at the beginning of 
1979. "It is only possible", he says, "to suggest that an 
absolute decrease of about 400.000 between 1975 and January 
1979 is likely". Given the normal pre-war death rate of 18 
per thousand, that would have been 511.200 natural deaths. 
The normal birth rate was 46 per thousand, but this obvious-
ly declined during the Pol Pot years. Vickery takes 30 per 
thousand as a crude average for the whole population in the 
Democratic Kampuchea years, 
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"giving an increase of 852.000. Since there was 
an absolute decline of 400.000 total deaths would 
have been 1.252.000, of whom 511.200 would repre-
sent the normal peace time death total, leaving 
740.000 deaths in excess of normal and due to the 
special conditions of Democratic Kampuchea" (55). 
All this is rather speculative, and many of the figures 
and claims presented contradictory, but it does give us 
some indication. Depending on the rate of growth one takes 
for the Pol Pot period and for the 1979-1981 period the 
number of deaths will vary somewhat, but on the whole the 
estimates by Kiljunen and Vickery seem to be realistic 
enough. The drop in birth rate not being the result of 
voluntary birth control measures, it should really also be 
charged to the Pol Pot regime ' s account. Excluding the drop 
in births I would estimate the total number of deaths in 
excess of the 'normal' death rate during the Pol Pot regime 
period to be somewhere between 700.000 and 1 million, of 
which probably 15 to 30% as a result of war and executions. 
How many would have died no matter which regime had 
come to power, as a result of the devastating 1970-1975 war 
is very difficult to estimate, but certainly something that 
must be born in mind when discussing the Pol Pot terror. 
Together with the 500.000 to 600.000 dead caused by the 
war, especially by the American bombing, more than one-fifth 
of the number of people alive in 1970 died unnaturally in 
ten years time. What the long term demographic and socio-
economic effect of this will be, remains to be seen. 
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PART II 
9 
PEASANTS, INTELLECTUALS, AND REVOLUTION 
In the terror that was Democratic Kampuchea a small group 
of revolutionary intellectuals organized in the CPK (Com-
munist Party of Kampuchea) were able to force their ideas 
about a better world upon the masses, resulting in the 
death of perhaps one seventh of the population. How was it 
possible that what started out as an emancipatory movement 
aimed at the abrogation of inequality and exploitation 
could become so lethal in its consequences? In the following 
chapters it is this question which I will tackle. 
Many factors are involved, one of the most important 
being the relationship between the revolutionary elite and 
the masses it pretends to lead, the subject matter of this 
chapter. The character and depth of this relationship is a 
crucial factor in determining the type of post-revolutionary 
regime; whether, and to what extent, terror will be used. 
In chapter 10 1 turn to a discussion of terror itself, 
particularly state terror: when and why is it used; how 
does it function; what are its consequences. To illustrate 
this I will subsequently discuss the "archetypical" case of 
the Soviet Union under Stalin. In order to ground the 
specific case of Democratic Kampuchea in a larger framework 
and to illustrate the more general and theoretical remarks 
I will, all through Part II, intermittently refer to a 
number of other, in many respects comparable, examples, 
taken from the history of both China and Vietnam. In chapter 
II I will then specifically compare the developments in 
Democratic Kampuchea with these other two cases. In each 
case the seperate causes of the use of violence as well as 
their combination leading to a greater or lesser degree of 
terror by the revolutionary regime, will be summarized (1). 
In the case of Cambodia the masses (ideationally the 
revolutionary agent) are peasants and it is the interaction 
between the revolutionary elite and the peasantry I will 
now turn to. One key dilemma highlighting the divergent 
values and interests between peasantry and revolutionary 
elite is that whilst the support of the peasantry is needed 
for a succesful revolution it also often becomes its first 
victim. In order to understand the dynamics of this rela-
tionship we need to know more about the peasantry itself, 
its character and motivations. Why and when do peasants 
rebel? An analysis of the causes of rebellion will show 
that the peasantry is not a passive object to be manipulated 
and moulded according to the aims and views of an elite, 
revolutionary or otherwise. 
After looking at peasant societies and the changes 
wrought by colonialism and commercialization, and peasant 
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reactions - rebellion being one of them - to these proces-
ses, I turn to those intellectuals in developing countries 
who became revolutionary elites. Then I look at the rela-
tionship between these elites and the peasant masses. This 
relationship is one of the key factors determining the 
choice for the use of terror by the revolutionary elite as 
a means for achieving and retaining power. Some other 
factors that enabled revolutionary elites to seize power 
will also be discussed. 
9.1 Peasants and Peasant Societies 
Why and when do peasants rebel? This question relates both 
to the character of peasant society and to the peasants' 
world view. One author who has dealt extensively with these 
questions is James Scott. Peasants, he tells us, in techni-
cal, social and moral arrangements, base themselves on the 
"safety first principle" (2). The reason for this lies 
embedded in the fragility of agricultural production. They 
seek to avoid failure, to minimize the subjective proba-
bility of maximum loss. They prefer to minimize the proba-
bility of disaster, rather than to maximize average returns. 
This desire for a subsistence security was socially articu-
lated as a pattern of moral rights and expectations. 
There are two moral principles involved, the norm of 
reciprocity and the right to subsistence. The latter forms 
the standard against which claims to the surplus by land-
lords, the state and/or other outsiders are evaluated. For 
the peasant it is not a question of how much is taken (which 
is the basis of the Marxist concept of "rate of exploita-
tion") but how much is left. A system which leaves the pea-
sant a minimal guaranteed return is likely to be experienced 
as less exploitative than one which may take less but does 
not rate the peasant's consumer needs as primary. Economic 
insecurity is far worse than poverty. Claims to peasant 
incomes by landlords, moneylenders or the state were never 
considered legitimate when they infringed on what was judged 
to be a minimal subsistence level. In a similar vein, 
relationships between peasants are formed by a safety first 
principle, in this case expressed as egalitarianism. Village 
egalitarianism is conservative in the sense that it claims 
all should have a place, not that all should be equal. Some 
are entitled to have more, as long as no one starves. The 
right to subsistence defines the reciprocal duty of elites, 
the minimal obligation they owe to those from whom they 
claim labour and grain, which is to at least not infringe 
on subsistence claims and arrangements of the peasantry. 
The norm of reciprocity is stressed by many theorists as 
the basis for the structure of friendship and alliance, a 
general moral principle to be found in all cultures (3). 
Part of these arrangements were to shield the peasantry 
from outside forces, which were predominantly experienced 
as unfavourable (taxes, corvée, conscription). The many 
vertical ties in traditional peasant society, (peasants as 
likely to experience themselves in terms of clan, lineage, 
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community, ethnicity or religion as in terms of class), 
help to soften the blows caused by difficult times, espe-
cially for the poorer members of society. Often there 
exist moral requirements on the part of the rich to help 
their less 'privileged' brethren. Reciprocity lies at the 
basis of patron-client relationships. Basically the patron 
protects, provides material needs, while the client gives 
labour and loyalty (4). Within the village mechanisms 
existed which redistributed wealth somewhat. Richer vil-
lagers sponsored more lavish ceremonies, gave higher dona-
tions, had more dependents and so on. These were rational 
arrangements. The richer villager, the patron, increased 
his clientele, gained more prestige or religious merit and 
created social debts that could be cashed in times of need. 
It was unequal exchange usually, to be sure, but it could 
enable the poorer peasants to survive in difficult times. 
Especially in situations where arable land was easily 
available and control of labour was the basis of power and 
income, as was often the case in pre-colonial times, the 
client's bargaining power vis-á-vis the patron grew (5). 
According to Adas, the 
"great majority of cultivators in pre-colonial 
Asia and African societies relied primarily upon 
(...) patron - client ties and the guile of local 
leaders (...) as their primary defence against 
oppression" (6). 
Other examples of the subsistence ethic and of risk avoi-
dance are the use of seed varieties with stable, if modest, 
yields, systems of work-sharing and labour exchange, and 
the many alternative ways of gaining income and food in 
times of need, such as gathering and hunting, fishing and 
handicrafts (7). We should, however, not exaggerate the 
levelling effects of these redistributive mechanisms, 
village cohesiveness and solidarity. Internal differentia-
tion, mutual suspicion and conflict did exist (8). Further-
more, vertical ties were also relationships of dependency 
which, to the advantage of the rich, could restrain and 
control the poor from acting against them. Village solida-
rity facilitates collective action, but at the same time 
this type of conservative solidarity and dependency ties 
the peasantry to the prevailing social structure. The Indian 
caste system exemplifies this conservative tendency, while 
pre-1917 Russia (with a more radical form of village solida-
rity against rulers and landlords) is a case where rebellion 
was endemic (9 ) . 
In pre-revolutionary China a peasant needed some 
minimum property to be a full member of the village and the 
network of kinship and religious obligations. As land 
scarcity made for many propertyless peasants not all vil-
lagers were included. Outsiders were also excluded from 
village membership. Clans or the smaller patrilineages 
being the only important link binding rulers and ruled, 
cohesiveness in Chinese peasant society appears to have 
been considerably less than in other peasant societies, as 
Moore sums up his review of the relevant literature (10). 
The general weakness of this link accounts, Moore suggests, 
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in considerable measure for the fact that also in Chinese 
society peasant rebellion was endemic (11). 
The concept of the peasant subsistence ethic had been 
noted by other authors before, but not dealt with in such a 
systematic fashion as Scott has done (12). Moore in his 
work Injustice (13), written about the same time as Scott's 
Moral Economy, develops a generalized moral conception (not 
limited to the peasantry) which also has reciprocity as its 
basic element. Man's conception of social relationships 
does not exclude hierarchy and authority, but people try to 
fit social inequality in an idealized pattern of how the 
rich should behave. Obligations should be reciprocal, and 
this whole should redound to the benefit of the community. 
This claim to subsistence as a moral right of the subor-
dinate classes would seem to have been a central feature in 
most pre-capitalist social orders (14). 
In many peasant societies colonialism severely weakened 
these patterns of insurance and security. It brought or 
reinforced commercialization, a market economy, a modern 
type of state. All these tended to increase surplus ap-
propriation, demographic pressure, and the inclusion in a 
global economic system dominated by the rich western in-
dustrialized world (15). Pre-colonial states often lacked 
the means to impose their will, having to rely mainly on 
adherence to state cults and doctrines about the respon-
sibility of the sovereign for the welfare of his subjects. 
The new state brought a centralized bureaucracy, combined 
with a more effective administration, a more effective army 
and police. It required a stable source of revenue. Fixed 
taxation, now often in cash, forced peasants into the market 
economy, a system which did not account for the devastating 
impacts of variable harvests. But, as before, peasants 
expected from the state what they had expected from their 
landlord or patron; a right to subsistence. Fixed taxes, 
therefore, were hated and led to many peasant uprisings 
(16). 
The Nghe-Tinh Uprising in Northern Annam is a clear 
example. In this poorest area of Vietnam, peasants were 
more dependent on rainfall and thus had the most variable 
yields. Even in the best of times the Annam peasants lived 
close to the famine line. Two poor harvests in a row meant 
large scale famine. Its rugged geography and physical 
isolation from the urban centres had always posed severe 
problems of politics and control. This area was known for 
its rebellious tradition. Rising fixed taxes, much higher 
than before the French colonization, and decreasing pos-
sibilities of tax evasion, coupled with the worst famine. 
of the century were the major causes of the 1930-1931 
Nghe-Tinh Revolt (17). 
Colonialism brought a gradual commoditization of land, 
together with a general growth in population. Communal land 
became private property, traditional non-agricultural lands 
(pasturage, forests) accessible to all were privatized or 
taken over by the state, turned into agricultural land or 
exploited otherwise (like logging, ranching, plantations). 
Import of cheap commodities dealt a blow to local trade. 
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The massive export of agricultural produce tied the produ-
cers to the vicissitudes of the world market. When the 
market determines the value of a crop then a good harvest 
does not necessarily mean sufficient food, as that depends 
on the price. And, according to Scott, on balance the world 
market showed greater fluctuations than the traditional 
local markets (18). The state infringed on the village, 
tying it more to the outside world. The multiple ties 
between patron and client were replaced more and more by 
the single ties between peasant and landlord, shopkeeper, 
moneylender or state official. The relationship became less 
reciprocal, losing whatever protective value it once had. 
From dependency with some security it developed into a cash 
nexus with little or no insurance for the weaker party. The 
patron could more and more rely on outside (state) protec-
tion to help enforce unequal exchange relations. The clients 
lost much of their previous bargaining power (19). Further-
more, the colonial state failed to surround itself with the 
symbols that had given legitimacy to the pre-colonial 
rulers. The process of colonialization and commercializa-
tion destroyed many of the traditional redistributive and 
fall-back resources. More work was created, generally, but 
it was outside the village, drawing the peasant firmly into 
the cash economy. Dependence increased; on cash, on employ-
ers, buyers of crops, renters of land, sellers of goods, 
lenders of money. Increasing differentiation in the village 
led to a worsening balance of exchange for the poorer 
peasants. Smallholders were somewhat more insulated. Owning 
their land they had greater subsistence possibilities. But 
they, too, had to pay taxes and rents, and buy necessary 
goods in cash. In some cases they had to sell their land 
and become tenants or labourers. It was, however, not 
decreasing peasant income per se, but growing insecurity 
which was at stake (20). 
In China, under the influence of commercialization and 
increasing population pressure, more and more peasants had 
to give up their land, thus being excluded from the village 
solidarity arrangements of clan or lineage. By 1925 land 
had become almost entirely private property. Although there 
were major differences between the wheat-growing North and 
the rice-growing South, on average about one quarter of the 
land was rented, the rest owned by the peasant himself 
(21). But the mass of marginal peasants at the bottom of 
the social hierarchy in the village amounted to half or 
more (22). Rents in kind went up to about 50 to 60% of the 
crop. Peasant handicrafts, the "traditional bulwark of 
village existence" (23), suffered severe blows at the hands 
of machine-made western and Japanese goods. Industrial and 
urban development was too little to drain off excessive 
population from the countryside. Multiple exactions from 
landlords, usurers, petty officials, warlords and the like 
increased. If the gentry ever had any ideological legitima-
tion it was lost with the abandonment of the examination 
system in 1905. All these processes were most marked in the 
coastal provinces where contact with the West and commer-
cialization were the more intense. Near the big cities 
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absentee landlordism became common (24). 
The processes of commercialization were most marked in 
pioneer or frontier areas. In the older, more cohesive and 
autonomous village, with a well developed tradition, 
redistributive mechanisms, subsistence guarantees and other 
shock absorbers were strongest. Here local social patterns 
resisted the full logic of the market throughout the colo-
nial period. The relatively new villages of pioneer areas 
were more atomized, socially fragmented, lacked these 
traditional shock absorbers, were most exposed to the 
fluctuations of the world economy and less able to soften 
the impact on the poorer villagers. Communitarian villages 
showed less differentiation and a greater capacity for 
collective action, but also had more resources to cope with 
the onslaught of colonialism and commercialization and 
mechanisms that served as alternatives to revolt. In fron-
tier villages, with their far stronger differentiation and 
greater insecurity, horizontal solidarity and cohesiveness 
was the problem (25). 
In the pioneer regions of the Mekong Delta (in newly 
colonized Cochin China) the growth of capitalist labour 
relations was especially great. Direct French impact was at 
its maximum. Even before the arrival of the French, Cochin 
China was the domain of the large landowner and the landless 
peasant. This difference increased dramatically under the 
French so that in the 1930's two-thirds of all households 
were landless whilst 2.5% of the landowners held 45% of all 
cultivated land (26). As the population grew and the fron-
tier's open resources became exhausted (much land also 
being seized by foreign colonists) the terms of tenancy 
stiffened. From a system whereby peasants' needs were 
recognized it developed into a system where tenancies became 
written contracts with a fixed rent established on the 
basis of what the land would produce in a good year. This 
was designed to maximize rents. Rents increased from the 
equivalent of 40% to 60 or 70% of the harvest. Especially 
near the cities rents had more and more to be paid in cash. 
By the 1920's there was little frontier land left so dis-
missed tenants had few options but to become labourers. As 
the number of labourers increased their security dropped, 
being hired by the day or week instead of by season or year 
as before, receiving payment in cash more than in kind. 
Newly created jobs were far too few to absorb all the 
unemployed peasants. It was not poverty per se but growing 
insecurity and the absence of a protective social fabric 
that made it hard. In fact, Cochin China peasants ate better 
and worked less than their counterparts in Annam and Tonkin. 
There the same processes were at work, but they could longer 
retain their old safeguards. Cochin China villages, often 
formed as they were by various population elements from 
different areas, lacked this cohesiveness. Tumultuous and 
often violent peasant politics in Cochin China can be 
understood less from the absolute levels of poverty than 
from the complete exposure to the fluctuations of the world 
economy. 
Where the impact of colonialism and commercialization 
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was not as pronounced one would, in the light of the above, 
expect less disruptive effects. This was the case in Cam-
bodia, as we have seen. Here the colonial period had not 
been as disruptive as elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Even 
after independence the peasants generally could retain 
their subsistence economy. There was hardly any landlordism 
and the rural proletariat was small. The market economy had 
only superficially penetrated the countryside. The peasants' 
main problem was indebtedness to Chinese merchants. But 
this was experienced as a relationship of mutual, if not 
equal, benefit. The peasants' standard of living was low 
but there was little threat to their subsistence ethic. Few 
of their traditional safeguard and fall-back resources 
were, as yet, threatened. The Khmer village, perhaps due to 
relative lack of population pressure and a relatively 
favourable ecological situation, had never developed the 
same strong cohesive and integrative patterns as the Viet-
namese (especially the Annamese and Tonkin) villages, with 
their many associations (for men over sixty, singers, 
kite-flyers, pupils of the same teacher, trade guilds, 
soldiers etc.), their village councils and so on (27). 
Another indication of this may be found in the linear 
arrangement of Khmer villages along roads and waterways, 
not grouped around a village temple as in North and Central 
Vietnam (28). 
Between the foreign dominated urban centre and the 
rural periphery yawned an immense chasm. There was little 
state interference at the village level. Rural Cambodia 
remained basically outside the reach of government and 
administration, outside national political affairs. In as 
far as the peasants were incorporated into the state it was 
through their reverence of Sihanouk as a god-king, as a 
ruler who intervened with the cosmic powers to get good 
done for society (29). In times of weak states, and there-
fore the absence of outside backing for local powerholders, 
subsistence agriculture and low population pressure, such 
alternative sources of support as the kindred and village, 
and the existence of unclaimed land prevented the balance 
from moving radically in favour of the patrons, Scott 
summarizes (30), a picture that quite accurately fits the 
Cambodian situation, even up to the I960's. 
The northwestern province of Battambang, which well 
into the twentieth century was still a frontier area, proved 
to be an exception to this general pattern of subsistence 
agriculture. Here the impact of commercialization had been 
greater, landlordism, tenancy and rural proletarianization 
far more widespread, differentiation more extreme. These 
factors had brought about a situation in which traditional 
social mechanisms and patterns epitomizing the peasants' 
safety first principle hardly existed. 
9.2 Peasant Rebellion 
In the pre-colonial period when regular village defence 
mechanisms failed, peasants often had more, and less dif-
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ficult, options for expressing their discontent and at-
tenuating their hardships "through activities that minimize 
the challenge to a clash with those whom they view as their 
oppressors". This is what has been termed "avoidance pro-
test" (31), the middle ground between passivity and open, 
collective defiance in peasant politics (32). This form of 
protest ranges from flight, foot-dragging, sabotage, poach-
ing, theft, tax-evasion, avoidance of conscription and 
corvée, to joining cult movements or religious orders and 
banditry (33). 
Under colonialism many of these possibilities became 
less viable because of the growing extent of government 
administrative and military control over the state ter-
ritory: formerly 'outlying' areas were incorporated into 
the state system and vertical ties between local elites and 
peasants weakened. What was left was protest through ridi-
cule in expressions of folk culture, as these were hardly 
understood by the colonial officials. Ridicule, expressing 
peasants' values as opposed to dominant state values, can 
begin to function as a "counterpoint". According to 
Wertheim, 
"(i)n general a more or less dominant set of 
common values can be discerned (in any community 
- RB). But beneath the dominant theme there always 
exist different sets of values, which are, to a 
certain degree, adhered to among social groups 
and which function as a kind of counterpoint to 
the leading melody" (34). 
They take the form of jokes, myths, songs, sayings and 
proverbs as well as religious idiom. Much of the folk 
culture of the peasantry amounted to avoidance protest. 
Solidarity arrangements among peasants, Moore says, can 
also constitute a focal point for the creation of peasant 
opposition to the dominant class and a basis for popular 
conceptions of justice that clash with those of the rulers 
(35). Distrust towards, the masking of beliefs and actions 
from, all outsiders can be seen as one of the arrangements 
peasants have developed to shield them from outside forces. 
Traces of peasants' true feelings can only be found in 
their stories and legends, according to Lewis (36). Huizer 
also sees this well documented peasant distrust as a ration-
al defence mechanism, a sort of counterpoint which could be 
used to mobilize the peasants (37). 
Just as avoidance protest may dampen mounting collec-
tive dissent so deviant values may become institutionalized 
and harmless forms of symbolic protest which strengthen the 
existing order (38). But deviant values may also become the 
normative focus of religious or political movements with an 
insurrectional potential. Harnessing such counterpoints can 
be very effective when national or left-wing movements 
attempt to mobilize the peasantry (39). 
Peasants choose types of resistance appropriate to the 
situation and with least risk. Only in situations in which 
severe dislocation has undermined the effectiveness of 
village defence mechanisms and rendered avoidance protest 
an insufficient response to excessive elite demands do 
178 
peasants resort to violent resistance. This is precisely 
what happened under the impact of colonialism and commer­
cialization, which also weakened vertical ties and often 
(unwittingly) strengthened horizontal ones. 
In Cochin China, the frontier area most exposed to the 
impact of the market economy in Vietnam, peasant resistance 
increased and became more violent. Landlords had to hire 
more overseers to guard the ripening paddy in fear of theft, 
and started protecting their homes against theft and ban­
ditry. When the world economic recession of the 1930's hit 
Vietnam and the price of rice took a downward plunge both 
the landlords and the state attempted to unload the crisis 
onto the peasantry. Threats and violence were needed more 
and more to collect rents and taxes. An unprecedented rash 
of peasant protest and violence broke out. The majority 
consisted of protests against or direct attacks on the 
French colonial tax system and the seizure and distribution 
of rice from landlords' granaries. The general unrest was 
put down by the French, but the situation remained uneasy. 
At about the same time and for the same reasons the peasants 
of the Northern Annam provinces of Nghe-An and Ha-Tinh 
revolted and actually succeeded in taking power for a while. 
And this revolt was merely the culmination of a long line 
of peasant protest and a number of earlier insurrections. 
In Cambodia, on the contrary, there had only been one 
major violent uprising, in 1885, when the French forced the 
king to sign a convention which virtually turned Cambodia 
into a colony. The uprising threatened the French presence 
in Cambodia and only ended after the king was persuaded to 
call on his countrymen to lay down their arms in exchange 
for some concessions to the king's position. So this was 
basically a nationalist anti-French uprising, sparked by 
what the people saw as a demotion, an insult, of their 
king. Some more typical peasant grievances may have played 
a role at grass-roots level. One of the origins of the 
insurrection, according to Thion, lay in the abolition of 
slavery, which had given the Khmer peasants a feeling of 
security (40). Following the 1Θ85 uprising the French, 
whilst gaining political ascendancy, maintained the king in 
a splendour which had probably not been equalled since 
Angkorian times, greatly enhancing his symbolic position 
within the kingdom. They thus carried over into the colonial 
period the legitimacy that surrounded pre-colonial Khmer 
rulers, reverence for their god-king probably being the 
only link tying peasants to their rulers. 
It is noteworthy that the only mass peasant protest to 
occur before the Second World War, in 1916, was a peaceful 
protest against taxes and corvée, which was disbanded once 
the king had given assurance that the government would try 
to ameliorate conditions. The peaceful character of this 
mass peasant protest apparently reflects the relatively 
mild colonial and capitalist impact on Cambodia (41). There 
was one violent incident in 1925, however, involving the 
killing of the French resident in Prey Veng by a crowd 
because of his rude treatment of some Khmer who were delin-
quent in paying their taxes. Subsequently the crowd marched 
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on Kp. Chhnang to demand remission of their taxes, but were 
dispersed before reaching their destination (42). Serious 
and sudden disruption of village life happened fifty years 
later, with the onset of the first Lon Nol government in 
1966. Then the state increased surplus extraction from the 
peasantry, causing peasant resentment. This increased 
government penetration at village level was experienced as 
an infringement of traditional village autonomy. 
In Battambang the threat to peasant security resulting 
from the Lon Nol government's activities coincided with 
growing polarization and class antagonisms, as we have 
seen. The forced collection of rice against very low prices 
by the military, who effectively took over this work from 
civil agencies, together with the bad harvest of 1966, 
caused bitter feelings among the peasants, leading to the 
1967 southern Battambang peasant uprising known as the 
Samlaut Rebellion. 
The crucial element in peasant anger would seem to be 
a moral component. The more subsistence is threatened, the 
more likely deception and force will be needed to skim of 
the surplus. The peasant's standard of justice is, however, 
not a static and absolute measure, but varies in time and 
from place to place. The balance of exchange can deteriorate 
while the living conditions of a peasant household remain 
stable or even improve. It is not, therefore, enough to 
establish that some level of peasant exploitation is present 
to account for peasant discontent. Injustice must be felt, 
Moore tells us (43). Or, as Wertheim remarks, more important 
than objective subordination are the victim's subjective 
feelings concerning this subordination (44). In spite of 
increasing poverty, insecurity and hunger peasants often 
do not rebel. When they rebell it is usually to protect 
their 'little community' against the claims of the state. 
The goal of most peasant resistance is not to overthrow the 
system of domination but to survive in it, as Scott says 
(45). Although peasants are not conservative per se, many 
peasant revolts have been in defence of customary rights 
(46). To rebel implies literally taking a deadly risk, for 
one's self as well as for one's family and homestead. So a 
significant reduction in coercive state pressure can in-
crease the likelihood of peasant revolt. This happened in 
many countries in the aftermath of the Second World War, in 
which first the colonial power and then the Japanese con-
queror had been defeated. Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Vietnam all saw insurrectionary movements in this 
period. The same occurred in Russia after the collapse of 
the army in 1917. In northern China the temporary disap-
pearance of state power after the Japanese surrender also 
gave poorer peasants the opportunity to revolt (47). 
Not all peasant strata show the same propensity for 
rebellion. Comparing six peasant movements. Wolf argues 
that it is the middle peasants, the strata more readily to 
take risks in regard of the market, that are also the ones 
most likely to come into political action first, and for 
the same reasons. The middle peasant has some internal 
leverage, some minimal tactical freedom. He is relatively 
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independent, has something to lose and lots to fight for 
(48). These criteria actually also more or less apply to 
poor but 'free' peasants, located in peripheral areas 
outside of landlord control, which gives them some tactical 
mobility. Factors that increase the latitude granted by 
tactical mobility. Wolf therefore concludes, will reinforce 
the revolutionary potential (49). 
According to Popkin the Vietnamese experience confirms 
"the almost universal finding that agricultural 
labourers are harder to organize or less likely 
to protest than tenants and they, in turn, are 
often less active than land owning middle pea-
sants" (50). 
Because the peasants of Cochin China had a small surplus, 
he concludes, they could more easily afford to take politi-
cal risks, and did, than their Tonkin counterparts who were 
truly against the margin (51). Even during the terrible 
famine of 1944-1945 the Tonkin peasants did not rebel. Just 
prior to the 1955-1956 land reform in North Vietnam it was 
found that middle peasants made up the great majority of 
party members at village level. Poor peasants and agricul-
tural labourers made up less than 5%. According to Moise, 
this was because middle peasants were more literate, self-
confident and had money to take time off for political work 
without their families coming in danger of starvation (52). 
The peasants of Nghe-An and Ha-Tinh provinces were also 
poor, but, living in a peripheral area beyond the control 
of the central power, they had the necessary tactical 
mobility. The Samlaut Rebellion, too, took place in a 
somewhat peripheral region, close to rugged mountain and 
forest areas (53). 
Poor peasants and landless labourers are unlikely to 
rebel, therefore, unless they can rely on some external 
power to challenge the power that constrains them. They 
need some security to rebel, such as the Red Army gave them 
in China by breaking landlord power in the villages. Under 
the protection of and prompted by the communist party poor 
peasants and agricultural labourers in both the Chinese and 
North Vietnamese land reforms unleashed violent campaigns 
of retribution that wiped out the landlords as a class. 
Both land reform movements threatened to get out of hand as 
poor peasants even started attacking middle peasants, thus 
confirming the notion that poor peasants, once they do 
rebel, have the tendency to be more radical than middle 
peasants. 
Many authors have noted the leading role in peasant 
rebellions of peasants with experience of the outside world; 
army veterans, migratory labour, peasants who have experien-
ced city life, worked in mines or other industrial enterpri-
ses. They have broader views, have some experience of 
organization, are able to give directions, provide a dis-
ciplined core (54). The role of the Russian peasant soldiers 
who returned to their villages armed after the collapse of 
the Russian army in 1917 is a clear example. 
The 100.000 odd Vietnamese, mainly peasant sons, who 
were sent to France during the First World War to help in 
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the war effort, gained, through their army and factory 
experience, not only technical and industrial skills, but 
also came in contact with discipline, union organization 
and the socialist workers movement. On return to Vietnam 
this was to benefit the revolutionary movement immensely. 
In the case of the Nghe-Tinh Revolt it was the tradition of 
out-migration which gave its inhabitants a wider horizon 
than most people from other areas in Vietnam. 
In Cambodia there was very little of this. Not Khmer 
but Vietnamese were used to work the plantations. The tiny 
proletariat was largely Chinese. Few Khmer peasants needed 
to migrate temporarily to the cities in search of additional 
income. The army (before 1970) was small (35.000 men), 
badly equipped and badly trained and had practically no 
fighting experience. In the case of southern Battambang, 
people had inmigrated from elsewhere and were still doing 
so right up to 1967. 
But even in cases where peasant rebellion could profit 
from the leadership of these peasants with outside experi-
ence, they have not, by themselves, been successful, at 
least not in terms of laying hold of the state, of trans-
forming the social, economic and political system. There 
are many reasons for this which basically revolve around 
the peasants' subsistence ethic, their village-centred 
lives, experiences and consciousness. 
"The very particularism of the little tradition 
(...) means that, by itself, the village lacks 
institutional means for a direct confrontation 
with a vastly more powerful great tradition. 
(Furthermore) the peasantry is, by itself, ill 
equipped, in terms of knowledge and interest, to 
sustain a national struggle for broad goals", 
as Scott notes (55). Futhermore, they have no experience 
with ruling over and "lack acquaintance with the operation 
of the state as a complex machinery" (56). And Shanin adds 
that "segmentation, lack of crystalised ideology and aims, 
lack of stable membership", are some of peasant rebellions' 
weaknesses (57). 
9.3 Revolutionary Elites 
Almost all peasant rebellions which became revolutions, 
which turned from movements aimed at the redress of wrongs 
into movements to overthrow society itself, have been led 
and controlled by a revolutionary elite of non-peasant 
outsiders (58). These outsiders have overwhelmingly been 
intellectuals. The intellectuals Ho Chi Minh, son of a poor 
country scholar from Nghe-An Province, and Mao Zedong, son 
of a self-made rich peasant cum-grain-dealer, were certainly 
better acquainted with peasant life than the doctor from 
middle class background, Che Guevara. Some outsiders cer-
tainly identified more with the peasantry than others (59). 
But even intellectuals with peasant backgrounds were prima-
rily intellectuals, representing the values of an urban 
culture (60). 
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In Vietnam the absence of outsider leadership is 
perhaps what "gave the unrest in Cochin China a sporadic, 
Idealistic character and helps to explain why it was easily 
crushed", according to Scott (61). The Nghe-Tinh Uprising 
of the same period, on the other hand, profited from the 
high concentration of local, dissident scholars, who "sup-
plied an indigenous leadership that was resistant to outside 
interference" (62). 
This leading role of outsiders is well documented. 
Most authors also deem it a necessity. Marx, e.g., was of 
the opinion that peasants were 
"incapable of enforcing their class interests in 
their own name (...). They cannot represent 
themselves, they must be represented. Their 
representatives must at the same time appear as 
their masters" (63). 
Marx held the peasantry in contempt, but even authors like 
Paulo Freiré who advocate methods for achieving the self-
emancipation of the masses, address themselves to revolu-
tionary intellectuals, holding that the initiative must come 
from outsiders (64). Huizer, for instance, mentions contact 
with educated urban allies and other modernizing forces as 
an essential factor for successful organization of the 
peasants (65). He gives a host of Latin American examples 
where outsiders organized peasants, formulated wishes and 
demands and led the movement (66). 
The need for outsiders/intellectuals is analogous with 
the urban - rural link. Here, too, there seems to be some-
thing like a general consensus. The urban - rural link must 
be made if revolt is to become revolution and it must be 
made and cemented by the revolutionary intellectual elite, 
or so most authors tell us. 
Intellectuals in most developing countries were brought 
into being by colonial administrations which began training 
a select group among the native intelligentsia to meet 
their major manpower needs. Many of these intellectuals 
became more or less déclassé, that is, they 
"can find no suitable place among the illiterate 
masses, among the beginnings of the middle clas-
ses, or in such alien organizations of Western 
business or government agencies as may exist", 
as Mills notes (67). This is not merely the result of a 
western type education, however. The "junior executives of 
the capitalist market in the dependent country", as Wolf 
calls them (68), also enjoyed western education. They, 
however, have been incorporated in the system. The new 
skills these intellectuals have learned are based on a 
literacy different from that of their own country. Within 
traditional society literacy was often a hallmark of high 
status, part of the dominant elite's culture. The new 
intellectuals do "partake of the reflected glory of this 
traditional evaluation of literacy" but at the same time 
their acquaintance with western education makes them "par-
ticipants in a communication process" which far outstrips 
the traditional body of knowledge. The new body of knowledge 
with which they have come into contact suggests "powerful 
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visions not dreamed of in the inherited ideology", as Wolf 
puts it (69). Concretely we are talking about school teach-
ers, the lower levels of the bureaucracy, and professionals 
such as lawyers. These people are 
"best aware of the world outside 'developing 
societies' and of the social limitations at home, 
yet in many cases completely unable to secure 
vital change" (70). 
They are limited to battling with symptoms. Furthermore, 
they deal with people from society at large, 
"rather than being confined to any particular 
group to which they might be tied by heredity or 
tradition. They thus confront a situation in 
which they answer to a much larger social field 
and communication network than the traditional 
power holder and yet experience every day the 
very real limitations on their power" (71). 
Already the mere admission to western type schools had been 
a promise of upward mobility. For many the expectations 
generated by this upward mobility subsequently went unful-
filled; their "ascendancy" was "blocked" (72). Many do not 
find work or must supplement their professional work through 
other activities. They believe they are of greater value 
than is given them, but they lack the power to correct this 
injustice (73). This frustration, their marginal position, 
their consciousness also of what is wrong and their in-
capability to do something about it, their wish to catch 
up, on the one hand, and their shame in relation to the 
West, on the other, may lead to a deep commitment to social 
change and the readiness for sacrifice necessary in revolu-
tionary action. Political movements often provide these 
'marginals' a home of which they are otherwise deprived by 
their social position, their separation from the traditional 
sources of power. So an articulate, trained elite was 
created, devoid of continuing prospects except those that 
might be opened by revolution. 
This disparity between income and power, on the one 
hand, and cultural capital and self-regard, on the other, 
drew dissatisfied intellectuals to politics. Acutely aware 
of the chasm separating the colonial power's preaching (the 
égalité, fraternité, liberté) from its practice of occupa-
tion, exploitation and enslavement, and emersed in western, 
forward looking knowledge systems, it is not surprising 
that many turned to socialism and Marxism, those western 
ideologies critical of colonialism and racism and the 
existing system in the mother countries. Many of these 
intellectuals were especially attracted to Lenin's concept 
of the vanguard party, which ascribed to them a leading 
role. As Mazrui has noted for Africa, the "newly educated 
class of Africans" turned to socialism and Marxism and took 
almost undisputed leadership in the phase of political 
decolonization (74). This was also true for Asia (75). 
The idea of the vanguard party is older than Lenin. 
Marx himself had already stated that the working class 
could not attain to socialist consciousness by itself. It 
showed a defective rationality, confusing surface appearan-
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ces with reality, effects with causes, in pushing economis-
tic goals, direct material benefits. "(T)he working class", 
he said, "ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate 
working of these everyday struggles" (76). These struggles 
inhibit the pursuit of the working class' long range inter-
ests. Working class theory needed to be transcended by a 
larger, more encompassing rationality, which incorporates, 
but does not limit itself to the logic of interests. Lenin, 
building on Marx, argued that this could only come from 
bourgeois intellectuals outside the proletariat. Recall his 
famous remarks on this issue: 
"We have said that there could not have been 
social democratic consciousness among workers. It 
would have had to be brought to them from without. 
The history of all countries shows that the 
working class, exclusively by its own effort, is 
able to develop only a trade-union consciousness 
(...) The theory of socialism, however, grew out 
of the philosophic, historical and economic 
theories elabourated by educated representatives 
of the propertied classes, by intellectuals" (77). 
Leninism was based on the principle that socialism was 
scientific (78), true and therefore must be imposed on the 
masses, who, deluded by the bourgeoisie, cannot understand 
their own true interests ("false consciousness") (79). The 
proper task of the revolutionary was to change the 'objec-
tive' situation, that is, to free the working class from 
its false consciousness and prepare it for its historical 
task: the overthrow of the hitherto dominant classes. But 
while theory is considered absolutely necessary for social 
transformation, theorists, being potential critics, may not 
be trusted. This is really one expression of what Konrad 
and Szelényi, in their study on the development of intellec-
tuals into a new class striving for power, call "intellec-
tuals' schizophrenia": 
"They articulate the rules of the social order 
and the theories which give them sanction, but at 
the same time it is intellectuals who criticize 
the existing scheme of things and demand its 
supersession" (80). 
Theorists were also seen as political competitors to power 
by other theorists. 
As theory was needed but theorists not to be trusted, 
a special theorist would have to be created, along with the 
infrastructure necessary to reproduce him: the Leninist 
vanguard party. It was an instrument for controlling and 
transforming intellectuals. At the same time it serves to 
transmit the socialist theory created by intellectuals to 
the proletariat, serving as an organizational instrument 
through which ideological influence over the proletariat 
could be exerted. With the vanguard party there is no more 
waiting for specific economic developments that must in-
evitably lead to revolution, till then the predominant 
Marxist position. Now the political initiative of the party 
becomes the decisive objective condition for revolution. 
The vanguard party is the means for intellectuals to over-
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come their own powerlessness, to place their hands at the 
wheel of history. Small wonder it had such appeal to revolu-
tionary intellectuals in developing countries. 
In the Leninist view the party, by virtue of its 
scientific knowledge of society, is the one legitimate 
source of political initiative. With its correct theoretical 
consciousness it embodies the proletarian consciousness 
irrespective of what the empirical proletariat may think. 
The party's interest is automatically the interest of the 
proletariat and of universal progress. This entitles it to 
ignore the actual wishes and aspirations of the people it 
has appointed itself to represent. The real interest of the 
working class is substituted by the historical mission of 
the working class, to establish a dictatorship of the pro-
letariat, or rather of the party leadership as the embodi-
ment of proletarian consciousness. Here lies the legitima-
tion of the use of violence by the party to achieve these 
ends, even against the real proletariat, if need be. As the 
proletariat had become the ruling class in the new socialist 
state, the state's interests naturally became its own, the 
state in Marxist theory not being an independent entity but 
an instrument in the hands of the ruling class. The prole-
tariat, therefore, obviously need not defend its interests 
against that state. The socialist state, founded by the 
vanguard party thanks to scientific socialism, is the 
incarnate proletarian ideology. According to Lenin, only 
one group could be in possession of the truth at any one 
time, all differences of views reflect class antagonisms 
and there are only two types of ideology, bourgeois and 
proletarian (socialist). So anyone doing anything not in 
accordance with the state's (the party's) purpose was, 
according to Lenin, per definition bourgeois and counter-
revolutionary (81). It follows, therefore, that should the 
workers try to defend their interests against the state 
anyway, it can by definition only mean that these prole-
tarians are counter-revolutionary, bourgeois class enemies 
and must be combatted accordingly. As Borcke, in her study 
on the ideological origins of Bolshevism, notes, every end 
goal will, in the final instance, result in the claim to 
mastery of those who profess to know this goal (82). 
In the concept of the Leninist vanguard party there is 
implicit a legitimation of the use of violence against what 
the party considers the revolutionary class. In the case of 
the CPK it is even made quite explicit. Angkar, embodying 
the most advanced and conscious part of the nation, always 
knew better than the community itself what the latter's 
needs and interests were. It stated as fact that 98 or 99% 
of the population supported the revolution. Anyone making a 
mistake or showing dissatisfaction could only be one of the 
1 to 2% counter-revolutionaries. Even if the empirical 
majority was dissatisfied, as in fact it was, it officially 
only constituted 1 to 2% of the population. This 1 to 2% 
was needed as a scapegoat to explain failures. With the 
happiness and well-being of the vast majority endangered 
the party was legitimized, even obligated, to deal firmly 
with this small minority. 
186 
In the concepts of false consciousness and vanguard 
party lies another legitimation for the use of violence. It 
could be used to rid the proletariat of its false conscious-
ness. As Nikolai Bucharin wrote in 1920, echoing the convic-
tion of many Bolshevik leaders, 
"Proletarian coercion in all forms, from execu-
tions to forced labour is, paradoxical as it may 
sound, the method of moulding communist humanity 
out of the human material of the capitalist 
period" (83). 
The use of violence and the rule of a small, virtually 
self-appointed minority were necessary, or so the Leninist 
party legitimized itself, only as long as there were enemies 
to be destroyed, only in order that the masses, once libe-
rated from exploitation and no longer held down by igno-
rance, could develop to realize fully their true nature, in 
the transition period to communism in other words (84). 
In China both the Kuo Mintang (KMT) and communist 
elites emerged from the political, social and economic 
chaos that came with the impact of western culture upon 
Chinese society and with the breakdown of the Ch'ing dynas-
ty. They usually came from parts of China where western 
influence had first penetrated and where the penetration 
itself was most vigorous. Most came from upper or middle 
class backgrounds and had studied abroad (65). The majority 
were intellectuals, men and women whose western education 
isolated them from the main currents of Chinese society. 
They had been "denied access to what they considered their 
proper place", "had experienced some upward social mobility, 
gained some economic rewards and wanted political power", 
to which end they "organized violent action" (86). 
In Vietnam most of the economic alternatives to a 
potential Vietnamese middle class were blocked, with most 
trade, finance and modern industry in the hands of Europeans 
and Chinese. What remained open to those with the proper 
(French style diploma) education were the professions and 
the lower positions in the government bureaucracy. But 
there were always more candidates than positions available. 
The salary difference between French and Vietnamese offi-
cials was gross. These contradictions provided fuel for a 
growing nationalism among Vietnamese intellectuals. Racial 
and cultural confrontation in the French colonial classrooms 
did the same for many pupils in Vietnam (87). As Wolf says: 
"The sons and daughters of former mandarins who 
had a sense of past glory but had seen their 
fathers go down in defeat before the foreigners, 
reacted against the mandarin style but now found 
in Western teaching a new weapon to use against a 
colonial power that did not grant them equal 
privileges with the colonists" (88). 
Even those who had been to school in France, children of 
the rich in other words, often returned to find that they 
were denied all the liberties they had enjoyed in France, 
that they were again "exposed to the scorn of Vietnam's 
colonial masters" (89). Many students returned from France 
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committed to communism. Rising expectations, confronted 
with impediments to development on all sides, drove many of 
them into various nationalist and socialist movements which 
began to spring up in Vietnam after 1900. 
Many Chinese, Vietnamese and Cambodian revolutionaries 
and revolutionary writers came from the ranks of tutors, 
primary and middle school teachers and educational adminis-
trators (90). Vietnamese intellectuals, (and Chinese and 
Cambodian intellectuals as well (91)), were responsive to 
the "writings of Lenin, in which they found a powerful 
tool for political organization and for overcoming fragmen-
tation" (92). All ranking Indochina Communist Party (ICP) 
leaders of the early 1940's had been members of the new 
intelligentsia (93). The great majority of the National 
Liberation Front (NLF)'s high command, as far as traceable, 
were also intellectuals with middle or upper class back-
grounds (94 ) . 
Developments in Cambodia were similar, although lagging 
about half a century behind. European, Chinese and Viet-
namese controlled non-agricultural economic life and the 
modern sector. The French used Vietnamese in the administra-
tion of Cambodia. For Cambodians there were very few posi-
tions available. What has been said above about intellec-
tuals in dependent countries, their marginal and more or 
less déclassé position and their frustration, certainly 
applied to the young men and women who were later to form 
the leadership of the KR, as we have seen. Before moving to 
France for higher education they had already been imbued 
with a strong resentment of Cambodian dependence of and 
domination by foreign powers, a deep historical sense of 
fear that the Khmer nation would disappear for ever. The 
great Angkor empire provided the framework of reference for 
their virulent nationalism. Their stay in France, the 
powerful, superior, mundane western mother country, rein-
forced their need to rid themselves of their feelings of 
dependency, inferiority and belittlement. It also immersed 
them in a Stalinist reading of Marxism-Leninism, providing 
them with a clear-cut and mechanistic interpretation and 
organization model. The Leninist vanguard party not only 
presented them with a means to overcome their powerlessness, 
it was also a clear expression of their convictions. They, 
the revolutionary intellectuals, were convinced that only 
they could pull Cambodia out of the quagmire and achieve a 
pure and glorious society for the Khmer nation. 
9.4 Peasants and Revolutionary Elites 
To add power to their claims against the economic and 
political power holders these intellectuals need a con-
stituency. The industrial workers, created by the market, 
and especially the peasants, being driven into increasingly 
greater insecurity (rural proletarianization, indebtedness, 
the grip of anonymous market forces) but for whom the 
dominant classes showed little or no concern, can provide 
such a constituency, although their interests and ideas 
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generally do not run parallel to those of the revolutionary 
elite. A huge gulf separates them, reflecting in part the 
traditional gulf betwen the peasantry and the old ruling 
elite, between centre and periphery. 
Describing the ruling elite as the centre is not only 
correct in terms of power, but also in terms of dominance 
in general: geographically, culturally, socially. There are 
definite ecological differences between the centre and the 
rest of society. We can identify the ruling elite, the 
centre, with a Great Tradition, the periphery with a Little 
Tradition, to use the terms coined by Redfield, who develo-
ped them to describe the relationship between peasant 
community and the outside world (95). Although centre and 
periphery may basically share the same culture and language 
the centre defines its own culture as important, as part of 
the Great Tradition, whilst looking down on that of the 
periphery. The centre and its Great Tradition are nearly 
always urban centred, cosmopolitan, literate, intellectual. 
The periphery and its Little Tradition generally refer to 
the rural area, to peasant culture, localistic, oral, folk 
traditions. The two are not separate but interdependent, 
interacting and affecting each other, though clearly not as 
equals (96). These concepts (Great and Little Tradition) 
are also helpful because they imply a denigration of the 
periphery by the centre. The terms refer to a general domi-
nation (geographical, cultural, social, infrastructural), 
not merely domination through use of physical force. Al-
though we are mainly concerned with terror, these concepts 
remind us of the fact that there are other ways of achieving 
domination, as well as other factors involved besides brutal 
force. 
The peasants' Little Tradition resists easy incorpora-
tion into the normative world of the elites. Their values 
vary substantially, their visions diverge. The peasants, 
subsistence-oriented, live in small, relatively homogeneous 
villages with their local customs. The revolutionary elite, 
much more differentiated, middle or upper class, is oriented 
to society as a whole. Generalizing we can say that what 
the peasants want and fight for is "their experience of 
existing society minus its most oppressive features" (97). 
They are suspicious of remote national bureaucracies, 
hostile to taxes, sometimes secessionist, against state 
interference. They want to be left alone. 
Generally speaking the revolutionary elite, on the 
other hand, strives for a radical remoulding of society. It 
is committed to state building, law and order, integrating 
the economy on a national level, and therefore to taxes and 
conscription. Where the peasants' idea of a good society is 
the "just sharing of austerity", as Hobsbawm says (98), 
both the bourgeoisie and Marxists are committed to progress, 
an economy of abundance, dependent on the sheer expansion 
of the forces of production, on economic growth. The pea-
santry's lack of formal hierarchal organization, which has 
the advantage of flexibility, is contrary to the Leninist 
orientation to class action led by the vanguard party. 
Even where a peasantry and a revolutionary elite seem 
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to share a political (or religious) identification, this 
nominal unity disguises the contradictions between the 
meaning and practice of their respective beliefs. To the 
peasant the city, if anything, is a source of exploitation 
and domination. The city-bred's attitude of easy superiority 
galls the peasant. "The weakest link in any revolutionary 
chain of command", as Scott says, "is that between urban 
cadre and the villages" (99). The conclusion seems ines-
capable that to the vanguard party, that 
"closely knit group of activists, having its own 
impetus, specific organizational structure, aims 
and leadership (...) the peasantry is an object 
of leadership or manipulation. The peasantry may 
be 'used' (i.e. deliberately tricked into some 
action alien to its own interests) or 'led to 
achieve its own aims': yet, the very definition 
of 'aims' is in the hands of qualitatively dis-
tinct leaders", 
as Shanin neatly sums it up (100). 
The peasantry, however, is by no means a passive, 
willing instrument. As Scott notes: 
"(i)f there is a case for a Leninist party then 
its rationale must be as much to restrain the 
peasants' revolutionary impulses as to create 
them - or, more ominously, - to ensure that the 
revolution which is made is the revolution that 
the elite intends rather than the revolution that 
the peasantry might make as its own" (101). 
Often enough peasants (or workers, or the poor in general), 
with their 'limited' visions and goals, rather than party 
strategy, have created revolutionary situations. The storm-
ing of the Bastille, the starting point of the French 
Revolution, is a case in point. So is the Russian February 
Revolution of 1917 which came as a surprise to the Bol-
sheviks. 
In a sense, the peasants' attempt at secession, their 
desire for political autonomy and its concomitant closed 
economy, is broader in scope and more radical, as they 
implicitly reject the very unit of political struggle which 
the revolutionary elite generally hopes to capture and 
preserve; the nation-state. The peasantry often rebel to 
evade or destroy the state. The reverse side of this medal 
is that full accommodation to local peasant demands may be 
at cross purposes with the revolutionary elite's goal of 
radical change. The revolutionary movement may then be 
encapsulated within the existing social structure, as seems 
to have happened to the Indonesian Communist Party before 
1965. This could be an argument for a Leninist party struc-
ture whose leaders could resist such "trade unionist" 
tendencies (102). 
So the most essential factor in determining the outcome 
of a vanguard party's struggle for power is probably its 
relationship with the masses it adresses itself to. As 
Michael Walzer, discussing this relationship, says: 
"The thrust toward revolutionary dictatorship, 
the pursuit of holiness, virtue, or communist 
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discipline, the use of terror, the possibility of 
a Thermidorean reaction, success or failure in 
the establishment of responsible government - all 
these depend upon the interaction of vanguards 
and classes and then on the historical factors 
that determine the interaction" (103). 
The more organized the class the less powerful the vanguard. 
A vanguard's independence is enhanced by its contact with 
poorly educated and unorganized classes. New industrial 
classes, and even more so peasants, are weak classes. So 
when the revolution is successful, sustained vanguard 
dictatorship is dependent on class underdevelopment. Con-
trary to the general association of 'Thermidor' with reac-
tion, restoration and counter-revolution (the 9th of Ther-
midor of year II of the revolutionary calender being the 
date of Robespierre's fall and the end of the Reign of 
Terror), Walzer's definition of Thermidor rests on the 
relationship between vanguard party and the class(es) it 
bases itself on: 
"(It) is not a counter-revolution, though it may 
open up possibilities for counter-revolutionary 
politics; it is rather the self assertion of the 
revolutionary class against the politics of the 
vanguard" (104). 
Thermidor elucidates the other side of the weighted equa-
tion, the masses, the object of the revolutionary elite's 
(the subject's) activity. In general it can be said that 
the weaker, less organized the class, the smaller the 
possibility of Thermidor occurring. But Thermidorean pres-
sure is something revolutionary elite's have to contend 
with. Only a few revolutionary movements, the Chinese and 
Vietnamese among them, have been able to forge a durable 
bridge across the chasm between urban revolutionary elite 
and peasantry. But it is a tenuous one and the "middle 
cadre, brokers between the little tradition of the village 
and a national revolutionary party, walk in treacherous 
terrain" (105). 
We can surmise that if a party is, initially at least, 
rather weak, there is a better chance of collabouration 
between party cadres and peasantry (a sort of inverted 
version of Walzer's weak classes enhancing a vanguard 
party's independence). The former's response to the values 
of the peasantry will be greater the more the elite needs, 
or is dependent upon, the masses. The length of time that 
this type of interaction lasts, too, is an important factor. 
Both the Chinese and Vietnamese parties were, for extended 
periods of time, dependent for their survival on peasant 
enthusiasm they could elicit voluntarily by associating 
themselves with the immediate demands of the peasantry. 
Initially, however, the communists in China followed 
the traditional Marxist, Moscow inspired strategy of reli-
ance on the urban industrial workers. This strategy was a 
reflection of classical Marxist attitudes towards the 
peasantry. Marx himself considered peasants "a sack of 
potatoes" (106), a potentially reactionary force (107), 
doomed to disappear, to become proletarians. To him, solving 
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the contradictions between town and country, industry and 
agriculture and mental and manual labour was a prerequisite 
for the truly human life that communism promised (108). But 
his conception of the revolutionary process was centred on 
the modern industrial city. If the peasantry were to play 
any positive role at all it could only be under the leader-
ship of the urban proletariat (109). 
Lenin, in The Development of Capitalism in Russia 
(1899), with a wealth of economic data argued that modern 
capitalist forces of production had already achieved domi-
nance in Russia and in consequence the emergence of a modern 
urban proletariat had shifted the revolutionary arena to 
the cities (110). Only later, when it became apparent to 
him that the bourgeoisie, by compromising with Czarist 
autocracy, failed to play its role in the bourgeois demo-
cratic revolution, did he turn to the peasantry as a sur-
rogate for the bourgeoisie. The alliance of peasantry and 
workers, under leadership of the proletariat (viz. the 
vanguard party), was, to Lenin, simply one of political 
expediency confined to the bourgeois democratic phase of 
the revolution, a means by which to hasten history on its 
proper course in the absence of a revolutionary bourgeoisie. 
(Remember that at this time Marxists generally considered 
the necessity of the bourgeois democratic revolution before 
a socialist proletarian revolution could occur). Lenin 
never lost his basic distrust of the peasantry. His view of 
progressive development, and Stalin's too, remained urban 
centred and based on centralization. The Bolsheviks in 
general, urban intellectuals, cosmopolitan in outlook, held 
the peasantry in contempt. 
But for the Chinese communists this urban centred 
strategy proved to be a costly failure. Chinese intellec-
tuals, however, lacking a social democratic tradition, were 
less firmly tied to Marxist theoretical concepts. In econo-
mically backward China it was hard to assume the progressive 
nature of capitalism, which Marxist evolution of societies 
demanded. Foreign imported capitalism was city-based and 
disastrous for the Chinese masses. This facilitated the 
shift to peasant orientated Maoism. The urban proletariat 
was, after all, numerically only a tiny percentage of the 
revolutionary masses. Cities were foreign dominated, and 
the countryside did surround and dwarf the cities. It was 
not illogical for a nationalist response to look to the 
rural areas for a true source of national regeneration 
(111). 
Mao's developing peasant orientation was also strongly 
influenced by the peasant movement of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, 
and especially the uprising in Hunan, not begun at party 
initiative and taking a course of its own (112). According 
to Mao, the peasants would "rise like a mighty storm (...), 
a force so swift and violent that no power (...) will be 
able to hold it back (...)" (113). The main contradiction, 
according to Mao, was between peasants and landlords, and 
the peasants' class struggle the real motive force of 
historical development in Chinese feudal society (114). 
Here the peasants take centre stage and to Mao it is clear 
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what the party should do. 
"There are three alternatives. To march at their 
head and lead them? To trail behind them, ges-
ticulating and criticizing? Or to stand in their 
way and oppose them?", 
Mao asked rhetorically (115). Just as the Russian populists 
in the nineteenth century, he saw backwardness as an ad-
vantage for bypassing capitalism and achieving socialism. 
No need to wait first for a bourgeois democratic revolution. 
Moral values, the actions of dedicated men, determined the 
outcome. 
Lenin and Stalin placed much more emphasis on develop-
ing the forces of production, on rapid technical and in-
dustrial development ("electrification"), and urbanization. 
Mao, on the other hand, stressed the role of human con-
sciousness in achieving the ultimate goal, reliance on 
man-power instead of machine centred industrial production, 
will-power over technical knowledge, ideological purity 
over expertise. The difference was very apparent in the 
controversy between the Soviet Union and China over educa-
tion in the 1960's. Where the Soviet Union stressed elite 
education and the need to create more specialists, to 
introduce more sophisticated machinery, to develop the 
technological base of socialism ("scientific socialism"), 
the Chinese accused the Soviets of creating privileged 
classes and stressed the need to combine manifold production 
functions even in each individual producer ("mass-line" 
education) (116). 
Maoism propagated an ascetic, rural life style and 
egalitarianism. It had a suspicion of cities, which were 
seen as corrupting foreign dominated seats of evil capita-
lism and imperialism. Living and working with the peasants 
was a purifying experience through which city dwellers, 
intellectuals and cadres could acquire true revolutionary 
virtues. Maoism tended to favour small scale, decentralised 
forms of political and economic organization, self-reliance 
and self-sufficiency. It had an antipathy for manifestations 
of bureaucracy, occupational specialization and formal 
higher education as factors increasing inequality (117). 
All these are peasant sentiments. Much of it goes against 
the grain of classical Marxism. Maoism has very much been 
concerned with diminishing and eradicating the contradic-
tions between manual and mental labour, agriculture and 
industry, town and countryside, undertaking steps now, not 
believing they would automatically disappear once communism 
had been achieved. 
Mao's conception of human nature also differed from 
Stalin's. Mao believed in the changeableness and redeema-
bility of human nature. Even class enemies were not beyond 
a change in consciousness and could be remoulded. "Diseases 
in thought and politics" required an "attitude of saving 
men by curing their diseases", according to Mao (118). 
Mao's "good society" is reminiscent of Rousseau's. No need 
for coercive institutions because it is composed of virtuous 
men who have internalized the right values, like self-sacri-
fice, and who directly participate in determining the course 
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of politics. Man, by nature good, can transform himself 
into the good citizen (119). Where Stalin believed the new 
socialist man would arrive after the socialist industrial 
economy had been built, Mao was convinced that the creation 
of a new socialist man was an ongoing process. Maoism placed 
much more systematic reliance, therefore, on (coercive) 
persuasion, on thought reform. As the psychologist Robert 
Lifton, in an essay on Chinese thought reform, notes, more 
than any other regime the Chinese communists have devoted 
themselves to changing human nature (120). 
The Vietnamese communists seem to have held an inter-
mediate position. On the one hand their socialism was rooted 
in the village. They recognized it as the basic element of 
Vietnamese society. Building socialism also meant forming 
new socialist men, people who considered labour their 
"pride, happiness and reason for living", who shunned 
leisure-seeking and performed "labour in a disciplined, 
technically oriented and creative manner with high produc-
tivity" (121). New socialist man will only come into being 
in the process of building socialism, through practical 
activity, the Vietnamese communists held, but to build 
socialism socialist men were needed (122). Even landlords 
could change themselves "into new men through work" (123). 
But for those most conditioned by the corrupt past and 
years of anti-communist indoctrination it would take a long 
time. "Discussion" was the means used; explain things and 
people will understand and accept them (124). 
Nevertheless, the Vietnamese generally were less 
radical in their peasant, countryside orientation, in 
decentralization and self-reliance. They put less emphasis 
on change in consciousness and more on raising productivity 
than their Chinese counterparts. Soviet influence is ap-
parent in the greater stress the Vietnamese laid on the 
development of the forces of production. Of the three 
revolutions that must be carried out, the "production 
relations revolution", the "ideological and cultural revolu-
tion", and the "scientific and technical revolution", the 
latter was held to be the key one (125). As Alec Gordon 
says, the Vietnamese communists, in distinction to Mao, 
"accord the peasantry a secondary role in the process of 
their own emancipation". But no version of a socialist 
primitive accumulation has held sway in Vietnam, he adds, 
meaning that the Vietnamese communists have not "squeezed" 
the countryside to develop urban industry (126). Education 
was more Soviet oriented, stressing specialization, tech-
nological advancement and rewarding classroom results (127). 
The Maoist slogan "red before expert" did not have the same 
appeal to the Vietnamese communists (128). Another dif-
ference with Mao was that, although the VWP remained closely 
in touch with the masses, compared to many other ruling 
communist parties, it did not see the masses as taking 
political initiative. "The dialectic of change", Gordon 
says, "is conceived of as taking place within the Party and 
not, as in Mao's idea, as a dialectic between the masses 
and the Party" (129). As a rough generalization it may be 
said that the Vietnamese had struck some sort of nationalist 
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and moderate balance between classical Marxism-Leninism 
and Maoism. This can be explained by, inter alia, both 
Soviet and Chinese influence on Vietnamese communism as 
well as their experiences during decades of struggle in a 
predominantly peasant society. 
The KR on the other hand, and especially the Pol Pot 
group, adhered to a very nationalist and extremely Stalinist 
form of Maoism. Stalinism they picked up in France from the 
French Communist Party. Their nationalism, already strong, 
was underlined by Pol Pot's visit to Yugoslavia in 1950, at 
a time when such an act was a direct affront to Stalin, who 
had 'ex-communicated' the Yugoslav Communists for going 
their own way (Titoism), instead of demurely accepting the 
Soviet Union's leading role. While in France they must 
certainly have been aware of the ideas of the French Revolu-
tion: there are a number of similarities between KR practice 
and ideas associated with the French Revolution, especially 
Babeufs program, so striking they cannot be left unmen-
tioned. Peasants as the backbone of the nation, cities 
associated with all that was evil, austerity, anti-intellec-
tualism, these ideas Babeuf shared with many intellectuals 
of the eigthteenth century French Enlightment. He also 
wanted money abolished. Meals were to be taken in common. 
Human knowledge was to be limited to reading, writing and 
arithmetic, and parents to have no part in the education of 
children, to achieve social equality. The sexes were to be 
rigidly separated. The cities were to be emptied, their 
inhabitants scattered over the countryside. The nation was 
to be isolated from the rest of the world (130). The future 
KR leaders in France were also familiar with the Algerian 
revolution raging at the time and the fierce debate it had 
provoked among the Left concerning the permissibility of 
the use of violence in pursuit of ends considered just. 
Whether they were also influenced by Frantz Fanon's The 
Wretched of the Earth, which only appeared in 1961, when 
most of them had already returned to Cambodia, is difficult 
to ascertain. But Fanon's idealization of the peasantry's 
revolutionary zeal and his warning them for the towns, 
foreign built and populated by a privileged and conservative 
proletariat (131) also shows a strong similarity with the 
views later expressed by the KR. This radical view is 
somewhat typical of the frustration and revolutionary 
impatience of many newly radicalised Third World intel-
lectuals, which could lead to the expectation that the 
exploited and downtrodden peasantry would immediately answer 
their call to rebel. It is also illustrative of the chasm 
separating them from the peasantry (132). 
Maoist influence came later when Cambodian communists, 
especially in the early 1960's, received training in China. 
They were particularly infatuated by the Great Leap Forward 
(GLF), whilst those communists still in the urban areas in 
1967, the young intellectuals, were more influenced by the 
Cultural Revolution (CR). The KR were more radical in their 
anti-urban, anti-intellectual, anti-foreign influences, 
anti-bureaucracy sentiments than Mao. They also believed 
that man, equipped with correct consciousness, could conquer 
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all obstacles and that ideology was superior to technology. 
But their conception of human nature was (or became) basi­
cally Stalinist. They had little faith in the redeemability 
of already 'corrupted' 'new people'. They lacked Maoism's 
more humane aspects, a gradual approach (generally), per­
suasion instead of coercion, mobilization by consent instead 
of force, a real concern with the welfare of the masses. 
Their methods were Stalinist. Their extremely rapid and 
radical approach to realizing their goals was at least 
partly conditioned by their self-overestimation, their 
instrumental conception of real people and, especially, 
their extreme distrust and suspicion. The use of terror to 
achieve their ideals in an extremely short time was perhaps 
also, as Quinn argues, to ensure that the elements that 
prevented success in China would be succesfully overcome, 
to wit, peasants' desire for private plots, the emergence 
of 'new' intellectuals within the party and the difficulty 
of communaliζing cities (133). 
Now concrete experiences and circumstances influence 
ideology. Mao's attitude towards the peasantry was certainly 
adapted by circumstances and changing tactics. During the 
Jiangxi Soviet (1928-1934), the communists' first major 
peasant base, the party needed a quick method of expanding 
the Red Army to survive. In this region they could basically 
choose between the powerful but conservative clans or the 
poor peasant Hakka. The latter, vulnerable, falling outside 
the protective solidarity arrangements of the village as 
they did and always having resented the privileged status 
of the powerful kinship groups to which they did not belong, 
were the more logical choice. The party attempted to mobi­
lize them by pledging to fulfil their vision of a ' just 
society'. It followed a policy of radical economic reform, 
land redistribution, liquidation of landlords and rich 
peasants, and so on. This intensified anti-party resistance 
from the established clan groups and so Mao tried to break 
up clan society. Land reform was meant to maximize the 
number of self-sufficient middle peasants created through 
radical land redistribution and therefore loyal to the 
revolution (134). The Jiangxi Soviet was a period of violent 
class struggle, "mass slaughter of reactionaries" (135), in 
considerable part due to the alliance with the poor pea­
sants, always more radical than other strata once they 
stand up. 
Already in his report on the situation in Hunan, Mao 
stressed the leading role of the poor peasants (not the 
middle peasants) (136). This group, precisely because it 
lacked access to land, was excluded from the solidarity 
arrangements of the village and kinship groups and through 
capitalist penetration this group was growing rapidly. For 
instance, in Changsha county, according to Mao, it accounted 
for some 70% of the population (137). Nor did Mao at this 
time criticize the poor peasants for "going too far", being 
too radical in their revolutionary fervour (138). Mao's 
willingness to accommodate what more orthodox Leninists in 
the party regarded as anarchist heresies, was an important 
factor in the degree of integration between the party 
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leaders' vision and that of the peasantry. The Jiangxi 
Soviet period was also a period of learning from mistakes 
(139). 
But after the Long March (1934-1935) Mao's position 
changed. During the Yan'an period, when the party, not in 
the least because of the war against Japan, opted for a 
united front approach, Mao time and again emphasized the 
need to contain the poor peasantry, to keep it from going 
too far, to curb its radicalism. To consolidate a broad 
coalition the party could not have poor peasant activities 
upsetting middle peasants and patriotic rich peasants (140). 
During the Yan'an period the party had to contend with 
banditry, secret societies and millennial tendencies, 
leftist 'excesses', local concepts of family and village, 
and "opportunism", all of which reflected tensions between 
the party leadership and its peasant base. Mao was aware of 
these. On occasion he showed an attitude which Freiré would 
later make the core of his dialogical approach for politi-
cizing the masses for their self-emancipation (141), for 
instance when Mao indicated that 
"(a)ll work done for the masses must start from 
their needs and not from the desire of any in-
dividual, however well-intentioned (...). We 
should not make the change until, through our 
work, most of the masses have become conscious of 
the need and are willing and determined to carry 
it out. (The masses) must make up their own minds 
instead of our making up their minds for them" 
(142). 
This is the "mass line", an organizing process in which 
cadres systematize ideas drawn from the masses and present 
them to the masses as concrete policies, where they are 
modified according to mass criticism. 
Thanks to the insight and improvisational genius of 
Mao and a few others in the party the centrifugal tendencies 
were modified and blended into a working accommodation with 
party policy. But even here, as with nearly all revolution-
ary elites, the CCP held the view that these divergent 
interests were the result of peasant backwardness, of their 
anarchist, deviationist, petty-bourgeois adventurism. It 
was the party's task to instruct the peasantry to a true, 
advanced understanding of the revolution (143). The Viet-
namese communists held similar views. 
"Their main consideration was that the majority 
of the peasants (...) were illiterate and lacked 
any insight into what the communists considered 
the real background of the deplorable living 
conditions in the rural areas. Any revolutionary 
change in the social structure that would put an 
end to the traditional circumstances under which 
they had been living for generations, the peasants 
were bound not to understand properly; neither 
would they be capable of regarding such a trans-
formation as the first step towards the improve-
ment of their own situation. It was considered 
necessary, therefore, to embark upon activities 
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aimed at producing a change of mentality that 
would enable the rural masses to free themselves 
gradually from the norms to which they had grown 
accustomed" (144). 
This view, the concept of the vanguard party as the embodi-
ment of true historical consciousness whilst the peasantry's 
(or the proletariat's) vision of justice and such is partial 
or false consciousness overlooks the real possibility that 
the latter's consciousness is not inferior but simply 
different. There is a fundamental difference between ex-
plaining the divergence between the revolutionary elite and 
the masses from false consciousness or from distinct inter-
ests fostered by the non-elite's location in the social 
structure. This latter view can, according to Scott, form 
the basis for collabouration and learning rather than a one 
way exercise in "consciousness raising" (145). 
This approach seems to differ from Freiré's dialogical 
method in so far as it seems to negate the problem of 
"hegemony". According to Gramsci the real strength of 
bourgeois rule (or any previous rule) lay not in the vio-
lence of the ruling class or the coercive power of its 
state apparatus, but in the acceptance by the ruled of a 
conception of the world which belongs to the rulers. The 
philosophy of the ruling class passes through a whole tissue 
of complex vulgarizations to emerge as "common sense": that 
is, the philosophy of the masses, who accept the morality, 
the customs, the institutionalized rules of behaviour of 
the society they live in. Domination (coercion) is one form 
of power and historically necessary at a given moment, but 
rule by intellectual and moral hegemony is the form of 
power which guarantees stability and founds power upon wide 
ranging consent and acquiescence (146). Do peasants really 
accept their fate because they are passive, politically 
incapable and intrinsically resistant to change as, e.g., 
Foster, Banfield and Erasmus have argued (147), or because 
they believe in the social ideology that justifies their 
exploitation (mystification and false consciousness)? The 
latter is true, according to Marxists, including Gramsci, 
because the ruling class controls the means of cultural 
production. Freiré holds that the suppressed internalize 
the myth of their inferiority under pressure of the superior 
power of and fear for their suppressors (148). 
Others, however, explain the fact that peasants seem 
to passively accept their fate from the fact that they lack 
power and possibilities to do anything about it, as a 
realistic evaluation of their concrete situation in other 
words. "The 'resistance to change of peasants' was a ration-
al and appropriate reaction to the overwhelming 'resistance 
to change', including repression, from above..." Huizer 
says (149). We can see it as an expression of the safety-
first principle. Age-old experience of domination and 
exploitation has taught them that passivity and reverence 
of their oppressors is an effective method to protect 
themselves and influence the conduct of their superiors 
(150). Grudging, pragmatic acceptation, according to Scott, 
does not imply normative consent to reality. The subor-
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dinated classes' pressing material needs necessitate some-
thing of a daily accommodation. It reflects the realities of 
power relations, but does not mean it derives from symbolic 
hegemony, let alone consensus (151). 
The problem here is, it seems to me, that subordinated 
classes do (sometimes, partially), for whatever reasons, 
share parts of ruling class ideology (152). The importance 
of the above lies especially in the consequences it has for 
a revolutionary elite's approach to the peasantry. Because 
although, in Scott's view (the most radical of those dis-
cussed), the peasants have a sharp appreciation of their 
relations with the rulers and do not need outsiders to help 
them recognize a pattern of growing exploitation, which 
they experience daily, outsiders are often critical to 
peasant movements. In the context of exploitation they may 
provide power, assistance and supra-local organization that 
help peasants act. 
Let us now take a closer look at how the Vietnamese 
and Chinese communists went about gaining the support of 
the peasantry. The early Vietnamese political organizers 
failed to communicate with the peasants they sought to 
enlist. They dealt with concepts and outlooks no peasant 
could relate to his world. Similarly, the Chinese peasant 
did not react to the slogans of unifying the country or 
overthrowing imperialism presented to him by the KMT. He 
did react to Sun Yatsen's slogan of "land to the tiller" 
(153). And the Vietnamese communists, later on, did, by 
drawing on Vietnamese legends, succeed in translating modern 
western political ideas into the traditional idiom of Viet-
namese peasant society (154). Initially the Vietnamese com-
munists and other groups of intellectuals concentrated 
their efforts on the urban areas. But by the early 1940's 
most intellectuals had become convinced that Vietnam's 
future lay with the 95% of the population living in the 
countryside. The Vietminh offered them a timely vehicle for 
working with the peasants. The transmission of revolutionary 
propaganda by urban cadres to the peasantry was facilitated 
by fluid class lines. Many of the nearly 100.000 Vietnamese 
who returned from France after the First World War had been 
peasants. Many workers were former peasants who retained 
their rural ties. There was a high turnover among workers. 
Some of them were literate. In fact, Marr, commenting on 
the lively intellectual debates, the attempts to marry wes-
tern thought to traditional Vietnamese culture, the deepen-
ing and spreading of new ideas, notes that "even workers 
and peasants gained access to the printed word" (155). 
The Vietminh and the Chinese communists both harnessed 
counterpoints, making use of the progressive elements in 
peasant folklore and traditional culture. The Chinese 
communists' method of getting the peasants to "speak bitter-
ness" is a case in point. Often peasants were able for the 
first time to express their bitterness, were listened to 
and taken seriously. This in itself was a revolutionary 
breakthrough, but as they heard each other's bitterness 
they began to identify themselves with each other. Harnes-
sing this counterpoint of bitter experiences suffered at the 
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hands of the landlords and their henchmen created emotional 
solidarity. Thus horizontal ties were forged and peasants 
mobilized (156) . 
Similarly the NLF gradually mobilized peasants by 
getting them to express their specific grievances at public 
meetings. Both the Vietminh and, later on, the NLF in the 
South, built parallel administrations consisting of a chain 
of committees from the CC right down to the village level. 
These were cross-cut by functional associations for pea­
sants, workers, intellectuals, women and youth. The basic 
unit was always the village and the basic administrative 
and judicial organ the committee, whatever its name. These 
committees also organized the defence efforts of the com­
munists. In the period up to 1954 they carried through the 
Vietminh's economic policies in the zones under the letter's 
control. Land was redistributed to middle, poor and landless 
peasants, rents reduced, usurious debts abolished, interest 
rates fixed and artisan production supported. This system 
of committees followed the traditional pattern of North and 
Central Vietnam. The use of these customary village patterns 
and of traditional symbols allowed the Vietminh to build a 
bridge between past and present. In secure and semi-secure 
areas in the South the NLF introduced reforms favouring the 
poorer peasants, like rent reductions, as well as assas­
sinating landlords. But the atomized social structure and 
the far less cohesive village level organization made 
peasant mobilization more problematic. The NLF's restrictive 
trade policies in regard to various - in the eyes of the 
NLF - luxury-type consumption goods, as well as fertilizer 
and water pumps, for instance, or its regulations concerning 
collective work and co-operation between villagers, were 
amended and/or applied flexibly once local cadres realized 
they were harmful to villagers' interests, or were just not 
appreciated and caused resentment (157). Another example of 
the NLF's reasonably flexible and considerate approach is 
that they lessened taxes after a bad harvest (15Θ), which 
indicated a taking into account of the peasant subsistence 
ethic. 
The Chinese communists had also introduced new forms 
of organization based on traditional village mechanisms for 
mutual aid and co-operation, usually among kin and friends, 
but now, by having party cadres as leaders, made to serve 
the interests of the CCP. These village councils, work 
teams and peasant unions gave the poorer peasants and 
landless labourers political leverage in influencing the 
course of village decisions. They were also a training 
ground for the development of leadership qualities. When 
new, young leaders from the poorer or landless peasants 
proved their mettle they were taken into the party or 
party-controlled mass organizations. Such organizations as 
the Peasant Organization and the All-China Federation of 
Democratic Women brought about the participation of the 
masses as well as mobilizing opinion in favour of the 
communists. The Red Army, particularly, was a channel for 
peasant mobility. 
Both the Vietnamese and Chinese communists made use of 
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peasant millenarianism to spread their influence. Millennial 
movements, Hobsbawm says, can be adapted to modern revolu-
tions easier than other forms of protest because they 
already reject the existing order in favour of an imminent 
utopia. A Leninist party, with its "secular theory of 
history" and its practical program for the seizure of power 
and a system of organization, can manipulate these utopian 
strains of peasant tradition to good advantage (159). But 
there is more to it. A modern revolutionary elite also 
needs the revolutionary zeal generated by utopianism. 
Although, according to Hobsbawm, "millenarianism inevitably 
collapses" if it is not "harnessed to a modern movement", 
he holds that utopianism is "probably a necessary social 
device for generating the superhuman efforts without which 
no major revolution is achieved" (160). 
This really reflects the Utopian strain in many revolu-
tionary elites' ideologies. I have already noted the belief 
in the possibility of creating a new socialist man that the 
various communist movements under discussion shared, as 
well as the ideal character this new socialist man would 
have. Interestingly enough the Chinese, Vietnamese and 
Cambodian communists all saw their new socialist man already 
mirrored in their disciplined, self-sacrificing, loyal and 
hard working young soldiers. The belief in the attainability 
(for some, in the very near future) of communism, a perfect, 
harmonious and contradiction-free society, is surely mil-
lenarian. This utopian strain, however, was much more potent 
in Maoism and even more so in KR ideology than in Vietnamese 
communism or Stalinism. The latter did not believe in or 
attempt to radically change man's consciousness in one 
gigantic chiliastic leap, as Mao did with the GLF (161). 
The CPK was convinced it could create this dream; a unique, 
independent, self-sufficient, sovereign, egalitarian, 
collectivist and pure Khmer society in the light of which 
the great Angkor Empire would pale, here and now. 
When modern revolutionary ideology reaches the pea-
santry it is translated and integrated into existing peasant 
beliefs. Some of these are attached to new leaders and 
movements. Peasant belief in a Redeemer or a Just Ruler is 
a good example. The figure of Mao, for instance, was often 
identified with peasant utopian belief in the return of a 
just emperor who would end misery and oppression. But these 
same beliefs that tied Mao and his politics, or Ho Chi 
Minh, to a peasant vision of justice continue to serve as a 
standard by which the revolutionary elite is judged and can 
just as easily 'delegitimize' them when they fail to live 
up to the revolutionary promise they were seen to embody, 
as Scott notes (162). 
The Vietminh, like the Chinese communists, also had to 
cope with radical peasant demands and actions that went 
contrary to party political interest. During the Nghe-Tinh 
Soviets for instance, the party, many of whose leaders were 
arrested or in hiding, lost the initiative to the peasantry. 
What the party thought of the result can be seen in party 
historian Tran Huy Lieu's criticism of the peasants: 
"the struggles carried out against the rich 
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peasants, middle peasants, petty notables, and 
educated people, were the great mistakes which 
brought discredit on the entire movement" (163). 
The party saw the correct struggle as one of anti-feudalism 
which would unite workers, peasants and the national bour-
geoisie. The party, therefore, regarded the confiscation of 
rice from the more well-to-do as a fundamental error. This 
happened, according to Tran Van Lieu, because "local cadres, 
left to themselves, let themselves be led by the masses and 
fell into a policy of adventurism" (164). But this "adven-
turism" was clearly a popular peasant demand that in times 
of scarcity food be equally shared. What happened was not 
"leftist and sectarian" but attempts by the villagers to 
destroy the state and establish autonomous village republics 
in which their vision of justice would prevail. 
During the Second World War the Vietminh leadership 
decided that the new situation required the formation of a 
national front including patriotic landlords. This meant 
shelving the anti-landlord slogan "land to the tiller". But 
for the peasants for whom the exploitative presence of the 
landlord was the central issue this policy reversal was 
hard to understand. Their was much successful resistance by 
the peasants against attempts to return land previously 
confiscated to the landlord and guarantee them their rents. 
In Cambodia Thermidorean pressure from the peasants 
lay more in their overall unwillingness to revolt. It was 
revolutionary impatience that led the frustrated left-wing 
urban intellectuals to misinterpret the isolated 1967 
Samlaut Rebellion, the result of specific local circumstan-
ces, as a sign of general peasant discontent. As far as the 
left-wing intellectuals were concerned, the peasants were 
ripe for revolution: they only needed correct and clair-
voyant leadership, which the intellectuals, of course, 
would provide. Many went into the bush to try and do preci-
sely this. But the uprising remained local and was bloodily 
put down. Even if they had realized its limited character 
the fierce establishment reaction to the revolt more or 
less forced many of them into the bush. It enabled them to 
justify their situation underground. It also gave them the 
powerful sensation of finally doing something, overcoming 
their previous powerlessness. The KR guerilla was thus 
born. Its effectiveness remained low, but its very existence 
stung what we have come to call the Pol Pot group, the 
nucleus of the CPK, into action. This group, recall, had 
gone underground roughly four years earlier, in the in-
hospitable and thinly populated northeast. It was able to 
survive with the support of the tribal population there. In 
later years it became clear that the CPK relied heavily on 
these tribal groups, but we know little of their apparently 
devoted relationship to the Pol Pot group. It is probable 
that, similar to the Chinese communists' relationship with 
the peasants, dependency for survival entailed an associa-
tion with immediate tribal demands and a tribal orientation. 
It is not inconceivable that this tribal base, numerically 
much smaller than a Khmer peasant base would have been, and 
culturally different, strengthened especially the Pol Pot 
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group's bent to violent solutions (165). 
Whatever the case, they did not have much feeling with 
or understanding of the mainstream Khmer peasantry. Their 
Maoist inspired class analysis was based more on wishful 
thinking than on a serious analysis of Cambodian conditions. 
It promised them the support of the peasantry, more or less 
85% of the population, as the revolutionary agent they 
needed, locating the main contradiction between exploiting 
landlords and exploited poor and lower-middle peasants. It 
also indicated a strong social basis for rural discontent, 
pre-supposing a powerful pre-revolutionary situation. This 
had been accurate enough for Hunan, and China in general, 
but, as we have seen, hardly had any relation with Cambodian 
social reality. 
The influx of left-wing urban intellectuals into the 
bush, and their attempts to set up guerilla organization 
was what drove the Pol Pot group out of peripheral isola-
tion. It needed to establish control over this infant 
guerilla that was developing in order not to be left on the 
side. The building of a national guerilla organization was 
started. Probably to present its credentials, to impress 
the guerilla and the Left in general over which it was 
trying to get control, the CPK initiated a national uprising 
in 1968. But this, too, remained limited mainly to southern 
Battambang and was swiftly crushed. 
The KR met with little success. The peasants were 
generally not interested. Although life was certainly 
becoming more difficult for most of them, there was, as 
yet, no basis for revolution. Those areas where (some) 
peasants did join the uprising were mainly peripheral. 
Furthermore, there was a lack of experience and continuity. 
Between the anti-colonial struggle and the beginning of the 
KR armed struggle thirteen years had lapsed and a different, 
younger generation of communists had emerged, who, in 
addition, were far from representing a homogeneous group. 
9.5 Cambodia as a Populist State 
But there is more to it than just the condition of the 
peasantry and the capabilities of the revolutionary elite. 
I will not discuss theories of revolution here (166), but 
most authors who deal with conditions necessary for success-
ful peasant organization or revolution mention what Zagoria 
calls the political condition (167), basically the condition 
of the state and the forces opposing radical change. 
Leninist vanguard parties have usually only succeeded where 
the moneyed class was still immature, the land based elites 
were discredited and the state, especially the armed forces, 
was weak or disrupted. So, whilst they were originally set 
up to harness the proletariat, they turn out to be most 
successful in precisely those settings that were, by Mar-
xists, not considered ripe for revolution. Here the van-
guard's revolutionary agent was generally weak classes, 
poorly educated and unorganized, like newly industrialized 
classes and even more so the peasantry, which enhanced the 
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vanguard's independence, as Walzer has noted (see ch.9.4). 
Lack of legitimacy generally costs powerholders more 
in terms of the need to compensate voluntary compliance by 
using coercion or the threat thereof. That is why new 
powerholders need to establish some sort of legitimacy, to 
transform power into authority. They do this largely by 
reference to their contribution to the welfare of the group. 
Rulers try to bind the ruled to them both through social 
and ideological mechanisms. And so, when the link between 
rulers and ruled is or becomes weak (16Θ), when there is a 
decrease in the acceptance of the existing social order 
(169), a lack of channels for peaceful communication of 
protests (170), the likelihood of revolt will increase. The 
vanguard's initiatives are, therefore, most likely to 
succeed when something like a vast military catastrophe 
and/or the humiliating subservience of its own impotent 
elite to foreign imperialism have undermined mass loyalties 
to the state. In fact Shanin mentions a major crisis of 
society as a whole, including an erosion of confidence in 
the regime, and a major crisis in the ruling elite and its 
ability to govern as the first two of four factors preceding 
and leading to every contemporary revolution (171), factors 
also mentioned by many other authors (172). World War One 
and the resulting disintegration of the Russian army was 
certainly a major factor creating a power vacuum that made 
the Bolshevik coup possible. 
In China the Japanese invasion, and eventually its 
defeat, left a much weakened state, whilst the KMT, by its 
conduct (corruption, heavy-handedness towards the common 
people, footdragging in the war against the Japanese) caused 
more and more people to lose confidence in it. Add to this 
the CCP's united front policy and the relatively clean and 
positive image it had, which made it more and more a cre­
dible alternative for the KMT for large sectors of the 
population, and one has some of the major factors instrumen­
tal in the communists' victory. 
In Vietnam, too, a much weakened state in the wake of 
the Second World War and the organization of a broad popular 
front by the Vietminh to basically wage a nationalist, not 
a class struggle, were important factors leading to the 
eventual Vietnamese communists' victory in the north. Ho 
Chi Minh had returned to Vietnam with much knowledge and 
experience of the Chinese national united front efforts. 
During the war years the Vietminh, established in 1941, had 
grown greatly. It was favoured by the disgrace of all groups 
that had looked to either the Japanese or the French for 
political advancement, as a result of the Tokyo - Vichy 
détente. 
The situation in Cambodia, in the wake of the Second 
World War, was hardly similar. After the relatively peaceful 
transition to independence Cambodia under Sihanouk resembled 
most what Worsley has termed a "populist" state. In The 
Third World (173) he associates this populist ideology, in 
which the people are seen as one and dominated by tradi-
tional values, with a society in which the great majority of 
the population still live in the countryside. It is typical 
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for a nation consisting predominantly of smallholders, he 
says. A charismatic leader must hold up a semblance of 
unity, must try to reduce the Left and Right to one (his 
own) denominator. Nationalist sentiments amongst the masses 
are fully exploited. A communist movement is encapsulated, 
inter alia by a progressive foreign policy which makes it 
difficult for the communist leaders to step down from their 
legal or semi-legal existence, their policy of compromise, 
and switch to a consistent strategy of class struggle. This 
is also partially the result of the vertical organization 
which is characteristic for societies in which patron-client 
type relationships predominate, because vertical ties hamper 
class based organization and action. Also a certain amount 
of attention for the less privileged is tolerable, as is a 
certain amount of respect for democratic rights and forms 
of security. Although relative and prone to fluctuations 
this type of state gives less direct cause for widespread 
revolutionary sympathies, even though the peasantry, through 
lack of real economic development, may be becoming poorer. 
Sure enough, Cambodia was largely a rural nation of 
smallholders. The charismatic Sihanouk stressed unity and 
traditional beliefs, not the least being the worship of his 
person as god-prince. He projected an anti-imperialist 
foreign policy image and was supported by all socialist 
powers. Internally the Sihanoukist state presented a prog-
ressive image by pretending to be the motor of development 
and by supposedly aiming at social reforms. In fact 
Sihanouk's policies strengthened the archaic monarchic-bur-
eaucratic structure, encouraging corruption, increasing the 
country's dependence and stifling real economic development. 
The development of organizational skills and experience 
that already had had little chance under the French, was 
also thus hindered, as was the growth of an independent 
commercial and manufacturing class (bourgeoisie) which 
further reduced the impetus to modernization. Sihanouk 
eliminated independent right- and left-wing parties, force-
fully uniting both under the banner of his own Sangkum 
movement and making real legal opposition impossible. 
The future KR leaders, on returning from France, were 
faced with the failure of the Vietnamese communist inspired 
Khmer Vietminh strategy. That part of the Cambodian com-
munist movement that, following Vietnamese advice, remained 
in Cambodia after 1954 to try and achieve change through 
legal politics also met with failure because of Sihanouk's 
domination of the political scene. In fact not only politi-
cal, even physical extermination threatened the Khmer 
communist movement. Hanoi's position at the Geneva Con-
ference and support of Sihanouk after the Bandung Conference 
again made clear to the returnees from France that faith in 
Vietnamese communist solidarity was misplaced. This must be 
seen against the backdrop of general historically grounded 
Khmer resentment and fear of the Vietnamese, feelings that 
were only fanned by Vietnamese arrogance towards the Khmer. 
Khmer nationalism nearly always carried overt or covert 
anti-Vietnamese undertones. 
Lack of internal and external support and felt betrayal 
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stimulated the Khmer communist returnees from France to opt 
for self-reliance. An already existing penchant for radica-
lism, "blocked ascendancy" and the near impossibility of 
independent political action encouraged and forced them to 
present a more radical and nationalist image than Sihanouk. 
The enemy (Sihanouk) being internal, class struggle was of 
central importance and, given the futility of legal, peace-
ful activities, it had to take the form of armed struggle. 
At least this was the opinion of one faction of the retur-
nees, who, by the early I9601s had largely taken over what 
was left of the Cambodian communist movement. Members of 
this group, among whom those we have come to define as the 
Pol Pot group, were more or less forced to flee in 1963. 
They went underground in the inhospitable northeast. In 
spite of various visits to Hanoi and Beijing they received 
no support for their struggle. They were physically and 
intellectually isolated in the periphery. It increased 
their distrust and felt need for self-reliance, but it also 
diminished their awareness of Cambodia's political reality. 
The other faction stressed nationalist struggle against 
imperialism, which implied a broad united front policy 
against an outside enemy and its henchmen inside the coun-
try, and therefore co-operation with Sihanouk. The two 
differing policies of the communists, class struggle and 
nationalist struggle, together with the divergent practice 
of the two groups, provided a potential source of conflict. 
Those communists who opted for nationalist struggle and 
remained in the towns tried to work within Sihanouk's 
political movement, without much success. 
Under Sihanouk the education system had been greatly 
expanded. But his socio-economic policies did not lead to 
more jobs for the school leavers. They, too, were frustrated 
by Sihanouk's domination of the political scene which left 
no room for a legal leftist alternative, as well as by the 
increasing corruption and the elite's luxurious style of 
living. They, too, were affected by "blocked ascendancy". 
The ideas of the CR fell on fertile soil here. Understan-
dably so, with its emphasis on man as determining factor 
(voluntarism), stressing the ideological (superstructure) 
and bypassing the 'objective' (material) situation and the 
factual consciousness of the masses. The radicalized Khmer 
communists had no mass base and were hardly a force to be 
reckoned with, at this time. 
In general, the possibilities for counter-revolution 
are much larger, Worsley tells us, certainly the longer the 
populist regime remains in power. The USA especially, become 
concerned about the anti-western and seemingly anti-capita-
list policy followed by the populist state. They will try 
to promote a military coup in order to install a regime 
that will be more sympathetically disposed to their inter-
ests. Populism's fundamental weakness, still according to 
Worsley, is its assumption of a homogeneous countryside. 
As long as the majority of peasants really does consist of 
smallholders this ideology can persist. But as soon as 
economic stagnation and population growth increase class 
conflict between impoverished peasants and a small top 
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layer of rich landowners, increasingly becoming richer, the 
populist bastion starts to crumble. For example, both in 
Indonesia and Brazil prior to the 1965 and 1964 coups 
respectively, peasant unrest and organization was on the 
upsurge. This agrarian unrest alarmed the Right, already 
dissatisfied with populism, which led to United States 
favoured military coups. 
This is really, if in diluted fashion, what also 
happened in Cambodia. The real problem was that the 
strengthening of the Right by the Lon Nol government ' s 
activities on the one hand, which precipitated the isolated 
Samlaut Rebellion and the beginning of armed struggle by 
the KR (partly as a result of both these events), as well 
as the panicky reactions by both the government and 
Sihanouk, rapidly polarized Cambodian political life even 
further. This and developments in the relations with China, 
North Vietnam and the USA undermined Sihanouk's position, 
his perennial political balancing act between Left and 
Right in internal as well as foreign affairs, and thus 
Cambodian neutrality in a region immersed in war. Lon Nol's 
coup, in 1970, executed with American blessings, was the 
coup de grâce. Now the Americans, through Lon Nol, could 
finally deal with the growing NLF/NVA presence in eastern 
Cambodia. Thus Cambodia became the "sideshow" to the Vietnam 
war. 
9.6 How the KR Won the Revolution 
The war created an altogether different situation. Much 
more than in the Chinese and Vietnamese cases, where peasant 
revolution had been raging for longer and had a firm foot-
ing, the coming of war to Cambodia gave the KR their oppor-
tunity. The violence unleashed by the troops of Lon Nol and 
his American and South Vietnamese allies against the rural 
population was perhaps the most important reason for the 
support given to the KR. The South Vietnamese invasion in 
1970, especially, fanned traditional antipathy to the 
Vietnamese and underlined Lon Nol's subservience to foreign 
powers. The American bombing of Cambodia "back to the 
stone-age" in the first eight months of 1973 was a traumatic 
experience, only leaving the peasants the choice between 
becoming American fed refugees in the cities or supporting 
the guerilla. By the end of 1972 the Cambodian state was 
certainly weak and disrupted. Thanks basically to the 
NLF/NVA the FUNK had gained control of most of the country-
side. Mass loyalties to the state, never strong, and in the 
case of most peasants, limited to the god-prince Sihanouk, 
had been undermined precisely by Sihanouk's disposal, as 
well as by military catastrophe and the humiliating subser-
vience of its own impotent elite to the Americans. 
When Sihanouk launched an appeal to the Cambodian 
people to unite with the FUNK many peasants, therefore, 
joined the guerilla against the Lon Nol state. The tremen-
dous chasm separating urban from rural. Great from Little 
Tradition, is clearly illustrated in the different reactions 
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to Sihanouk's disposal. Whereas this was initially broadly 
welcomed in the urban areas, the peasants were shocked. The 
war increased the urban - rural cleavage manyfold, but as 
it progressed many within the urban centre grew increasingly 
disillusioned by the bungling, corrupt Lon Nol regime. 
Although well-equipped with technologically advanced mate-
rial, Lon Nol's armed forces were generally badly organized 
and led. The war, therefore, precipitated the major crisis 
of Cambodian society and its ruling elite, paving the way 
for an organized revolutionary vanguard party. But, although 
the KR had the support of most of the rural population 
initially, it was a rather passive support and mainly 
dictated by the Sihanouk connection. That, Sihanouk's 
popularity and the support it would attract, was precisely 
why the KR, at the outbreak of war still small and weak, 
had joined the FUNK. 
Generally the peasants were not revolutionary. They 
wanted an end to war. They suffered under the American 
bombing and the violence of war and therefore supported 
those fighting the hated Lon Nol regime and promising to 
bring an end to war. The KR' resolute struggle under horren-
dous conditions gave them a self-sacrificing and patriotic 
image that won many people's respect. Furthermore, the KR 
initially presented a fairly moderate image, only partly 
due to Sihanoukist, Khmer Vietminh and Vietnamese influence. 
The KR made use of traditional songs and artistic performan-
ces, stuck in a revolutionary coat, to mobilize the pea-
sants. The peasants appreciated not being submitted to 
taxation. More equitable land redistribution and the setting 
up of mutual aid teams were also generally welcomed. Private 
ownership was not yet attacked. KR cadres were taught to be 
ascetic, to make self-denial a virtue, to act humbly and be 
helpful towards the peasants. 
Now Popkin tells us that such qualities in cadres 
increase the peasant's confidence that his contribution 
will really be used for the purpose claimed (174). Huizer 
also mentions such leadership qualities as conducive to 
successful peasant mobilization, adding such qualities as 
self-discipline and devotion (175) which KR cadres were 
also taught. Essentially Chinese and Vietnamese communist 
cadres were taught the same. Maoism emphasized individual 
psychological transformation in training cadres, although 
nearly all Chinese have more or less come into contact with 
thought reform. Already in use in the late 1920's in a 
simple form, it was mainly developed during the Yan'an 
period and especially used on intellectuals recruited into 
the movement. Basically through group sessions in which 
criticism and self-criticism played a central role, an 
individual's psychological and emotional ties to past 
authority are cut, after which the individual is re-in-
tegrated into the new society. Thought reform serves as a 
channel for transmitting the new values and goals from the 
leaders to the cadres and from there to the people. It is 
also an ongoing process. As Liu Shaoqi, in How to be a 
Good Communist, wrote, self-cultivation and indoctrination 
of cadres are endless processes (176). Great importance was 
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attached to correct relations with and learning from the 
masses. It was something Mao was continuously stressing, 
and the gist of many a "to the countryside" campaign. 
The political training of Vietnamese communist soldiers 
took place through "discussion". Party cadres applied the 
strategy of the "three togethers" (tam cung), eating, 
working and living with the peasants (177). Bearing Mao's 
dictum in mind that the peasantry should be to the guerilla 
as the ocean is to the fish, the Chinese communists, the 
Vietminh and later the NLF (initially) stressed political 
over military struggle. 
Chinese, Vietnamese and Cambodian communist soldiers 
and cadres were also, on the whole, well disciplined, a far 
cry from the looting, pillaging and raping troops that the 
peasantry were used to. A characteristic in fact of all 
three revolutions, to a greater or lesser extent, is their 
puritanical strain. 
The Saigon regime, on the other hand, like the Lon Nol 
regime, preferred to eradicate the ocean in order to elimi-
nate the fish, a strategy that, like in Cambodia, only 
created refugees in over-crowded urban areas and supporters 
of the guerilla. Before that, severe oppression and often 
indiscriminate violence against the Vietnamese people by 
the French and indiscriminate KMT violence against the 
rural Chinese population fed both Ho and Mao's growing 
peasant armies. 
The Chinese and Vietnamese communists, although ulti-
mately intending to monopolize power, did give substance 
to their united front policies, even allowing some non-com-
munist political organizations some leeway after the revolu-
tion. But the KR only avowed a united front to make use of 
Sihanouk's popularity and Vietnamese material support. 
Given Sihanouk's previous treatment of them it is understan-
dable that they did not want to see his return to power. 
Their distrust of the Vietnamese only grew. Even after the 
coup Hanoi waited to see if Lon Nol would continue 
Sihanouk's neutralist policy. Only when it was clear that 
Lon Nol and his American allies threatened their sanctuaries 
and supply and communications lines in eastern Cambodia did 
the Vietnamese communists start to support the KR. To serve 
its needs Hanoi tried to set up a Khmer movement loyal to 
it. To this end it started returning the Khmer Vietminh who 
had moved to Hanoi in 1954. 
KR antipathy was aggravated when Hanoi (and Beijing as 
well, incidentally), under pressure from the USA (following 
the December 1972 Paris Peace Agreement), tried to force 
the KR to negotiate by seriously limiting the flow of 
material support. The KR, however, were not interested in 
any settlement in which they would have to share power. 
They understood these moves as one more sign of Hanoi's 
attempts to use Cambodia. 
Sihanouk's visit to liberated areas in Cambodia at 
about this time heightened the KR' awareness of the threat 
he posed as a rival to power. Perhaps they uneasily surmised 
that peasant support for the FUNK was not the result of the 
peasants' extreme exploitation and their consequent revolu-
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tionary zeal, as the CPK's class analysis had determined, 
but of the peasants' attachment to the god-prince. Contrary 
to Mao or 'uncle' Ho, the KR never really succeeded in 
shifting peasant Utopian belief in a "just ruler" from the 
traditional ruler (Sihanouk) to a revolutionary leader. 
Those KR leaders the peasants could have identified with, 
like Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim or Hou Youn, were not the real 
leaders, and the real leaders were generally unknown. In 
fact, Angkar, the anonymous Organization introduced as the 
central leadership, was hardly something that would fire 
possible peasant utopian sentiments. 
Ideologically Angkar replaced the patron. It was 
presented as the father who would look after his children, 
the Cambodian people. But whereas in Stalin's regime of 
terror he did indeed succeed in establishing some paternal 
relationship with large segments of the ordinary urban 
people (178), Angkar did not. For that it was too abstract. 
It succeeded in destroying traditional authorities, but 
failed to replace them (Sihanouk, Buddhism, family) success-
fully in the hearts and minds of the people. The CPK had 
always swathed itself in a shroud of secrecy. Feelings of 
insecurity, inter alia, had led the CPK to increase the 
distance between rulers and ruled. Practically no one knew 
of the party. Very few of its leaders were known. Angkar 
had been introduced as the central leadership, the anony-
mous, but omniscient and infallible Organization, thus 
creating an unbridgeable chasm between the handful of CPK 
leaders and the rest of the KR. This seriously reduced the 
possibilities of address, complaint and critique. It con-
stituted a more subtle way of dealing with resistance. The 
tremendous distance between rulers and ruled made it easier 
for the former to manage conditions of confrontation and to 
reduce claims by subordinates. But this also narrowed the 
CPK's power base, whereas Stalin, in establishing some 
paternal relationship with large segments of the ordinary 
people, had broadened it. It isolated the CPK's leaders 
even more, further reducing their sense of reality. And so 
the KR started to actively neutralize the power of their 
allies in the united front, both Sihanouk and the Vietnamese 
communists. 
Like Mao, the KR proclaimed a worker - peasant alliance 
under leadership of the workers, but, even more than in 
Mao's case, they based themselves only on the peasantry. In 
fact the workers were considered untrustworthy (179), as 
became apparent after the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975, when 
they were evacuated like everyone else and treated as 'new 
people'. The KR did not, contrary to the Chinese and Viet-
namese communists' broad front policy, really attempt to 
unite broad sectors of the population to achieve victory. 
The Pol Pot group especially, partially through its years 
of isolation in remote tribal areas, mistrusted all those 
who had had anything to do with the Lon Nol regime, even if 
it was no more than having lived in a Lon Nol controlled 
zone. People with other ideological convictions (including 
religion), who had been exposed to urban culture, posed a 
threat to its domination, or so it believed. Small wonder it 
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especially mistrusted urban intellectuals. 
Its poor-and-lower-middle-peasant line favoured the 
poorer peasants, giving them the feeling of importance and 
self-respect they had never known. They were chosen in 
positions of (lowest) authority. But, contrary to China and 
Vietnam, the poorer peasants only constituted a small 
minority of the peasantry. 
During 1973, as a result of the traumatic eight months 
of carpet bombing by the Americans, hatred and revenge 
became a much stronger factor for supporting the KR. In a 
thinly populated country like Cambodia control over people 
is essential, more than control over land, a situation 
reminiscent of many pre-colonial states. The bombing provi-
ded the KR with a reason, if they had needed one, to evacu-
ate towns and settle the population in liberated areas. 
They capitalized on the situation created by the bombing, 
by pushing the revolution into the phase of total collec-
tivization. The evacuation of large numbers of people and 
their resettling made this easier. The radicality of this 
move was probably influenced by the fact that the KR based 
themselves on poor and peripheral peasants. The bombing 
mainly affected the central agricultural area, destroying 
the base of the smallholding middle peasant majority, who 
might otherwise have exerted more Thermidorean pressure 
against such a rapid collectivization. Collectivization was 
deemed imperative to enhance control. Land redistribution 
had, after all, not attacked the principle of private 
property, which was, according to the party, a major obsta-
cle in its path to power. 
Collectivization was also enforced to secure self-suf-
ficiency in food, to counter inflation of food prices and 
to facilitate an autarkic war effort. Also, through greater 
efficiency and the ability of collectives to take care of 
the families of KR soldiers, more people would be freed for 
the armed forces. Collectivization, as well as forced 
evacuation of towns and villages, gave greater control over 
the people as means of production and as a reservoir for 
the KR armed forces. Traditional social structures were 
broken, food production and distribution centralized, money 
abolished. Everyone had to participate. 
Initial peasant complacency probably strengthened the 
party's conviction that the peasants supported the revolu-
tion, as their analysis of Cambodia's social structure had 
indicated. But peasants generally, even poor peasants, who, 
in Cambodia, still mostly owned some land, are rarely 
enthusiastic about collectivization. Even in China and 
Vietnam, where the link between party and peasantry was 
much stronger and the process towards collectivization much 
more gradual, it was generally not welcomed by the peasants. 
Peasants' resistance to the GLF and their enthusiastic 
reactions to the dismantling of the communes in China 
confirm this, as does peasant resistance to collectivization 
in the Soviet Union and South Vietnam. 
Evacuations and collectivization caused dissatisfac-
tion. Living conditions dropped in some areas. Thermidorean 
pressures increased. Peasants had resisted attacks on 
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Sihanouk. They also occasionally protested against collec-
tivization, evacuation and the concomitant dislocation of 
traditional social relationships. Often it took the form of 
avoidance protest; not mentioning Sihanouk's name in public 
anymore, fleeing to Lon Nol controlled areas (180), hiding 
food because most was taken for the KR army. Sometimes it 
was a more active and even temporarily successful resis-
tance . 
The situation was compounded by the KR' lack of politi-
cal and organizational skills and experience. The KR did 
not form a unified, centralized organization. Physical 
isolation alone already made communication difficult. Even 
between party leaders contact was very tenuous. In practice 
power lay with the zone party committees who had their own 
troops. There were regional differences within the party. 
In some areas, specifically those controlled by the Pol Pot 
group and its allies, collectivization was enforced faster 
and more rigidly than others. The Pol Pot group's distrust 
went so far as to include some of the regional party ap-
paratuses not under its control. 
The war, especially the devastating bombing, decimated 
the ranks of the few cadres the KR had, whilst their rapid 
growth only increased the urgent need for cadres. As a 
result of the bombing, furthermore, many peasant youngsters 
joining the KR did so more out of revenge than from politi-
cal convictions. These new, young, fanatical cadres were 
certainly loyal, but lacked the skills and education to 
patiently win the people over to the side of the revolution. 
Nor did the KR really have the time for this. In fact, lack 
of organizational skill and experience only increased their 
mistrust of their allies, who, like the Khmer Vietminh for 
instance, were often better trained. The KR could of course 
have had more and better trained cadres, but their own 
distrust and feelings of insecurity prevented them from 
accepting intellectuals and other urbanités who wanted to 
cross over to the revolutionary cause. Before 1973 these, 
although distrusted, had still been 'remoulded' to become 
suitable cadres. But from 1973 onwards, with less cadres 
available for this work and the Pol Pot group exerting more 
influence and being more suspicious of all urbanités, these 
people were sooner purged or put into front line battle 
positions. 
The Chinese, on the other hand, solved these leadership 
and cadre problems by recruiting young, urban intellectuals 
through nationalist and united front themes, and then 
'remoulding' them through thought reform. The same was true 
in Vietnam. Here the young intellectuals, joined in the 
Marxist youth organization set up by Ho Chi Minh, were 
instructed to find jobs as manual workers in factories, 
mines, plantations and such, to organize the workers and 
form experienced cadres. 
"By devoting attention to nationalism, culture 
and the middle class, the Communists attracted an 
elite, its 'revolutionary friends', whose energies 
could be channelled into mass organization" (181). 
The new KR cadres exacerbated the use of terror preci-
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sely because they lacked the qualities to execute policies 
in a more humane fashion. (This aspect of organizational 
development is discussed in the next chapter). One reason 
why especially the Pol Pot group started to base itself 
more and more on these youth of poor peasant descent and 
often from peripheral areas, was that they were relatively 
the easiest to mould, as yet untainted by strange and 
'foreign' ideas and experiences, and potentially most 
radical (182). 
This special interest in youth was shared by other 
communist movements. The Vietminh for example, while in-
filtrating the colonial administration, especially con-
centrated its efforts on those organizations concerned 
with mobilizing youth, such as the popular youth and sports 
program in Cochin China (183). When Mao decided to attack 
the CCP and revitalize the revolutionary process through 
the CR he turned to high school and university students to 
be his Red Guard shock troops. 
In short but heavy indoctrination sessions and in 
battle the KR were formed into collective-thinking, self-
denying, ascetic, obedient, disciplined, militant fighters. 
All competitive loyalties and ideologies, such as family 
ties and religion, were suppressed, leaving only a powerful 
patriotism and loyalty to Angkar. Angkar, after all, gave 
these young peasants the weapons to overcome their power-
lessness to vent their hatred, gave them respect and esteem 
as patriotic guerilla fighters, where before they had occu-
pied the lowest rungs of the social ladder. This approach 
was not all that new. Before 1973 the KR had already deman-
ded from their members absolute obedience. They had to get 
rid of all individualistic character traits and freely hand 
themselves over to be remoulded and used as seen fit by 
infallible Angkar. "You are nothing, the Organization is 
all". 
And so, basing itself mainly on poor peripheral peasant 
youth and tribals, the CPK made the KR into a strictly 
hierarchal, disciplined machine, that reacted to Thermido-
rean pressure from the peasantry against collectivization 
by resorting more and more to violent means. From 1973 
onwards these new, young cadres filled up the decimated 
ranks of the KR, taking over local organizations still in 
the hands of Sihanoukists, Khmer Vietminh, the NLF/NVA and 
sometimes even of more moderate domestic KR, pushing collec-
tivization and evacuating villages with little or no ex-
planation. 
Most post-war developments were already embryonically 
present. The choice for systematic terror, if not yet its 
general use, had already been made as the method to achieve 
and consolidate sole power. But before we carry forward 
this discussion to the post-revolutionary situation, and 
knowing that the KR did turn to the use of terror, we should 
first take a closer theoretical look at what terror is, how 
it functions, why and when it is turned to and what its 
effects are. 
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10 
THE SYSTEM OF TERROR AND THE STATE 
People generally do not kill each other without legitimizing 
their actions. A system of massive slaughter or genocide 
needs an even stronger ideological legitimation, as most 
societies presuppose moral restraints on destructive con-
flicts. The ideological legitimation of genocide generally 
acts by shaping a dehumanized image of the victims in the 
minds of their persecutors. When people are not considered 
to be human, the inhibitions against their slaughter cease 
to be operative. The victim group is defined as alien and 
as an enemy population. It is denied common humanity and 
reduced to an object or demonized. Its non-human and inimi-
cal character justifies the purification of society from 
alien threats. So, to justify mass murder, ideology needs a 
dehumanizing component. Conversely, violent treatment is 
encouraged by ways of thinking that dehumanize classes or 
groups or reduce them to objects. 
10.1 Terror - an Introduction 
This study is concerned with large scale, systematic vio-
lence directed against collectivities. The concept of 
genocide naturally springs to mind. When we consider geno-
cide we usually think of racial or ethnic minorities as 
victims, but even political groups recruited from the same 
population may be readily differentiated. The victim group 
must be identifiable. This is necessary in order to set it 
apart from the moral community of the powerholders, in 
order to dehumanize it. The fact that identification as 
racial, ethnic, religious or political groups may not be 
precise is no obstacle to genocidal assault. 
In the case of Marxism-Leninism and the specific 
subject matter of this study, the KR, we are especially 
dealing with the eradication of political groups who are 
defined as bourgeois or reactionary, as class enemies, 
counter-revolutionaries, 'new people' and such like. This, 
the liquidation of political groups, is, as Kuper, in his 
comparative analysis of genocide, notes, "a specialty of 
governments, though not their exclusive prerogative" (1). 
But then this can also be said of genocide in general. 
Kuper himself indicates this when he suggests that the 
strategies and goals of elites may be a crucial factor in 
any kind of genocide (2). The line is really quite arbitrary 
because political motives usually enter the genocide of 
ethnic and religious groups as well. According to Kuper 
there are some significant differences, notably that the 
liquidation of political groups may, but does not generally, 
take the form of root-and-branch extermination (3). But in 
fact this is true of much of what is generally rated as 
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genocide, as many of Kuper's own examples show (4). 
In a long essay on the role of the state in genocide, 
the sociologist I.L. Horowitz, although not actually limit-
ing genocide to state activity, does place great emphasis 
on the role of the state. It is "conducted with the approval 
of, if not the direct intervention by, the state apparatus", 
he says (5). In his opinion: 
"when the ruling elites decide that their con-
tinuation in power transcends all other economic 
and social values, at that point does the pos-
sibility if not the necessity for genocide in-
crease qualitively. For this reason genocide is 
a unique strategy for totalitarian regimes" (6). 
It is hard to define exactly what constitutes genocide. The 
element of "massive and systematic liquidation of one or 
more specific groups" is generally accepted. The problem 
seems to lie in whether the intent is to destroy them in 
whole or in part, and the reason(s) behind the destruction. 
It is less confusing, I think, to see genocide as a distinc-
tive aspect of state terror which aims at the systematic 
extermination of ethnic, religious or political groups. Let 
us, therefore, turn our attention to terror. 
Terror can be used by anyone and so its philosophy 
transcends the dividing line between political ideologies. 
Whilst both Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany were 
governed by fascist ideologies, in terms of mass murder of 
Jews, gypsies and homosexuals, there is a vast difference. 
Compared to the massive purges, deportations and extermina-
tion under Stalin or Pol Pot, the violence used by the 
Pathet Lao in Laos was mild. If we take state-organized 
assassinations of citizens as a yard stick Nazi Germany and 
Socialist Soviet Union are closer to each other than either 
is to Fascist Italy. Between five and six million Jews 
alone were killed at the hands of the Nazi's between 1939 
and 1945. Countless others died in concentration camps as 
well, like Poles, gypsies (an estimated 400.000) and other 
'undesirables' like communist party members or sympathizers. 
In all the camps in Nazi Germany and its occupied terri-
tories between 1B and 26 million people died (7). In com-
parison, in Italy the Special Tribunal for the Defence of 
the State, an extra-legal judicial body created in 1926 
with a view to prosecuting political opponents and removing 
them from the jurisdiction of the ordinary magistracy, 
passed 4.596 sentences. There were 42 death sentences, of 
which 31 were executed (8). After the Italian resistance 
was formed about 36.000 resistance people lost their lives 
and another 10.000 civilians were killed in reprisals, but 
German forces played an important part in these (9). 
So some fascist or communist countries employ virtually 
no deaths-by-state decrees, whilst in others, based on 
similar political ideologies, death may be a commonplace 
event. Furthermore, this type of massive extermination is 
not the prerogative of fascist or communist regimes. The 
history of colonial regimes is rife with telling examples. 
French colonialism particularly was very oppressive and 
generally more violent than British and even Dutch colonia-
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lism. And in the case of resistance to their rule "no 
colonial power in South-East Asia (...) perpetrated such 
indiscriminate massacres as did the French" (10). The USA 
also has a rich tradition in this respect, as the remaining 
Indians and the American blacks can testify. Their devasta­
tion of Indo-China, the massive, indiscriminate, high-tec 
and often high-altitude slaughter of civilians and their 
means of livilyhood and even sometimes, as a consequence of 
the properties used, their progeny, stands as a milestone 
in human barbarity. 
The conclusion Martha Crenshaw draws from a symposium 
on terrorism is that the use of terror by the state "may 
indeed be commonplace" (11). АзЬфгп Eide, former secretary 
general of the International Peace Research Association, 
indicates how fluid the transition to state terrorism can 
be: 
"In most Western States civil and political rights 
form key elements of the constitutions (...). 
They are also important for the legitimation of 
the existing system. It therefore becomes a 
preoccupation of the bureaucracy to present 
dissident groups as enemies of the democracy or 
of the constitution or to claim that they are 
involved in criminal activities condemned by the 
society as a whole (dehumanization - RB) . For 
this purpose, expansion of the police and escala­
tion in armaments is sought to be justified, by 
the necessities of, in particular, anti-narcotic 
campaigns and preparations to fight terrorists. 
But the actual power thus obtained is all too 
frequently used for rather different purposes, 
and may become a threat to democracy" (12). 
And Stohl, in an essay on the international dimensions of 
state terrorism, says that the "strategies and tactics of 
terrorism have become integral components of the foreign 
policy instruments of the modern state" (13). 
Clearly, then, terrorism is a very broad concept. And 
we have not even discussed the use of terror by non-state 
actors. One problem with the concept of terror is its 
ideologically charged connotation. As the much quoted dictum 
says: "One man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter". 
So let me try to delimit and order the subject matter 
somewhat. 
Most authors make a distinction between what Thornton 
has defined as enforcement terror, used by those in power 
to suppress challenges to their authority, and agitational 
terror, used by those who want to disrupt the existing 
order and ascend to political power themselves (14). Alex 
Schmid, in his thorough and balanced research guide on 
political terrorism, notes that the theories and models on 
terrorism mostly pertain to insurgent terrorism, not state 
terrorism. Not only state terrorism, but even the role of 
the state's actions are often ignored or neglected in 
explaining the occurrence of insurgent terrorism, he con­
cludes (15). 
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10.2 State Terror 
Although Horowitz's concept of terrorism is limited to 
insurgent terrorism (16), he does, albeit in another con-
text, deal with state terror, but (confusingly) calls it 
genocide. It is, he says, a fundamental mechanism for the 
unification of the national state. It functions as a fun-
damental political policy to assure conformity and par-
ticipation by the citizenry (17). It is essentially a 
political decision (18). Clearly, Horowitz's concept of 
genocide is so broad it loses the little clarity it had, 
becoming more like state terror (regime of terror) than 
just one aspect of it. This is confirmed by his concept of 
"genocidal societies". Recognizing that terror cross-cuts 
political ideologies, he develops a typology of social 
systems, based on a measurement scale of life and death. 
The first of these is what he calls "genocidal societies in 
which the state arbitrarily takes the lives of citizens for 
deviant or dissident behaviour" (19). 
Some authors, although concentrating on insurgent 
terror, incorporate state terror in their definition. 
Wilkinson, for instance, after first presenting a typology 
of terrorism consisting of criminal, psychic, war and 
political terrorism, goes on to define the latter as; 
"the use, or threat of use, of violence by an 
individual or a group, whether acting for or in 
opposition to established authority, when such 
action is designed to create extreme anxiety 
and/or fear - inducing effects in a target group 
larger than the immediate victims with the purpose 
of coercing that group into acceding to the 
political demands of the perpetrators" (20). 
Elsewhere he defined repressive terrorism, which is most 
commonly, but not exclusively, used by states, as aimed at 
suppressing or restraining groups, individuals or forms of 
behaviour deemed to be non-desirable by the repressor, or 
simply arbitrarily chosen for liquidation (21). He goes on 
to say that it is often highly sanguinary, that a specia-
lised terror apparat, the secret police, is developed to 
perform this task and that the archetypical technique is 
torture, but I find his definition lacking. It does not 
focus our attention on specific aspects, heighten our 
awareness of the typical mechanisms involved in, or indicate 
under which circumstances a state will resort to terror, 
and on which scale. He does state that political terrorism 
is not mindless, that it has objectives, that it aims at 
control (22). This aspect Wilkinson's definition has in 
common with Horowitz's concept of genocide. Both bear some 
resemblance to E.V. Walter's "regime of terror" (23). 
Walter distinguishes two major categories of terror 
systems, analogous to Thornton and others. One, the movement 
to overthrow an established system of power, to destroy 
this established authority system by creating extreme fear 
through systematic violence, he calls a "siege of terror". 
In the other, the "regime of terror", the power holders 
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choose to rule by violence and fear, instead of relying on 
"authority, conventional rules and legitimate techniques" 
(24). To qualify for the label "system of terror" all the 
individuals in a society must, in one way or another, 
actually or potentially, be involved. If terror is confined 
to part of society, as for example against a religious 
minority, Walter introduces the term "zone of terror", 
within which the violence and fear are confined. Outside 
this zone power relations follow the rules of an ordinary 
system of authority. In practice this division will not 
always be so clear cut. 
Terror is a means by which the state can extort what 
it wants. It constitutes a substitute for moral pressure. I 
assume that the use of violence, let alone terror, is never 
a first choice. More specifically, men in authority in a 
condition of minimal resistance tend to avoid destructive 
methods of power "unless other cultural or psychic factors 
create a disposition to act in a violent manner", Walter 
notes. Resistance or the expectation of resistance, on the 
other hand, increases the probability of violence (25). In 
embryonic form this is Duvall & Stohl's "expected utility". 
In order to find a theory that fits state terrorism in both 
capitalist, socialist and developing countries they had to 
find a very general model of explanation. They found it in 
the "Expectancy Value" theory of motivation, which uses an 
expected utility model. This model is based on 
"the assumption that an actor behaves in accor-
dance with a basic rule which consists of three 
main elements: (1) the benefits, personally de-
fined, that the actor would get from some desired 
state of affairs; (2) the actor's belief about 
the probability with which the desired state of 
affairs would be brought about if the actor were 
to engage in a particular action; and (3) the 
actor's belief about the probable costs, or nega-
tive consequences, that it would have to bear as 
a result of its engaging in that action" (26). 
These three elements define the concept of expected utility. 
The idea is that a government will choose terror if it 
estimates the expected reward of this choice to be higher 
than alternative means of dealing with its situation. In 
the case of "weak" states, the relative effectiveness of 
terrorism really depends on the belief that other available 
means of rule are quite inefficacious (27). This cost -
benefit type, clinical analysis, because it precludes 
morality, is a useful model for explaining, or at least 
helping to explain, all types of regimes of terror, as long 
as the terror remains a containable rational strategy. 
The process of terror, according to Walter, consists 
of three elements; namely the specific act or threat of 
violence, which induces a general psychic state of extreme 
fear, which in turn produces typical patterns of reactive 
behaviour. Terrorism depends on the effect deliberate 
violence has upon those who witness it or learn of it 
indirectly, the impact it makes on the consciousness of 
witnesses and the communication of their fear to others 
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more remote. For violence to be terroristic, witnesses are 
needed - as the Chinese proverb says: "kill one, frighten 
ten thousand". 
There is a contradiction here between publicity and 
secrecy. This must be so, as the sociologist de Swaan notes 
in a short essay on terror regimes, 
"because, if the existence and manner of operation 
of the terror apparatus were the subject of public 
debate then the citizens would inevitably try the 
terrorist practices against the confessed ideals 
of the regime. But if the methods would remain 
completely unknown, then they would not achieve 
their intimidating effect. Thus the system of 
terror works through a steady stream of rumours, 
(and) private conversations. (Herein lies the) 
devilish shrewdness of the set-up: whoever men-
tions it himself thereby collaborates with the 
reign of terror" (28). 
Terrorism indicates the systematic rousing of chronic fear. 
The victim perishes but the target reacts to the spectacle 
or the news of that destruction with some manner of submis-
sion or accommodation, by withdrawing resistance or by 
inhibiting potential resistance. The regime does not elimi-
nate the group that falls in the zone of terror but controls 
it through violence and fear. A segment of the group may be 
destroyed to instill terror in the rest, but the group is 
not wiped out. This is the process of terror and herein 
lies the essential difference with genocide, when we under-
stand genocide to be an act of or attempt at total destruc-
tion of a group for no end beyond itself. 
Walter distinguishes between an act of destruction 
which is complete and not directed at an end beyond itself, 
and the process of violence, which is. The latter aims to 
instill terror in order to achieve control. So the process 
of violence stands in the service of terror and the process 
of terror in the service of power. Violence, he says, may 
be used to control, to punish or to destroy. Control and 
punishment are forms of power, whereas destruction is not, 
unless it is used indirectly to control or to punish. 
Therefore genocide (what Walter calls "violence to change 
conditions"), when used to control or to punish, where it 
is directed to an end beyond itself, falls within the 
process of violence and so ultimately stands in the service 
of power. 
Terror, according to Walter, is not the same as in-
timidation. True, the latter aims, through threats, also 
to arouse fear in order to gain compliance. But, as with 
punishment, the relationship is dyadic. The victim is also 
the target. With terror the relationship is triadic, the 
victim being a helpless object in the middle, whose fate is 
decided upon by one or both of the conflicting parties, the 
actor and the target. Hardman, guoted approvingly by Walter, 
sees intimidation as a "means of achieving desired ends" 
and as such a "feature of behaviour where power or authority 
is based primarily on force". Fear is evoked in the party 
that is expected to do or not to do certain things "without 
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however resorting to direct violence" (29). And, according 
to Walter, terror cannot occur without violence although 
violence can occur without terror (30). 
This distinction is a little cloudy. After all, in-
timidation is based on the threat of the use of violence. 
If the threat is called, violence will have to be used if 
the intimidator wants to retain his credibility. Even 
without the threat actually being called it may occasionally 
be enforced to prevent a loss of credibility. When the 
enforcement is not merely punishment but aimed at a target 
group larger than the victim to, once again, ensure com-
pliance there is no longer any difference with the process 
of terror. In the case of exemplary punishment, show trials 
and political justice, punishment and intimidation border 
on triadic relationship, as Walter admits, the act also 
being aimed at third parties, victim and target no longer 
necessarily identical. They "thereby become terroristic", 
as Schmid notes (31). Walter does seem to be aware of the 
fluidity between the various conceptions. At least he says 
about punishment; 
"(s)ince violent punishments do evoke fear and 
are often justified by their putative deterrent 
value, it is sometimes hard to distinguish the 
administration of punishment from the process of 
terror" (32). 
Violence used not only as punishment for acts of disobe-
dience and resistance, but also to sap the potential for 
disobedience in advance and to break the power to resist, 
thus becomes the violence of terrorism. 
Contrary to the impression Walter gives, the victim of 
terror need not necessarily perish. Torture, for instance, 
is widely and consciously used by governments to set ex-
amples, to frighten and to intimidate the population, or 
parts thereof (the "opposition"), in order to discourage 
resistance. According to one Amnesty International report, 
torture "has proved to be an effective means of maintaining 
power (...) for those who govern without the consent of the 
governed". If torture is the price of dissent, the majority 
will be "neutralized by fear". Only "a small minority will 
act (but) the forces of repression" can take care of them 
(33). Wilkinson even considers torture the archetypical 
technique, as we have seen (see chapter 10.1). 
Disappearances are also an effective method of terror, 
as Amnesty International indicated when it started an 
international campaign against disappearances in 1981. Real 
or imagined opponents, even children, are seized without 
arrest warrants and 'removed', never to be heard of again. 
The authorities deny any responsibility, so all judicial 
formalities lapse (34). Usually the families and friends of 
the missing are left in despair and hope, hope that the 
missing person might still be alive. The stress is tremen-
dous, neither being able to reconcile oneself with the 
death of one's beloved one, nor certain that he or she is 
still alive. 
This was true in Cambodia. People who disappeared 
("called away to study" or "called to see Angkar") were 
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sometimes killed, but often merely sent somewhere else or 
to a re-education camp. Quite a number of these 'dead' 
turned up later. But those who stayed behind hardly ever 
saw the person again (at least not during Pol Pot's regime), 
which fed their fear. The KR' habit of never giving explana-
tions only exacerbated matters. Disappearances can also be 
an effective way of creating fear among the population for 
their own safety. One of the first thoughts Cambodians had 
when they learned that a family member had been "called 
away to study" was "its my turn next". 
Another effective method of terror is taking hostages. 
They are held to ensure the compliant behaviour of the rest 
of the group. Hostages can also be killed as punishment for 
acts carried out by others and as a warning to others about 
engaging in acts of resistance in the future. The use of 
children as hostage, kidnapping and even torturing them, to 
blackmail the parents is an easy and effective example, as 
Scholten indicates in her study on the use of torture in 
Pinochet's Chili (35). 
In all these cases we are clearly dealing with triadic 
relationships between the source of violence (the terror 
staff), the victim and the target. Sometimes, especially in 
the case of torture used to extract information, the victim 
is also target. But even then putting fear in the outside 
population can remain an important aim and effect. That 
violence has to be triadic in order to be terroristic does, 
however, pose a problem, as the Cambodian case illustrates. 
The purging of Sihanoukists and Khmer Vietminh, which was 
the work of Nokorbal, the CPK's state security apparatus, 
took place in secret. Similarly, what went on at Tuoi Sleng 
and the other interrogation centres was known only to a 
very small and select group of people. The torture of 
suspects there was only meant to extract confessions, to 
unmask 'conspiracies' against the Pol Pot regime. Contrary 
to what happened under Stalin's regime during the great 
mock trials of 1936, 1937 and 1938, these confessions were 
not used for foreign consumption, nor to increase fear 
among the rest of the people. There was no campaign against 
the suspect, no public trial, no public justification, not 
even any communication afterwards. 
Dallin and Breslauer, whose work on political terror 
in communist systems appeared about the same time as 
Walter's study, and who themselves state that their approach 
in many respects coincides with Walter's, call this "her-
metic terror", where victim and target are identical (36). 
This doesn't solve the problem, of course. Seen in a broader 
context, however, even the very secret work of Nokorbal 
had triadic connotations. Before being secretly tortured 
and exterminated, victims first 'disappeared', arrested or 
otherwise, something their surroundings surely noticed. 
People are terrorized not primarily for what they have 
done as a group but on the ground of expectations that they 
might oppose the regime. The process of terror is a policy 
of deterrence. As the goal of terrorism is change in the 
behaviour of other groups than the victims, a certain 
arbitrariness in the choice of victims is characteristic of 
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terrorist forms of violence (37). The process needs a 
regular selection of victims, but anyone in the system may 
be chosen. In a system where violence is used only as 
punishment, no matter how destructive, the individual who 
chooses to conform remains reasonably secure from official 
harm because punishment is only dealt out for transgressions 
of a recognized norm established by coercion or consent. In 
the terror process no one can be secure for the category of 
transgression is, in reality, abolished. Anyone may be a 
victim, no matter what action he chooses. Innocence is 
irrelevant. All members of the victim group are guilty by 
virtue of their membership in it. 
The unpredictability concerning what may or may not be 
punished and the often extreme severity of punishment in 
terrorist regimes cannot be without limits, however. For, 
as de Swaan remarks; 
"if nobody knows anymore what will lead to arrest 
or ill treatment, anxious abiding would lose all 
sense, subjects would become careless and even 
daring" (38). 
Dallin and Breslauer agree that 
"the element of arbitrariness both in he decision-
maker's ability to disregard any binding legal 
norms and in the incalculability of the applica-
tion of terror as perceived by the citizen (must 
be stressed)". 
But they add that 
"(T)his second characteristic must not be con-
fused, however, with capriciousness in the iden-
tification of victims. Whereas terror may come to 
affect any member of society either as victim or 
as target, it appears that in Communist systems 
neither the entire society is the primary target 
of terror campaigns, nor is terror randomly 
applied. And where the prophylactic removal of 
entire categories is involved, such groups -
though not necessarily the individual victims 
within them - tend to be chosen for selective or 
total elimination by a rational, albeit peculiar 
process" (39). 
Under systems of terror a person is considered guilty before 
having been convicted on any particular charge simply 
because of membership of a class (or group), because of 
past or present affiliation. For example, Martin Latsis, a 
leading Cheka official at the time of the Red Terror, made 
this terrorist concept of suspect clear when he stated: 
"(d)o not seek in your accusations proof whether 
the prisoner has rebelled against the soviets 
with guns or by word. You must ask him, first, 
what class he belongs to, what his social origin 
is, what his education was, and his profession. 
The answer must determine the fate of the accused. 
That is the meaning of the Red Terror" (40). 
The atmosphere thus created is poignantly captured by Talmon 
in a comment that, although dealing with the Jacobin Terror, 
can easily be generalized: 
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"To have remained silent on some past and half 
forgotten occasion, where one should have spoken; 
to have spoken where it was better to hold one's 
peace; to have shown apathy where eagerness was 
called for (...); to have consorted with somebody 
whom a patriot should have shunned; avoided one 
who deserved to be befriended; (...) such and 
other 'sins' came to be counted as capital offen-
ses, classifying the sinners as members of that 
immense chain of treason comprising the foreign 
plot, royalism, federalism, bureaucratic sabotage, 
food speculation, immoral wealth, and vicious 
selfish perversion" (41). 
Other "sins" can be added to, or replace those in, this 
chain, depending on the specific regime in power, such as 
being 'feudalist', 'bourgeois', 'counter-revolutionary' and 
so on. 
Having dealt with the victims and the targets of 
terror, I will now turn briefly to the perpetrators. Walter 
has named them the "terror staff", consisting of a direc-
torate, which designs, initiates, controls, defines and 
justifies the terror, and the agents of violence, the 
executioners who carry out orders and perform acts of 
destruction (42). Wilkinson had already called our attention 
to the fact that in a regime of terror "typically a specia-
list terror apparat, the secret police, is developed to 
perform (the) task" (43). 
Contrary to the general public's impression that the 
terror staff consists overwhelmingly of sadists and psycho-
paths (44), it would seem that in principal anyone could be 
an "agent of violence". This, at least, is the outcome of 
psychological research such as Milgram's well-known studies 
on obedience to inhuman orders. He concluded that we were 
not dealing with sadism but conformity (45). Pol Pot, a 
name now synonymous with evil, was considered by everyone 
who knew him before the war to be a very kind-hearted, 
friendly and helpful person. 
At Tuoi Sleng and probably also at the other interroga-
tion and execution centres in Democratic Kampuchea, the use 
of torture was seen as a rational means for achieving a 
political end. According to the Manual for Interrogators, a 
42 page guide found at Tuoi Sleng that included an exposé 
on the practice of systematic torture, the goal of torture 
was to gain answers. "It is not something we do for fun", 
the Manual says. Torture is not something done out of 
personal anger or for self-satisfaction. Politics is the 
most important thing. Torture is of secondary and subor-
dinate importance, and serves to supplement a political 
concern. In fact torture was such a routine that it could 
be summarized in an eight point work schedule for the 
interrogators. The Tuoi Sleng archives show that the whole 
process was very systematic and bureaucratic. There are 
even confessions by interrogators who had themselves been 
arrested for either torturing too little or too much. 
Overardent torturing could lead to the death of a prisoner 
before all the desired information had been obtained. This 
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was seen as a lack of self-control and a defeat for the 
party (46). 
In her thesis on the usage of psychological knowledge 
and methods for repression and torture in Chili, the psycho-
logist Lia Scholten notes a number of similarities between 
Milgram's experiments and the Chilean reality (47). Milgram 
had discovered that the 
"concrete, visible, and proximal presence of the 
victim acts in an important way to counteract the 
experimenter's power and to generate disobedience" 
(4B). 
In other words, hearing, seeing, touching the victim, having 
had personal contact before experiments, reduced obedience. 
Scholten ascertains that in the Chilean torture centres 
contact with prisoners is kept fragmented to prevent guards 
developing an emotional relationship with and feelings of 
responsibility for what happens to prisoners (49). In his 
study on suppression and resistance, Injustice, Moore says 
that: 
"(t)hose charged with keeping order in a hostile 
population generally see to it that their subor-
dinates have a minimum of contact with those 
whom they are supposed to control" (50). 
The dark sunglasses of 'Papa Doc' Duvalier's Ton Ton Macout 
- his hated secret police - were a striking visual represen-
tation of the psychological distance which terror staff try 
to establish to separate themselves from the populace. In 
one of his earliest studies, on the use of terror in the 
Soviet Union, at that time still under Stalin, Moore notes 
that the MVD (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the secret 
police, in other words, successor to the NKVD): 
"is mainly viewed as something feared and apart 
(...) Clique lines seldom cross the barrier that 
separates the MVD from the rest of the population 
(...) Unlike the rest of Soviet officialdom the 
MVD is widely regarded as incorruptible" (51). 
In Democratic Kampuchea the secret police were really 
secret. Some people were vaguely aware of the existence of 
agents from the centre, the Sontebal, roving squads of the 
centre's security forces who, inter alia, also executed 
people. But practically no one knew of Nokorbal let alone 
S-21 (Tuoi Sleng). Even the KR, mostly youth of poor peasant 
background, were kept apart from the populace and treated 
better. This had already started after 1973 as the war more 
and more took on the form of a conventional struggle and 
the KR troops became permanently separated from the rest of 
the population. This, together with their specific training 
and battle induced hardness, gave them a somewhat elitist 
and condescending attitude towards the ordinary people. To 
a certain extent this was deliberate policy on the part of 
the CPK leadership. To prevent identification with the 
(potential) victims, which would lessen their effectiveness 
as executors of the party's policies, the KR should have a 
minimum of contact with the people they were supposed to 
control. 
Due to the nature of its work this terror apparatus 
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develops into a state within the state, uncontrollable by 
all except the very elite of the powerholders, on whom the 
terror apparatus, however, also has a hold through the 
compromising information it collects about it. As the 
intelligence network expands, absorbing more and more 
people, it again becomes clear how much opposition has 
remained uncovered, how threatened the regime still is. And 
so the terror apparatus proves its own necessity. In this 
it is no different from any other bureaucracy. It grows 
easily and is hard to curtail, let alone abolish. 
This is precisely what happened in the Soviet Union. 
Already as a result of the Red Terror the Cheka had grown 
to about 31.000 employees (52). The purges of the 1930's 
created a frighteningly powerful political police force, 
which soon started looking for more work, demanding more 
and more victims to justify its existence and exceeding the 
responsibilities delegated to it. By 1941 the NKVD (succes-
sor to the Cheka) had become by far the most important 
economic organ in the whole of the Soviet Union (53). It 
had its own internal army (54), which was called on to 
execute critical assignments such as the suppression of 
popular uprisings following collectivization and the depor-
tation of minority peoples. 
Now terror does not by itself function as an assurance 
of participation. On the contrary, "it upsets the framework 
of precepts and images which members of society depend and 
trust", as Crenshaw notes. It "destroys the solidarity, 
co-operation and interdependence on which social functioning 
is based". As people don't know what to expect from others 
anymore they are disorientated. "The formerly coherent 
community dissolves into a mass of anomie individuals, each 
concerned only with personal survival" (55). Or, as Walter 
says ; 
"The perpetual danger from within the community 
depresses activity not officially sanctioned and 
it renders personal relations unpredictable" 
(56), 
In other words, to quote Moore : 
"Terror ultimately destroys the network of stable 
expectations concerning what other people will do 
that lie at the core of any set of organized 
human relationships" (57). 
This was very apparant in Democratic Kampuchea, where 'new 
people' would spy on and betray each other for the slightest 
perceived advantage. Normal solidarity was shattered. They 
stole from each other. Work brigades would even vie with 
each other to see which could do the most work (58). Living 
in extreme fear can lead to an atmosphere of paralysis and 
powerlessness. 
So some other force is needed to set them in motion. 
In totalitarian systems ideology provides the motor, or so 
Hannah Ahrendt suggests. Walter does not disagree but 
suggests another process which he terms "forced choice". In 
part it depends on the same violence as the process of 
terror : 
"(I)t motivates those who neither resist nor 
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co-operate voluntarily (by closing alternative 
chances to act until the individual must choose 
between two evils, both of which would be rejected 
in an 'open' situation (...)(T)o avoid the more 
noxious alternative (people co-operate) to gain 
the positive increment of the lesser evil. The 
incentives to co-operate may be increased if the 
increment appears as a relative advantage, and if 
an individual must compete with his fellows to 
seize it", (59). 
In slavery, for instance, a condition was created by force 
under which bare subsistence and protection are made suffi-
cient incentives to co-operation. In a concentration camp 
the possibility of getting "two cigarettes with the added 
chance of some immunity from violence" can be enough to 
motivate a person to co-operate with the camp guards, to 
punish or exercise control over fellow prisoners (60). One 
extremely effective strategy to induce co-operation is 
hunger. According to Moore; 
"(i)t increases alertness to cues from the social 
environment about ways to behave that will reduce 
the pangs. (Though there is considerable variation 
from one individual to another) the effect is to 
make people eager to learn how to please those 
persons in charge of the environment. When drives 
have been aroused, simple withdrawal from the 
situation becomes much more difficult. A critical 
rejection of the source of gratification seems 
almost impossible. The result is an acceptance of 
the social codes and standards held by those in 
control of the situation. It is the elementary 
form of co-option" (61). 
In the Soviet labour camps food rations were linked to a 
prisoner's output as some kind of incentive. A typical 
ration scheme would average around 700-900 grams of bread 
per day for over-fulfilling the norm, about 400-500 grams 
for not fulfilling it and 300-400 grams for achieving less 
than 50% of the norm (62). In practice the norms were 
usually set so high that few achieved 50%, let alone the 
norm itself. Sometimes the whole work gang was made respon-
sible for fulfilling the norm. This was even more effective, 
each member spurring the others on to avoid a cut in ra-
tions . 
These mechanisms were also operative in Democratic 
Kampuchea, which really resembled one huge labour camp. 
People co-operated to avoid a cut in rations, to avoid 
punishment or "being sent away to see Angkar", sometimes in 
the hope of getting some more or better food, or even a 
cigarette. The sick only received half rations, a strong 
incentive to continue working even when one was ill. The 
monopolization of food as a method to achieve compliance 
was still used after the fall of the Pol Pot regime, in the 
KR controlled refugee camps, to force people to return to 
Cambodia with the KR. 
Terror must not destroy co-operative relations. Victims 
of terror must be expendable. Their loss must not effect 
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the system of co-operation. A balance must be found between 
control (terror) and economic development (surplus genera-
tion). 
As the CPK had decided that, at least in the short 
run. Democratic Kampuchea had no need for all sorts of 
technological and scientific skills held by 'corrupted' 
people, the possessors of such skills were expendable. The 
CPK wanted to eliminate certain cultural and belief systems 
that it considered a threat to its power and authority, to 
guarantee its monopoly on power and to create a structural 
change in society. Destroying the economic base of these 
'corrupted' classes was not enough. Their consciousness 
also needed changing. This did not necessarily mean it was 
to kill all the carriers of these character traits. As Pech 
Lim Kuon, the helicopter pilot who flew party leaders around 
before fleeing, said, the policy was not to exterminate 
people but to abolish classes (63). The party leaders' aim 
was to eliminate that aspect they considered dangerous but 
to retain the human carriers as a tool for primitive ac-
cumulation. Segments of these groups were eliminated, but 
in order to control the rest. Wiping out the whole category 
of 'new people' would have been contrary to the CPK's need 
for rapid economic development. It was not a case of geno-
cide, but of terror used in the service of power. The 
traditional social network was destroyed, certainly, but 
substitute relations were introduced, through the collec-
tivization of life - the co-operatives and workbrigades. 
Similarly Stalin's massive purge had not meant to kill all 
party, army and bureaucracy members. Its aim had been 
control. It was a process of terror, not political genocide. 
According to Walter there are five conditions necessary 
for the maintenance of a terror regime, which may also be 
understood as fundamental prerequisites. All five have been 
discussed above more or less extensively. 1 . There must be 
a shared ideology that justifies the violence; for instance, 
terror as a weapon of the proletariat against the class 
enemy (This refers to the dehumanizing aspect necessary to 
legitimize the violence). 2. The victims in the process of 
terror must be expendable. 3. The agents of violence must 
be dissociated from the people (e.g. separate organiza-
tions), the victims must be dissociated from ordinary life, 
separated from sources of protection and violence must be 
removed from social controls. 4. Terror must be balanced by 
working incentives that induce co-operation (ideology, 
forced choice, pay-off). 5. Co-operative relationships must 
survive the effect of the terror (64). 
10.3 Terror in Conmunist Systems 
I will now turn more specifically to the use of terror by 
communist regimes. When and why do they resort to terror? 
According to Barrington Moore Jr., one of the first people 
to have tackled this question, it is not true that every 
form of socialism will require organized terror to maintain 
it. This depends on whether centralized economic control is 
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a way of meeting the wishes of the people or whether it is 
forced on them (65). 
Power is necessary to achieve ends and realize inter-
ests. But power must be won and then defended against 
contenders. The use of terror is a method for achieving and 
retaining power. Now the new rulers must, like the old 
ruling class, acquire the means needed to consolidate and 
extend their power through accumulation. To put it very 
simply, political power is a means of realizing and maximiz-
ing economic exploitation, whilst this economic exploitation 
delivers the means by which the ruling elite can build and 
retain its position of power. Communist elites, on coming 
to power, want to transfer the means of production to state 
control. That destroys the power-base of the old propertied 
class. Also, by thus joining economic and political power 
the amount of surplus product withheld from the personal 
consumption of society's members and mobilized for purposes 
of expanding production can be maximized (66). The new 
communist elite rules by using state power to impose un-
favourable rates of exchange on the rest of society, albeit 
not equally unequal on all its different sectors (67). The 
increase of productivity by any means was decisive for 
Marxist theory. Such divergent streams in Marxism as 
Kautsky's brand of social democracy and Bolshevism, no 
matter how much they differed, both called for the elimina-
tion from the economy of all competitive market elements. 
They fully agreed that the triumph of socialism was synony-
mous with the nationalization of the whole economy and the 
transfer of total authority to a scientific, rational 
bureaucracy. The bigger the budget the greater the power of 
the officials who administer it. 
When routine mechanisms fail or when they expect their 
use to be quite ineffective (Duvall & Stohl's "effective 
utility") the new powerholders use force and violence. One 
could say the more surplus the rulers want to extract in 
the shorter time, the more they will seek recourse to terror 
(all else remaining the same). Two major factors that would 
be involved in determining the amount of surplus extracted 
are the ruthlessness of the dominating group and the resis-
tance of the expropriated (Thermidorean pressures). 
Dallin and Breslauer, who also see political terror as 
a coercive instrument to effect political control (68), 
hold that all social and political control requires systems 
of sanctions. There are three systems of sanctions; "norma-
tive power" (persuasion), including socialization, educa-
tion, and the offer of prestige, recognition or love, 
"material power" (incentives), including such forms as 
wages, bonuses, bribes, and promotions, and "coercive 
power", including such forms as fines, penalties, regulatory 
and police power and terror (69). Arbitrariness, or un-
predictability, is what distinguishes terror from other 
coercive means (70). Immediately following take-over a 
revolutionary regime tends to rely heavily on coercion to 
consolidate its power and assure its survival, by eliminat-
ing actual and potential enemies and deterring hostile 
acts. In part due to the upheaval of revolution it lacks 
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the material resources to satisfy its followers. Nor has it 
had time to implant the revolutionary ideology as a norma-
tive control instrument in the masses. "(Socialization and 
indoctrination at best require time", as Dallin and 
Breslauer note (71). With the limited availability of 
normative and material incentives the resort to coercion in 
general and terror in particular becomes mandatory for the 
survival of the regime. At this stage of power consolidation 
(which Dallin and Breslauer call the "take-over stage") 
there is frequently 'unnecessary' use of terror. They call 
this "situational terror", "which is generally a product of 
uncontrolled and undisciplined behaviour by lower-level 
cadres". It should be distinguished from "purposive terror", 
"which is initiated and intended by the policy-makers" (72). 
Now communist elites have always been committed to a 
substantial transformation of society, the economy and even 
individual human nature. This stage of development (the 
"mobilization stage") follows the take-over stage, although 
there need be no sharp distinction between the two. The 
elite may surmise that this drastic transformation (rapid 
industrialization, collectivization of agriculture) will 
clash with the values and perceived interests of sectors of 
society and take pre-emptive action by suppressing or 
removing these sectors. To secure the crucial breakthrough 
(73) requires a mobilization and reallocation of human and 
natural resources that will impose considerable strains on 
society and the economy. Given the urgency communist regimes 
attach to the tasks of transformation and the lack of 
normative and material assets, recourse to purposive terror 
is an effective element in their strategy of primitive 
accumulation. It "seems to ensure compliant behaviour during 
such a period of change, and to this extent (...) has a 
rational base", according to Dallin and Breslauer. "Com-
munist practice, however", they continue, 
"has typically moved beyond these paroxysms of 
directed change, with total mobilization increas-
ingly shaping the system. Most instances of 
massive political terror under Communism appear 
to have served the function of destroying or 
inhibiting all rival authorities, and of insulat-
ing the population from all incongruent value 
systems. The net effect is to eliminate all 
organized political opposition and to facilitate 
socialization by exposing the population to a 
single unchallenged system of values" (74). 
The ultimate goal is to have every citizen internalize all 
the prescribed goals and values, so that each citizen will 
be a "good communist". This reflects the assumption that 
the transformation of the individual into the "new, socia-
list man" is both desirable and possible. And herein lies a 
legitimation of the use of terror, as we have seen (see 
chapter 9.3). 
In the mobilization stage purposive terror serves to 
eliminate all rival authority figures, actual, potential, 
or imagined, as well as their 'strings', and to eliminate 
incongruent value structures, by neutralizing or removing 
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groups identified as carriers of such values, or by isolat-
ing the population from access to them. The former tends to 
take the form of purges, which need not necessarily involve 
the use of terror. Whereas in the take-over stage terror is 
primarily directed at members of various 'out-groups', at 
the mobilization stage it also turns against insiders. This 
is, in a sense, the result of the effectiveness of the 
terror system. The process of terror creates 
"an emotional environment of extreme fear ( in 
which) the interaction and relationships that 
bolster individual courage or encourage group 
solidarity cannot survive" (75). 
It deprives people of the capacity of resistance. Only if 
people are in some way isolated from the corrosive effects 
of terror can resistance begin to emerge. As Kolakowski 
notes for the Soviet Union, with the elimination of all 
external opposition 
"social conflicts came to be reflected within the 
Bolshevik party itself; and this in turn led to 
the application within the party of the same 
principle of despotic rule as the party exercised 
over the rest of society" (76). 
The way in which the transformation was executed generally 
did also lead to disagreement within ruling communist 
parties. 
The elimination of incongruent value structures may 
involve individuals who disseminate values deemed to be at 
variance with the official ones and of entire socio-econo-
mic, ethnic, religious or other groups identified as bad 
risks. Divergent cultures and languages may operate as 
counterpoints around which opposition can develop. The same 
holds for religion, where it is at variance with the ruling 
elite's ideology, and can, therefore, form a competitive 
ideology. Their elimination, of course, was meant to open 
the way for the communist elite to establish its hegemony 
(in the Gramscian sense). In the case of ethnic groups with 
differing cultures, where it is not merely a question of a 
culture changing, but of "social processes destroying 
(their) ability to maintain self-determination", we can 
speak of ethnocide, as Hvalkof and Aaby conclude their 
review of the literature on the subject (77). Ethnocide, 
too, is a strategy for unification. 
Once the breakthrough has been achieved, the regime 
succeeds in industrializing the country and gains more 
material and normative resources, there will be, according 
to Dallin and Breslauer, less reliance on coercion (78). 
They explain the variations in the amount of terror exer-
cised by communist regimes after the seizure of power by 
reference to pre-take-over conditions. Generally speaking 
it can be said that the way in which the revolution is made 
will influence the post-revolutionary order. Party domina-
tion or isolation in the revolutionary process will favour 
a post-revolutionary regime that attempts to impose its 
will. Partnership in the revolutionary process or accommoda-
tion favours interaction and reciprocity between party and 
masses. The central government can be seized by a coup 
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d'etat, as the October Revolution in Russia for instance. 
On the other hand, the communist party can come to power 
after protracted mass peasant mobilization at the periphery, 
as in China. A communist regime may also be imposed under 
threat of external military force, as happened in some 
Eastern European states after the Second World War. 
A second cluster of variables concerns the relative 
level of organizational control of the communists, the 
extent of their administrative penetration of the country, 
and the quality of their organization. If the revolutionary 
movement was successful in 
"gaining a fair measure of popular support, in 
penetrating the administrative - organizational 
system of the country, and in gaining the upper 
hand over alternative organizations and authori-
ties - whether by guerilla warfare against domes-
tic or foreign enemies (China, Yugoslavia, Al-
bania) or by administrative manipulation, through 
front organizations, party and police operations, 
or other backstage moves (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) 
- then there is correspondingly less "need" for 
terror (and no civil war) after the take-over of 
the central government. The equivalent functions 
of terror at this stage will have been substan-
tially fulfilled prior to take-over" (79). 
The Vietminh, for example, directed their members and 
friends towards many positions in the provincial capitals, 
especially those directly concerned with mobilizing youth. 
Leadership of the enormously popular youth and sports 
program that the French developed throughout Cochin China 
was dominated by communists and their sympathizers. By 
1943, according to Popkin, they "were being placed in 
strategic locations throughout the administration..." (80). 
If the goal of revolutionaries is power they must establish 
"institutionalized interdependence with the families" in 
the areas they have gained control over, so Migdal says 
(81). Successful revolutionaries have decentralized ad-
ministrations by placing cadres within villages and dis-
tricts. Violence against the state is secondary to that of 
creating power (which is defined as the support or consent 
of the people to act as opposed to the use of violence to 
force them to comply). Initially the revolutionary army is 
used to protect the process of creating power. This involves 
the institutionalization of administrative and executive 
activities. As Eqbal Ahmad has remarked; "a revolutionary 
guerilla movement concentrates on outadministering, not 
outfighting the enemy" (82). Also a high level of organiza-
tional development tends to diminish situational terror. 
Thirdly, Dallin and Breslauer mention "the extent of 
societal disruption and exhaustion", including "the acuity 
of social tensions in the country" (83). This would include 
the relative strength of the various classes and groups in 
society, their mutual alignments and the measure of their 
opposition or support for the communists. In other words, 
not only the measure of destruction but also the general 
socio-economic development of the country is relevant here: 
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what is the level of industrialization, how widespread is 
landlordism, is there an indigenous middle class of any 
importance, are we dealing with a populist state with 
relatively little real development, to what extent have the 
organizational structures previously deemed legitimate 
broken down, how weak a class is the peasantry? The extent 
of disintegration of traditional organization and values 
will facilitate the change. All these are issues we have 
already dealt with in the previous chapter. 
Dallin and Breslauer's final point is 
"the nature of the dominant political culture -
its attitude toward violence, for example - and 
of the political strategy pursued by the revolu­
tionary elite" (84). 
This, too, has already been dealt with. Duvall and Stohl's 
"expected utility" can be included here. The speed and 
radicality with which the new regime attempts to achieve 
'total' control and realize the transformation it desires 
is an important element. The more rapid and more thorough 
the change, the more extensive and bitter the opposition is 
likely to be, the more terror is called for to impose the 
change, Barrington Moore jr. notes. A communist party's 
commitment to terror, he says, is as great as its commitment 
to change that goes against the habits and desires of 
various sectors of the population (Θ5). If a regime seeks 
to pursue several objectives simultaneously we may expect 
more coercion to be called for. 
To these factors must be added the international 
factor; the presence or absence of external threat or 
support to the new regime. Although this can be of crucial 
importance, it does not lead to any easy propositions. 
External support might encourage the revolutionary regime 
to throw caution to the wind and use terror to enforce 
radical change. It might just as well exert a restraining 
influence. Material support might ease the strain on the 
economy, increasing the possibility of using material 
resources to achieve compliance. Conversely external threat 
may encourage an internal conciliatory approach for sake of 
national unity, or increase existing suspiciousness and 
fear of opposition, which demand more heavy handed suppres­
sion. 
One last factor must be mentioned: culture. Is one 
people or society more prone to violence, obedience, social 
control, militancy, organization and so on, than another? 
Occasionally I have touched on related aspects; Khmer 
Buddhist culture for instance, or Chinese Confucianist 
tradition. But although a systematic explanation might be 
fruitful it is a terrain full of pitfalls. I, at least, do 
not feel myself well enough equipped to attempt such an 
explanation. 
Now the manner in which all the above factors converged 
and interrelated should explain the variations in the use 
of terror. The classical example of a communist regime of 
terror is, of course, the Soviet Union, at least until 
Stalin's death. Much of the theory on state terror has used 
this example as starting point. It is therefore appropriate 
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and relevant to discuss Stalin's regime of terror as an 
illustration of the analytical categories and processes 
discussed so far. 
10.4 The Soviet Union 
In the Soviet Union the success of the Bolsheviks in expand-
ing their power after their October 1917 coup was as much 
the result of indecisive action by the other leftist groups 
as of Lenin's resourceful leadership and flexible (or 
opportunist) manoeuvering. In part the bourgeoisie was 
rendered harmless through co-optation. Specialists and 
experts were given privileges to keep them for production. 
Trotsky organized the Red Army with ex-Czarist officers. 
This also, and the dissolution of the Czarist army, deprived 
the old ruling classes of their main weapon of self-defence. 
Their economic base had been expropriated by the soviets or 
through nationalization. 
Ideologically the Bolsheviks were dedicated to the 
urban proletariat, not more than 2 to 2.5% of the population 
in a society overwhelmingly consisting of peasants. Initial 
peasant support, or at least the buying off of potential 
peasant opposition, was gained with land distribution, the 
first decree issued by the Soviet government. In it 150 
million desyatina of land (163 million hectare) were given 
to the peasants, satisfying their land hunger and simul-
taneously eliminating the landed nobility in one blow. 
Although the peasantry often enough during the Civil War 
tried to avoid choosing sides, or clashed with the Reds 
(86), ultimately it defended the Bolsheviks against the 
Whites and foreign interventions, because it thus defended 
itself against the return of the landlords trailing behind 
the White armies. 
Ending the war, with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, also 
gained Lenin some support from the masses, peasant disgust 
with the war being one of the major reasons for the disin-
tegration of the Czarist regime in the first place. However, 
this treaty, which belied pre-Revolution Bolshevik rhetoric 
and was very disadvantageous to the Soviet Union, also 
evoked strong opposition from, inter alia, the social 
revolutionaries and even from within the Bolshevik faction 
itself. Far from representing national pride against foreign 
aggression, the Bolsheviks were even accused of capitulating 
and working for the Germans. But Brest-Litovsk gave Lenin a 
period of respite in which to consolidate power and extend 
it to those parts of the former empire not under German 
control. This the Bolsheviks needed, for in the spring of 
1918 armed resistance - foreign interventions, forces of 
the ancien regime (the Whites), but also the social revolu-
tionaries and minority peoples - sprang up. 
The Bolsheviks had little contact with the vast major-
ity of the population, the peasants, before the revolution, 
let alone any experience as a party with administering 
government. Their experience was with conspirational under-
ground organization, their political mobilizing activities 
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limited mainly to the tiny (but growing) urban proletariat 
and that again mainly in Petrograd and Moscow. At the time 
of take-over they were a relatively small group that assumed 
power before effectively penetrating the country administra-
tively and before eliminating anti-communist authorities and 
organizations. They had very limited normative and material 
incentives, were faced with all sorts of opposition and 
hardly in control even in the centre. 
Under these circumstances and given the Bolsheviks' 
(especially, given his decisive role, Lenin's) evaluation 
of these conditions, ideology and objectives, the resort to 
terror was obvious (albeit not inevitable). Terror is in 
fact a sign of weakness of a regime. The head of the Cheka, 
Dzerzhinski, for instance, is quoted as saying that "the 
proletariat takes up this weapon only when it cannot do 
without it" (87). The Red Terror was unleashed. Among its 
victims were countless non-Bolshevik revolutionaries. 
Non-Bolshevik organizations and periodicals were dissolved, 
cultural institutions purged (88). 
The key question in devastated Russia was the produc-
tion of food, especially grain. War Communism consisted 
primarily of requisitioning all food surpluses from the 
peasants. The requisitioners, through intimidation, shoot-
ing and imprisonment, decided what was surplus. The lack of 
organizational development especially in the rural areas, 
and the urban orientation of the party's organization only 
tended to increase situational terror. Industrial production 
was organized on a basis of forced labour conscription and 
discipline, whereas bourgeois intellectuals, experts and 
specialists had to be gradually won over by persuasion and 
material privileges, not ignored or terrorized (89). Trade 
unions became organs of production of the Soviet state, 
identifying themselves with it, or - as Trotsky (90) 
wrote - : 
"They have the right to demand from all their 
members the self denial, discipline and zeal that 
till now had only been required in the Army", 
The state determined where labour was to be put in (91). 
The Red Army, in spite of strenuous efforts to increase the 
number of proletarian soldiers, consisted overwhelmingly 
of, mostly conscripted, peasants. During the Civil War 
millions of them deserted, sick of war, sick of the Bol-
sheviks' forced requisitioning and terror against the 
peasantry. Terror was needed to keep the Red Army in tact. 
The Civil War was won, but War Communism was an econo-
mic failure and a demographic disaster (92). It evoked 
increasing resentment from the peasants and even from the 
proletariat. The latter's discontent culminated in the 
Kronstadt Uprising of March 1921. The rebels were in favour 
of the soviets, not of one-party rule (93). The uprising 
was bloodily suppressed by Trotsky, but all these Thermi-
dorean pressures more or less forced the Bolsheviks to 
back down. The introduction of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) was also, however, an indication of Lenin's realism. 
Implicit in the shift away from terror decreed by the 
Bolshevik leadership towards the end of the Civil War was 
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the realization that if applied 'excessively' it could 
prove counter-productive, costing the regime too much 
popular support. This shift would also seem to indicate 
that the Bolsheviks at this time still set store to some 
measure of humanitarian values, were still to some extent 
sensitive to the wishes of the masses. This is confirmed by 
the help they accepted from outside sources, including 
Hoover's American Relief Administration, as well as the 
energetic efforts of the Soviet authorities themselves, 
thanks to which the effects of the 1921 famine were con­
tained somewhat (94). There is quite a difference here 
with Stalinism (95). 
At the same time power was centralized more and more 
within the CC. Repression of non-Bolshevik socialists was 
intensified. Even supporters within the party of the "power 
to the soviets" line, the so-called workers opposition, 
even those in the CC itself (Kollontai, Shlyapnikov), were 
eliminated from party work. But they were not shot or even 
imprisoned, another important difference with Stalin's 
approach. "Centralization is a function of (perceived) 
threat", Lasswell and Lerner have stated (96). To counter 
perceived threats Stalin continued the centralization of 
power, finding opponents more and more within the party. 
Under the NEP there was rapid economic recovery, but 
at the same time a dangerous imbalance developed in the 
terms of exchange between city and country. Whilst the 
prices for manufactured consumer goods had risen sharply, 
those for agriculture products were low (the "Scissors 
Crisis"). So the peasants were unwilling to supply grain 
and other foodstuffs to the government and the cities, and 
fell back on subsistence farming and local exchange. It 
became clear that the independent peasantry could only be 
induced to part with its surplus at a price which the regime 
considered unacceptable, not only in monetary terms but 
especially in terms of industrial output (consumer goods) 
for the peasantry. This would severely hinder the accumula­
tion of capital needed to finance accelerated industrializa­
tion. Continuation of the NEP also left the government with 
very uncertain control over the supply of grain. The pea­
sants could and did withhold grain, for instance hoping for 
a rise in the governmental purchase price (97). 
As the Bolsheviks had repudiated the Czarist foreign 
debts, foreign capital credits were not forthcoming. The 
terms of trade would have to be turned against the peasan­
try, to achieve what Preobrazhensky called "primitive 
socialist accumulation" (9Θ). Forced collectivization (the 
beginning of the Soviet Union's mobilization stage) en­
countered strong resistance. The majority of peasants were 
middle peasants (thanks to the 1917 land redistribution). 
The transformation was very radical, with no intermediate 
phase between peasant smallholdings and collectivization. 
Also, the Civil War period had increased the social cohesion 
of the peasant class as a whole, as Shanin notes (99). So 
the "(d)isintegration of traditional ties and transformation 
of rural organization were simultaneous processes" and this 
required greater stress on coercive power, Dallin and 
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Breslauer note (100). Peasant resistance was answered by 
ever greater use of terror by the state (101). This was 
also stimulated by Stalin's lack of faith in the redeemabi-
lity of human nature. He had a very narrow definition of 
those who could be trusted and made over to become "good 
communists". The Soviet orientation on the control of 
behaviour called for greater use of terror than the control 
of attitudes sought by Mao. 
The kolchoz and sovchoz system entailed the organiza-
tion and regimentation of labour. Peasants were denied the 
passports required for internal travel (issued in 1932). 
The peasantry was not proletarianized, but enserfed. Collec-
tivization gave the government control over the labour and 
produce of the peasants, enabled it to squeeze from them 
the necessary funds for industrialization (102). It also 
drove millions of peasants to the towns (103), there to 
supply the labour power necessary for the expanding in-
dustry. Collectivization was part of the first Five Year 
Plan (1928-1932), which gave top priority to rapid military 
industrialization so that the Soviet economy would be 
independent in all aspects dealing with military production 
as soon as possible. Real wages were held down and commodity 
circulation minimized by sharply restricting the quantity 
of available consumer goods (104). Rationing had to be 
introduced. The living standard dropped to a bare minimum. 
As is typical of a mobilization stage the language of 
war was used; "shock brigades" "fought" on the "coal and 
iron front" where "great victories" were achieved, which 
were broadcast through a constant stream of communiqués. 
Enormous and unrelenting pressure was applied for the 
accomplishment of tasks, especially the fulfillment of 
production quotas. The penalties for failure were severe. 
Where production remained too low the secret police sought, 
and found, "saboteurs" and scapegoats. A number of public 
trials for sabotage were held as warning. 
The size of the surplus product the authorities could 
extract from the population was now limited only by politi-
cal factors. The regime now only needed to take into account 
power considerations (instead of economic ones) in deciding 
what bare minimum standard of living would be tolerable. 
The hardship and suffering caused by collectivization 
and the first Five Year Plan led to disagreement within the 
party. A moderate anti-Stalin block had, by 1930, more or 
less developed (105). With the elimination of all non-party 
opposition the party remained the only medium for expressing 
political sentiment. Stalin's closed and indisputable world 
view could not suffer any contradiction. He "lived in the 
paranoid world of constant threat and wholesale conspiracy", 
as Riasanovski aptly puts it (106). The hitherto ruling 
party policy opposing bloodshed within the party was now 
thrown overboard completely. The purges of the Great Terror 
were primarily directed against party members, and aimed to 
destroy all suspected, potential and even any possibility 
of opposition. They were presented as a campaign against "a 
gigantic conspiracy to undermine the revolution and to 
restore capitalism in the Soviet Union" (107). As the purge 
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spread it came to effect virtually all party organizations, 
branches of government, cultural institutions, the military 
and even the politburo and the secret police itself, all 
party controlled institutions. Altogether Conquest, in his 
standard work on the Great Terror in which he carefully 
researches the casualty figures, concludes that about eight 
to nine million people were arrested during the Great Purge 
and about one million executed (108). 
People were not persecuted for what they had done or 
said, but for their assumed willingness to harm Soviet 
society. This willingness was deduced from the social 
category to which the accused belonged, his or her social 
background, nationality or membership of a specific group. 
This principle was based on a vulgar materialist interpreta-
tion of Marxism, which stated that a person's social being 
determines his consciousness and therefore his political 
loyalty. It yielded a conception of guilt by social origin. 
The true essence of man cannot be deduced from what he says 
or does - a person can have a ' false consciousness ' - but 
from the social category he or she belongs to. The dif-
ference between real and potential guilt became blurred and 
an all embracing category of real culprits arose. Under 
Stalin extraction of confessions to imaginary crimes (neces-
sary as a kind of legitimation and to implicate others) 
became a major industry. It was not so much the severity of 
the system that made it terroristic, but the fact that 
there was no such thing as law, that the government could 
put to death anyone it chose through the formula that he 
had "objectively served the interests of the bourgeoisie". 
("Bourgeoisie", off course, can be arbitrarily replaced by 
any other category or categories the ruling elite sees and 
has publicly projected as the enemy.) 
From the very birth of the communist party a system of 
keeping files on all party members had been initiated. Data 
was collected on every aspect, including the personal lives 
of party members. Lesser figures were arrested first, the 
net thus closing round their superiors. But the arrest of 
an important figure was also followed by the seizure of his 
entourage which then led to the imprisonment of his friends 
and acquaintances. An endless chain of involvements and 
associations threatened to encompass entire strata of Soviet 
society. Fear of arrest, exhortations to vigilance, and 
perverted ambition unleashed new floods of denunciations. 
Whole categories were singled out for arrest because of 
their Objective' characteristics; old Bolsheviks, Red 
Partisans, citizens who had been abroad and so on. The 
eliminated cadres were replaced by new ones, created by 
Stalin, educated by the purge, with loyalty to Stalin being 
the only criterion. Even the old party-line Stalinists were 
purged. And, ominously, where previously the party secretary 
had been the most powerful person in an area this was now 
the NKVD (secret police) chief. 
The labour camps were a special facet of the terror 
regime. Although already started under Lenin (109) it was 
in the 1930's that they grew spectacularly (110). Forced 
labour at the disposal of GULAG (the labour camp administra-
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tion) was a normal component of the Soviet economy. Mining, 
lumbering, construction (especially railroads, canals and 
roads) and agriculture were the main sectors, as well as 
leasing of labour to government institutions such as fac­
tories (111). Generally forced labour was not a very econo­
mic device. Total camp costs, including guards, were high, 
the workforce and organization inefficient. But then the 
mass arrests were primarily political. Once arrested the 
extortion of physical labour at least ensured some contribu­
tion to the economy, whilst non-working prisoners only cost 
the state. And in some areas, hardship areas such as the 
mines of northern Siberia, where free labour would have 
been inordinately expensive, forced labour was certainly 
cheaper. 
Arbitrariness and unpredictability, characteristics of 
a terror system, were carried through so far that even 
people who had done their stint in prison or labour camp 
and survived remained uncertain of their fate. Many were 
rearrested and as yet executed or returned. Often when 
inmates had served their sentences they were kept anyway. 
Arrest, interrogation, torture, release, rearrest, transfer, 
release, again and again, was part of the terror process 
(112). 
Recourse to terror was prompted by hostility to the 
regime by large sectors of the population. Given the pea­
sants' attitude to requisitioning and collectivization the 
regime lacked normative incentives to ensure compliancy. 
The mobilization of material assets was aimed at rapid 
industrialization, not at satisfying material demands and 
thus providing material incentives to the population to 
bring about the economic transformation envisaged by the 
regime. This further shrunk the regime's reserves of norma­
tive resources. 
But recourse to terror was also prompted by real and 
alleged hostility from the capitalist countries (siege 
mentality). Also, although the vastness of the country 
brought with it specific problems to establishing control, 
it was, on the whole, thinly populated, thus lessening the 
chances of a successful uprising against the government's 
hardhandedness. 
The use of terror was facilitated by the fact that 
for many Bolsheviks their Civil War experience, with its 
revolutionary voluntarism, readiness to resort to coercion, 
rule by administrative fiat and summary justice, was forma­
tive, leaving a readiness for militant, authoritarian 
solutions. In a sense the Civil War was to them what the 
pre-liberation revolutionary wars were to the Chinese, 
Vietnamese and Cambodian communists, also in terms of 
mobilization and organization of the countryside. 
Furthermore, the party's policy commitments were shaped 
by an ideology that saw the peasantry as backward and 
unreliable, that emphasized speedy urban-based industriali­
zation, which limited its consciousness for developing 
alternatives in regard to the peasantry. It was facilitated 
by the concept of proletarian dictatorship that legitimized 
the use of violence by the vanguard party and eventually 
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the party leader, embodying "true proletarian conscious-
ness", in order to defend the revolution and bring the 
masses to realize their "true socialist consciousness". 
Another aspect of Leninist ideology played a role; 
service to and faith in the party, putting the party's good 
(and therefore per definition that of the Soviet state) 
above all else, including one's own life. Party discipline, 
party-style thinking, combined with horrendous interrogation 
methods, made many give in, believing their elimination to 
be demanded by, even necessary for, the success of the 
revolution. Stalin was identified with the revolution. To 
strike at Stalin was to strike at the Soviet system. From 
the moment they had joined the vanguard party they had 
sacrificed some smaller or larger part of their capacity to 
independent critical thought voluntarily (if not conscious-
ly) . As power was centralized and critical exchange, even 
within the party, was muted, more and more of this faculty 
did they sacrifice. The party (that is, Stalin) knew best. 
Their surrender and self-abasement during the purge was 
merely the last in a long line of submissions to the party 
(113). 
Stalin's attempt to gain complete control included the 
neutralization or elimination of value systems at variance 
with the ruling ideology, as well as the holders thereof. 
Many bearers of knowledge and culture; scientists, artists, 
scholars, writers, were eliminated (114). To prevent reli-
gions and minorities' cultures from forming counterpoints 
around which opposition could develop, they were neutra-
lized. Even in the take-over stage centralization and expan-
sion of communist control soon infringed on the little 
autonomy that had been granted the minorities following the 
October revolution. Under Stalin things only got worse. 
Clerics, monks, mullahs and Buddhist leaders were executed 
or exiled, church and temple property confiscated, places 
of worship closed or destroyed. Large numbers of minority 
peoples were deported (115). 
Before the deportations many a minority village had 
already been wiped out in pogroms. The deportations them-
selves, mostly to Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Siberia, also 
cost large numbers of peoples their lives. Not only were 
the minorities uprooted and dispersed among cultural stran-
gers, there was also a large scale movement of Russian and 
Ukrainian settlers to the areas vacated by the deported 
minorities, as well as to other areas occupied by non 
Russians. These latter peoples thereby became (or are 
becoming) minorities in their own homelands. Intermingling 
was stimulated. The whole policy was in fact aimed at the 
Russification of the Soviet Union. 
Clearly the purpose of the deportation and scattering 
of minority peoples over alien country, with a minimum of 
economic resources, deprived of civil rights, cultural 
opportunities and education in their own tongue, was to 
annihilate them as national entities, not to annihilate 
them physically (genocide), although many were, in the 
process. This ethnocide was thus part of a campaign for 
national unification. 
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Stalin's attempts to gain complete control were not 
limited to terror. He also tried to establish hegemony. 
That would provide the normative resource that would enable 
the regime to lessen its reliance on terror to achieve its 
goals. Culture and knowledge were standardized and homoge-
nized. Socialist Realism determined art. History was rewrit-
ten in accordance with the prevailing party line. Science 
was corrupted in accordance with some degenerate interpreta-
tion of Marxism that happened to suit Stalin (116). The 
cult of the personality placed Stalin above critique, above 
ordinary human standards. Under Stalin the Soviet state was 
"flawless", the party "infallible", the people's love for 
the government "boundless". Contrary to Lenin and other 
Bolshevik leaders, who were more prone to call things by 
their name and openly advocated the use of terror, denying 
the possibility of democracy (117), Stalin submerged the 
whole spiritual life of the people in a "universal flood of 
mendacity", Kolakowski remarks (118). 
Children were encouraged to spy on their parents, 
wives on their husbands, neighbours on neighbours. One was 
never certain whom to trust. One had to continually express 
love for Comrade Stalin. One had to be on guard at all 
times to give correct answers and not be caught out by 
tricky questions. Political meetings were held all the 
time, during work breaks, after work, in spare time. Outside 
of work time there were also the mass rallies, and social 
and agitational work to do. Although the effect of this 
onslaught on private life in the Soviet Union seems rather 
to have been a strengthening of family ties, it was basi-
cally aimed at disrupting the last real bastion of possible 
competition to love for Comrade (father) Stalin. 
Stalin did succeed in realizing what de Swaan concludes 
is the idea of a system of terror, namely 
"to impose so much fear in people that of their 
own account they will abstain from things that 
otherwise would be hard for the regime to detect 
or prevent. Not even a police state can always 
keep under surveillance all people in all their 
doings. (People must) ask themselves with every 
action whether their deeds do not create risks 
for themselves and for the people around them, 
that they will not just abstain from what is 
forbidden, but will avoid whatever has not ex-
pressly been allowed. They really must continuous-
ly try to imagine what the rulers would want them 
to do, they must become vicarious rulers for 
themselves" (119). 
But that was hardly "winning the hearts and minds" of the 
Soviet Union's citizens. Stalin primarily ensured compliance 
through the control of behaviour, through fear, not through 
any positive identification of the citizen with the ideology 
and goals of the system. 
Having discussed the issues relevant to understanding 
why revolutionary elites may turn to the use of terror to 
achieve and consolidate political domination, and having 
discussed the issue of terror as wel as illustrating this 
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issue by reference to the example of the Soviet Union, I 
will now, in the next chapter, compare the case of Democra-
tic Kampuchea with what actually happened in China and 
Vietnam in relationship to the use of terror. 
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CHINA, VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA 
In order to ground the specific case of Democratic Kampuchea 
in a larger framework, to place into some perspective the 
causes and intensity of the KR' use of terror, I will 
compare it with the cases of China and Vietnam. In all 
three predominantly peasant, Asian societies peasant revolu-
tions brought communist parties to power after the Second 
World War, in protracted struggles against colonial or 
foreign supported regimes. Both China and Vietnam have 
historically and ideologically had major impacts on Cam-
bodia. Despite similarities in ideology and the problems 
faced the three revolutionary elites did not always seek 
the same solutions. Specifically they differed in their use 
of violence and terror as a means for achieving their ends. 
The reasons for this lie in the specific convergence of and 
interrelationship between a whole number of factors (dis-
cussed in chapters 9 & 10), which I will now examine in 
relationship to China, Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea. 
11.1 China 
When the CCP, with its preponderant membership of illiterate 
peasants, came to power it perhaps hardly had the apparatus 
or the experience needed to run large modern cities like 
Shanghai and Beijing, let alone the whole nation, but it 
consisted of a disciplined and loyal body of people. It had 
organization, experience and, most important, it was used 
to building slowly from the bottom up over long periods of 
time in close relationship with the people. It emphasized 
political over military struggle. During the Civil War 
period, before victory, the communists were already ad-
ministering large areas, including towns. The party had the 
support of the great majority of the population, the pea-
sants. Its patriotic credentials (won in the anti-Japanese 
war) and its united front policies had also attracted other 
groups. Establishing a viable and more acceptable social, 
economic and administrative alternative to the sitting 
regime generally won it the acquiescence and often the 
support of the masses. For many this choice had been facili-
tated by the wide scale violence and terror of the Japanese 
and the KMT against them. Many of the CCP's most ardent 
opponents had fled. The more than one million individuals 
who left the cities for Taiwan constituted an important 
segment of China's small middle class and therefore the 
loss of badly needed administrative and professional talent, 
but it also meant an important reduction of potential 
opposition. Most cities were taken peacefully, thus sparing 
industrial plants and infrastructure in a country that had 
been ravaged by many years of turmoil. 
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Internationally China, although faced with a KMT 
blockade at sea and a hostile USA (hostility that within a 
year was to suck China into the Korean War), had the power-
ful military cover of the Soviet Union. It was not as much 
exposed to international threat as the Soviet Union had 
been. It was also able to profit from massive Soviet assis-
tance in economic development. 
The Chinese communists' experience was with guerilla 
warfare, the careful strategy of striking only when victory 
is certain. Their approach was more one of reconciliation 
and relatively gradual change. Rapid industrialization was 
not stressed as much as in the Soviet Union. Partly as a 
result of Soviet protection and assistance however, initial 
developments were urban-centred. This favoured those groups 
that were last to come under communist rule. Together with 
the retaining of most old-regime officials, capitalists and 
intellectuals in positions of authority, this did much to 
reduce possible opposition from these urban-centred groups. 
Most individuals from these groups only had to undergo six 
month re-education courses at special indoctrination centres 
("revolutionary colleges"). Many industrial and commercial 
enterprises did not become joint state-private ownership 
till 1956. And up to 1966 at least national capitalists 
earned 'fixed interest' from nationalized enterprises. In 
fact, one of the five stars in the national emblem represen-
ted the national bourgeoisie. 
But to consolidate power after take-over the Chinese 
communists did also resort to terror. It was used to elimi-
nate what was left of any political opposition such as KMT 
remnants, and other local oppositional authorities like 
bandits. Some were killed in action or executed. But most 
organized opposition had been neutralized previous to actual 
take-over. 
Where Stalin was satisfied with achieving societal 
atomization, the disruption of traditional patterns and the 
insulation from incongruent values, Mao stressed a 
"change in the underlying attitudes to be brought 
about by internalization of the desired value 
structure, (...) a far more ambitious, difficult, 
and distant aim", (1). 
The reintegration of the individual into the new value 
structure was to be achieved mainly through thought reform. 
It was this thought reform and related devices of psycholo-
gical control, which I will roughly and perhaps not quite 
accurately lump together as thought reform, that, on the 
whole, replaced terror. Based on Mao's belief in the remoul-
dability of human nature, it basically entails face to face 
social and psychological pressure exerted in small groups, 
a collective and mutually supportive effort by the group 
members to transform themselves. On the whole these groups 
coincide with the most elementary political institutions 
that Chinese communist society is divided into and to one 
or more of which every individual belongs; resident groups, 
work teams and such. These groups, besides ensuring mass 
participation and mutual solidarity, also have the function 
of social control. Thought reform not only aimed at the 
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creation of new socialist people, it also had practical 
aims; training of new personnel, undermining and conversion 
of opposition and, in the service of these, the establish-
ment of close control over individual behaviour and thought. 
The whole approach, the intricacies of which I will 
not concern myself with here, makes it difficult to maintain 
a dissenting opinion, especially in the Chinese cultural 
context which has always stressed group harmony at the 
expense of individualistic achievement (2). Although mainly 
developed by the Chinese communists, thought reform has its 
roots in Chinese tradition with its emphasis on personal 
relations. Thought reform attacks traditional Chinese 
cultural forms, especially filial loyalty, and in its lack 
of consideration for "face", but it is also consistent with 
Confucian tradition that man can and should be re-educated, 
that man should follow the correct ideological path as a 
guide to human conduct. It is an expression of totalita-
rianism, no doubt, but also the product of an ideological 
movement. It is not only a form of coercive persuasion, it 
also contains psychological satisfaction for the individual, 
as Lifton explains (3). 
Unlike under Stalin 'confession' was for the Chinese 
communists the starting point in a long process of changing 
consciousness. In the process of thought reform, particu-
larly that in which individuals belonging to the elites had 
to participate in the first years after the conununist take-
over, writing of autobiographies was also a central activity 
(4). One had to lay oneself bare, to state verbally and in 
writing one's political, social and personal attitudes, 
past and present, particularly noting one's "errors" and 
"reactionary tendencies". One's entire personal background 
was then analyzed and criticized. Personal traits were at-
tributed to class origin. Lapses, mistakes or holding unor-
thodox views did not lead to execution as under Stalin. 
Punishment consisted of group criticism. The 'culprit' was 
expected to follow this up with a genuine and whole hearted 
analysis of his or her mistakes (self-criticism). In this 
way conformity was enforced and opponents combatted without 
bloodshed and a new Chinese communist culture was superim-
posed. The rare "student" who was truly recalcitrant faced 
public denunciation at a mass "struggle" meeting before 
hundreds or even thousands of people (5). This also served 
as a warning to others - the demonstration effect. The whole 
process is like a cleansing ritual. Once this has happened 
the individual is reintegrated into the new communist 
society. 
The actual process (the mobilization of the entire 
environment so that it will psychologically nourish the 
"student" only when he is meeting its demands and consis-
tently undermine him when he fails to do so) is not dis-
similar to that which the KR used at re-education centres, 
except that in China participants returned to society, 
after a six month course, to high positions. In Democratic 
Kampuchea they went to work as peasant-serfs, and many died 
of hunger or disease, or were killed. Psychological pressure 
varied, however, both in intensity over time and from group 
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to group. Rectification campaigns aimed at cadres or intel-
lectuals hardly affected the peasantry, for instance, unless 
in the form of a sometimes concomitant rustication campaign. 
High points in psychological remoulding seem to have coin-
cided with the most intensive mass mobilization campaigns, 
the GLF being the clearest example. For Mao normative power 
played a far greater role in the system of sanctions than 
for Stalin. 
Mao's definition of 'out-group', those who formed too 
much of a bad risk, was narrow. Because, according to 
Maoism, even class enemies are not beyond a change in con-
sciousness, thought reform became an alternative to terror 
- "reform rather than purge", as Lifton says (6). It gave 
the party leaders a way of undermining or converting opposi-
tion (real, imagined or potential) without bloodshed. Most 
campaigns, like the Three Anti and Five Anti Campaigns 
(1951-1952), aimed at corruption and other economic offen-
ses, and the Su Fan Campaign (1955), aimed at bureaucratism 
and "hidden counter revolutionaries", held to the principles 
of thought reform. Most offenders were let off after 'volun-
tary' confessions and self-criticism, some demoted or dis-
missed. There were few if any executions during most cam-
paigns (7). We know that torture and beating of prisoners 
did occur, at least in the early years, because communist 
leaders took prison officials to task for these transgres-
sions (8). 
Another important difference with the Soviet Union is 
the party's relationship with the peasantry. The majority 
of party and army members were peasants. The communist 
elite was far more at home with the problems of the country-
side than their Soviet counterparts. The Chinese revolution 
was rooted in tradition, making the changes it brought more 
comprehensible and acceptable. 
The party did use terror against landlords, selecti-
vely, not so much to break their power as to demonstrate 
their frailty to the tradition bound peasantry. The disrup-
tion of traditional social patterns had made it easier for 
the communists to mobilize the peasants. But traditional 
authority, obeisance to the landlords, was deeply ingrained. 
Land redistribution could in many cases have been carried 
out without violence. But the poor and middle peasants were 
called upon to unite in class warfare against the landlords 
in order to discredit them thoroughly as well as eliminating 
them economically. Although only a small percentage were 
actually killed it did create a power vacuum. At the same 
time the PLA conducted an anti-local bully campaign in 
which local gangs and secret societies were terrorized into 
"submission and dissolution (...) using selective public 
trials and executions for demonstration effect" (9). The 
resulting rural power vacuum greatly facilitated the party's 
administrative penetration of the countryside. The demon-
stration effect of the terror against landlords emboldened 
the tradition bound peasants to rise up against their former 
masters. Because the peasantry was directly and emotionally 
involved and given a share of the responsibility, it was 
easier for them to accept the change positively, as well as 
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the regime that made it possible. After all, they received 
land, a material resource to satisfy followers in the sense 
used by Dallin and Breslauer. 
Now weak classes give vanguard parties more indepen-
dence, as Walzer noted (see chapter 9.4), and the peasantry 
is generally considered a weak class. But dense population 
and decades of political mobilization and struggle as well 
as a tradition of rural based intellectuals and rural 
rebellions made the Chinese peasants relatively more of a 
factor to be reckoned with. I have already noted various 
instances of peasant Thermidorean pressure. During the 
Civil War (1945-1949) land reform and the "settling of 
accounts" had become harsher. In scattered areas and instan-
ces there was a growing tension between party cadres and 
poor peasants who went much further, attacking not only 
landlords, but also rich and even middle peasants. The 
peasants had suffered so much for so long that when the 
communists initiated the rural revolution it unleashed a 
pent up fury that often led to retribution that went beyond 
the party's guidelines, threatening the coalition on which 
the party's rural strategy was based (10). But the pre-1949 
land reform violence is difficult to separate from that of 
the Civil War (the communist's expansion of control) and the 
aftermath of the anti-Japanese war. Many landlords and 
their coteries had collabourated with the Japanese and 
co-operated with the KMT (11). After 1949, too, there was 
some situational terror (12). 
Mao denounced these "errors" of poor peasant radica-
lism. According to him expropriations went too far, commerce 
and industry owned by landlords and rich peasants should 
not be encroached upon, indiscriminate use of violence 
against rich peasants and landlord families should be 
stopped. The party encountered resistance and hostility 
from the poor peasants who had profited, when it subse-
quently attempted to make restitution to those whose pro-
perty had been redistributed. 
After the initial turmoil of land redistribution during 
the take-over stage, collectivization proceeded at a rela-
tively slow pace. The majority of peasants, not having 
enough land for subsistence or enough time to develop strong 
proprietary relationships to the land they had received, 
acquiesced or even enthusiastically approved the forming of 
mutual aid teams and (lower) agricultural producers co-op-
eratives. 
Initially the CCP, after victory, turned to a Soviet 
model of urban based industrialization and centralization. 
The favouring of industrial workers, the growth of tech-
nological and intellectual elites, of bureaucracies and 
red tape, led to a growing gulf between city and country-
side, and a shift away from the more egalitarian Yan'an 
style of plain living and hard work. Soviet aid was of 
great importance. But self-reliance remained a guiding 
principle. The Chinese did have to (and want to) pay for it 
all. This had to come from agriculture. Agricultural output 
had to be increased. Because little capital could be diver-
ted to agriculture in the near future, greater agricultural 
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output, necessary to pay for industrial development and to 
feed the growing number of workers in the cities, would 
have to be achieved through the organization of manual 
labour. To this end full scale collectivization was needed. 
The diminished surplus for industrial investment as the 
result of the bad 1954 harvest, but also the growing dif­
ferentiation in the countryside, the increasing influence 
of rich peasants at village level and the fact that many 
co-operatives did not function or had been disbanded, 
stimulated the decision to speed up collectivization. 
Mao called for a "high tide of socialization in the 
countryside", and insisted that it coincided with a full 
nationalization of urban and industrial business. By the 
middle of 1957 practically all peasant households were in 
higher agricultural producers co-operatives modelled on the 
Soviet kolkhoz. There was resistance, especially from middle 
and richer peasants but as a whole the peasants were not 
alienated as in the Soviet Union. 
But problems were piling up. The year 1956 showed 
another bad harvest as a result of natural disaster. Agri­
culture was stagnant. With such a dense population it was 
difficult to produce the surplus necessary for capital 
accumulation. The economy was in bad shape, the Soviet 
model was failing (13). Soviet assistance was decreasing. 
The Soviets were unable or unwilling to supply the assis­
tance needed for the Second Five Year Plan. The "Hundred 
Flowers" Campaign convinced Mao that it was dangerous to 
base the country's economic future on intellectuals, on the 
experts who had shown themselves to lack "redness". Without 
intellectuals it was very much the question if the cumber­
some superstructure of the Soviet model could be maintained. 
Also the increasing manifestation of bureaucratism, career-
ism, the lust for personal profit and the lack of consulta­
tion with the masses were a thorn in the flesh of the 
Maoists. Advanced education and good connections had become 
the means to get ahead. Education oriented youth to science 
and technology but not to self-sacrifice and the ideals of 
the revolution. The longer one attended school the less 
reliable one be с enne, ideologically speaking, or so the 
Maoists started to feel. 
So Mao once again turned to the peasantry. The GLF, 
China's mobilization stage, an attempt to achieve a major 
economic breakthrough through the massive mobilization of 
the masses was launched. It was accompanied by a revival of 
class struggle in the countryside, attacks on ex-landlord 
and capitalist elements, and massive propaganda. A united, 
politically conscious population would overcome all obstac­
les in whatever sphere, the Maoists held. The GLF was not a 
rejection of the objectives of the early 1950's, to build 
China into a modern industrialized state, but a shift in 
how this was to be done from a Soviet to a Maoist model. 
Agriculture and industry would be developed together (the 
industrialization of the countryside, the famous backyard 
furnaces), relying on labour power instead of machine-
centred industrial processes. By merging collectives large 
scale communes were formed. Political and economic control 
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came in the hands of the party secretary at commune level, 
often ex-peasants. This decentralization was a departure 
from Leninist centralized control. The communes provided an 
administrative framework large enough to allow for the 
rational management of rural industries. They were designed 
to become self-sufficient and to organize all peasant 
activities, the basic unit for China's leap to communism, 
which was imminent, as propaganda would have it. The lan-
guage accompanying the GLF was Utopian and martial. Millions 
of city people were sent to the countryside to work and to 
be remoulded through contact with the peasants. A very 
large irrigation and waterworks program was carried out by 
specially formed waterworks brigades. These resembled 
military units and were moved around according to construc-
tion needs. These brigades were the forerunner of a more or 
less permanent mobilization of labour that could be ration-
ally allocated and employed. (It will be clear from the 
above that in many respects the GLF was a source of inspira-
tion and model for the KR). 
It was this attempt to transform the organization of 
work using moral incentives, with its concomitant complete 
collectivization of life (confiscation of private plots, 
introduction of communal dining halls and so on) that was 
really disruptive, more so than the mere collectivization 
of land. Labour discipline and moral sagged. Incompetence 
led to the collapse of waterworks. Peasant avoidance protest 
and resistance increased. Withdrawal of Soviet technical 
personnel and natural disasters made matters worse. There 
was a very large drop in agricultural output and famine hit 
many parts of the country. As overzealous cadres falsified 
the figures for the grain yields, the leaders only belatedly 
became aware of the magnitude of the catastrophe (14). 
Whereas Stalin increased the terror to forcefully push 
through the transformation, the GLF was repealed, in I960, 
and replaced by a sort of NEP to remedy the effects. Private 
plots and agricultural implements were returned, discipline 
relaxed, the free market expanded, more emphasis placed on 
material incentives and expertise. 
Communization, the GLF, was carried out 
"through coercive mobilization combined with 
'socialist education' and the promise of economic 
abundance to come. Compliance was thus based on a 
combination of coercive, normative, and 'deferred' 
material power", 
as Dallin and Breslauer note (15). Although the GLF was 
even more extreme than Stalin's collectivization there was 
relatively far less reliance on coercive power. For one, 
the disintegration of traditional rural ties had been 
achieved earlier, and in a way that had provided the regime 
with legitimacy its Soviet counterpart lacked. The Chinese 
communists, with their extensive administrative network in 
the countryside, had a higher level of rural organization. 
The terror that was used was mostly situational. Most likely 
this was the result of the speed and scope of the transfor-
mation placing too great a strain on the organizational 
qualities and discipline of many cadres and the reigning 
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fear that the party would not tolerate failure. 
Still, the millions of deaths were mainly the result 
of the famine. Shalom notes that "no one alleges (...) that 
the GLF was accompanied by any significant number of execu-
tions". In fact "(e) very observer of the Chinese scene 
(...) agrees that the years 1955-1965 saw relatively few 
executions" (16). Between 1960 and 1962 China underwent a 
crisis of food shortage, of declining morale, and of politi-
cal dissent which, according to Schurmann and Schell, "would 
have destroyed most other nations" (17). At the same time 
it also had to cope with the total withdrawal of Soviet 
assistance and a crisis in relations with the Soviet Union, 
as well as a nationalist revolt in Tibet and minority 
troubles in Xinjiang, both strategically very sensitive 
regions. And yet, as Schurmann and Schell add, unity "not 
only survived, but Beijing hardly resorted to coercion to 
maintain its authority" (18). 
In line with this, and again contrary to Stalin, Mao 
did not eliminate rival or potentially rival elites before 
embarking on the massive mobilization stage of the GLF. In 
general differences of opinion and political 'errors' within 
the party were dealt with less harshly than under Stalin. 
Offenders were admonished, criticized, demoted, expelled, 
even sentenced to labour reform, but rarely executed. Mao 
was reticent in this respect. "Heads don't grow back on, 
like leek does", he is reported to have said (19). In Mao's 
Politburo there was room for debate. The people surrounding 
him were no yes-men. Mao could be defeated or ignored. 
According to North, writing in 1952, Chinese communist 
leaders had been reprimanded and expelled from the party, 
"(b)ut to date there is no authenticated record 
of a prominent Chinese Communist leader executed 
by his own party, no matter how serious the 
doctrinal deviation. On the contrary, there has 
been a strong tendency (...) to reform the fallen 
leader and even to give him limited opportunities 
for reconstructing his career" (20). 
In fact some of Mao's most bitter rivals for party leader-
ship not only survived but regained positions of influence 
(21). According to Snow, writing in 1961, there had been no 
split in the top leadership of the party since 1937, with 
the exception of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi (22), who were 
accused of attempts to set up an independent state in 
Manchuria and dismissed from all posts in 1954. But the 
marginal impact of this purge right at the apex of the 
party stood testimony to the essential unity of the leader-
ship still reigning at that time. 
The debacle of the GLF and the natural disasters of 
the "three bitter years" (1959-1961) were bound to aggravate 
dissension within the party leadership. In the Soviet Union 
this was purged. In China development strategy was reas-
sessed and Mao fiercly criticized by many of his colleagues. 
The existence of opposition to Mao within the country's 
leadership may partly explain why the GLF was repealed. The 
failure of the GLF dealt a blow to Mao's authority within 
the party. The liberalization that followed once again led 
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to a growing differentiation in the countryside, the reas-
sertion of urban-centred economic and political bureaucra-
cies and technical and intellectual elites, and all those 
concomitant manifestations that had prompted Mao to embark 
on the GLF. 
When Mao's attempt to bring the country back onto what 
he considered the right track, the Socialist Education 
Movement, was not received enthusiastically at all levels, 
and consequently thwarted, he was convinced of deliberate 
sabotage. The CR was his answer, in a sense his version of 
Stalin's Great Purge to eliminate all rivals. But it was 
also very much about the development route the country 
should take, a second great mobilization stage in which the 
Utopian element in Maoism re-emerged "with apocalyptical 
fury", as Meisner put it (23). In some ways it formed a 
watershed. Not only were many of Mao's erstwhile colleagues 
denounced for mistakes during the years prior to the CR, 
but for actions spanning their entire careers. Their con-
tributions to the Chinese Revolution were denied. At the 
Ninth National Congress of the CCP in 1969 about 70% of 
those elected to the Eighth CC in 1956 were removed. 
The first few years of the CR probably came closest to 
resembling a system of terror in the way it affects the 
social structure as well as the individual. For instance, 
the victims interviewed by Thurton in Enemies of the People 
indicate that being beaten and kicked, having to walk around 
with signs around one's neck and being jeered at by the 
crowd was bad, but it was worse to have even their family 
and closest colleagues turn from them out of fear of also 
becoming a victim (24). A major difference, again, with the 
Stalin regime is that most victims of the CR lived to tell, 
or repress, their experiences. However, I propose to basi-
cally leave the CR out of my discussion. The diversity of 
opinion, the complexity and uniqueness of the case itself 
advise against an analysis in this context that can never 
be more than a very limited indication of the events, causes 
and issues concerned. It is, furthermore, not essential as 
comparative material for the case of Democratic Kampuchea 
(25). 
Like the Soviet Union, China also had labour camps. 
Here too, it was thought that prisoners' compulsory labour 
helps make penal institutions self-sufficient and contri-
butes to the economic development of the country. The 
Chinese labour camps, however, were far more efficient 
because, as Bao Ruo-wang said, they understood that "convict 
labour can never be productive or profitable if it is 
extracted only by coercion or torture". They were able to 
motivate prisoners, to achieve co-operation through thought 
reform (26). But here too, food - "the single greatest joy, 
chagrin and motivating force in the entire prison system", 
as Bao Ruo-wang says - was the greatest weapon existing to 
induce co-operation (27). Contrary to the Soviet Union, 
where labour camp inmates were seen and treated as expen-
dable, the Chinese believed that offenders could be reformed 
through work. Nearly all offenders, therefore, were com-
pelled to do productive work. This policy was also con-
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siderea more humane than enforced idleness. So conditions 
in labour camps were generally considerably less harsh than 
under Stalin (28). 
In Mao's view one does not eliminate opposition, but 
tries to reform it. Oppositionists or potential oppositio-
nists must and can undergo a change of attitude. But the 
aim is the same, an unitarian system, a new socialist man. 
This can be seen in the Chinese communists' policy towards 
minorities and religion, which was, as in the Soviet Union, 
to integrate them into a unified political and economic 
entity. They, too, feared the possible unifying and mobiliz-
ing foci minority culture and/or religion could have in 
opposition to official ideology. Ethnic Han attitude towards 
minorities was often characterized by arrogance and con-
tempt. But on the whole and in conformity with their ap-
proach in general the Chinese communists did attempt to 
achieve integration through relatively non-violent means. 
Where these groups did not resist communist dominance or 
pose a (perceived) threat to the regime, they were accorded 
some semblance of autonomy. 
There have, however, also been serious violations of 
human rights and in some areas a policy of Han colonializa-
tion. This has applied particularly to China's two most 
significant minority regions, the western frontier land of 
Xinjiang with its nomadic and part Islamic tribes, and 
Tibet (29). But whilst the integration of the minority 
peoples of Xinjiang with retention of their cultural diver-
sity seems to have, on the whole, progressed relatively 
peacefully, the communists have made very little headway in 
winning over the Tibetans (30). Ethnic Han arrogance and 
condescension vis-à-vis the minorities remain serious 
problems. 
Religion was initially tolerated, although many foreign 
missionaries were expelled. Through the various religious 
organizations it established, like the Chinese Islamic 
Association and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, 
the government was able to keep tabs. In 1959 it was pro-
claimed that religion had to be gradually weakened and 
eventually suppressed. Many monasteries and churches were 
closed or adapted for other use. Here again policy oscil-
lated with the general mood, usually much harsher during 
great mobilization stages like the GLF. It was during the 
GLF, for instance, that the most radical collectivization 
of private life was attempted. Not only was the forming of 
communes accompanied by the confiscation of private plots 
and agricultural implements but also by the establishment 
of communal kitchens and dining halls (to free women for 
"productive" work). 
One of Mao's major headaches was the intellectuals. 
Not only were many of them holders of divergent values, but 
they are per definition the enunciators of - possibly 
divergent - ideology, the disseminators of - possibly 
divergent - culture. They are also the ones with the know-
how needed for advanced economic development. It was not 
only necessary politically to remould them into trustworthy 
allies, thus neutralizing their (potential) opposition, but 
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also ideologically, to bridge the gap between mental and 
manual labour, and concomitantly between town and country-
side. Generally most campaigns were aimed particularly at 
cadres and intellectuals. The Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, 
a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend Campaign that Mao 
launched in 1956, was typical for Maoism's ambiguity regard-
ing this group, and criticism and freedom of expression 
generally. Influenced by the Hungarian Uprising and 
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February 1956, to 
prevent the development of a similar repressive political 
climate as under Stalin, Mao, the only party boss ever to 
do this so directly, invited criticism of the party's 
policies. Initially people were reluctant to speak out, 
wary of attack (by itself of course already a bad sign). It 
was not till May 1957 that articulate elements of society, 
including members of non-communist groups as well as party 
members, began to criticize party policies freely. But then 
within weeks every aspect of government was being denounced 
in both the local and national press. This was more than Mao 
and his colleagues had bargained for. Alarmed by the gap 
between party and intellectuals and fearing that a modern 
version of the old literati-officials was developing to 
rival the party's claim to power Mao launched the Anti-
Rightist Campaign. More criticism and reform of intellec-
tuals was needed. Notwithstanding the years of ideological 
remoulding they still retained beneath a thin socialist 
veneer their old bourgeois characteristics, according to 
Mao. They could still not be trusted. The party would have 
to rear its own intellectuals from the workers and peasants 
(31). The massive replacement of intellectuals and cadres 
to the rural areas, having them do manual labour, learn 
from the peasants, combining theory and practical (produc-
tive) work in education, the July 21 Universities to convert 
workers into "intellectualized proletarians" (32), and 
other such schemes and campaigns, Utopian in their belief 
in thus being able to create the new socialist man, were 
aimed at the elimination of intellectuals as a specific 
category. 
Stalin had only wanted to destroy the political auto-
nomy of intellectuals and cadres and exert control over 
them. Yet very few intellectuals in China underwent the 
fate of their Soviet counterparts. Here, too, thought 
reform, criticism and self-criticism, and such psychological 
devices, had given the party a much more effective (and 
cheaper) weapon of control than the conventional firing 
squad. 
In general the use of terror, as we have come to 
understand it, in China was limited both in scope and time 
and to varying specific groups (zones of terror). Generally 
not forced choice but moral incentives were used to mobilize 
the people, although the normative resources were not devoid 
of coercive elements. But whereas thought control and 
related devices were more effective than terror as a weapon 
of control, they did not succeed in creating a 'new socia-
list man' . 
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11.2 Vietnam 
In many respects the situation for the Vietnamese communists 
was similar to that of China at take-over. They had institu-
tionalized procedures and organizations for peasant par-
ticipation in order to gain power to challenge the existing 
state institutions. They had emphasized political over 
military struggle. They had organization, a nationalist 
image, widespread support, not only from the peasants but 
from other groups as well, but lacked the expertise to 
actually run a whole country. Here, too, the extreme oppres-
sion of the former regime facilitated this support. French 
colonialism, more than other colonial regimes, was "charac-
terized most of the time by total oppression" (33). Its 
foreigness, furthermore, fanned Vietnamese nationalism. 
Close to a million people fled North Vietnam in 1954, among 
them many members of the petty bourgeoisie, already a small 
group, and over 100.000 Vietnamese soldiers who had fought 
with the French. Most of these refugees were Roman Catholic. 
The French also dismantled all industry under their control 
and had it shipped out of the country. This was an important 
loss of administrative and technical know-how, but at the 
same time it facilitated revolutionary transformation. 
North Vietnam was even more protected internationally, 
having been formally recognized at an international con-
ference, and having the People's Republic of China at its 
back as well as Soviet and Chinese assistance. It did, 
however, like China, face a hostile USA, which was to drag 
it into a long and brutal war. 
The Vietnamese communists' experience was with protrac-
ted nationalist, more than class, struggle, patiently trying 
to unify as many sectors of the population as possible to 
achieve victory. Their relationship with the peasantry was 
similar to that of the Chinese communists, as we have seen. 
Their revolution was also rooted in tradition, less foreign 
and difficult to comprehend and accept for the masses, 
therefore. And population density, as well as organizational 
experience, tradition of rural based intellectuals and 
rebellion on the whole made the Vietnamese peasants more of 
a factor to be reckoned with. 
Nor was the North Vietnamese land reform of 1953-1956 
dissimilar to that of the Chinese. Landlordism was abolished 
and land placed in the hands of peasant smallholders, paving 
the way for a later transition to co-operative farming. It 
was also a political struggle for power in the countryside. 
Specially trained teams of cadres had been sent into the 
villages to mobilize the poor peasants and agricultural 
workers, who were supposed to carry out the land reform as 
mush as possible by themselves. This included taking over 
party and administrative committees at village level that 
were overwhelmingly controlled by middle and rich peasants. 
The party was afraid that without a very substantial in-
crease in poor peasant influence the road to the collec-
tivization of agriculture would be much more difficult. To 
carry out the land reform the status of every household had 
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to be established. Party policy was to have the poor pea-
sants work together with middle and rich peasants against 
the landlords. The VWP focussed on class issues, so most 
former collabourators with the French - mostly ordinary 
peasants in the colonial army - were forgiven and even 
allowed responsible positions at village level. 
But the policy of giving a major political role to 
poor peasants and agricultural workers was badly misapplied. 
According to Moise, in practice most land reform cadres 
lacked adequate training experience. Working against a 
tight schedule they often did not trust the poor peasants 
or have the patience to make decisions correctly. They told 
them what to do or did it for them. Cadres "tended to follow 
blindly patterns they thought they were expected to follow" 
(34). Some thought they were supposed to fill quotas of 
landlords and despots in each village. On the other hand 
poor peasants were promoted too rapidly, without adequate 
training, to positions they had no experience to handle. In 
theory the landlord was to be left with about as much land 
as his former tenants were getting, his home and most of 
his other goods. In practice he was left with less than 
other villagers, often deprived of his home and his life. 
People with landlord or rich peasant background, as well as 
those suspected of having sympathies for them, were expelled 
from the village branch of the VWP and other village orga-
nizations, and replaced by mobilized and selected poor pea-
sants and agricultural labourers. Theoretically those not 
having a correct attitude should have had some re-education 
and only a small percentage expelled. In practice they were 
dismissed and often imprisoned. Land reform cadres and the 
new cadres they had chosen from the poor peasants and agri-
cultural labourers decided who in the village was landlord 
or rich peasant, who in the party branch and village ad-
ministration was "bad element". It was seen as a great 
accomplishment to expose a landlord or reactionary who had 
not previously been known to be one. Land reform cadres 
were often suspicious and even paranoid, seeing sabotage 
and enemies everywhere. They conveyed these feelings to the 
new poor peasant cadres. 
As the land reform progressed it became more radical. 
The main point of the execution of landlords lay in its 
psychological (demonstration) effect. It was not necessary 
to have an execution in every village, because it was common 
for peasants from several surrounding villages to gather 
for an important trial. But most of the terror was situa-
tional. Not only were more landlords being executed, but 
also many peasants were being attacked who in practice 
were only slightly better off than their poor peasant 
neighbours. Even poor peasants who refused to treat such 
people as enemies were likely to be attacked, let alone 
anyone trying to defend a victim. Also thousands of ex-
perienced and loyal party cadres were accused of being 
connected with the old order and purged. Evidence was sought 
in a person's social class. Victims did not meet the strict 
criteria of class origin and therefore class loyalty set by 
the newly promoted zealous poor peasants and agricultural 
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labourers. Only later was this "classism" criticized (35). 
It took the party leaders till July 1956 to discover 
what was happening. The problems in the countryside first 
led to the formation of a new, more moderate majority in 
the Politburo, which started a campaign to undo some of the 
excesses lasting more than a year (36). Probably, according 
to Moise, over 30.000 peasant households had been incor-
rectly classified as landlord. Over 50% of those classified 
as such were given back part of their property (37). But 
there were sharp conflicts over some of this property. Wolf 
even mentions a revolt in Nghe An that was put down by force 
(38). Most people expelled from the party were readmitted. 
There was much animosity between old and new cadres, some 
former victims even assaulting the latter. Party unity was 
shaken. But the leadership, convinced of the need to keep 
the proportion of poor peasants in the party and village 
organization high - with a view to collectivization - had 
considerable success in reconciliation. The land reform 
errors were openly discussed in the North Vietnamese media. 
They were not covered up or blamed on a few scapegoats. A 
rectification campaign was started. It was made clear that 
those released from prison were not being granted clemency, 
but were set free because they had never been guilty in the 
first place. This resembles Stalinist practice even less 
than the Chinese experience. 
Concerning the number of victims there is, again, much 
doubt. The standard estimate for the number of executions 
during land reform is about 50.000 (39). Gareth Porter, 
however, has convincingly demonstrated this estimate to be 
unfounded (40). Moise supplements Porter's evidence and 
arrives at a total number of executions during land reform 
"almost certainly between 3.000 and 15.000" (41). 
Economically land reform was a success, substantially 
raising the living standards of the poorer peasants and 
agricultural labourers. Agricultural production rose rapid-
ly. After landreform peasant smallholdings were gradually 
merged,and, as in China, the stage of co-operatives was 
reached without any significant violence. The party could 
primarily rely on persuasion. Peasants were allowed in-
dividual plots and individual incentives. Co-operatives 
were gradually and cautiously combined into larger ones, 
quite unlike the GLF. There was also an increased speciali-
zation of the co-operatives, the regime critical of the 
idea of self-sufficient co-operatives on the grounds of 
economic inefficiency. 
The situation in the South in 1975 was more problematic 
(42). A swollen metropolis, a society heavily effected by 
'Coca-cola' consumerism and corruption, and the overwhelming 
majority of Saigon regime personnel still around, presented 
serious problems for the communists. They had disciplined 
and politicized peasant soldiers and they had continued to 
place politics over military struggle. For example. Race 
noted that after the NLF gained control in an area one 
could find five to ten times as many political workers in a 
village as when it was still under control of the Saigon 
regime (43). But they lacked experienced trained cadres for 
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this type of situation. A large percentage of NLF cadres 
had been eliminated as a result of operation Phoenix, part 
of an American pacification program started in 1968 aimed 
at assasinating civil functionaries and cadres of the NLF. 
The new rulers showed a marked unwillingness to enlist the 
help of the erstwhile supporters of the third way, the 
non-communist South Vietnamese opposition, in the post-1975 
reconstruction of the South, which exacerbated their lack-
of-cadres problem (44). True, part of the country (the 
North), having already operated as an independent socialist 
state since 1954, had plenty of governmental experience. In 
part because of separate developments since colonial times, 
however, southerners on the whole did not react enthusiasti-
cally to being ruled, administered or bossed by northerners. 
Internationally, unified Vietnam looked sound, with 
Laos and Cambodia as buffer states, China at its back, 
strong Soviet support and a lot of international goodwill 
stemming from the anti-war movement. But within a few years 
all that was left was a very isolated Vietnam forced more 
and more to depend on the Soviet Union, not something the 
independently minded Vietnamese communists relished. After 
years of destruction through war Vietnam was in urgent need 
of assistance for the arduous task of reconstruction. Yet 
the USA failed to keep its promise of reconstruction aid 
made at the Paris Peace Conference. On the contrary, it 
imposed a trade embargo against Vietnam and cajoled its 
allies to do likewise. Especially economically this isola-
tion was disastrous. 
Still, the withdrawal of USA assistance to the Saigon 
regime and the fleeing of many of the former regime's 
economic and political leaders made it somewhat easier for 
the communists to neutralize the remaining (potential) 
opposition. 
In the months after the fall of Saigon all old regime 
military and civilian officials were called to register 
themselves on a certain date according to their rank. They 
were then sent home and later called up for re-education. 
For the rank and file this usually meant no more than a day 
or so of instruction after which they were released and 
given a testimonial stating that they had been successfully 
re-educated. The leading military and civilian officials, 
the backbone of the Saigon regime, were held responsible as 
a group, and generally sentenced to three to five years of 
re-education. Depending on the progress an individual showed 
these terms could be shortened or prolonged. The latter 
seems to have been far the more common. Re-education through 
labour was not only reserved for ex-Saigon regime officials. 
It was also, as in China, used for dealing with other offen-
ses, both political and criminal (45). The re-education 
centres, labour camps, although far from being holiday 
centres, were, as far as living conditions and camp regime 
were concerned, hardly comparable to the GULAG under Stalin 
(46). 
With the end of war in 1975 Hanoi moved quickly to 
reunite the country. In the South political consolidation 
and neutralizing of (potential) opposition was intertwined 
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with social and economic transformation. Land was collec-
tivized and industry nationalized. A Soviet-style centrally 
planned economy was also set up for the South. Here almost 
all land formerly rented out had already been distributed 
by the Saigon government or by the NLF, or abandoned as a 
result of the war. The new government wanted especially to 
bring abandoned land back into cultivation and get the 
millions of former peasants out of the cities and refugee 
camps back to the countryside. Transportation was provided, 
as was land and some food. Many, also from the most devas-
tated areas in the North, were brought to the New Economic 
Zones, large, more or less virgin areas that the peasants 
had to bring into cultivation. These New Economic Zones 
also aimed at redistributing the Vietnamese population, 
traditionally concentrated in certain, mainly lowland 
coastal regions. Because many original villages had been 
almost completely destroyed and traditional social institu-
tions weakened it was thought that both the reallocation of 
people and a more rapid collectivization would be possible 
without too much resistance. This, and reunification in 
general, proved to be far more difficult. 
Especially the South Vietnamese urbanités were less 
than eager to accept the more rigorous, disciplined and 
austere socialist way of life. Peasant resistance to collec-
tivization in the South was greater than in the North, 
peasant society there having always been more atomized and 
individualistic. This forced the government to move more 
slowly than it would have liked. The same held for the New 
Economic Zones. Migration was not always voluntary and 
coercion was used, but the communists mainly relied on 
persuasion. And so the development of the New Economic 
Zones also lagged behind the party's plans. Bad planning, 
lack of trained and experienced cadres and a certain amount 
of arrogance and authoritarian behaviour towards the urban 
population of the South (partly caused by ignorance and 
fear) aggravated matters. 
The government was unable through administrative 
measures, emulation campaigns and unfavourable rural 
urban terms of trade embodied in official prices of com-
modities, to induce the peasants to grow and deliver enough 
surplus to feed the cities and pay for industrialization. 
The basic policy of no free market in rice to keep the 
price low failed. Peasants, unhappy about the low procure-
ment price of rice and the lack of availability of consumer 
goods, resisted official exhortations to increase production 
by transferring more energy and land to subsistence farming, 
by encroaching on co-operative land, failing to deliver 
grain and livestock to the state, by using rice to feed 
ducks or pigs, distilling it into alcohol and the like, 
activities that fetched higher prices. The black market 
prospered. These are typical examples of peasant everyday 
resistance. 
The situation worsened even more with the exodus of 
ethnic Chinese (Hoa's). In 1978 a currency reform, a block-
ade of private food transports and the nationalization of 
also the smaller private enterprises in the South hit the 
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Hoa ' s hardest. Together with a growing anti-Chinese mood as 
a result of increasing tension with the People's Republic 
of China this precipitated the exodus of many Hoa entrepre-
neurs, technicians and skilled workers, all of whom played 
an important role in the economy. In the North anti-Hoa 
Vietnamese propaganda and anti-Vietnamese Chinese propaganda 
that fanned the Hoa's fears, as well as growing anti-Chinese 
sentiments led about 140.000 Hoa's, many of whom were loyal 
party cadres and officials active in technical and manage-
rial positions, to flee. The Vietnamese government, afraid 
of a potential fifth column, had presented the Hoa's with 
an ultimatum; resettlement in New Economic Zones in the 
Central Highlands on rubber or coffee plantations, or leave 
(47). Shortfalls in state rations and the high price of 
rice on the black market caused hardships for state emplo-
yees and urban workers. War with Cambodia and China, inter-
na- tional isolation at its peak, bad harvests, industrial 
production never lower, the economy on the verge of col-
lapse; and yet, as in China after the disastrous GLF, the 
regime hardly resorted to terror to maintain its authority. 
On the contrary, it introduced a more liberal pricing and 
marketing system and reduced central government control. 
Nor did all these difficulties lead to the purging of any 
party leaders. The Vietnamese communist tradition of collec-
tive leadership and striving for consensus seems to have 
prevented internal party disagreement from leading to the 
purging of leading party members, let alone erupting into 
open inter party struggle on the scale of the CR. In the 
momentous years between the Third Congress (I960) and the 
Fourth (1976), for instance, the only changes in the com-
position of the Politburo were due to death from old age or 
in action. 
But rice production had to be increased much more if 
it was to keep up with the country's rapidly growing popula-
tion and help finance industrialization. Unemployment was 
rapidly growing. A groundswell of popular discontent forced 
the party, at its December 1986 Congress, to admit mistakes 
and introduce more wide ranging reforms. Cash incentives 
for peasants and workers were increased, local and manage-
rial initiatives stimulated, centralized planning reduced 
even further, discrimination against private capitalists 
ended, and measures taken to stimulate an easier flow of 
goods around the country. Since 1979 there have, on and 
off, been drives against incompetent bureaucrats and corrup-
tion within the government and party. All this has been 
accompanied by a more liberal cultural climate, more open 
debate and airing of opinion and criticism, even within 
party periodicals. Already since 1979 a more flexible 
attitude towards ex-Saigon officials and intellectuals had 
been adopted, partly because of a lack of technical and 
managerial expertise. 
The Vietnamese communists on the whole used moral 
incentives and not terror to mobilize the people, although 
here too, as in China, the normative resources were not 
devoid of coercive elements. The party had generally avoided 
a harsh reaction to problems, but in spite of increasing 
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demands, also from within the party, for more reform and 
liberalization of society, retained its authoritarian 
approach in the 1980s. 
11.3 Deeocratic Kampuchea 
When the KR marched into Phnom Penh in April 1975 about 
half the population was stashed away in a single urban 
area, very dependent on American aid. The countryside was 
in no position to produce enough food for the whole popula-
tion. As far as the KR, and certainly the Pol Pot group, 
were concerned, the country was surrounded by enemies ; 
Thailand, harbouring the inimical Khmer Serei and American 
military bases, and Vietnam and its 'satellite' Laos (48). 
They had had far less time and opportunity to gain adminis-
trative experience than the Chinese and Vietnamese com-
munists. Whereas the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions 
were able to mature in protracted wars over a period of 25 
years or more, the KR were, in a sense, parachuted to power 
by a short and brutal five year war. They had very little 
cadre. By far the largest part of the KR executive consisted 
of young peasant soldiers, fanatically obedient, loyal and 
disciplined, battle hardened, used to a bare minimum and 
ready and willing to sacrifice themselves for Angkar, but 
with very little political know-how, education, experience 
with discussion, explanation and persuasion. Even senior 
cadres did not have "the experience that generates the 
instrumental self-confidence basic to pragmatic, flexible 
implementation of principles", as Carney notes (49). They 
had not taken over the administration of captured towns, 
but evacuated them. Although initially placing "politics in 
command" they had, since 1973, mainly enforced compliancy 
by increasingly coercive means. Their experience was with 
vicious war and war communism. It prepared the ground for 
militant, authoritarian voluntarism after the war. There 
are always the psycho-logical difficulties of moving from 
war to peace. In Cambodia it was to be extra tough, since 
there was hardly any institutional framework and the KR 
meant to make a complete break with the past. 
Their choice for an extremely rapid, radical and 
coercive approach was in part inspired by the desire to 
neutralize the opposition and 'contradictions' that had, in 
their view, prevented the success of the GLF. It was further 
facilitated and even encouraged perhaps by the massive 
destruction of the Cambodian economy and society, on top of 
its already underdeveloped character. Vickery has suggested 
that the conditions in the 1975-1976 period could reasonably 
be explained as "inevitable results of wartime destruction 
and disorganization" (50), which would seem to exonerate 
the party leadership of any blame for the hardship and 
terror that ocurred. Evans and Rowley at least note the 
regime's responsiblity when they observe that it was the 
"brutal response" of an "extremely backward state apparatus" 
to the overwhelming economic and political problems that 
led to the 1975-1976 terror (51). Cambodia's relatively 
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small population also made the choice for a coercive ap-
proach easier. It did not need too much effort to control 
popular reaction because each area contained too small a 
fraction of the population to be successful in a revolt. 
The Cambodian peasantry was a weak class, enhancing the KR' 
independence of action. Little rural stratification, no 
tradition of self-organization, little contact with out-
siders and really only brought into action by the war, the 
diffuse peasantry had either fled to the towns or chosen, 
or been forced to choose, the side of the guerilla. 
At take-over most 'new people' it seems were happy 
enough with the KR' victory. But the KR' use of normative 
power was hampered by their distrustfulness, and the radical 
implementation of their program, starting with the immediate 
evacuation of the cities, lost them nearly all the goodwill 
they might have had. Nor did they have material resources. 
In the KR' rigid adoption of Maoism the practical 
possibility of remoulding a person was seriously reduced. 
As under Stalinism, terror here was aimed at eliminating or 
paralysing expected resistance until such a time that the 
new Kampuchea would have brought forth new socialist Khmer. 
The KR' definition of 'out-group', those destined for the 
"rubbish bin of history", was even larger than Stalin's. In 
fact only youth of poor peasant background, as yet untainted 
by outside values and experiences, were mouldable. To some 
extent it was also tried to mould 'new people' children. 
But especially the 'new people' grown-ups were considered 
'corrupted'. In the short period of its existence the Pol 
Pot regime at least gave the strong impression that it 
found this category unredeemable, and therefore expendable. 
The CPK had little or no confidence in especially the 'new 
people's' voluntary compliance. In as far as there were 
other available means of rule than terror these were seen 
as less effective or attainable. The KR' resort to terror 
was very much the result of their suspiciousness, a suspi-
ciousness born of long years of frustration, isolation and 
betrayals that especially the Pol Pot group leaders had 
suffered. Here personal experience and political expediency 
fused in determining all that, in their opinion, threatened 
the realization of their end goal. They feared everyone and 
everything not under their control - ideologies, culture, 
knowledge, experience, beliefs - everything that could 
possibly function as a potential focussing point for rival 
loyalties, as a competitor to KR ideology, or a drag on the 
development of revolutionary (Angkar) consciousness. 
The cities that fell to the KR in April 1975, espe-
cially Phnom Penh, packed with millions of refugees, formed, 
in the eyes of the KR leaders, their biggest direct threat. 
Hatred of what the city represented ideologically and fear 
for millions of 'foreign' influenced people not under their 
control, made them even suspect the peasant refugees in the 
cities. The urban proletariat, radical students, left-wing 
politicians and even the communist underground in the cities 
were therefore also considered dangerous. This formed the 
basis for the 'base people' - 'new people' dichotomization, 
as well as the formal, but little used 'full fledged -
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candidate - depositee' categorization. 
As in the Soviet Union under Stalin, victim selection 
took place on the basis of supposed willingness to harm 
society, as defined by the centre. Trustworthiness, or 
inversely, the degree of contamination by alien influences, 
was the real criterion, deduced from a person's social 
background. Initially the terror process was, in practice, 
largely confined to the 'new people'. Within this category 
some groups were considered more dangerous than others. The 
Lon Nol regime's higher and highest military and administra-
tive cadres, religious leaders and prominent intellectual 
and cultural figures were often killed outright. Towards 
the middle cadre, the richer people and intellectuals the 
initial approach was less drastic, more one of isolation in 
re-education camps, or just bundled off with the rest of 
the 'new people' to the countryside. No attempt was made to 
co-opt any segment of the old regime's apparatus, any 
experts, specialists or authoritative persons in any field. 
Having been abroad and having had further education were 
sure liabilities. Whatever happened was dependent on whether 
one was identified by the KR as belonging to one or other 
category. One's personal convictions and history were 
irrelevant. If one worked hard, however, was modest and 
adopted the style of poor peasants one certainly stood a 
better chance. 
Religion was forbidden. Most expressions of the 
'foreign' influenced urban Great Tradition, including all 
sorts of 'western' products, were discarded and sometimes 
destroyed. The evacuation of the cities destroyed the 
infrastructure of any possible resistance. It also shattered 
the social, cultural, economic patterns existing in the 
urban areas, atomizing the 'new people'. Together with the 
demonstration effect of the killing it helped create a 
general psychic state of extreme fear. 
Not only fear for counterpoints but also a strong 
egalitarian tendency motivated the KR' great drive for 
equality and uniformity. The minority Islamic Cham com-
munities, for instance, had to be broken up before they 
were allowed to join co-operatives. And they had to be 
dispersed. It was felt as a threat if too many Cham were to 
concentrate in one area. Only when the suppression of their 
divergent cultural expression fanned Cham resistance did 
the KR resort to physical violence. The Chinese Cambodians 
did not resist Khmerization and were not treated differently 
than other people. The northeast mountain tribes that had 
become one of the Pol Pot group's main basis of support had 
not resisted Khmerization either. What happened to minority 
tribes that did can only be guessed at. The expulsion of 
the Vietnamese Cambodians, considered a potential fifth 
column, was another way in which unification was pursued. 
To achieve total control even non-rival loves and 
loyalties such as those existing within the family had to 
be eliminated. To that end nuclear families were separated 
for all or most of the day. Even such family activities as 
cooking and eating were disrupted and collectivized. It was 
forbidden to show emotions towards one's family and the 
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opposite sex. Children were taught to spy on and stand up 
to their parents. One was never certain whom to trust. 
But this unification was one mainly of outside ap-
pearance, based on the control of behaviour through coercion 
and fear. The attempts to change attitudes, to establish 
hegemony, were at best half hearted. The party leaders, as 
we have seen, had little faith in the remouldability of at 
least the grown-up generation. Political indoctrination 
rarely went further than admonishments to work harder, to 
love and be loyal to Angkar, "or else". Even in those cases 
where some sort of re-education, something like Mao's 
thought reform, was attempted, in special camps and with 
certain groups (such as overseas Khmer who returned after 
take-over) the outcome was often used as a legitimation for 
execution instead of a reintegration into society. Criti-
cism-self-criticism sessions did achieve some (partial) 
depersonalization and instilled fear in people, fear of 
being accused and taken away "to see Angkar". 
The party leaders' fear and distrust also played a 
central role in the choice for autarkic development. They 
saw it, inter alia, as a powerful tool against corruptive 
outside influences and forces bent on sabotaging the revolu-
tion. For them the way to rapid economic development - also 
a necessary condition for true independence - was to build 
a rural economic base through the exploitation of human 
capital. This would generate the capital needed for in-
dustrialization, which in turn would again support agricul-
ture. The total evacuation of the cities more than doubled 
the amount of human capital that could be exploited. 
Here the take-over stage of power consolidation and 
the mobilization stage in which the transformation of the 
economy and society were to be achieved were hardly sepa-
rable. To various degrees both stages also served both func-
tions. Traditional patterns, in as far as they had not 
already been disrupted by the war, were disintegrated by 
the evacuations, whilst collectivization nearly simulta-
neously reintegrated the population under KR control. This 
collectivization, the Cambodian version of the GLF, gave 
the centre direct access to the surplus created by agricul-
ture and secured its food supply. Most property was either 
discarded, destroyed or transferred to state (KR) organs. 
Money and most private property were abolished, as was 
internal trade. The centre had a monopoly on the distribu-
tion of the essential commodities, rice and salt. Otherwise 
far-reaching self-sufficiency for all units was pushed. The 
centre enforced conditions of unequal exchange; long hours 
of hard labour for minimal, one sided rations, hardly any 
adequate health service, some clothing. Housing and part of 
their food the people had initially to organize themselves. 
Consumption was reduced to a minimum so that the maximum 
possible surplus could be extracted at the least cost to 
the state. People were only seen as a means of production 
necessary to extract as much surplus labour from as possible 
at the least possible cost. There was no place for an 
individual without a unit. There was no freedom of movement 
or communication. People were shifted about at will. The 
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continuation of war terminology, the projection of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea as a besieged country, also aimed at 
extracting the extraordinary effort associated with war 
time. What Trotsky had dreamed of, having complete disposal 
over labour, was practically realized here. The masses were 
not proletarianized but reduced to serfhood. 
The second evacuation was also aimed at bringing under 
cultivation new land in the fertile northwest. In that 
sense it was an effective allocation of capital. In general 
the wide scale opening up of new land, the clearing of 
forests, was aimed at achieving rapid increases in agricul-
tural production in the short term. The evacuations can 
also be seen as a simple means of realizing a more efficient 
work force. It was mainly the old, sick and feeble who died 
during the evacuations. For building the new Kampuchea 
these people were a burden, consuming but not really capable 
of hard work, of producing. The evacuations, although it is 
not clear whether this effect was consciously desired by 
the CPK, certainly rationalized its production force. 
Initially Pol Pot's general economic policy was will-
ingly implemented in all regions. But the co-operative 
infrastructure built up in the liberated areas was not 
really strong enough to absorb the flood of ' new people' 
evacuated from the cities, produce enough food for everyone 
as well as a surplus for the state. Pressure on cadres 
responsible for the execution of these policies was tremen-
dous. As it became clear that the centre's general policy 
was unpracticable it received more criticism. As every form 
of politics and political organization outside of Angkar 
had been suppressed, the only resistance to the Pol Pot 
regime could only come from within the ranks of the KR and 
the party themselves. They had some isolation from the 
terror, at least till 1977, more freedom of movement and 
communication, and the means. 
At the time of victory the Pol Pot group, the most 
radical and distrustful of the three historically developed 
tendencies making up the CPK, controlled the party and 
military top and the government. Actual power, however, 
still lay with the zone party committees, especially with 
their secretaries and military commanders. 
The Pol Pot group could and would not accept failures 
and criticisms. The setbacks and failures that occurred 
were, therefore, blamed on those responsible for executing 
the policies, accusing them of treason. Part of the problem, 
as far as the Pol Pot group was concerned, lay in the power 
of the zones. 
Life in the Northwest zone, from which most of the 
horror stories came, was generally rougher. But this was 
not because this zone's KR belonged to a more bloodthirsty 
faction. There were different shades of opinion in different 
regions, mainly revolving around a more or less anti-Viet-
namese attitude, more or less radical execution of policies 
and more or less use of terror. Generally life in 'new 
people' villages was harsher, not only because 'new people' 
were generally treated rougher, but also because 'new 
people' villages were built from scratch, in areas where 
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land had to be opened up. Contrary to most other regions KR 
control over the Northwest was only effectuated after their 
victory. The harsher situation in the Northwest can largely 
be imputed to the difference in treatment of 'base' and 
' new people ' , most ' new people ' having been moved to the 
Northwest. Specific conditions also made it more difficult 
for cadres there to realize the centre's policies. The 
resulting tensions were in part vented on the 'new people'. 
This also held for other areas where cadres encountered 
difficulties in realizing the centre's policies. Specifi-
cally problems in meeting the centre's quotas very often led 
to smaller rations for the people. 
There were also local differences in treatment as a 
result of the personal character of the local village chief 
or team leader. Local cadres had quite some autonomy in 
implicating the centre's policies. For 'new people' the 
difference between a brutal and a more lenient group or 
co-operative leader could often be the difference between 
life and death. The relative autonomy of the different 
zones, sectors and even co-operatives was in part due to 
the lack of control the centre had over them. Still, the 
centre can be held responsible because, as Barnett remarks, 
it had not set a minimal ration to ensure that all had 
adequate food to survive, and because no public law or 
regulation had been promulgated to safeguard the lives of 
ordinary people from the authority of local leaders (52). 
And although the centre's control was far from complete its 
policies were executed in all areas in a similar fashion; 
the evacuation, the executions of old regime cadres, espe-
cially military officers, collectivization and communaliza-
tion of life, the work system, the rules governing family 
life, contact between the sexes, the abolition of civil 
rights and religion, reducing everyone to poor peasant 
level, and so on. Even in the supposedly better areas of 
Democratic Kampuchea, like the East zone, life was, on all 
accounts, very hard. On the other hand, life in the Pol Pot 
zone par excellence, the Southwest zone, was not as bad as 
in many other regions, which could be an indication that 
the extreme hardship of the Northwest zone for instance, 
was not the Pol Pot group's aim as such. 
To ensure the success of its policies and combat 
dissent centralization was called for, according to the Pol 
Pot group. But it was not, by itself, powerful enough. It 
sought an alliance with Mok, secretary of the large and 
powerful Southwest zone. By the end of 1976 this alliance 
had more or less succeeded in deciding the internal party 
struggle in its favour. It was then that the final phase of 
collectivization was initiated. It also seems to have been 
the starting shot for a purge of KR and party ranks. In 
zones not considered under its definite control the party 
apparatuses were purged and replaced by very tough young 
cadres and troops from the Southwest zone, trained by the 
party and military schools under Pol Pot's control. 
Suspects were made to write and rewrite their autobiog-
raphies. Nokorbal agents then drew connections and made 
networks within each and between all the biographies, not 
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unlike the work of Stalin's secret police. Whole 'conspira-
cies' could thus be unmasked. Like an extremely contagious 
disease, merely having been in contact with a suspect could 
be sufficient to be considered contaminated and therefore 
also a danger to Democratic Kampuchea. The system of writing 
autobiographies had also been used, although less thorough-
ly, on the 'new people', to unmask ex-Lon Nol cadres and 
members of other categories that were considered 'bad risk'. 
Not only suspected opponents were purged, so were their 
strings, their following. 
The centre's actions themselves led to growing dissent 
whilst the system of autobiographies and conspiracies drew 
more and more names into 'traitorous' networks. Accordingly 
the purges became more and more rabid. In all probability 
local uprisings did occur and coup attempts were plotted. 
They were all discovered and crushed. Not all those purged 
were also killed, however. Many were expelled from the 
party, often in combination with imprisonment or internment 
in a labour camp. Most of the 20.000 executed at Tuoi Sleng 
were from the KR themselves, functionaries, cadres and 
soldiers from areas and departments considered untrustworthy 
by the centre (53). Some of those that arrived at Tuoi 
Sleng had come from local prison/execution centres. The 
autobiographies always 'proved' that suspects had been 
traitors right from the start, lending justification to 
their elimination. 
Like all power holders even the Pol Pot regime felt 
the need to justify and legitimize its rule. The extremes 
used to obtain confessions at Tuoi Sleng and other centre's 
can be seen as an indication of this. Nokorbal worked 
methodically, taking time to build up a solid case against 
a once identified "enemy agent", carefully preparing the 
arrest, not much different from how Stalin's terror ap-
paratus worked. The Tuoi Sleng archives, as Heder has noted, 
suggest a "pathologically perverse sense of due process" 
(54). Other signs indicating the CPK's concern for legitima-
tion were the 1976 elections, the official use of Sihanouk, 
the stress placed on having won the war without outside 
help, the assertion that 98 to 99% of the population sup-
ported the revolution, the concomitant blaming of all 
negative expressions on a tiny minority in the service of 
foreign powers, and so on. 
The generalization of the terror coincided with an 
escalation of the conflict with Vietnam. Whereas in its 
internal policies the CPK attempted to make a complete 
break with the past, its policies towards Vietnam rather 
showed a continuity with the past. The overriding concern 
here was the historical fear that Cambodia would disappear 
altogether as a national entity. Already under Sihanouk a 
situation had been reached in which it was felt that further 
concessions to its more powerful neighbours could no longer 
be tolerated. Although the CPK had profiled itself as even 
more nationalistic than Sihanouk it seems to have initially 
taken a relatively moderate stand as far as the border 
issue with Vietnam was concerned. This is all the more 
surprising bearing in mind their antipathy and distrust of 
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the Vietnamese as well as their radical non-concessionary 
and violence prone approach to problems in general. When, 
because of Vietnamese intransigence and reneging on earlier 
agreements, negotiations led to nothing, however, the CPK 
started to attempt to violently drive the Vietnamese from 
what it considered Cambodian territory. The presence of 
Vietnamese authority on Cambodian territory formed a serious 
affront to KR nationalism, belying its claim to sovereignty 
and acting as an irksome reminder of Vietnamese support 
during the war. The CPK's position was one of mutual non-
interference. The VWP, on the other hand, wanted a 'special' 
relationship similar to what it had with Laos. KR initiated 
border violence only hardened the Vietnamese attitude. 
It has been suggested that the Pol Pot regime adopted 
a belligerent attitude and exploited traditional anti-Viet-
namese sentiments to rally the people to support otherwise 
less than popular domestic policies. But this anti-Viet-
namese campaign gained a momentum of its own that got out 
of hand. The logic behind the explanation is the tested 
recipe of converting internal dissatisfaction into nationa-
listic feelings by unifying the country against a common 
outside enemy (55). Until the unsuccessful Vietnamese 
invasion at the end of 1977, however, there had been no 
open, public enmity with the Vietnamese, whilst there were 
already massive problems with the execution of the centre's 
policies. 
Once the conflict had come into the open the CPK did 
try to mobilize and unite the people in this way, fanning 
traditional anti-Vietnamese sentiments with its inciting 
racist-like slogans. The war, however, also increased the 
centre's need for ever greater surplus extraction, while 
more activity was shifted to the war effort at the expense 
of production. The conflict with Vietnam naturally increased 
the Pol Pot group's paranoid distrust. It also stimulated 
more dissension within the party. More cadres, although 
agreeing on the threat posed by Vietnam, felt it was beginn-
ing to harm the socialist development of Democratic Kam-
puchea. The Pol Pot group not only held this for 'objecti-
vely' pro-Vietnam and therefore treason but all setbacks and 
criticisms were now imputed to spies and traitors working 
for the Vietnamese. 
The purging of KR from regions and ministries not 
considered under control of the Pol Pot - Mok alliance was 
escalated. Military setbacks in the East zone even led to a 
large-scale forced deportation and execution of ordinary 
people, accused of supporting the Vietnamese. In fact part 
of the KR opposition was forced by increasing pressure from 
the centre to finally and reluctantly accept Vietnamese 
support as a matter of survival. 
The centre's policies left it with an ever-diminishing 
social base. Initial peasant support for the KR had not 
immediately disappeared after the war. Although the vast 
majority of Cambodian peasants were smallholders the war 
and especially the bombing had destroyed much of their 
economic base, radicalizing them and making them more 
susceptible to KR ideology. They were, therefore, more open 
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to (or less resentful of) collectivization, which was also 
introduced slower and not quite as radically as for the 
'new people'. 'Base people' were allowed to keep more 
private property. Their villages were usually left in tact. 
They enjoyed better rations and generally a more secure way 
of life. The change for them, and therefore also the shock 
and the fear, was less extreme. They were used to the 
working and living conditions of rural life. 
There was certainly peasant (and tribal) influence in 
the party, particularly poor and peripheral peasant in-
fluence. Resentment of intellectuals and hatred for cities 
were peasant (particularly more peripheral peasant) and 
tribal sentiments the war had fanned and the party had 
absorbed. 'Base people' were treated better than 'new 
people' and where both groups came into contact, placed 
above them. Nearly all KR soldiers, although estranged, had 
peasant backgrounds, and been taught that peasants formed 
the basis of the revolution. One function of the 'new 
people' - 'base people' contradistinction was that by 
downgrading the 'new people', 'base people' could identify 
more with the KR. The second evacuation, which isolated the 
'new people' from the 'base people', was quite likely also 
done to prevent 'base people' 'contamination'. To increase 
the contradistinction it would make sense to exclude the 
peasants, who had fled to the cities, from the second 
evacuation. It is quite possible that this did indeed 
happen. 'Base people' may even have approved of the execu-
tions of ex-Lon Nol cadres, if they had been aware of them. 
They were, initially at least, outside of the zone of 
terror. 
Some authors have attributed the terror and ultimate 
failure of Democratic Kampuchea to the peasant connection. 
Barth, e.g., saw Democratic Kampuchea as the revenge of the 
poor peripheral peasants and the tribals on the well-to-do 
(56). According to Vickery the peasant element was so strong 
that the "outside leadership", the "petty-bourgeois intel-
lectuals" of the CPK, overcome by "peasant romanticism", 
were "pulled along with it", turning their "back on Marxist 
Communism". This conjunction of "peasantism" with "petty-
bourgeois intellectual dissatisfaction" led to the failure 
of Democratic Kampuchea (57). Although the KR' way of 
communism, as Heder correctly notes, was to destroy all 
class distinctions and force everyone down to equal 'com-
munist' poor peasant level and then rebuild society on a 
class-free basis (58), I would hardly consider Democratic 
Kampuchea to be a case of 'peasantism'. The industrial 
organization of agriculture and of the countryside, the 
introduction of communes and work brigades bely this. The 
peasants' situation compared favourably to that of the 'new 
people'. But it is doubtful if they really welcomed the KR' 
version of the GLF. They were subjected to more state 
interference than they had ever known before the war. They 
were hardly enthusiastic about collectivization, industrial 
organization of agricultural work and communal dining. Most 
were unhappy about the abolition of religion. They, too, 
were, after all, enserfed. And were the routine mechanism 
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of surplus appropriation to fail terror would also be used 
against them. This had already happened on occasion. Vil-
lages had been forcefully relocated. Peasant acquiescence 
of KR' dominance could, besides recognizing some aspects of 
peasant ideology, very well also have been an expression of 
their astute awareness of the actual power relations. 
The Pol Pot group's power-base started more and more 
to consist only of ever younger recruitments of ever more 
fanatic KR troops and cadres, including more and more women, 
and the tribal troops that formed the backbone of Pol Pot's 
military. 
The opposition's lack of success or the lack of real, 
organized opposition inside Cambodia, is some indication of 
the effectiveness of the terror system. It had led to the 
psychological isolation of the individual, suspicious of 
everybody, dependent on his or her group leader, willing to 
betray a neighbour for the slightest advantage. Perhaps 
also many Cambodians felt it terribly hard to believe that 
Angkar was cruel and evil, as did many of the victims of 
the Stalinist terror and the Nazi concentration camps. Many 
KR cadres, analogous with their Soviet counterparts under 
Stalin, may have felt that their elimination was 'objecti-
vely' necessary and therefore right for the good of the 
revolution. Furthermore, most of the KR rank and file were 
very disciplined and loyal. They were well equipped to 
execute the party's system of terror but not to question 
the correctness of its policies. Thus So Phim and other 
East zone cadres, in spite of the purges directed against 
them in 1978, still did not want to betray the party. "If 
the party kills me while I remain loyal I will die a 
patriot", and if "I die, I die faithfull to the party and 
loving it", they are reported to have said (59). Also, Pol 
Pot's rivals may have been less unified than the Pol Pot 
group, and in the climate of suspicion which prevailed, may 
have been ready to believe that certain former colleagues 
were traitors, as Vickery suggests (60). 
Through the system of terror the CPK also seemed to 
have achieved some success in the economic development of a 
rural infrastructure. The foreign visitors to Democratic 
Kampuchea came back with more or less identical stories of 
reasonably well-fed and healthy, cheerful people in the 
fields. They saw no signs of internal tension, nor did they 
notice tension caused by the conflict with Vietnam. They 
did report what seemed to amount to a well-functioning 
economic and social system based on co-operatives. The 
favourable rice crop of early 1978 certainly contributed to 
this image, as did the fact that these foreigners visited 
'base people' co-operatives loyal to Pol Pot and otherwise, 
too, were shown only what the regime wanted them to see. On 
the other hand they did traverse large sections of the 
country, including parts of the east, northwest and south-
west regions. In spite of rather large ideological differen-
ces among the various visitors, their stories also concurred 
on other points, at least in the facts mentioned, if not in 
the general drift, points that did agree with what the 
refugees had to say. Furthermore, refugees arriving in 
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Thailand and Vietnam in 1978 were not very starved. 
It is possible that the refugees, in their misery and 
fear, failed to notice the improved economic situation, 
although many of them did remark on the rationalization of 
agriculture and increased production. Their rations, after 
all, although generally slightly improved, remained meagre 
and one-sided and the exploitation of the people had not 
diminished. Visitors, on the other hand, would be struck by 
the extensive agricultural irrigation and paddy-fields 
network, the seemingly efficient work system. The reasonably 
well-fed and cheerful workers were not 'new people', slaving 
in the periphery. It is quite likely that rice production 
had increased without the population noticing this in their 
rations. Most rice was creamed off as surplus, for export, 
to finance the war effort, to hoard in case of invasion and 
to feed the centre and its troops. Also, human capacity 
for cheerfulness is immense and even survives under extreme 
conditions as exist in concentration camps. People smiling 
and waving does not have to mean they are also basically 
happy and satisfied. It could be an impressive if tragic 
indication of the "human capacity to withstand suffering 
and abuse", an aspect not really analyzed in this work but 
one that lies at the heart of the issues discussed by 
Barrington Moore Jr. in his book Injustice (61). 'Base 
people' were also feeling the terror system, even though 
they were, on the whole, still better off than 'new people', 
unless they had been transported from the East or still 
lived in the war zone. 
Another consideration is that after three years of KR 
terror only the fittest and strongest would have survived. 
So, all together, it is possible that the Pol Pot regime, 
after a very difficult 'take-off' period, was achieving 
some economic success. There were indications of a slight 
slackening of rigorous and radical Democratic Kampuchea 
policies towards intellectuals and the 'new people' in 
general. 
Perhaps this would have meant a gradual slackening of 
the reign of terror as well as better living conditions for 
the population. Perhaps, as occurred in the Soviet Union, 
an effective bureaucratic apparatus, a functional alterna-
tive for terror once resistance has been pacified, could 
have been developed far enough to take over the routine of 
domination and surplus extraction. Democratic Kampuchea was 
meant to become an industrialized nation. Already more 
machinery, like tractors and bulldozers, was being used to 
develop the country. We will, however, never know how it 
would have developed further. It was aborted by an external 
factor: the Vietnamese invasion. 
11.4 The Value of Life 
Analyzing state terror Horowitz has quite rightly pointed 
out that we should also consider the efforts of a government 
to reduce the 'naturalness' of such natural causes of death 
as famine, war, plagues, floods, and so on, and to harness 
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technology and natural resources to minimize such disasters. 
This in itself is, as he says, "a central indication of how 
a society values life" (62). This is, however, much easier 
said than done. Shalom, who agrees with Horowitz that 
"whenever it can be shown that the deaths were 
avoidable, given the economic wherewithal of the 
society, they must be included as part of the 
regime's toll" (63), 
adds that this is not a very widely held point of view. By 
this view, he continues, Washington would be responsible 
for the death of more than 32.000 infants in 1970 alone, 
being the excess of the USA infant mortality rate over that 
of Sweden, or for the deaths of at least 8.000 black infants 
that same year, being the difference between the black and 
white infant mortality rates (64). It can be misleading if 
this viewpoint is applied in some cases but not in others. 
It is likely that many nations over the past decades have 
been responsible, in the above sense, for the deaths of 
millions of their citizens. How many millions have died of 
hunger and hunger induced diseases that could have realisti-
cally been avoided? How to evaluate whether a regime is 
guilty of negligence in this, and to what extent? The same 
goes for natural disasters and diseases following in their 
wake. What can be considered realistic? What about military 
expenditure and war? How does one determine what part, if 
any, of a country's resources should be spent for military 
purposes and whether a war was avoidable? And how do we 
judge government decisions that cost lives now, but save 
them in the future, or vice versa? Even if any of these 
complex and in part moral issues are at all answerable I 
will not attempt to do so here. 
Bearing all this in mind, it is still safe to say that 
the Pol Pot regime placed little value on the life of most 
of its citizens. This caused by far the largest number of 
deaths. The evacuation of the cities was executed with 
great speed. Neither the old, nor the sick or wounded were 
spared. Working and living conditions, especially for those 
not used to life in the rural ares, were extremely tough, 
whilst food rations were often insufficient and one-sided 
and health care minimal, sometimes even more lethal than 
the ailment. Deaths caused by illness and starvation were 
not planned or organized by the centre. They were, up to a 
certain extent, the unintended outcome of the regime's 
policies. But it could have foreseen the outcome, it could 
have taken more measures to ease the hardships. It decided 
in favour of other priorities, and in this sense it does 
hold some responsibility for these deaths. 
We must bear in mind, however, that many people would 
probably have succumbed after the war anyway, as a direct 
result of the American interference in Cambodia, regardless 
of the type of regime coming to power. 
In the People's Republic of China, and in Vietnam too, 
much more has been done to alleviate the plight of the 
poor, witness amongst others the increased life expectancy, 
although hunger and destitution have not disappeared com-
pletely (65). Whatever the incidence of hunger in normal 
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years, there is no doubt that the "bitter years" following 
the GLF were very harsh. 
Here again it is difficult to make what can be con-
sidered a reasonably accurate estimate of the number of 
deaths. According to Karnow, for instance, none of the 
refugees who fled China in 1962 that he interviewed in Hong 
Kong had seen or heard of people starving (66). Official 
demographic data imply an excess of 20 million deaths above 
normal for this period. But the problem here is the unre-
liable and suspect data. Chinese statistical work was 
totally disrupted during the GLF and its aftermath, and 
again during the CR (67). Shalom argues that these official 
data overstate the population loss, but says it would 
"not be implausible (for) excess deaths to have 
been 1 million or 10 million: death from starva-
tion, malnutrition and disease caused by the food 
shortage" (68). 
He stresses the need to keep these figures in perspec-
tive. In a country the size of China an increase in the 
mortality rate of 1 per thousand translates into about one 
million deaths (69). Assuming that the reported birth and 
death rates for 1959-1961 are accurate, he goes on, then 
the highest death rate was 25.4 per thousand in 1960. This 
death rate is about the same as that which prevailed in 
India in 1953-1954. In a typical year China's death rate 
is well under that of India. In 1975, for instance, the 
difference was six per thousand, which gives an excess 
death toll in India of 3.6 million for that year. "This is 
not to minimize the Chinese food crisis", he adds, "but to 
suggest that demographic tragedy is hardly unprecedented 
among large Third World nations" (70). 
Although the Chinese leaders blamed nature and the 
abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid, the CCP leadership must 
bear considerable responsibility. But they did not want or 
willingly tolerate the famine. Even some of the refugees 
into Hong Kong in 1962 were of the opinion that "the Chinese 
communists did a 'fair and equitable' job of rationing in 
the face of shortages" (71). In fact in the first half of 
1961 China bought millions of tons of food grains and milk 
powder from Canada and Australia (72), costing it at least 
357 million pounds sterling (73). 
This can be distinguished from instances were famine 
was an accepted consequence of leadership policy. Washington 
has used food aid to pressure receiving countries into more 
pro-American behaviour (74). The American bombing of North 
Vietnamese dikes was meant to cripple North Vietnamese food 
production, creating a famine that would force Hanoi to sue 
for peace (75). Stalin wittingly used famine to destroy 
opposition to collectivization, as we have seen. 
11.5 Terror Gone Mad 
Till now I have discussed terror more or less as a rational 
instrument, as a process or phenomenon the result of ra-
tional decisions. It can, and often does, get out of con-
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trol. As long as it is directed towards an end beyond 
itself, namely control, it has a limit and remains a pro-
cess, Walter tells us. But under certain conditions it 
becomes unlimited and an end in itself (76). Walter does 
not explicate these conditions. But when fear and mutual 
suspicion have become "all-pervasive and all-consuming" 
(77), feeding the leader's (or leaders') paranoia, and the 
terror apparatus keeps on extending and intensifying its 
work out of self-vindication and self-preservation, I would 
posit we have a situation where terror has become an end in 
itself. 
This is what seems to have happened in the Soviet 
Union as the Great Purge progressed. It not only swallowed 
many Stalin stalwarts, it also turned onto the terror 
apparatus itself, the NKVD. In 1936 and 1937 Yagoda, the 
NKVD boss, and 3.000 of his officers were executed (78). 
Under Yezhov, his successor, the terror reached its zenith, 
until he, too, less than a year later, in September 1938, 
fell victim, dragging many of his henchmen with him. 
Still, in the Soviet Union even this extreme terror 
was contained, and stabilized on a lesser scale, after 
Beria took over the NKVD. And the terror had achieved a 
number of objectives. A vast number of past or potential 
'hostile elements' had been eliminated or atomized and the 
rest of the population reduced to a near complete silence 
and obedience. Stalin had succeeded in establishing some 
kind of paternal relationship with large sections of the 
ordinary urban populace. This enabled him to use the egali-
tarian elements in communist ideology to mobilize them 
against the bureaucracy. "Equality" was used here from 
above down to control what was in between, a tactic of 
which Stalin was not the sole proprietor. It is often used 
in populist states. Sukarno, Nasser and Sihanouk used it. 
Mao employed it when he set the youthful Red Guards against 
the party and bureaucracy in the CR. 
The bureaucracy ' s obedience and support had been ob-
tained by its being both terrorized by and dependent for 
its privileges on Stalin. And Stalin used the bureaucracy 
against and in competition with the party. All this enhanced 
the emergence of a one man dictatorship. The bureaucracy 
was then able to take over some of the routines of domina-
tion and surplus extraction. Orders from the centre were 
now binding and enforceable in practice. By far the greatest 
part of national income was redistributed through the state 
budget, maximising the amount of surplus product withheld 
from the citizens' personal consumption. The centre deter-
mined investment and organized distribution. But the terror 
apparatus, although it had served its function, could not 
just be put aside. For that it had grown too large and 
powerful. Stalin's last years saw an upsurge in terror as 
he became more and more suspicious. The "Leningrad case", 
the "Crimean affair", and the "Doctors' plot", are clear 
examples of this (79). According to Medvedev, only Stalin's 
death prevented a repeat of the 1937-1938 peak of terror 
(80). 
In Democratic Kampuchea, too, terror seems to have 
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become an end in itself. Even the bureaucracy administering 
the terror became suspect. The terror system started turning 
against the Southwest zone, against high ranking Pol Pot 
stalwarts, against top leaders of the regime and even 
against Nokorbal itself. The terror seems to have become a 
self-generative conflict, fuelling itself, a vicious spiral 
of paranoia and violence, the Khmer version of the revolu-
tion eating its own children (61). 
The terrorism of the regime was mirrored in its vicious 
execution of the conflict with Vietnam. As the Pol Pot 
group, caught up in its own paranoid spiral of terror and 
suffering from a heavy doses of self-overestimation, could 
not distinguish clearly between them, internal and external 
conflict became indissolubly entwined. And so KR East zone 
troops could be extravagantly praised for repulsing a 
Vietnamese invasion in January 1978, and radically purged 
for being pro-Vietnamese a few months later. Ironically, 
the second Vietnamese invasion, about a year later, in all 
probability saved some of the highest-placed KR leaders 
from Tuoi Sleng. 
The terror system had cost Cambodia so much the Viet-
namese had little trouble bringing the Pol Pot regime down. 
The terror had in fact been so effective in destroying 
previous existing social structures that Cambodian society, 
once the regime of terror had been swept away, completely 
disintegrated. Could one want a clearer indication that the 
rigorous collectivization, which replaced the old social 
structures, was a straight jacket for the people, only held 
together by fear and violence? 
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CONCLUSION 
Terror is not a phenomenon unique to Democratic Kampuchea. 
Other states have used it as the cases of the Soviet Union, 
China and Vietnam that I have discussed indicate. Relatively 
speaking, however, there are few cases in history that 
match the Pol Pot regime in this respect. In the case of 
Democratic Kampuchea it seems that most of the different 
causes and variables fostering terror occurred simulta-
neously and interacted in such a fashion that countervailing 
pressures were reduced to a minimum, leading to one of the 
worst of all worlds. 
Power is a means to realize ends. While economic 
exploitation delivers the surplus to acquire the means by 
which the ruling elite can rule, can retain its power, 
political power is at the same time a means to realize and 
maximize economic exploitation. And terror is one of the 
means to achieve and retain power. A ruling elite can turn 
to the use of terror if it estimates the costs to be less 
and the expected rewards to be greater than alternative 
means of dealing with its situation or if it believes other 
available means of rule to be quite ineffective (expected 
utility). Terror aims at control, whilst the closely related 
concept of 'forced choice' ensures co-operation. The use of 
terror is not mindless. 
There is no unambiguous scenario for predicting its 
use. We can, however, identify the variables that influence 
its use, the circumstances that may facilitate its occur-
rence. Before recapitulating the specific relevant factors 
and their interrelationship or causal connection for Demo-
cratic Kampuchea I will briefly, and of necessity, there-
fore, in a rather generalized fashion, summarize the main 
factors relevant to the use of terror by revolutionary 
communist elites in general, discussed extensively in 
chapters 9 and 10. Taken separately each factor perhaps 
raises more questions than answers. It is their specific 
configuration, the 'mix' of relevant factors, that brings 
about the use of terror. 
Often on coming to power a revolutionary communist 
regime lacks other systems of sanctions (having a limited 
availability of normative and material resources) to achieve 
compliance (take-over stage). Furthermore, communist elites 
generally are committed to a substantial transformation of 
the economy, society and even individual human nature 
(mobilization stage). A lack of normative and material 
resources may (again) lead them to resort to terror. The 
speed and radicality of transformation, the strain on 
society and the economy imposed by this mobilization and 
reallocation of human and natural resources, the extent to 
which it clashes with values and perceived interests of 
sectors of society, will all influence the use of terror. 
274 
The more rapid and thorough the change, the more objectives 
a revolutionary regime tries to pursue simultaneously, the 
more extensive and bitter opposition is likely to be, the 
more terror is called for to impose the change. On the 
whole, 
"(w)hatever else the revolution may achieve, it 
almost always creates a more coercive and hegemo-
nistic state apparatus - one that is often able 
to batten itself on the rural population like no 
other before it. All too frequently the peasantry 
finds itself in the ironic position of having 
helped to power a ruling group whose plans for 
industrialization, taxation and collectivization 
are very much at odds with the goals for which 
the peasantry had imagined they were fighting" 
(1). 
Still, with so many other variables involved the actual use 
of violence against the people can show marked differences 
as the history of the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam 
indicate. How a revolutionary communist elite deals with 
the divergence between the new political culture of the 
centre and the cultural tradition of the countryside, the 
chasm separating it from the peasantry, their differing 
aims and interests, is a central aspect to whether or not 
this elite will use terror against the masses. The way the 
revolution is made will influence the post-revolutionary 
order. Party domination or isolation in the revolutionary 
process will favour a post-revolutionary regime that at-
tempts to impose its will. Partnership in the revolutionary 
process or accommodation, on the other hand, favours inter-
action and reciprocity between party and masses. If the 
revolutionary movement has been successful in gaining 
popular support, in penetrating the administrative-organiza-
tional system of the country and in gaining the upper hand 
over alternative organizations and authorities then there 
is less 'need' for terror after take-over. Also, a well 
organized party tends to diminish situational terror. 
The extent of societal disruption, the extent to which 
loyalty to the state and the legitimacy of the ruling class 
has been eroded, factors that favour the likelihood of 
successful revolution, also influence the post-revolutionary 
order. Depending on their relative strength and alignment, 
the various classes and sectors in society can exert a 
moderating influence on the revolutionary elite, encouraging 
accommodation and co-operation with other groups and sec-
tors, or facilitate arbitrary and authoritarian action. The 
weaker, less organized the class the revolutionary elite 
wants to mobilize, the less possibility there is of these 
masses exerting Thermidorean pressure, the more it enhances 
the vanguard party's independence, increasing the possibi-
lity of authoritarian rule. Generally the fewer countervail-
ing pressures in the form of traditional structures and 
patterns that exist at take-over, the greater the social 
and economic disruption, the greater the revolutionary 
elite's room to manoeuvre. An exhausted economy will leave 
the revolutionary elite with little or no material resources 
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to satisfy its followers, even in the medium tern). External 
threat or support, too, can be of crucial importance to 
whether the new regime will resort to terror or not. 
The revolutionary elite's ideology is another important 
factor. In the specific case of the communist elites dis-
cussed, the concepts of false consciousness and vanguard 
party indicate an attitude towards the masses that can hold 
an implicit legitimation for the use of violence against 
those masses. The masses, deluded, according to these 
elites, by the existing ruling class ideology, cannot 
understand their own true interests. They suffer from "false 
consciousness". These elites claim to know these true 
interests, the basis and legitimation for their revolution-
ary political activity. The vanguard party was the organiza-
tional instrument through which ideological influence over 
the masses could be exerted. At the same time it was an 
instrument for controlling the critical and potentially 
politically competitive faculties of revolutionary intellec-
tuals, moulding them into an effective organization for 
revolutionary activity. To achieve the end goal, true 
socialist consciousness and a true communist society, all 
means were allowed. The ideal, the internalization by every 
citizen of all the prescribed goals and values so that each 
citizen would be a "good communist", would, of course, make 
the use of any type of coercion superfluous. Here again the 
cases discussed indicate that the actual use of terror 
varied considerably precisely because there were so many 
other factors of influence. 
Factors and circumstances influence, but ultimately 
people decide whether or not to resort to terror. Finally, 
therefore, those factors that influence the elite's ex-
periences, its psychological 'condition' (inter alia its 
self-confidence, sense of reality, distrust) and its politi-
cal strategy must be considered. 
In the specific case of the KR regime of terror a 
number of issues were of special importance in the psycho-
logical development of the CPK leaders, especially the Pol 
Pot faction. Their virulent nationalism was born against 
the backdrop of the great Angkor Empire that was, born of a 
strong resentment of Cambodian dependance of and subordina-
tion to foreign powers and of a deep historical fear that 
the Khmer nation would disappear forever. Immersion in 
French communism of the time, a rather Stalinist reading of 
Marxism-Leninism, provided them with a clear-cut and mecha-
nistic interpretation and organization model. Sihanouk's 
anti-imperialist foreign policy that gained him the support 
of all socialist powers, the progressive image the 
Sihanoukist state presented at home, and the impossibility 
of legal independent political opposition, marginalized the 
CPK. It also encouraged it to present a more radical and 
nationalist image than Sihanouk. 
The Pol Pot group's physical isolation from the Khmer 
peasant majority was compounded by the peasants' semi-reli-
gious reverence for the charismatic Sihanouk. The failure 
of the Vietnamese inspired Khmer Vietminh strategy in pre-
and post-independence Cambodia together with old Khmer 
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resentment and fear of the Vietnamese, as well as the lack 
of support of even the socialist countries, increased its 
isolation, suspiciousness, felt need for self-reliance and 
fierce independence. The radical revolutionary fervour of 
the relatively small group of left-wing intellectuals was 
fired by blocked ascendancy, the corruption and lack of 
development of the populist Sihanouk state, the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution and a very specific, isolated peasant 
rebellion. But the vast majority of the population, small-
holding subsistence peasants, were not interested in revolu-
tion. 
The demise of the populist Sihanouk regime, however, 
sealed by the rightist Lon Noi coup and executed with 
American blessings, heralded sudden and immense changes. It 
brought the Vietnam War to Cambodia and gave the KR the 
opportunity to escalate and expand their struggle. The 
violence unleashed by the Lon Nol regime and its American 
and South Vietnamese allies against the rural population, 
and Sihanouk's call to join the FUNK, thereby legitimizing 
the KR, drove many peasants to join the guerilla. Thanks in 
large part to Vietnamese communist support the KR soon 
controlled most of the countryside. Mass loyalties to the 
state, never strong, and in the case of most peasants 
limited to the god-prince Sihanouk, were undermined by 
Sihanouk's disposal. They were also undermined by the 
general disruption and destruction brought about by the 
war, the subservience of the bungling and corrupt Lon Nol 
regime to foreign powers and military failure. All this and 
the growing disillusionment even among the urban elite 
indicated a major crisis of Cambodian society, paving the 
way for a revolutionary vanguard party, the CPK. 
The party, and especially the Pol Pot group, distrusted 
both Sihanouk and Vietnamese communist support. Prior to 
the war Sihanouk had hounded the KR. The Vietnamese com-
munists had never been trusted and now were sending Khmer 
Vietminh back into Cambodia to ensure Hanoi's control over 
the guerilla. CPK fear and distrust were aggravated when 
Hanoi (and Beijing), following the Paris Peace Agreement, 
tried to force the KR to negotiate. And the warm response 
Sihanouk's 1973 visit to liberated areas elicited from the 
peasants heightened the party's awareness of the threat he 
posed as a rival to power. Wary of being side-tracked or 
having to share power after the war, the CPK started to 
eliminate its allies from the united front. Years in hiding, 
of isolation, betrayal and feelings of insecurity had 
heightened the KR leaders', especially the Pol Pot group's, 
distrust to include everyone and everything that had not 
been under their control, that had been affected or in-
fluenced by other cultures, ideologies, experiences. Intel-
lectuals especially were distrusted. Contrary to their 
united front propaganda, the KR did not attempt to unite 
broad sectors of the populace to achieve victory, out of 
fear of embracing Trojan horses. They relied only on the 
peasants. Their self-sacrificing, patriotic image and 
initially fairly moderate approach won them respect. Hiding 
behind the anonymous, abstract and rather awesome Angkar, 
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however, instead of presenting a charismatic leadership, 
was not likely to fire possible peasant Utopian sentiments. 
On the whole the peasants were not revolutionary. They only 
wanted an end to war. 
As a result of the traumatic bombing by the Americans 
in 1973 hatred and revenge became much stronger factors for 
supporting the KR. In a relatively thinly populated country 
like Cambodia control over people is more essential than 
control over land. The KR, capitalizing on the situation 
created by the bombing, started evacuating towns, resettling 
people in liberated areas and enforcing radical collec-
tivization. These moves gave them greater control over 
people as means of production and as a reservoir for their 
armed forces. The radicality of collectivization, partially 
influenced by the fact that they based themselves on poor 
and peripheral peasants, was facilitated by the bombing. It 
had mainly affected the central agricultural region, des-
troying the base of the smallholding peasant majority, who 
might otherwise have put up more resistance against these 
measures. 
The demands and harshness of war, the distrust of 
allies, leading to their purge, and peasant support not 
forthcoming out of revolutionary zeal, the party unsure of 
peasant loyalty and compliance with radical transformation, 
the CPK turned more and more to coercion to enforce its 
policies. This development was significantly compounded by 
the party's lack of political and organizational skills and 
experience. Within the party there were regional differences 
and different factions. The Pol Pot group was already 
working for control over the other factions. The war deci-
mated the ranks of the few cadres the KR had, whilst their 
rapid growth increased the urgent need of cadres. Their 
distrust and feelings of insecurity prevented them from 
accepting intellectuals and other urbanités who crossed 
over to the revolutionary cause. It also increased their 
distrust of their allies, who were often better trained. 
The party relied more and more on youth of poor peasant 
background. Especially as a result of the bombing more of 
these youngsters were joining the KR more out of revenge 
than from political convictions. The CPK hardly had the 
time or the cadres to educate them. Being young and as yet 
untainted by strange and 'foreign' ideas, influences and 
experiences, however, they were relatively easiest to mold 
into loyal and obedient executors of CPK policy. They were 
also potentially most radical. These new, young and fanati-
cal cadres exacerbated the use of terror precisely because 
they lacked the qualities, training and experience to 
implement policies in a more humane fashion. This discip-
lined KR fighting machine also facilitated a radical im-
plementation of the war, the party leaders taking risks 
and accepting casualties far beyond what is generally, by 
military strategists, considered 'tolerable'. Fear and 
distrust as well as their belief that man, equipped with 
correct consciousness, could conquer all obstacles, self-
overestimation and an instrumental conception of real people 
encouraged their radical and rapid approach. They were 
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certainly influenced by Maoism, but lacked Maoism's more 
humane aspects, belief in remouldability, persuasion instead 
of coercion, generally a more gradual approach and concern 
for the welfare of the masses. 
At take-over the CPK and certainly the Pol Pot group 
felt the country to be surrounded by enemies. About half 
the population was concentrated in one urban centre, depen-
dent on American aid. The destruction by the war, on top of 
an already underdeveloped economy, left the party no mate-
rial resources. The ravished countryside was in no position 
to produce enough food for the whole population. The party 
leaders' suspiciousness and fear of all they deemed not 
under their control impeded the use of the little normative 
resources they had. Their experience was mainly with secre-
tive, underground activity, with war and authoritarian, 
often coercive implementation of party policies, using 
young, fanatical cadres, battle hardened, used to killing 
and death, but unaccustomed to contradiction, patient 
discussion and explanation. Having in a sense been parachu-
ted to power in a short and brutal war they had had far 
less time and opportunity to gain administrative experience 
than, e.g., the Chinese and Vietnamese communists. The 
party, especially the Pol Pot group, also lacked the in-
clination to build a more partnership-type relationship 
with the masses. It had little faith in the remouldability 
of people, and less inclination to spend the meagre means 
at its disposal to such an end. In spite of this relatively 
low level of organizational development the loyalty and 
discipline of the KR precluded the incidence of situational 
terror of any significance. 
The party's major immediate concern was to achieve 
control, at any cost. The evacuation of the cities neutra-
lized their biggest direct threat, shattering the social 
patterns existing in the urban areas, destroying the in-
frastructure of any possible resistance. Everyone and 
everything that could possibly function as a potential 
focussing point for rival loyalties, for opposition to the 
party and its policies, had to be destroyed, or at least 
neutralized: religion, minority cultures, intellectuals 
(unless under party control), everything associated with 
the urban Great Tradition, with 'foreign' influence, even 
the family. The choice for terror was facilitated by the 
massive destruction and disruption of social and economic 
life. A relatively small population was easier to control 
and little resistance was to be expected from the weak 
peasantry. The rest of the population was atomized and 
confined to what in effect were labour camps. Everything 
was done to insulate the people from incongruent value 
systems. 
The party's second and related major concern was rapid 
economic development. The choice for autarkic development 
was also influenced by fear and distrust, prompted by the 
desire to control. The party's way to communism was to 
lower everyone to poor peasant level and build a classless 
society from there. 'New people' first had to develop 
correct consciousness through manual labour and the ex-
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perience of living as peasants. Till then the party had no 
need for their knowledge and expertise. That would only 
make it dependent on them. Modern science and technology 
were to be used, but only by those trusted by Angkar. 
Starting from scratch was facilitated by the underdeveloped 
and war-devastated economy. Also, the party had never 
penetrated the administrative-organizational system of the 
country, it had destroyed it. 
A rural economic base was built through the exploita-
tion of human capital, to generate the surplus needed for 
industrialization. The take-over stage of power consolida-
tion and the mobilization stage in which transformation of 
the economy and society was to be achieved were fused. To 
various degrees both stages served both functions. The 
total evacuation of the cities disintegrated traditional 
patterns, but also tremendously increased the human capital 
that could be exploited. Whether or not consciously desired 
by the party leaders, the evacuations, by mortally effecting 
mainly the old and feeble who, consuming but hardly capable 
of hard work, were only a burden to the KR revolution, 
certainly rationalized their work force. Collectivization, 
nearly simultaneously, reintegrated the people under KR 
control, effectuating forced choice to ensure compliance. 
Consumption was reduced to a minimum. People were mainly 
seen as a means of production necessary to extract as much 
surplus labour from as possible, at the least possible 
cost. And, as mentioned earlier, the more surplus the rulers 
want to extract in the shorter time, the more they will 
seek recourse to terror. This, the lack of value the KR' 
leaders placed on human life, the lack of sufficient food 
and decent medical care, was the greatest killer. This was 
not planned or organized by the centre, but, to a large 
extent, the result of the priority it gave to policies 
concerning security and accumulation above the immediate 
well-being of particularly the 'new people'. 
The terror initially mainly effected the 'new people'. 
Although influenced by poor peasants (and tribals) the 
party never became a peasant (or tribal) party. It was able 
to harness peasant (and tribal) energies but for ends these 
peasants and tribals never dreamed of. The peasants were in 
fact, although treated somewhat better, also enserfed. 
Peasant acquiescence of KR dominance could, besides recog-
nizing some aspects of peasant ideology, also have emanated 
from their awareness of the actual power relations. 
The degree of contamination by alien influences, 
deduced from a person's social background, determined one's 
trustworthiness or danger to the new regime. This more 
discriminate form of terror, therefore, first sought out 
old regime leaders and cadres and leaders (spiritual, 
intellectual and organizational) of rival organizations and 
value systems. The growing problems with the realization of 
the CPK's policies, reality lagging way behind the Utopian 
goals, failures having to be explained, but never the fault 
of the plans and goals of the centre, were blamed on those 
responsible for implementation, accusing them of treason. 
This heightened the Pol Pot group's struggle for control 
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over the whole party and country. Once it had decided the 
internal party struggle in its favour the terror turned 
inward. KR and party cadres in zones and ministries not 
under the control of the Pol Pot group were purged. The 
execution of policies remained problematic, however. 
Together with the system of unmasking "traitorous networks" 
through the autobiographic confessions of victims it fired 
the Pol Pot group's growing paranoid suspiciousness, sending 
the terror into a spiral of ever expanding purges, torture 
and death. 
The generalization of the terror coincided with an 
escalation of the conflict with Vietnam. Although much of 
the initial blame for the conflict can be laid with Vietnam, 
the CPK's belligerent handling of the conflict set the 
stage for war. It exacerbated Democratic Kampuchea's econo-
mic problems, stimulated more dissension within the party, 
increased the Pol Pot group's distrust, making it see more 
and more signs of treason and, consequently, more and more 
traitors. In the end the terror even started eating its own 
children, even top leaders of the regime becoming suspect. 
It succeeded in eating its own goal of a strong and indepen-
dent Kampuchea. The Vietnamese invasion that toppled the 
Pol Pot regime once again made Cambodia subservient to 
foreign powers. 
Democratic Kampuchea was not an attempt at auto-geno-
cide by a group of lunatics. It was a conscious and ration-
al, although very radical, attempt to create a classless 
and contradiction-free, modern and independent society. It 
was a case of a revolutionary intellectual elite which, 
confronted with the discrepancy between its ideals and 
reality, sought to achieve power to realize its ideals by 
any means possible. The tragedy of Cambodia is that the 
developing configuration of variables and circumstances 
diminished or weakened obstacles to the use of terror, 
whilst simultaneously enhancing those factors that might 
encourage its use, resulting in one of the worst possible 
revolutionary scenarios the twentieth century has seen. 
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Notes chapter 1 
1. I use the term Democratic Kampuchea (DK) when referring 
specifically to the regime established by the Khmers 
Rouges (KR) in Cambodia after the defeat of the United 
States-backed Lon Nol regime and brought down by the 
Vietnamese invasion in early January 1979. Alternately 
I refer to this regime as the Pol Pot or KR regime. 
Otherwise I use the term Cambodia 
2. I can only touch on these problems here. A thorough 
discussion would constitute at least one book in itself 
3. From the KR victory in April 1975 to the end of 1977 
there was not one critical article on DK in the follow­
ing left-wing magazines: Monthly Review, BoCAS, JoCA 
(its December 1977 issue carried the first critical 
article, by Pierre Rousset), Indochina Chr. (since 
1977 the SEAChr.). The same holds for Dutch magazines 
as the Groene and the Vietnam Bulletin (of which I was 
an editor at the time) 
4. Not only had the 'Viet Cong' not perpetrated the 
bloodbath, it was the Americans themselves that caused 
the countless civilian victims, e.g. Pluvier 1983: 171 
5. For the full details of this falsification affair and 
the western media's unwillingness to correct matters, 
see Indochina report July 1976, International Bulletin 
25-4-1977, Chomsky & Herman 1977, 1979: 169-171, 
McCormack 1979: 57-58, the Guardian Weekly 19-4-1978, 
SEAChr. 58 & 59, JoCA 4, 1977 
6. On media distortions and the role of the media -
Burgler R., Paper read at Cambodia Workshop, VASSOA-
ASC, Amsterdam, Dec. 1979 (which includes examples 
from the Dutch media), Weggel 1977: 16-19, Rousset 
1977 (inter alia examples from the French media), 
Retb<|>ll 1979, Kiernan, Letter to the Times, in: JoCA 
4, 1977: 546-547, Boua, ibid: 547-548, Chomsky, Letter 
to the Christian Science Monitor, in: ibid: 548-554, 
Burstein 1978: 53, 62, McCormack 1979: 48-58, Tarr & 
Tarr 1975, Vickery 1984: ch.2, Thion 1980c, VSEAI 
July-Sept. 1977:1-3, Chomsky & Herman 1977, 1979. For 
a more or less opposite view to Chomsky & Herman's on 
press coverage of DK see Shawcross 1983, 1985: ch.3-4 
7. See note 3 and Boggett 1979, Lek Hor Tan 1979, Second 
Consultation 1980, Thion 1981a: 13-20, Le Beer P., Le 
Monde 18-9-1976, Chanda Ν., Le Monde Dipl. 5, 1977 
Porter 1979: 137, McCormack 1979: 58-64, VSEAI July-
Sept. 1977: 1-2, Simons L.M., WP 19-02-1978 Burgler 
R., Bijeen June 1983: 6, Heder 1980b: 5 
2Θ3 
This is a very generalized scheme. Already in 1976 for 
instance the French left-wing magazines Liberation and 
Rouge came with critical analyses of the events in DK 
Finley 1978a: 36 n.11 
Vickery 1984: especially ch.2 
To mention but a few; Van Wolf eren, NRC 26-5-1979 
"remarkably many educated (...) among the recent 
refugees", Gray D., The Nation Review 1-12-1979 "per­
haps as many as several thousands arrive daily, depriv­
ing Cambodia of badly needed managers, technicians, 
doctors...". Economist 21-7-1979 among those who had 
tried to flee to Thailand in June 1979 but were turned 
back, were "a former president of Cambodia's supreme 
court, a former director-general of finance, bank 
presidents, doctors, dentists, teachers", Vickery 
1984: 49 & п. З according to a European businessman 
with wide contacts in Phnom Penh (PP) before 1975, 
after 1979 "there was a sudden arrival at the border 
of all sorts of old acquaintances presumed dead -
businessmen, bankers, professionals, military offi­
cers...", FEER 9-11-1979 "one of the rightist guerilla 
groups, the SNLM, counts about 1000 soldiers, most of 
them ex-Lon Nol soldiers who fled after the Vietnamese 
invasion". Heder 1980a, 1980b the Heng Samrin govern­
ment was discomfited to find, after initial efforts to 
reorganize the local administration, that it ran the 
risk of parts of the country being taken over at that 
level by military and civilian servants from the 
Sihanouk and Lon Nol period, Vickery 1986: 49 "below 
the highest ministerial level the PRK administration 
is full of people many of whom were employed under 
Sihanouk and Lon Nol", Vickery 1984: 244 perhaps half 
the surviving doctors, thousands of teachers, uncounted 
numbers of skilled administrators, technicians, and 
other educated people fled in 1979, FEER 4-1-1980: 50 
% of doctors have been killed during 1975 and 1979, 
according to authorities. (According to the Tribunal 
against Pol Pot and leng Sari it was claimed that only 
54 of 500 doctors had survived, see FEER Yearbook 
1980: 208, and Burchett W., VB 22-12-1979: 10). Gough 
1982: 64 the Heng Samrin government's Director of 
General Planning Keo Samuth e.g. said that "all in­
dustry (was) destroyed by Pol Pot". Shawcross 1985: 
359 when Elizabeth Becker returned to PP in 1983, 
however, she noted that there seemed to be less in­
dustrial activity than in 1978, when she visited DK, 
although the PRK government had by then had four years 
and much Soviet and Vietnamese aid to restore indus­
trial activity. Also see Vickery 1986: 146 n.28. On 
destruction of western goods and Buddhist temples see 
chapter 5.1 and notes 12, 13, 14, chapter 5.2 and 
note 59. On minorities see chapter 8 and note 27. 
Concerning babies and pregnant women see chapter 5.2 
2 4 
and note 66 and chapter 8 and note 43, also e.g. 
interview with Dr. Vinot, VB 22-12-1979: 4, Claassen 
Α., Volkskrant 9-2-1980, Howard, NYRoB Jan. 1980: 27, 
Richardson M., PEER 12-2-1982: 35, and many reports 
from the refugee camps in Thailand 
12. See chapter 8 and notes 51 S 52 
13. I have, on the whole, refrained from criticising what 
I consider to be misleading and incorrect information 
presented in other works, as I have generally refrained 
from going into debate with other authors there where 
I strongly disagree with their presentation and/or 
interpretation. That would have constituted a book by 
itself 
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Notes chapter 2 
1. Simon 1974: 3 
2. Carney 1977: 15. Carney refers to Samphan's doctoral 
thesis, but in the translation that I have had access 
to, Laura Summers' translation N.Y. 1979, Samphan 
mentions a possible "violent upheaval" if structural 
disequilibrium "should become intolerable for an 
increasingly large percentage of the population", 
Samphan 1979: 68 
3. Delvert 1961 
4. Carney 1977: 14. According to Kiernan 1982b: 4-13 the 
percentage of farming families who owned no land and 
lived as tenants or sharecroppers had, by 1970, in-
creased to 20% 
5. Rousset 1977: 521. According to the historian and 
Vietnam specialist Feddema, 50 to 60% of the peasants 
in Annam and Tonkin owned 0-1 mâu (= 0,36 hectare). 
The majority, therefore, owned very little or no land 
but was not absolutely landless. Raymond Feddema 
personal communication, June 1984 
6. Delvert 1961: 563, also Kiernan 1982b: 4-13 on wide-
spread indebtedness 
7. Prud'homme 1969: 75 says "among the lowest in the 
world". Thion 1983: 13 mentions a 1961-1962 study by 
G. Martel, of a village near Angkor still showing "the 
traditional features of a pre-capitalist economy": 
limited trade, self-subsistence, indebtedness 
8. Kiernan 1976a: 372 
9. Delvert 1961 : 594 
10. Vickery 1984: 2 ff 
11. For a detailed account of the birth and development of 
the Cambodian communist movement, see Kiernan 1985 
12. Meyer 1971: 187-188. Pluvier 1974: 507 says the Cam-
bodian communists recruited their followers mainly 
from ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese. Khmer Krom is the 
name given to the ethnic Cambodians living in South 
Vietnam. Girling 1972: 551 also mentions that the more 
politically minded Cambodian independence fighters 
came from this community. According to Weggel 1977: 41 
many joined the KR. Kiernan 1975: 35-36 indicates that 
it may be likely that many Khmer Krom had leftist 
sympathies. But Chomsky 1971: 140, and Caldwell & Tan 
1973: 162, 229, 299, 312 mention Khmer Krom units 
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fighting for the USA and their allies 
13. Chandler 1979a: 5, Osborne 1975: 235, Laurent 1968: 
44. The great majority of KPRP members were still 
Vietnamese in 1951, Kiernan 1985: 83-84. The KPRP was 
also called the Revolutionary Cambodian People's Party 
or Revolutionary Party of the Cambodian People -
probably the result of transliteration problems from 
Khmer. There is some controversy over the founding 
date of the KPRP, see Kiernan 1985: 78-85 and Vickery 
1986: 40-64 and 184 n.25, for contending views 
14. Laurent 1968: 43, Thion 1983: 11-13, 18-19, Pluvier 
1974: 528 (hardly influential), Kiernan 1985: 82 (the 
TCP's failure as yet to penetrate the peasantry 
(1951)), 86, 153, 117-118 (no success in the cities 
for the Khmer communist movement) 
15. The 1840 uprising against the Vietnamese had been 
caused by "a deepening resentment of the Vietnamese 
domination of Cambodian life", Chandler 1975: 143 
notes. The 1820-1821 millenarian rebellion was also 
against the Vietnamese, Chandler 1983c: 120 ff 
16. Countless journalist reports' of interviews with Khmer 
in Cambodia are witness to this, see ch.7 n.220 and 
221 . In many Khmer fairy-tales and stories the bad 
guys are Vietnamese, Barth S Terzani 1980: 32 
17. Newman 1979: 205 
18. Kiernan 1979a: 8, 9, Heder 1978: 43, Rousset 1978: 
201, 216, Summers 1981: 414, Thion 1980a: 42, 45, 
Chang Pao-Min 1985: 5, β 
19. Carney 1977: 3, Vickery 1986: 12, Thion 1983: 19, 
Kiernan 1985: 99-100, 131 
20. Summers 1981: 414. The Cambodian left-wing author Lek 
Hor Tan 1979: 4 also talks of "Khmer-Vietminh". 
According to Kiernan 1985: 77-78, the term was coined 
by Sihanouk in 1951, ibid: inter alia 70-78, 96-97, 
104-105, for references to Khmer Issarak anti-Viet­
namese and anti-Vietminh attitudes and conflicts. For 
evidence of Vietminh tutelage, Etcheson 1984: 40 (the 
VWP reserves the right to supervise the activities of 
its brother parties in Cambodia and Laos), Quinn 1982: 
4 (even the (KPRP's) name and statutes had to be 
translated from Vietnamese) 
21. In the latter half of the 1950's even the Vietnamese 
communists in South Vietnam who wanted to fight the 
United States' sponsored South Vietnamese government, 
were rejected by Hanoi as Hanoi, at that time, con­
sidered the re-emergence of armed struggle against 
its interests. According to Sihanouk 1981: 209-212 the 
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Cambodian communists were side-tracked at the Geneva 
Conference by him, but also by the Vietnamese com-
munists, who were eager to earn concessions for Vietnam 
and for the pro-Vietnamese forces in Laos 
22. Pomonti & Thion 1971: 112 
23. Ibid: 281, Ponchaud 1978: 179 (half of 5000 went to 
Hanoi, the other half stayed but not all in the bush), 
Caldwell & Tan 1973: 91 (a handful went to Hanoi), 
Meyer 1971: 187, 188 (2000 went to Hanoi, at least 
1000 remained), Shawcross 1979: 238 (the bulk went to 
Hanoi, 2000 being closer to the truth than 4000), 
Carney 1977: 7 (estimates 2500 to 4000), FEER 
21-4-1978: 19 (Hoang Tung, member of the VWP's CC, 
mentioned several hundred in an interview with Nayan 
Chanda), the Vietnamese theoretical journal Communist 
Review Nov. 1983, however, says 1000, in FEER 
16-2-1984: 20, Etcheson 1984: 45 (probably between 
2000 and 5000), Stuart-Fox 1985: 22 «between 1000 and 
2000), Kiernan 1983: 153 (1000 Issaraks including over 
500 party members, but Kiernan 1985: 154 (190 KPRP 
members to Hanoi). They were forbidden to receive mail 
from home. In "one sense they were hostages to the 
nexus between the policies of Sihanouk and Hanoi", 
Kiernan 1985: 179. Unless otherwise indicated all 
renderings and citations in English from non-English 
sources are by the author - RB 
24. Summers 1981: 416 
25. Ibid: 417 
26. Thion & Kiernan 1981: 355 Annexe I. Chandler 1983c: 
186 and n.23, notes that in none of the articles is 
there any hint of an internationalist view of the 
Indochinese struggle. Up to 1975 I will use the name 
Saloth Sar when the reference is specifically to the 
person. When it is more political (Pol Pot group, Pol 
Pot's policies) and when in reference to remarks made 
by him in the post-1975 period I use the name Pol Pot 
27. Van Damme 1980: 47, Kiernan 1982b: 16, Debré 1976: 80 
28. Ponchaud 1978: 178, Chandler 1983c: 186 and n.23. When 
Saloth Sar returned to Cambodia in 1953 he joined an 
'ICP cell' (Vietminh dominated Khmer communist resis-
tance). It seems, according to Kiernan 1985: 122-124, 
that this experience increased his dislike of the 
Vietnamese communists. According to his 1976 confes-
sion, extracted under torture at the Pol Pot regime's 
central interrogation centre. Tuoi Sleng, Non Suon, an 
ex-Khmer-Vietminh peasant cadre and his Pracheachon 
comrades, all of lower class non-intellectual back-
ground, did not trust the returned students from 
France. They were opposed to giving them important 
2ΘΘ 
roles because of their middle class and privileged 
backgrounds. Cambodian communism should be in the 
hands of poor peasants, in Vickery 1984: 198-199 
29. Poole 1974: 325 
30. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 1 October 1977, 
FE/5629/C2/6 as quoted in Kiernan 1982a: 235 
31. Sarin 1977a: 37 
32. "Summary of annotated party history, written by the 
military-political service of the Eastern Zone - US 
gov. translation of captured document, Kiernan 1982a: 
235 (brackets in original) 
33. Chandler 1983: 292 
34. According to a party history distributed by leng Sari 
in 1971 to cadres in Hanoi (1971 party history), in 
Kiernan 1985: 190. In 1966 the party's name was changed 
to Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) 
35. In Kiernan 1985 364-367. The first part of the 1974 
party history is practically the same as the East 
zone's 1973 party history's first 18 points, except 
that all references to solidarity with Vietnam, to the 
ICP and to previous party leaders who had followed a 
policy of solidarity with Vietnam, had been deleted. 
36. Kiernan 1985: 190 
37. Kiernan 1982a: 252-253. Kiernan cites the first edition 
of the Black Book, Sept. 1978. It, the reference to 
Samouth, does not appear in later editions such as the 
second, widely spread, 1979 edition. This Black Book 
is the Pol Pot regime's account of its history and its 
version of Cambodian - Vietnamese relations 
38. Kiernan 1985: 190, Nuon Chea, So Phim and Ney Sarann 
had been among those Khmer Vietminh who had gone to 
Hanoi following the Geneva conference, but had returned 
a few months later along what was later to become 
known as the Ho-Chi-Minh trail 
39. In Kiernan 1985: 193 
40. Kiernan 1985: 190 
41. Kiernan 1982a: 251-252 
42. leng Sari says the police assassinated Samouth, 
Burstein 1978: 42, as does Pol Pot 1979: 112 in his 
interview with Jugoslav journalists. In Hanoi, however, 
"there were hints of Pol Pot's involvement", according 
to Chanda Ν., FEER 21-4-1978: 18. Sihanouk agrees with 
2Θ9 
this, Schier S Schier-Ошп 1980: 6, as does Kiernan 
1983: 153, who says he was "probably betrayed to the 
police and executed". The Heng Samrin government said 
it was Sihanouk, FEER 22-5-1981: 17, although its 
prime minister and party secretary till his removal in 
December 1981, the Khmer Vietminh Pen Sovan, in his 
political report to the 4th Party Congress in May 1981 
said that Pol Pot's agents had assassinated Samouth, 
Vickery 1986: 72 
43. Vickery 1984: 147, Kiernan 1985: 172. Kiernan 1985: 
124 claims he was not a returnee from France 
44. Kiernan 1985: 200, Vickery 1986: 17, Chandler 1983: 293 
45. Pol Pot 1977. For a detailed account of these events 
see Summers 1979b: 12-20, also Heder 1979a: 2-4, 
Kiernan 1985: 198-204 
46. Kiernan 1985: 367 
47. See e.g. two major documents from the DK period, Pol 
Pot's speech of September 30th, 1977 and the Black 
Book, first published in September 1978 (Pot 1977, 
Black Book 1979), in which the Stalinist scheme is 
used for presenting Cambodian history and for the 
CPK's class analysis. Willmott 1981: 213 also points 
to a Stalinist use of terms in Samphan's thesis. I 
also found this to be true of Hou Youn's doct. diss., 
1982a, also 1971 CPK Southwest zone documents cited in 
Kiernan 1985: 223-224 
48. For instance Carney 1977: 11-15, Peiris D., FEER 
2-6-1978: 40-41, Hildebrand & Porter 1976b: 67-69, 
Pluvier 1983: 256, Stuart-Fox 1985:160, Debré 1976: 
30, Shawcross 1976al: 17 
49. Samphan 1979. His autarkic approach is very similar to 
Samir Amin's (see Amin 1970 or Amin 1976a and 1976b) 
and André Gunder Frank's (see Frank 1969) body of 
thought generally referred to as "centre - periphery 
relations". Amin was a colleague of Samphan's in Paris 
according to Etcheson 1984: 52 
50. Willmott 1981: 213 n.10. He bases this on what he has 
seen of Hou Youn's first chapter of The Cooperative 
Question, Phnom Penh 1964 (published in Khmer) which 
was translated and appeared in News from Kampuchea, 
vol 1, no. 2 (June 1977) and on Hu Nim's doctoral 
dissertation Les Services Publics Economiques au 
Cambodge, University of Phnom Penh, 1965. Hou Youn's 
dissertation, La paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets 
de modernization, had been presented at the University 
of Paris in 1955, four years before Samphan's. Extracts 
of this thesis have been translated by Kiernan, (Hou 
Youn 1982a). From this translation it is not evident 
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that Hou Youn already advocated an autarkic approach. 
Debré's discussion of Hou Youn's thesis, however, does 
convey the impression that Hou Youn at that time 
already advocated self-reliancy, Oebré 1976: 88-94 
51. Willmott 1981: 221 
52. Delvert 1961: 639-640 
53. Ibid: 465, 638 
54. Summers 1981: 418, Pot 1977, also Chandler 1983: 292, 
where Chandler cites Tung Padevat (Revolutionary Flag, 
the internal magazine of the CPK) Sept.-Oct. 1976 
issue, which says about this period "We could only 
defeat the enemy by fighting a revolution", the enemy 
being Sihanouk 
55. "There were conflicts within our ranks" due to this 
analysis, he said. "There were a number of factions 
which thought that Cambodia was independent", in 
Kiernan 1985: 191 
56. Samphan 1979: 100-104 
57. Youn 1982b: 136-138, 160 ff. In his thesis Youn at one 
point says "we have posed a certain number of related 
problems, which can be solved only by establishing a 
rational system of agrarian relations to pave the way 
for the development of capitalism and create the 
necessary foundations for the industrialisation of our 
country", Youn 1982a: 63. Ponchaud and Debré also 
underline the division into 'radicals' and 'moderates' 
within the ranks of the returnees, Ponchaud 1978: 179, 
Debré 1976: 86-88, as does the VWP's counterpart to 
the Pol Pot regime's Black Book, Kampuchea Dossier II 
1978: 60. The Pol Pot group even does so. Black Book 
1979: 33, 48 
58. Kiernan 1985: 196 
59. Son Sen in fact remained in hiding in Phnom Penh 
following them a year later. Sarin 1977b: 44, as did 
Ney Sarann and Nuon Chea. The wives of Son Sen, leng 
Sari and Saloth Sar apparently joined them in 1965. 
Phuong, Chou Chet, Koy Thuon and Ke Pauk also took to 
the jungle in 1964, as did Chhouk in 1965, Kiernan 
1985: 203, 213, 214 
60. Pomonti ft Thion 1971: 118-122, Kiernan 19751: 9, van 
Damme 1980: 61-62, Ponchaud 1978: 185, 189, Black Book 
1979: 22, Thion 1983: 24 
61. Kiernan 1982a: 251 and n.52, van Damme 1980: 62 who 
incorrectly refers to Sihanouk 1979: 125, confusing 
the Khmer word Yothea, which means soldiers, for 
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tribals. In 1976 leng Sari, during a lecture, said 
that the northeast hill-tribes people were faithful to 
the revolution, not commercially orientated, and they 
had class hatred, according to someone who attended 
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received their rations husked, although Yathay 1980a: 
96-99 mentions having to mill it themselves in Takeo 
37. Delvert 1961: 532, also Youn 1982a: 49 who says that 
the average Kampuchean does not consume more than 350 
grams of rice daily (in the 1950's - RB) 
38. See this chapter note 6 
39. Vickery 1984: 84 
40. For instance Burgier R., Onze Wereld June 1983: 26 the 
Karen of northern Thailand call this period the 'hunger 
period'. According to Boua 1982: 60, on the basis of 
interviews, only during the harvest months was there 
sufficient food in DK 
41. Shawcross 1976b: 9 
42. De Beer P., Le Monde 8-11-1975, FEER 28-9-1979: 86, 
Ponchaud 1978: 206 
43. Da Silva E., NRC 5-9-1975, FEER 28-11-1975: 20, FEER 
28-9-1979: 86, Weggel 1977: 43 citing the Bangkok Post 
19-11-1975 
44. For instance Volkskrant 12-1-1980 Sophann and Hayouk 
testimony (per family), also Le Monde 21-5-1976 ex-in-
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doubt, for they were expertly applying science of 
seeds for new rice hybrids". Also Dudman 1979: 7B 
74. Pot 1978c: 34-35 
75. Stanic 1978: 77. Also see the pictures in Burstein 
1978: 30-34, in the official DK picture magazines 
Pictures 1976 and Moving Forward 1977 and in Dudman 1979 
76. Yathay 1980a: 138, 189, 254, Le Monde 18,19-4-1976 
interview with Savannary, Le Monde 21-5-1976 with 
ex-Pailin evacuee, VB 15-11-1979: 22 Sarun testimony, 
Stuart-Fox 1985: 44, 46 Ung testimony. Chandler 1976a: 
4, 5, 9-12 Peang Sophi testimony, NYT 1-11-1977 Hoeng 
An Khieng testimony. Le Monde 18-9-1976 interview with 
Haksimsan, Vong Sarat, Ponchaud F., Le Monde 18-2-1976, 
Shawcross 1979: 377, Weggel 1977: 34, 47, Tarr & Tarr 
1975: 7, 20, Shawcross 1976a I: 18, ibid 1976b: 9, 
Rousset 1977: 519, Chanda Ν., FEER 29-10-1976: 23, 
FEER 26-3-1976: 24 citing Björk (Swedish ambassador), 
most of the 1978 visitors 
77. Only 5 of the 94 refugees Ponchaud interviewed for his 
book said that they had actually witnessed killings, 
McCormack 1979: 60 citing T. Retb<J>ll, letter to the 
Economist 23-5-1978 (but I have not found this letter, 
having gone through the Economist from 1-4-1978 to 
15-7-1978 and checking 23-5-1977 and 23-5-1979. As a 
matter of fact there is no Economist dated 23-5-1977 
or 1978 or 1979), Gallois J., New Statesman 13-4-1979, 
Paringaux R., Guardian Weekly 4-1-1979, Chomsky S 
Herman 1979 II: 146 citing J. Fraser, Toronto Globe 
and Mail 27-11-1978, Schanberg 1985: 44 Dith Pran saw 
no killing himself, nor did Ung, Stuart-Fox 1985: 56 
78. E.g. Vickery 1984: 96 agricultural engineer who was 
jailed, then sent to a re-education camp, then gradua-
ted to an ordinary co-operative, ibid: 133-135 high 
Lon Nol officer jailed, then labour camp, then ordinary 
co-operative, Szymusiak 1987: 20 her uncle 3 months 
re-education camp, then released, rejoined his family, 
Corrèze & Forest 1984: 42 Phany, Ea 1981: 218 n.28, 
Woollacott M., Guardian 22-2-1976 
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79. Shawcross 1985: 227 a number of examples, Vickery 
19Θ4: 49-51, 206, many examples, inter alia more than 
half of the unaccompanied minors of three refugee 
camps who had initially reported "knowing of" or even 
"witnessing" their parents' death in DK were eventually 
reunited with those same parents, Picq 1984: 138 a 
cadre who had disappeared after severe criticism, 
turned up about li years later in a higher position 
80. Ponchaud 1978: 66, 72, 148, Ponchaud F., Le Monde 
18-2-1976, Heder 1980e: 69, 36, 71, Kiernan 1982a: 
251, 313-314 η.167, 207 η.9, Yathay 1980a: 104, Heder 
1980b: 16, 17, Phandara 1982: ch.7-11, Vickery 1984: 
93, 94, 96 
81. According to Vickery 1984: 318 n.138 on the basis of 
information gathered at Khao I Dang refugee camp 
82. Ponchaud 1978: 89-91 
83. Corrèze & Forest 1984: 177 Dr. Ang Sarun, Vickery 
1984: 53 intellectuals, 166 doctors, 52 primary school 
teacher, also see use of old regime specialists ch.7.1 
and note 19 
84. Chandler 1976a: i Peang Sophi was elected economic 
leader of an 800 man work-team, Yathay 1980a: 62 
mentions only one case, Szymusiak 1987: 80 ff together 
with other girls from her work team, became a "daughter 
of Pol Pot" for a while, but she was 13 at the time 
85. This is mentioned by many refugees, inter alia by 
Yathay, Sophi, Ung, Picq, Hong Var, Szymusiak, and 
Naito Yasuko, the latter in McCormack 1980: 37 (see 
this chapter note 68) 
86. Stuart-Fox 1985: 43 Ung testimony 
87. Kiernan 1979c: 8 Hong Var testimony, also e.g. Vickery 
1984: 135, Corrèze & Forest 1984: 173 Dr. Ang Sarun 
testimony, Stuart-Fox 1985: 45, 55, 60 Ung testimony 
88. Picq 1984, Barth & Terzani 1980: 75 a student who 
returned from France in 1976 
89. Yathay 1980a: 103, 303, Ung, however, says that if you 
wanted tobacco you had to grow your own in his area, 
sector 22, East zone, in 1975, Stuart-Fox 1985: 46, 
according to Szymusiak 1987: 160 a dressing of tobacco 
with saliva was the KR' standard remedy for cuts and bruises 
90. Chandler 1976a: 2-3 Peang Sophi testimony 
91. Cazaux J. & Juvenal C , WP 9-5-1975, cf. Stuart-Fox 
1985: 3 Ung testimony 
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92. Yathay 1980a: 163 
93. VSEAI Jan.-March 1980: 20 quoting Kiernan 
94. Picq 1984: 55 
95. Yathay 1980a: 103 
96. For instance de Beer P., Le Monde 10-5-1975 
97. Ponchaud 1978: 77, Yathay 1980a: 410, Sihanouk discus-
ses in some detail training, background and mentality 
of the KR, see eh.8 this work and Sihanouk 1979: 67, 
97-98, 136, 137. See also inter alia Szymusiak 1987: 
16, 21 ff, 40, 52, 62, 81, 93, 105-107, Picq 1984, 
Yathay 1980a, Stuart-Fox 1985 Ung testimony, Schanberg 
1985: 46, 51, Dith Pran testimony, Barth ft Terzani 
1980: 77, Corrèze 8 Forest 1984: 177, 179, Dr. Ang 
Sarun testimony, Vickery 1984: 135, for examples of KR 
kindness, help and leniency 
98. See e.g. Kiernan 1985: 276, 293 n.175 for examples 
99. Vickery 1984: 6, 5-7 for some examples 
100. Le Monde 8-9-1977 
101. Le Monde 18-9-1976 interview with Vong Saret 
102. Yathay 1980a: 74 
103. See notes 100 & 101 and Ponchaud 1978: 85, 123, Yathay 
1980a: 93, Kamm Η., IHT 17-7-1975, Martin 1982: 13 
104. Stuart-Fox 1985: 55 
105. Inter alia Szymusiak 1987 many examples, Corrèze & 
Forest 1984: 172 Dr. Ang Sarun testimony, Stuart-Fox 
1985: 55, 95 Ung testimony 
106. Inter alia Le Monde 7-9-1977 interview with Ly, Der 
Spiegel 9/1978 Khem Sou, Stuart-Fox 1985: 82, 95 Ung, 
Le Monde 18-9-1976 Vong Saret, Le Monde 18, 19-4-1976 
Savannary, Volkskrant 12-1-1980 Sophann ft Hayouk 
107. Shawcross 1976b: 9. In Ung's village 12.000 people and 
less than 50 KR, Stuart-Fox 1985: 53. Also Szymusiak 
1987: 50-51, 59, Vickery 1984: 40-41 
108. Vickery 1984: 108, 110 examples in Northwest zone, 133 
East zone, 135 Kp. Thorn, 137 Siem Reap 
109. Ponchaud 1978: 205-206 citing Sam Suon 
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110. Kelly Ν., Times 30-1-1978. Also Volkskrant 12-1-1980 
Sophann S Hayouk, Le Monde 7-9-1977 Ly, Der Spiegel 
9/1978 Khem Sou, Szymusiak 1987: 19, 29, 35, Yathay 
1980a: inter alia 275, Le Monde 8-11-1975 Souvannari 
111. Stuart-Fox 1985: 46, Ponchaud 1978: 80-81, Yathay 
1980a: 78-80, 144-145, 148, 263, 289, 344, Szymusiak 
1987: 91, 94, 95, Paringaux R., Le Monde 7,8-9-1977 
112. Heder 1980α: 26 
113. Ibid 
114. Yathay 1980a: 161 ff, 190 ff, and Szymusiak 1987: 
inter alia 34, 37, 52, 57, 66, 72, 76, 94, 98, 100, 
148. Also Le Monde 15-5-1976 Tun Bunleang, FEER 
31-8-1979 Nim Dará, Heder 1980e: 47, Ponchaud 1978: 
numerous accounts, Phandara 1982: various incidents 
115. Carney 1977: 11 
116. Chandler 1976a: 20 Peang Sophi testimony, cf. Sampson 
W., letter to Economist 26-3-1977, Ponchaud 1978: 54, 
Kiernan 1979c: 8 Hong Var testimony 
117. Porter 1979: 140, de Beer P., Le Monde 28-9-1976, 
Chandler 1977: 207 ff, Simons L., WP 19-2-1978, Rousset 
1977: 518, Chomsky & Herman 1979 II: 352 n.90, VB June 
1983: interview with Ben Kiernan who says "in some 
areas, after a few months of re-education ex-Lon Nol 
cadres were released, in other areas they and their 
families were killed", Kuper 1981: 156 Summary provided 
by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
(etc.) of the Commission on Human Rights of the UN 
30-1-1979 pt. iv "treatment (of lower level Lon Nol 
cadre) appears to have been different from region to 
region", Thayer 1981: 94 in the northwest Lon Nol 
military, including non-commissioned officers, Lon Nol 
functionaries and intellectuals were executed, but 
reports from the east and southwest indicate only the 
killing of officers, intellectuals being left alone, 
Ea 1981: 216 Kratie and Stung Treng provinces did not 
experience hunger, excessive and constant overwork or 
the psychological stress that produced injurious 
effects on the health of women as in Pursat or Battambang 
118. Kiernan 1976a: 372 
119. Ibid: 375 and Vickery 1984: 100 
120. Vickery M., Becker H., in Kiernan 1976a: 376 n.18 
121. VB 15-11-1979: 23 Hok Sarun testimony 
122. Chandler 1976a: 8 Peang Sophi testimony 
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123. Myrdal J., Befreiung July 1979: 6-19 
124. Kiernan 1976a: 374 citing Bangkok Post 25-6-1975 
quoting a KR official telling a prospective refugee 
that order had just gone out to stop killing. Chandler 
1976a: 9 Peang Sophi says local cadres mentioned it at 
a meeting, Kiernan 1982a: 313-314 n.156 Sim Savuth, 
wife of ex-Lon Nol soldier mentioned that orders came 
from Phnom Penh in April or May 1975 to stop this 
killing, also Srey Pich Chnay and Thuy Bounsovanny 
with similar reports from Battambang Province, Porter 
1979: 140 cites ex-Cambodian diplomat who was told by 
a high-ranking KR cadre, end of May 1975 near the Thai 
border, that local officials had received specific 
orders to stop killing old regime cadres. No source 
given, perhaps it is the same as the Bangkok Post 
story mentioned above. For the October 1975 order 
Vickery 1984: 99, 110, 112 a KR official, a Nnorthwest 
zone village chief and a Southwest zone 'new person' 
125. To mention a few sources from areas other than the 
northwest; VB 22-12-1979: 13 Denise Affonco (Svay 
Rieng prov.), Kiernan 1979e: 2 Heng (Svay Rieng), VB 
28-4-1979: Mao Sras (Kp. Cham), ibid Amnesty Interna-
tional report (Cham minority being killed in Kp. Cham), 
NYT 1-11-1979 Hoeng An Khieng (Koh Kong), PEER 
31-8-1979 Nim Darà (Takeo), Le Monde 7-9-1977 Ly 
(Kampot), Le Monde 18-9-1976 Haskimsan (Kp. Speu), 
Kiernan & Boua 1982: 332 Thoun Cheng (Kp. Cham), Quinn 
1977: 53 cites Ponchaud who mentions refugees from all 
areas saying that ex-Lon Nol cadres were being ex-
ecuted, Kiernan 1982a: 298 Sarun (eastern & central 
Cambodia), Heder 1980e,· 44, 45 ex-KR soldiers East 
zone), Vickery 1984: 130-131 two testimonies from 
Kratie Province, 132-133 one from sector 22, East 
zone, also see above note 117 
126. Yathay 1980a: 85, 92, 237, 336. Other 'new people' had 
similar experiences, inter alia Stuart-Fox 1985 Ung, 
Szymusiak 1987, also Vickery 1984: 269, ibid 1986: 30, 
Martin 1981: 14, Barnett 1983: 211 ff, Barth & Terzani 
1980: 78. leng Sari admitted as much when he said that 
some cadres forbade the growing of maize and sugarcane 
around the house, as they regarded this as a sign of 
individualism, FEER 22-6-1979: 11 
127. VB 15-11-1979: 22 Sarun testimony. Also Kiernan 1979c: 
8 Hong Var testimony 
128. VB June 1983: 22 interview with Ben Kiernan 
129. AndeIman D., IHT 22-1-1976 
130. On the second evacuation see for instance; Ponchaud 
1978: 76-77, Yathay 1980a: 82-134, Andelman D., IHT 
22-1-1976, NYT 21-1-1976, Keesing 1976: 316, Ponchaud 
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F., Le Monde 17-2-1976, Szymusiak 1987 45-65 
131. There is some confusion here, people getting communes 
and co-operatives mixed up 
132. Carney 1977: 19 citing Radio PP 3-2-1976 (brackets in 
original), Stuart-Fox 1985: 82, also Weggel 1977: 28 
(who incorrectly says the co-operatives took the form 
of village (khum) instead of hamlet, see Carney 1977: 
19 n.104 
133. Pot 1977: 92 
134. Yathay 1980a: 281, also VB 25-6-1980: 20 interview 
with Sokieng who says that co-operatives consisted of 
about 100 families each. When Quinn 1977: 52 says a 
co-operative consists of about 50 families he confuses 
them with camps or work brigades. Andelman D., IHT 
6-5-1977 is closer with 200 to 400 families per co-op-
erative. VB 15-11-1979: 22 Sarun says that the Kencho 
area of Battambang consisted of 4 co-operatives with 
about 2000 families each. Phany's 'new people' co-op-
erative in Pursat consisted of 6 groups of 150 people 
each Corrèze S Forest 1984: 41, visitors to Cambodia 
in 1978 visited co-operatives with from 300 members 
(Preah Meas in Kp. Cham) Becker: 1979: 5, to up to 
9000 members (Lebo and Ang Trasom co-operatives in 
Takeo) Bergström 1978: 22. Ito 1978: 47 mentions that 
the Lebo co-operative (he calls it Libo) had 5000 
members, divided into 7 production corps. According to 
a delegation of American Marxist-Leninists who also 
visited Ang Trasom (calling it Ang Tasom) it had 1300 
members, Burstein 1978: 11 
135. Chandler 1976a: 7 
136. Le Monde 21-5-1976 interview with ex-inhabitant of Pailin 
137. FEER 26-3-1976: 24 
138. Stanic 1978: 83, Ekerwald 1978: 10, Wikander 1978: 18, 
Bergström 1978: 22, 24, Volkskrant 12-1-1980 interview 
with Sophann & Hayouk, FEER 22-6-1979: 11 leng Sari 
139. Szymusiak 1987: 93, 95, 96, 113, 128, 131, 155, 164, 
165, 170-171 
140. IHT 24-7-1977, cf. Naito Yasuko cited in McCormack 
1980: 34, Szymusiak 1987: 95, 96, 113, 131, 164-165 
141. Boua 1982: 59, also Stuart-Fox 1985: 86 
142. Yathay 1980a: 183, 281. Dr. Ang Sarun says communal 
eating in Chamkar Loeu (East zone) was introduced in 
Sept. 1976, Corrèze & Forest 1984: 176, Ung notes the 
same, adding that it occurred together with the intro-
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auction of co-operatives, in sector 22 (also East 
zone), Stuart-Fox 1985: 82-86. In sector 3 (Northwest 
zone) it was only introduced in August 1977, according 
to Vickery 1984: 110 
143. Dudman 1979: 7B. Also the other 1978 visitors, 
Shawcross 1976b: 9 and many refugee reports 
144. Here again reports about at what age differ considerab-
ly. According to McCormack "(a)t an early age, various-
ly described as soon as the child finished breast 
feeding, at four years, or at eight years, children 
were separated from their parents, made to live in 
communal huts and assigned simple work tasks (...) In 
some cases, however, children do seem to have remained 
attached, at least for sleeping purposes, to the 
family" McCormack 1979: 66 
145. Picq 1984: 71 
146. Becker 1979: 8, Kiernan 1979c: 9 Hong Var testimony, 
Yathay 1980a: 275, Volkskrant 12-1-1980 interview with 
Sophann & Hayouk, Vickery 1984: 178, Quinn 1977: 52, 
Le Monde 18,19-4-1976 interview with Savannary, 
Stuart-Fox 1985: 108 Ung testimony, VSEAI Jan.- March 
1980: 3 talk by Chanthou Boua, Reading Uhiversity 5, 6,7-1-1980 
147. Dudman 1979: 6B. Also Bergström 1978: 23, Stanic 1978: 
70, Burstein 1978: 12-13, Yathay 1980a: 281, 286, 
Debré 1976: IB Sok Thy testimony, Le Monde 7-9-1977 Ly 
interview 
148. Kiernan 1976a: 386 "according to all sources", Chanda 
Ν., FEER 29-10-1976: 20, Ponchaud 1978: 81, Le Monde 
5-6-1976 Pech Lim Kuon (helicopter pilot for the KR) 
interview, also in FEER 29-10-1976: 23 "but bad qua­
lity. Rice was also being imported from China", Ea 
1981: 215, IHT 22-1-1976 Chou Try interview, Szymusiak 
1987: 93 ff 
149. Kelly N., Times 30-1-1978 
150. Simons L., WP 28-4-1976, also Guardian 29-4-1976. 
Björk, after his visit in early 1976, said "he saw no 
signs of starvation" something he attributed to the 
evacuation, cited in FEER 26-3-1976, also Le Monde 
4-3-1976, Munro R., NYT 9-3-1976 
151 . Times 22-4-1976 
152. Ponchaud 1978: 81. Martin 1981: 37-38 mentions people 
seeing trucks with rice going to PP and to Kompong Som 
harbour, and Chinese boats being loaded 
153. McCormack 1980: 34 
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154. Kiernan 1976a: 380, Le Monde 18-9-1976 
155. Yathay 1980a: 200-211, 250, Szymusiak 1987: 93 ff also 
mentions diminishing rations during the course of 
1976, cf. Ung testimony, Stuart-Fox 1985: 86 for East 
zone 'base people' village 
156. Kiernan 1979c: 9 
157. Le Monde 21-8-1977 
158. Barth & Terzani 1980: 75 ff 
159. Vickery 1984: 162 
160. Yathay 1980a: 97-98, also Kiernan 1981: 27 Kerb's 
song, Prediction de Pouth, 1863 cited by Sokha 1979: 3 
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Notes chapter 6 
1 . The number of zones and autonomous zones as well as 
their boundaries seems to be unclear. Ponchaud 1978: 
110-111 mentions 6, calling them regions; North, 
Northwest, Southwest, West, East and Northeast, plus 5 
autonomous zones; Kratie, Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, 
Oddar Meanchey and Kp. Som. Weggel 1977: 39-40 mentions 
the same regions but does not include the Northeast. 
He also mentions 5 autonomous zones without naming 
them, although he adds that they were liberated long 
before the fall of Phnom Penh. Carney 1977: 9 mentions 
the same 5 zones as Weggel, as well as 5 sectors 
(autonomous zones, similar to those mentioned by 
Ponchaud above); Kratie, Preah Vihear, Siem Reap-Oddar 
Meanchey, Ratanakiri-Stung Treng, Mondolkiri. These 
"sectors" were included in one or other zone but 
separately administered. Carney adds that the represen-
tatives to the Assembly came from these zones and 
autonomous zones. Zone (military region = MR) 405 
included Takeo and Kampot provinces, MR 607 included 
Kandal Province and MR 203 Prey Veng and Svay Rieng 
provinces, according to Quinn 1976: 19. A MR was 
divided into sectors. Kampot e.g. was sector 35, Takeo 
sector 13, Kandal sector 25, Prey Veng sector 24 and 
part of 20, Svay Rieng sector 23, and so on. Vickery 
1984: 66 and n.'s 5 & 6 notes that the terminology for 
the Cambodian administration in English translation 
had not been stable in the literature to date. What 
some, including myself, e.g. have called zone has by 
others been called region. Similarly damban (my sector) 
has by others been called region. Zones were rarely 
referred to by number, not even by KR cadres, nearly 
always by compass terms. Vickery also points out that 
the administrative division in DK were not always 
stable. I have already noted the creation of the 
Special zone during the war. After the war this zone 
disappeared. The West zone was then created out of the 
western part of the Southwest zone. After the 1977 
purge the North zone was split into a North and Central 
zone, the new North zone now also including the former 
Siem Reap special sector 106, now renumbered 44. For 
the administrative divisions see map 
2. Ponchaud 1978: 114. According to Heder Ponchaud's 
rendering of the Khmer word kasethan as 'state farm' 
is not correct. It literally means 'agricultural site'. 
The term for state, roat, is absent although it always 
appears in the original Cambodian names of state 
enterprises that really exist, Heder 1978c. Heder is 
probably right but I doubt if it affects the essence 
of Ponchaud's description in this case. See also ch.5 
note 57 
3. Keesing 1976: 315 
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4. Le Monde 21-5-1976 ex-inhabitant of Pailin interview, 
Yathay 1980a: 236, Ponchaud 1978: 127. Ung was handed 
a ballot with one name already written on it, 
Stuart-Fox 1985: 70 
5. Keesing 1976: 315 citing Radio PP, also Quinn 1977: 45 
6. Communique 1976: 2 
7. Sihanouk 1986: 85 f f claims he wanted to resign inter 
alia because he did not want to continue endorsing the 
KR regime. After this resignation he was, he says, 
treated worse 
8. Weggel 1977: 38 citing Radio PP 5-1-1976 
9. Ibid: 41 according to Radio PP "the army was especially 
helpful in the taking over of the old regime's ad-
ministrative functions" 
10. Stuart-Fox 1985: 118 says he was identified with the 
veteran faction, Picq 1984: 100 says he belonged to 
the Koy Thuon clan, Vickery 1986: 33, 1984: 146 how-
ever, says that Koy Thuon was minister for Commerce 
11. Kiernan 1985: 139 n.166 suggests this, although not 
having mentioned it in previous works 
12. According to Hu Nim's Tuoi Sleng confession. Barnett 
1983: 220. On the meeting see Kiernan 1983: 178-179 
and ibid 1985: 422 n.22. According to Sin Song, a 
member of the economic committee of sector 24, Chhouk 
was especially against communal eating, which was 
therefore not introduced in sector 24 while he was in 
command there. But that was till Aug. 1976, at which 
time communal eating had not been introduced in many 
places yet. Other things in sector 24, according to 
Sin Song, where done according to Pol Pot's wishes 
13. Vickery 1983: 108 ff, 1984: 69-72, Kiernan 1982a: 296 
on differences between the various zone occupying 
armies. But Ponchaud 1978: 25 for instance, mentions 
having friendly discussions with a group of KR from 
Kp. Thorn Province (North zone). He found them to be 
"fine fellows (on whom) visibly, no ideology had yet 
made much of a dent in their reactions which were 
those of the peasants we had known before" 
14. In 1980 leng Sari, summing up a number of reasons why 
things had gone wrong in DK, said that "each region 
constituted a small kingdom (that) ran its own af-
fairs", interview with H. Kamm in Shawcross 1985: 334-335 
15. Heder 1980b: 8-9, Summers 1981: 12, Vickery 1984: 
83-84. Heder adds that "due to relatively poor land 
and water conditions, even those peasants with a fair 
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amount of land in the southwest often found it more 
difficult to get by than peasants with less (or even 
no) land (...) in other regions. It seemed to be the 
case that in terms of income and economic security it 
was better to be an agricultural laborer in Battambang 
than to be the owner (probably indebted) of two hec­
tares of land in Takeo". But relatively poor land and 
water conditions generally existed in other inhabited 
areas of Cambodia as well, Delvert 1961: 113, 53B. 
Landholdings were not much smaller than average, and 
in the southeastern districts of Kampot, Takeo and 
Kandal (Kp. Trach, Kirirong, Koh Thorn) they were 
considerably larger, Delvert 1961: 471, 493 ff, 704 
carte 13. The % of landless was much lower in the 
southwest than in Battambang, as we have seen, although 
it did probably have a higher % of poor and lower 
middle peasants. Economic security was less in the 
Battambang region, although income was higher. It is 
highly doubtful if peasants with a fair bit of land in 
the southwest found it harder to get by than peasants 
with no land in other regions. There is no evidence 
for this. This of course does not disprove Heder's 
assertion that the peasantry of the southwest generally 
accepted the KR' rural economic policy quite willingly, 
only part of the evidence he presents. There are, in 
fact, many reports of poor peasants being reasonably 
satisfied with the KR from all over the country 
16. Heder 1980d: 27 
17. Ibid: 28. According to Vickery 1984: 136 however, 
Heder's interviews with KR cadres indicate that in 
1976 the Nnorthwest sent at least some rice to the 
centre. Various refugee testimonies would seem to 
confirm this, see ch.5 notes 152-154 
18. Kiernan 1982a: 286 interview with Thuy Bounsovanny 
19. Yathay 1980a: 100 
20. Ibid: 103 
21. Neither leng Sari nor Khieu Samphan, at that time the 
country's most important mouth-pieces, had mentioned 
numbers of dead and wounded in their speeches before 
the elections, but did do so after the elections. Hu 
Nim, the GRUNK minister for Information and Propaganda 
at that time, seems to have been the only KR function­
ary to have given the 600.000 dead and 600.000 wounded 
figures. It was mentioned over Radio PP which resorted 
under Hu Nim. Sihanouk mentions these figures in 1975. 
But after the elections Hu Nim and Radio PP switched 
to 800.000 dead and 240.000 wounded and disabled. Hu 
Nim was purged in 1977, by the way. The post-election 
figures are odd in the sense that usually the number 
of wounded and invalid exceeds the number of dead. For 
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the 800.000 dead figure; Weggel 1977: 5, 6 citing 
Radio PP 30-3-1976 and Hu Nim over Radio PP 14-4-1976, 
Pictures 1976: 12, Sari 1976: 2. For the 600.000 dead 
figure; Impérialistes 1976: 7 declaration by Hu Nim, 
Hildebrand & Porter 1976a: 23 Radio PP 9-5-1975, 
Ponchaud 1978: 92 citing Sihanouk 
22. Le Monde 5-6-1976. The FEER 29-10-1976: 23 agred with 
Pech, even showing photos of both Saloth Sar and Pol 
Pot to prove they were different persons 
23. Lenart E., FEER 26-6-1976: 26, also see Carney 1977: 
62, Pot 1979: 111-112. The secrecy surrounding high-
-ranking KR' identities also confounded DK watchers, 
even after the Vietnamese invasion. Quinn 1982: 25 
n.49 e.g. still thought Non Suon later emerged as Nuon 
Chea or Та Mok, and Etcheson 1984: 167 n.43 thought 
Sok Thuok was Nuon Chea 
24. Barnett, Boua & Kiernan 1980 Hu Nim 'confessions'. 
Contact between members of different ministerial 
departments in PP was also forbidden, Picq 1984. There 
was a total compartimentalization of units, Vickery 
1984: 68 notes 
25. Chandler 1983: 297 n.31 
26. Chandler 19B3b: 4Θ, 41 speech later printed in Tung 
Padevat, Aug. 1975. Chandler does not say how he knew 
it was Pol Pot. This name for Saloth Sar only surfaced 
in April 1976 
27. FEER 29-4-1977: 11 
28. Situation 1975: 8 
29. Ibid: 10, 11, Impérialistes 1976: 7 Hu Nim declaration, 
Befreiung June 1976: 7 interview with DK representative 
in GDR, Pot 1976, Workers State 1977: 14 Sari speech 
UNO General Assembly 6-10-1976 
30. Heder 1978a: 10. For the Cambodia-Vietnam conflict 
see; Heder 1979a, 1979b, 1978b, Revolution 1978: ch.8 
Heder-letter to a friend, ibid: ch.6 & 7 NLF and Hanoi 
1967 declarations agreeing to Sihanouk's border propo-
sals, ibid: ch.9 A long struggle for independence 
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20-22, Le Monde 21-8-1977, Chanda Ν., Le Monde Diploma­
tique May 1977, FEER Yearbook 1976, 1977, Quinn 1977: 
51, Ponchaud 1978: 104 ff, 122, Simon 1978: 199, 
Shawcross 1979: 375, NRC 28-9-1977. There was some 
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tractors to be known 
Thion 1981d: 288 document of Tribunal 
Thion 1981a: 26 
Klernan 1982a: 298 Hui Pan (Siem Reap), ibid Denice 
Affonco (Battambang), Le Monde 25-4-1978 Ear Soth 
(Battambang), Times 14-6-1978 Chieu Kien (Battambang), 
Quinn 1982: 144 ff. Klernan & Boua 1982: 361 Tae Hui 
Lang testimony mentions end of 1976 already in the 
Maung area of Battambang Province 
Yathay 1980a: 318-320, Vickery 1984: 119, 127 
Heder 1980b: 12 
Barnett, Boua & Klernan 1980: 671 
Thion 1981a: 21 
For examples see Heder 1980e: 15, 36, Vickery 1984: 127 
Klernan 1983: 166-168, 185, ibid 1982a: 297, Stuart-Fox 
1985: 122 
Klernan 1985: 419 
Vickery 1984: 97 
Vickery 1984: 110, 119. In an interview in 1980 leng 
Sari said that one of the party's mistakes had been 
that they "did not choose our public servants well and 
lost some control", interview with H. Kamm in Shawcross 
1985: 334-335 
Vickery 1984: 86-100, 118-119, 139 
Heder 1980e: 76, Klernan * Boua 1982: 350-351 Chnay 
testimony, 357 Sarun testimony, Szymusiak 1987: 
147-148, Quinn 1982: 144-148 refugee and ex-KR tes-
timonies from Battambang, Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey. 
Vickery 1984: 125 for an example where life improved 
after the purge, 119 for a summary under which cir-
cumstances a situation would be likely to improve 
after a purge and in which it would be likely to deteriorate 
Le Monde 21-8-1977, IHT 6-5-1977 
Simons L., WP 24-7-1977 citing a western source 
338 
37. FEER 23-9-1977: 33 
38. Stuart-Fox 1985: 95, 102, 108, Vickery 1984: inter 
alia 94, 103, 104, 117 because rice was being taken away 
39. According to Vickery 1984: 100 this was a one of the 
least developed areas, the local inhabitants 'primi-
tive' and very anti-urban, generally a very bad area 
during DK. Kiernan & Boua 1982: 338 Mien testimony, 
351 Chnay testimony, 356 Sarun testimony, Kiernan 
1982a: 242 interview with Te Ean Chhoeng and Tao Sun 
Hauv, 241 citing Ponchaud F., BISC 5/1978: 20, VSEAI 
Jan.-March 1980: 2 Boua talk at Reading University 
5,6,7-1-1980, Kiernan 1982a: 296 citing a peasant 
woman, Szymusiak 1987: 62. Since Stalin piece wages 
have been quite common in socialist countries 
40. Szymusiak 1987: 97, Martin 1981: 18. At the original 
pilot project at Damdek in Siem Reap province 7 cubic 
meters of earth per day was set as the norm, and you 
had to help your neighbor if you finished before him 
or her. Apparently this was one case where the authori-
ties accepted the impossibility of their norm and 
lowered it to 1 to 5 cubic meters 
41. See ch.4.2 
42. Pot 1977: 87 
43. Thion 1981a: 23 document of Tribunal 
44. See ch.6.4 
45. Dossier Kampuchea I 1978: 36 
46. FEER 12-8-1977: 16 
47 . For Thai - Cambodian r e l a t i o n s i n t h i s p e r i o d s e e ; NZZ 
30 -10 -1977 , F i n a n c i a l Times 1 1 - 7 - 1 9 7 8 , IHT 2 2 - 7 - 1 9 7 7 , 
Le Monde 7 - 3 - 1 9 7 8 , 2 8 , 2 9 - 8 - 1 9 7 7 , FEER 1 1 - 2 - 1 9 7 7 , 
5 -8 -1977 , 1 9 - 8 - 1 9 7 7 , NRC 1 0 - 4 - 1 9 7 8 , Times 6 - 6 - 1 9 7 8 , 
Shawcross 1985: 58-62 
48 . Kiernan 1983: 170-172 
49. Kiernan 1982a: 302 citing Report of East zone con-
ference, included in document addressed to Comrade 
Rin, committee chairman, 4th division. East zone, 
dated July 17, 1977. Comrade Rin is certainly Heng Samrin 
50. In Kiernan 1983: 172 
51. Summers 1979a: 12 citing NYT 9-8-1977, Thion 1981d: 289 
339 
52. McCormack 1979: 78 reference to Kitazawa Yoko - The 
nature and roots of the Vietnam Kampuchea dispute, in 
Honda Katsuichi (ed.). Thinking about relations between 
Vietnam, China and Kampuchea and socialism, Tokyo, 
1979: 50 (in Japanese) 
53. Inter alia Dossier Kampuchea I 1978: 138 La Vérité sur 
le Frontalier Vietnamo-Kampucheen 7-4-1978 (La Vérité) 
54. Moving Forward 1977: 4 
55. Finley 1978b: 40 
56. Butterfield F., IHT 30-9-1977 
57. The KR had not sent a delegation or even a congratula-
tory telegram to the CCP's 11 th Party Congress in 
August 1977 at which the demise of the radicals was 
further pursued 
58. Thion 1981d: 290, Heder 1979b: 174 
59. Keesing 1977: 752. For Pol Pot's visit to China, his 
speech etc. see; IHT 30-9-1977, NZZ 7-10-1977, 
30-10-1977, Peking Review 7-10-1977, Le Monde 
30-9-1977, 5-10-1977, 19-1-1979 
60. Kiernan 1982a: 302 (see this chapter note 49). This 
document was translated by Stephen Heder, who considers 
it to be an authentic DK document. The Vietnamese 
printed a photo of this document, captioning it with 
one sentence from this document, completely out of 
context; "We must cross over to stop and annihilate 
them on their own land.." Dossier Kampuchea II 1978: 
photo 1 opposite p. 96. On p. 74 there is a longer 
translation with the same tenor as the caption, but 
very different from Heder's translation 
61. Dossier Kampuchea I 1978: 32. Although we have seen 
that the Vietnamese rendering of this document is very 
dubious (see note 60 above), in this instance it could 
be correct. At least the rendering is not to Vietnam's 
advantage 
62. According to Dossier Kampuchea I 1978: 32 these enemies 
of the revolution were the Khmer people themselves. In 
this instance it was not far from the truth 
63. Black Book 1979: 75 admits that they were not ready 
and had not expected such a powerful invasion. Accord-
ing to Etcheson 1984: 191-192 the Vietnamese under 
command of General Giap himself, made an incursion 
into Cambodia along most of the border, in September 
1977. They met with unexpectedly stiff resistance. 
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Asiaweek 26-1-1979. In a later version, Kiernan 1982a: 
304, he claims Nhim Ros was killed in March 1978, 
after being accused of working as a Vietnamese agent. 
He gives no source, nor any reason for this claim. 
Stuart-Fox 1985: 118-119 says he apparently joined 
armed insurgents fighting central army troops before 
being captured and executed in March 1978. Heder 1980b: 
12 maintains Nhim Ros was arrested in early 1977, 
which does not tally with the party CC's Standing 
Committee meeting held in April 1977, mentioned in ch.7.1 
163. Heder 1980b: 12, Kiernan 1985: 418 
164. As Vickery 1984: 130, 146, 322 n.226 notes 
165. FEER 18-7-1980: 12, 24-11-1978: 11, Congress 1979: 10. 
He visited Sihanouk in late 1977, another sign of his 
high standing, Sihanouk 1986: 209 
166. Kiernan 1983: 163 
167. According to a KR cadre there were no changes made in 
the Politburo at the August 1978 Party Congress, so at 
the end of 1977 the Politburo line-up was Pot, Chea, 
Mok, Sari, Vet, Son Sen and Keu, the latter two having 
been newly promoted, Kiernan 1983: 175 
168. Nations R., FEER 18-7-1980: 11 suggests he also con­
trolled the East zone, incorrectly stating there were 
6 zones in all. In fact Chan had become secretary of 
the East zone in May, after the demise of So Phim 
169. Chanda Ν., FEER 19-12-1980: 29 
170. Thion 1981a: 23 
171. According to leng Sari he had committed suicide after 
leading an unsuccessful coup. Le Monde 2-6-1979. 
Kiernan 1985: 136 n.39 Vorn Vet's Tuoi Sleng confession 
dated Dec. 1978 
172. Visite 1978: 3, 6-7, 8, 24, 31, 33 
349 
173. Thion 1981b: 97, who incorrectly assumes Vet had joined 
the Politburo in 1977. In fact he had been a member 
since 1963 
174. Heder S., PEER 16-7-1982: 3 letter to the editor 
(brackets in original) 
175. Picq 1984: 100 
176. Kiernan 1982a: 304 n.1 
177. Congress 1979: 9-10 
178. Dudman 1979: 7B 
179. Heder 1980b: 14 
180. In late 1979 visiting foreigners were being shown a 
room of Hotel Samaki, the former Hotel Phnom, and told 
that Caldwell had been shot there by Pol Pot gunmen. 
But, as Becker acknowledged, Caldwell never once set a 
foot inside that hotel, the guest-house where they 
were staying when he was killed being somewhere else 
altogether, Becker E., PEER 16-4-1982: 20-21. (McCor-
mack 1980: 40 cites Becker E., Guardian Weekly 
14-10-1979, saying it was Hotel Royale). In his des-
cription of the killing, Dudman, who had spent 40 
days with the KR in 1972, raises the question if 
perhaps it had been an inside job. How could the 
terrorists otherwise have gotten into what should have 
been one of the most heavily guarded spots in the 
country. During the attack Dudman had seen various 
people running back and forth in the streets outside 
the wall surrounding the guest-house. Why was there a 
li hour delay after the shooting in which Caldwell and 
one of the gunmen were killed before government forces 
entered the grounds to secure the guest-house? Why the 
additional 75 minutes before Becker and Dudman were 
allowed to leave their rooms? Both Becker and Dudman's 
stories show that there were more gunmen involved. 
From their stories one could conclude, although some-
what speculatively, that Caldwell was the only target. 
Becker was left alone when confronted with a (the) 
gunman, Dudman was shot at, but not followed into his 
room to be finished of. According to Thiounn Prasith, 
the senior foreign ministry official in charge of 
their visit, the gunman had shot himself, but another 
had been captured and a third escaped. Later the 
British government was informed that the gunman had 
been killed by Cambodian government forces. It was, 
according to Prasith, a "political act to discredit us 
in the world (and) to show that we cannot protect our 
friends", Dudman 1979: 2. More light is thrown on the 
affair by a number of documents, 'confessions' found 
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1. Much has been written about what I will deal with in 
part II. My discussion can of necessity be no more 
than a general overview, which may not in all cases do 
adequate justice to the authors concerned or the depth 
and shading of the debates touched on 
2. Scott 1976 
3. Gouldner A.W. - The Norm of Reciprocity, in American 
Sociological Review, XXV, April 1960: 161-178, 
Malinowski B. - Crime and Custom in Savage Society, 
Paterson, 1959, Blau P.M. - Exchange and Power in 
Social Life, N.Y., 1964: ch.4, Mauss M. - The Gift, 
London, 1954, Migdal 1974: 79, Dore 1959: 79 (labour 
exchange to maintain harmonious relations in Japan), 
Nooy Palm 1979 (the Toradjas), Heider 1970 (the Danis), 
Phillips 1965 (Thailand), also 'gotong-rojong' on 
Java, and even gift giving (birthdays, Christmas) in 
• the West 
4. For patron-client relationships see for instance 
Kaufman 1974, Breman 1970, Scott 1972, Scott S 
Kerkvliet 1973 
5. In order to regain control of labour the ruling elite 
in Thailand resorted to the tattooing of clients in 
order to make it more difficult for them to change 
patrons or to flee, see for instance Rabibhadana 1969 
6. Adas 1981 : 226 
7. Examples of village redistributive mechanisms, vertical 
ties, co-operation etc. can be found in most village 
studies. For Thailand see e.g. Moerman 1968, Ramsay 
1979, Potter 1976, de Young 1956, Kaufman 1960: 36 
{phujaj-phunanj relationship). For Vietnam e.g. Popkin 
1979: 89 ff, Ngo 1973, Sansom 1970: 29, 31, 114, Wolf 
1969: 172-174, McAllister & Mus 1970: 50 ff, 55 ff. 
For China, e.g. Wolf 1969: 285, Moore 1974: 206 ff, 
Polachek 1983, Chen 1973. Also Shanin 1972: 2-3, 25, 
33, part III (Russia), Moore 1974: 476-477, Dore 1959: 
79, 166 (both Japan), Pitt Rivers 1961 (Andalusien 
peasants), Scott 1986 (present day Malaysian village), 
Nooy Palm 1979 (Toradja society), Wolters 1976 (Philip-
pines), Nash 1965 (Burma), Moore 1974: 330-340 (India), 
Adas 1986: 70 (references to literature dealing with 
the aliran system in Indonesia), Geertz 1963b (agricul-
tural involution), Heider 1970 (Danis of the New Guinea 
Highlands), Migdal 1974: especially ch.4, Adas 1981: 
218 ff, Wertheim 1977: eh.9.4 
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8. Most authors who deal with village solidarity etc., 
also mention this other side of the medal, see note 7 
and the brief discussion on the Scott-Popkin controver-
sy a little further on. Also Hinton 1968: 55, Scott 
1986: 14, 21, 26, Piker 1975 
9. Moore 1974: 475, also Shanin 1972: 2-3, 25, 33, part III 
10. Moore 1974: 213. Also see Wolf 1969: 109 ff 
11. Ibid: 208 
12. Wolf 1969: 279, Migdal 1974: eh. 4 and references to 
other studies in Africa, Asia and the Lebanon, Shanin 
1971: 246-247, Shanin 1973b: 241, 247 and references 
to studies by inter alia Chayanov and Galeski, Aya 
1979: 79, Moore 1974: 203, 220, 471, 479, 497-499, 
Huizer 1976: 233, Pitt Rivers 1961, Moerman 1968 (this 
is an excellent example of the priority of subsistence 
concerns over profitability in a Northern Thai village) 
13. Moore 1978 
14. On claims to subsistence as a moral right by slaves, 
see Genovese 1974, by Dutch navvies; Burgler 1979, by 
artisans, journeymen and others see note 53 
15. In fact these processes were not determined by actual 
colonialism alone, as the cases of Thailand and, to a 
lesser extent, China, clearly show 
16. On taxation in general see the excellent studies by 
Ardant 1965, 1972 
17. Scott 1976: 127-149, Also see Ngo 1973. The only mass 
peasant protest in pre W.W.II Cambodia was also direc-
ted against taxation (and corvée) as were the large 
scale peasant protests in Cochin China around 1930. 
See for a recent critical discussion of Scott's find-
ings, Kleinen, J. - Boeren, Fransen en rebellen: een 
studie van boerenverzet in een Midden-Vietnamese regio 
(1880-1940), Amsterdam, 1988 
18. Scott 1976: 59 
19. Often patron-client relationships did not disappear 
but were adapted to the new situation. One such ac-
comodation was forged in some post-colonial, usually 
populist states, with state funds and based on elec-
toral competition. This type of transformed patron-
client relationship is important in explaining inter 
class followings and fractions in the politics of 
these developing states. See e.g. Nash 1965 (pre-Ne 
Win Burma), Wilson 1962 (Thailand), Phillips 1969 
(local Thai politics), Wolters 1976 (Philippines), cf. 
Huizer 1976: 217 (Venezuelan brokerage system), Siegel 
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1972 (vertical ties based on ethnicity in politics in 
Syria - Malaysia also has such a system based on 
ethnicity), Lijphart 1968 (verzuiling (denominational 
segregation) in Holland) 
20. Permit me to digress for a moment. Popkin has critici-
sed the view of the peasant as victim of colonialism 
and capitalism. According to him, peasants also use 
colonialism and capitalism as external resources. He 
also criticizes the "overly benign" view of traditional 
peasant institutions, stressing village differentiation 
and internal conflict. But then he remarks that the 
"moral economists are fully aware of the rivalries and 
conflicts within villages" (Popkin 1979: 17, also see 
note 8 this chapter). Migdal, however, one of the 
authors Popkin criticizes, whose work deals with how 
villages react to their being broken open under impact 
of outside forces, concludes that some peasants do, in 
fact, want outside contacts to accumulate, invest and 
become richer. The traditionally inward looking peasant 
villages are more or less forced to become more outward 
looking, to adapt. Some peasants profit, some suffer 
(Migdal 1974: 18, also Scott 1976: 21, 1986: 10). 
Scott, another author criticized by Popkin, also 
concurs that peasants do gamble and are willing to 
innovate sometimes, but it depends on the risks. "The 
closer to the (subsistence minimum - RB) a family is -
provided it is still above it - the less its tolerance 
for risk and the more rational and binding the safety 
first formula becomes" (Scott 1976: 22). This is 
basically what Popkin himself holds when he says that 
peasants innovate when their position is secure against 
the loss and when success could measurably improve 
their position (Popkin 1979: 21). In other words middle 
peasants are more likely to take risks vis à vis the 
market than poor peasants. But subsistence cultivation 
takes precedence. As Wolf remarks, the peasant "favours 
production for sale only within the context of an 
assured production for subsistence" (Wolf 1969: XIV, 
also Adas 1986: 65 (colonial Java), Scott 1976: 88 
(Cochin China), Moerman 1968 (Thailand)). When subsis-
tence routines are not producing satisfactory results 
anymore the safety first principle breaks down. Then 
it makes some sense to take risks. Much peasant innova-
tion has this last-gasp quality. Popkin seems to negate 
this difference between innovation on the basis of 
security and as a last possibility (Popkin 1979: e.g. 
19, 21, 68, 80). Popkin's peasant seems to lose all 
that distinguishes him from the farmer (for this 
distinction see e.g. Wolf 1969: XIV-XV, Wolf 1966, 
Tilly 1974: 301). Generally his critique rather carica-
tures the moral economy approach. Brocheau e.g. of the 
opinion that Popkin "overstates his case" (Brocheau 
1983). But he does raise a few interesting issues. 
E.g. in his view, "collective action requires (...) 
conditions under which peasants will find it in their 
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individual interests to allocate resources to their 
common interests - and not be free-riders" (Popkin 
1979: 253). In his Moral Economy Scott hardly deals 
with free-riders, although he does, in a later work, 
also stress peasant self-interest as the basis for 
collective action (Scott 1986: 25-26). Basically the 
Popkin - Scott controversy is more, it seems to me, a 
question of shifts in accent. As Popkin 1979: 267 
himself concludes, the moral economy approach should 
be modified "to take account of the ways in which 
aversion to risk, conflicts between public and private 
forms of investment, and conflicts among peasantry 
limit the quality and extent of insurance and welfare 
embedded in peasant institutions". See Keyes 1983 for 
an interesting debate on this controversy 
21. Moore 1974: 191, Wolf 1969: 134 
22. Moore 1974: 219 
23. Wolf 1969: 170, 131, Belden 1973: 181 
24. Thorner 1973, Belden 1973: especially eh.VII, Wolf 
1969: 106 ff, Moore 1974: 162-227, Myrdal 1967: for 
instance 118 ff, 158 ff, 400 ff. On changing land 
patterns etc., see Tawney R.H. - Land and Labour in 
China, N.Y., 1964 (repr.). For other examples of the 
impact of colonialization, commercialization and such, 
see for instance Scott 1976 (Burma and Vietnam), Ngo 
1973, Sansom 1970, Bosgra & Eijbersen 1966: ch.'s 1 
and 2, McAllister & Mus 1970: 57 ff (all Vietnam), 
Piker 1975, Williams 1973, Ingram 1971, Turton cs. 
1978, Elliot 1978, Ramsay 1979 (all Thailand), Jacoby 
1961: ch.4 (Burma), ch.8 (Thailand), Adas 1974 (Burma), 
Adas 1979 (Java, India, Tanzania, Burma), Wolters 1976 
(Philippines), Huizer 1980: ch.4 (Indonesia), Gough & 
Sharma 1973 (India), Amin 1971 (West Africa), Boahen 
1975: e.g. 148 (Ghana), Wolf 1969 (inter alia China, 
Vietnam), Dore 1959: 69-70 (Japan), Migdal 1974 
25. Huizer, therefore, considers these areas potentially 
less revolutionary (1976: 35), whilst Wolf, for in-
stance, for the other reason mentioned, finds frontier 
areas quite often to have a strong tendency to rebel 
(1969: 166). Also Adas 1974 
26. Scott 1976: 78 citing Gourou P. - L'Utilisation du sol 
en Indochine Française, Paris, 1940 (probably still 
the work on cultivation patterns in colonial Vietnam). 
Also on land distribution in Cochin China, see Bosgra 
S Eijbersen 1966: 52, 310, Wolf 1969: 166, Pluvier 
1974: 59-60 
27. See e.g. Wolf 1969: 171-174 
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A similar kind of linear settlement pattern is found 
in the Central Plains area of Thailand, a frontier 
area that has only been settled since the end of the 
last century under impact of commercialization proces-
ses. Cohesiveness, redistributive mechanisms etc. are 
less well developed here, contrary to the older, more 
traditional villages of, say. Northern Thailand, where 
the impact of commercialization and such has been less 
In Khmer proverbs and literature there are many refe-
rences to the helplessness of individuals and the 
importance of accepting power relationships as they 
are, see e.g. Chandler 1975: 37-39, Osborne 1973: 13. 
The Cambodian peasant is, in this sense, comparable to 
the Thai and Burmese peasant, see e.g. Phillips 1965, 
Kaufman 1960, Nash 1965. This 'passivity' must be seen 
relative to that of the Vietnamese peasants, e.g. with 
their more Mandarin culture (Newman 1979, also Keyes 
C.F. & E.V. Daniel (eds) - Karma: An Anthropological 
Inquiry, Berkeley, 1983, which deals with the contrast 
between the social implications of Buddhism as compared 
to those associated with Hinduism). But also see the 
discussion on false consciousness and hegemony further 
on in this chapter 
Scott 1972b: 7. On weak states see Myrdal 1968 
Adas 1982: 217 
Not everything peasants do to survive can be labeled 
resistance. Intention is important. There is disagree-
ment among the ' peasantologists ' on how to differen-
tiate everyday peasant resistance from various survival 
methods. Some find it must contribute to revolutionary 
consequences. There must be a revolutionary intent, a 
conscious will to change the system (for instance 
White 1986: 57). To Scott 1986: 25-26 this position-
considering everyday or 'token' peasant resistance, 
not having a revolutionary intent, as trivial - is 
based on Leninist and bourgeois assumptions of what 
constitutes political action. It is a misconstruction 
of the basis of class struggle to demand of lower 
class resistance that it be 'principled' or selfless. 
The self interested element in peasant resistance is 
the determinate context of peasant politics. Everyday 
resistance, although it often has no more than a 
marginal effect, is far from trivial. It is through 
avoidance protest that the peasant has traditionally 
made his political presence felt, not through revolts, 
let alone legal political activity, according to Scott 
(ibid: 8). Furthermore, if revolutionary intent were 
to define resistance, peasant rebellions would not 
qualify. The goal of most peasant resistance is not to 
overthrow a system of domination but to survive in it. 
For this discussion see the Special Issue of the JoPS 
13, 2, Jan. 1986, as well as the discussion on false 
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consciousness and hegemony further on in this chapter 
33. Examples can be found in Huizer 1976: 23, 24-25, 30 
ff, 98 (Latin America), Adas 1986: 64-65 (Java), 72 
(Africa), Rabibhadana 1969, Flood 1975, Turton cs 
1978: 121 (Thailand), Scott 1986: 9 ff (Malaysia), 
Hobsbawm 1971 (especially banditry - for a critique of 
the social-bandit-as-an-exponent-of-popular-protest 
concept see Blok A. - The Peasant and the Brigand: 
Social Banditry reconsidered, in Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, 14, 1972: 494-503. For a 
romanticized account of a post W.W.II social bandit 
see Puzo M. - The Sicilian, N.Y., 1984). Avoidance 
protest among slaves, Genovese 1974. In the literature 
on rural development one can find many cases of govern­
ment schemes and programmes as well as NGO development 
projects failing due to the passive resistance of the 
peasantry 
34. Wertheim W.F. - East West Parallels, Chicago, 1965: 
26, also Wertheim 1977: 128-130 where he tells us that 
value orientations can diverge within society and even 
within a single individual, simultaneously 
35. Moore 1974: 479 
36. Lewis 1974: 2 
37. Huizer 1976: for instance 102-104, 196, also Huizer 
1980: 166-167 
38. Carnival is a fine example of this, as are most fes­
tivals during which the social order is turned upside 
down. Jokes can be a harmless exhaust valve of anger, 
an indication of deviant values and they can fan this 
anger. On joking see e.g. Radcliffe-Brown A.R.-
Structure and Function in Primitive Society, N.Y., 
1952: ch.4, Dollard J. - Caste and Class in a Southern 
Town, Garden City, 1957: 309-310 (jokes as an outlet 
for anger among blacks in the Southern States of the 
United States), Kessel I. van - Moppencultuur in 'n 
politiestaat, in Onze Wereld, 3, 1987: 13 (on jokes 
against the Mengistu regime and the Russian presence 
in Ethiopia) 
39. In China Taoism and Buddhism contained counterpoints 
to the dominant Confucian culture. The secret socie­
ties, which were often foci for rebellions, employed 
Taoist and Bhuddist elements. The Chinese communists 
used their knowledge of secret societies and Taoist 
and Buddhist traditions to good avail in organizing 
the peasants and promoting their objectives, see e.g. 
Wolf 1969: 111 ff. Mediums, medicinemen, whitchdoctors 
and such have often harboured ideological counterpoints 
to the dominant ideology and inspired and led rebel­
lions, see e.g. Ranger Т.О. - Revolt in Southern 
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Rhodesia, 1896-1897: A Study in African Resistance, 
London, 1967, Adas 1979, Wilson B. - Magic and the 
Millennium: Religious Movements of Protest among Tribal 
and Third World Peoples, Frogmore, 1975 
40. Thion 1983: 12. See Osborne 1969: 206-228 on the 1885 
uprising, also Chandler 1983c: 144 ff. There had been 
some smaller uprisings against the French and, to a 
leser extent, against the king, in the 1864-1876 
period, attempts to revive memories of Cambodia's 
ancient glory, that were also aimed at the hated taxes. 
Another reason for these uprisings was missionary 
activity, resented by the Buddhist clergy. The first 
two of these uprisings were led by monks, the third by 
a prince, who also played a major role in the 1885 
uprising. Reddi 1970: 29 
41. After dispersal some marchers attacked the houses of 
some officials, which led to some demonstators being 
killed, Osborne M. - Peasant Politics in Cambodia: The 
1916 Affair, in Modern Asian Studies 12, 2, 1978: 
217-243, also Chandler 1983c: 153-156 
42. Chandler 1983c: 157 ff 
43. Moore 1974: 220, also Wilkinson 1977: 37-38. It is this 
crucial element of felt injustice that Jeffrey Page 
misses in his otherwise interesting comparison of 
types of agricultural structure with types of protest, 
which would seem to indicate a close correspondence 
between the form of exploitation (mode of production) 
and the type of resistance it evokes, Paige 1975 
44. Wertheim 1971 : 292 
45. Scott 1986: 30 
46. A few non-Southeast Asian examples; Moore 1974: 466 
(the German Bauernkrieg 1524-1525), Huizer 1976: 20-23 
(Latin America), Pitt Rivers 1961 (Andalusian pea-
sants), Shanin 1972 (Russian peasants), Chiang S.-
The Nien Rebellion, Seattle, 1954, Michael F. - the 
Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents vol. 1, 
Seattle, 1966 (both China), Adas 1979 (India, Tan-
zania), Wolf 1969: 28 ff (Mexico), Gough & Sharma 
1973, Gough K. - Indian Peasant Uprisings, in BoCAS, 
July/September 1976. For Thailand Ramsay 1979 
47. Belden 1973: 226 ff. On Burma, Indonesia, the Phillip-
pines and Indo-China, see e.g. Pluvier 1974: parts IV, 
V S VI 
48. Wolf 1969. Also Alavi 1973, Huizer 1976: 24, Huizer 
1980: 171, Popkin 1979: 250, 258, Aya 1979: 79 
49. Wolf 1969: 270-271 
365 
50. Popkin 1979: 250 
51. Ibid: 258 
52. Moise 1976: 79-80 
53. Studies of poor peoples' popular protest in 18th and 
19th century Europe indicate a similar tendency. Most 
of those who rose up were not the most downtrodden, 
lumpen-proletariat, but those who had something to 
lose, something to fight for as well as against, and 
something to fight with. Here, too, and apparently for 
non-peasant pre-industrial poor uprisings in general, 
felt injustice seems to be crucial. As the German 
historian Rudolf Stadelman (1970: 5) already noted in 
his study of the German Revolution of 1848, more was 
needed than economic deprivation to generate revolu-
tion. "(O)ppression creates discontent and opposition 
only where it is perceived as injustice", he said. 
Revolts of the pre-industrial poor were also often 
claims to the right to subsistence and a defence of 
customary rights, e.g. Burgler 1979 (Dutch navvies), 
Hobsbawm & Rude 1973 (rural labourers, England 1830's), 
Rude 1964 (the poor, France and England 18th and 19th 
century), Cobb 1972 (the poor, France), Genovese 1974 
(slaves, North America), Moore 1978: 351-352, 362-371, 
474-478 (workers, Germany turn of the century), Moore 
1974: 481 (sans cuiottes French revolution), Thompson 
1966: 203, Aya 1979: 72 
54. Wertheim 1977: eh.7.6 (horizontal mobility and In-
donesian national struggle as example). For Huizer 
1976: 218-219 it is a necessary condition for the 
successful organization of the peasants. For a brief 
discussion on why this type of peasant plays a leading 
role, see Shanin 1973b: 259-261. Also Shelton W.J. -
English Hunger and Industrial Disorders, London, 1973 
(on the role of veterans from the Seven Years War in 
the English Food Riots), Gitlitz J.S. - Haciendad, 
Comunidad, and Peasant Protest in Northern Peru, Chapel 
Hill, 1975 (role of army veterans in uprisings on 
haciendas), Huizer 1980: 8 (the same for the Bolivian 
peasant unrest in the aftermath of the Chaco War 1933-
1935, in which Bolivia was defeated by Paraguay), Wolf 
1969: 22, 30, Huizer 1980: 6-7 (both Mexican Revolu-
tion, specifically its leader, Zapata), Wolf 1969: 151 
f f (the role of ex-soldiers and especially miners in 
Mao's first peasant army) 
55. Scott 1977: 218. On "Little Tradition" see further on 
this chapter 
56. Wolf 1969: 294 
57. Shanin 1973b: 260, also Scott 1986: 8 
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58. Adas 1986: 83, Shanin 1971a: 26, 29, Shanin 1973b: 
256, 257, Benda 1961: 3, Wolf 1969: 294, Wolf 1973: 
272, Moore 1974: 479, Popkin 1979: 250, 258, Tilly 
1974: 299, Chesneaux J. cited in Tilly 1974: 291, 
Alavi 1973, Race 1974, Walzer 1979, White 1974, Aya 
1979, Hobsbawm 1971: 6, Scott 1977: 173, Scott 1979: 
129, Gouldner 1979a: 10, Belden 1973: 218, Marr 1981, 
North 1965 
59. In 1972 I met a Scandinavian in Tamil Nadu (India) 
who, as a strategy for development, had gone to live 
with the Harijan peasant community he was trying to 
help, even marrying one of their daughters. He had 
renounced practically everything he was used to, living 
more or less as the rest of the community. But not in 
100 years will he become a Harijan peasant 
60. The spiritual leaders of the peasant wars of the 15th 
and 16th century, the Czech Jan Hus, the Hungarian 
Lorinc Mészáros, the German Thomas Münzer, were all 
clerics or former clerics (Konrad & Szelényi 1979: 
102). The exception would seem to be the Mexican 
revolution, led by Emiliano Zapata, cowboy son of a 
middle peasant ranchero. But his peasant movement 
began to encompass more than a couple of villages only 
when outsider-sympathizers (local teacher, lawyer) 
joined and helped build a proper regional organization 
(Wolf 1969: 30-31, Huizer 1976: 222). The short lived 
Peasants Federation of Thailand may be another example, 
see for instance Samudavanija C.A. - Farmers Movement 
in Modern Thai Politics, paper presented to the Thai-
European Seminar on Social Change in Contemporary 
Thailand, Amsterdam, 28-30 May 1980, Turton A. - The 
Current Situation in the Thai Countryside, in Turton cs 
1978: 104-142, Nardon D. - Thai Peasants' Leaders 
Murdered, in AMPO, 4, October-December 1975: 45-48, 
Last Interview with Intha Sriboonruang, in ibid: 49-51 
61. Scott 1976: 126 
62. Ibid: 129 
63. Marx 1948: 149 
64. According to Freiré 1972, the masses in the Third 
World are neither able nor willing to take their fate 
in their own hands. Their apathy is the result of 
suppression. The suppressed internalize the myth of 
their inferiority under pressure of the superior power 
of and fear for their oppressors. Oppressors exist 
thanks to the myth of ignorance of the suppressed. The 
oppressors define their class as being born to their 
position, or as possessing true knowledge. This social 
and cultural domination, "cultural invasion" as Freiré 
calls it, is akin to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. So 
the suppressed have to have an awareness of their 
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suppression imparted to them from the outside. It is 
the task of revolutionary leaders, of intellectuals, 
to do this. They must find ways and means to communi-
cate with the people, to help the people help themsel-
ves to achieve critical insight into their suppression. 
What is needed is a "dialogical approach", as Freiré 
calls it; action and reflection inseparably linked, 
self activity that leads to consciousness (reminescent 
of Gramsci's praxis). Certainly, the oppressed must 
participate in the revolutionary process as subjects 
of change. They must truly participate of power. There 
should be no split between leaders and masses. Revolu-
tionary leaders who do not act dialogically, who claim 
to know what is good for the masses better than the 
people know themselves, are not real revolutionary 
leaders. But Freiré recognizes separate roles between 
leaders and masses. The leaders posses "more theoreti-
cal knowledge", are "more enlightened", versus the 
"empirical knowledge" of the people (Freiré 1972: 
159). His whole discourse is aimed at revolutionary 
leaders, his dialogical approach a method for revolu-
tionary leaders to use 'on' the masses 
Huizer 1976: ch.6 
Ibid. The Japanese peasant union was created by intel-
lectuals, although it did have the son of a poor tenant 
as leader in the person of Ishida. Most tenant leaders 
were also intellectuals, see Huizer 1980: 17, 21, 25, 
26. Pluvier 1974: 80, discussing the emergence of the 
"renaissance movement" in Southeast Asia, says that 
"the peasants lacked the leaders, the organization and 
the education to stand up against their oppressors 
(...) These were provided, instead, by the Western 
educated urban politicians, ...". Many of the Indone-
sian Communist Party's peasant organization's leaders 
were intellectuals, and quite a few were landlords. 
Many of the leaders of the Vietnamese Cao Dai sect 
were bourgeois landowners or civil servants, many 
French educated, whilst most adepts were peasants, see 
Popkin 1979: XVIII, 195. Monks with some education 
played leading roles in, inter alia, 19th century 
Cambodian rebellions, see note 40 above, and in the 
Saya San rebellion in Burma in the 1930's, Scott 1976 
Mills n.d.: 413-414. In Thailand, too, although never 
formally colonized, the same process of declasse 
intellectuals turning to leftist politics took place, 
see e.g. Flood 1975 
Wolf 1969: 287 
Ibid. 
Shanin 1971a: 32 
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Wolf 1969: 288 
This blocked ascendancy is in essence what Gurr 1970 
24 termed "relative deprivation". He sees it as the 
main reason for collective violence. This concept of 
his is rather unclear, however, when it comes to 
prediction. When looking at revolutions retrospectively 
it is obviously always true in the sense that if the 
rebels were not frustrated, dissatisfied and unhappy 
then why did they rebel. Whether it is also the main 
reason is unprovable. Elsewhere the concept of relative 
deprivation as a cause for political violence has been 
broadened to encompass political values and rights, 
the role of mass perception of ethnic and political 
oppression and injustice, see the reference to Kirkham, 
Levy & Crotty, in Wilkinson 1977: 37 
Benda 1961: 9 notes that "(t)he intellectual metier 
deals with handling words and ideas. It is influential 
in affecting politics but does not give its practi-
tioners political power" 
Mazrui 1978, quote on 378. Also Boaden 1975: 103, 
ch.15, 159 ff, 168 ff (Ghana) and 1975: 104, 156 
{déclassé, blocked ascendancy). Even though Ethiopia 
had not been colonized these same processes led intel-
lectuals there to take a leading role in the overthrow 
of the 'feudal' rule of Haile Sellasie in 1974, see 
e.g. Giorgi D.W. - Wraakzuchtige Mengistu kent één 
oplossing: Dwang, in NRC 22-1-1987: 8. The Weltan-
schauung of educated Russians at the turn of the 
century was also dominated by a love - hate relation-
ship with the West; adoration, envy, shame, desire to 
catch up, xenophobia, Shanin notes (1972: 45). Intel-
lectuals also formed the revolutionary elite in Russia, 
Lasswell & Lerner 1965: ch.3, Medvedev 1972: 413 
E.g. Pluvier 1974: 456-457, Niel R. van - The Emergence 
of the Modern Indonesian Elite, The Hague, 1960. On 
the role of left-wing intellectuals in Thailand see 
e.g. Flood 1975, Phillips 1975, Lasswell & Lerner 1965 
(China, Russia, Germany). For a more personal analysis 
of intellectuals in Japan, see Oda 1979. Generalizing, 
Alatas 1977: e.g. 69, 85, 102 says that intellectuals 
have and must play an essential role in the development 
of developing countries. They give the necessary 
leadership. They must awake the backward elites' 
consciousness. It depends on the intellectuals whether 
there will be progress or stagnation. More in general 
Shils 1963 notes the elites of the 'new states' consist 
mostly of intellectuals, adding the hope that the 
ideology of the West will rub off on these new elites, 
intellectuals of the Third World. This line of thought, 
popular in the 1950's and early 1960's, and contrary 
to what has been said here, identified intellectual 
elites as the vehicle for modernization in developing 
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countries along lines and in the direction of western 
values and norms. Also Apter 1963, Rostow W.W. - The 
Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 1960. For a 
critique of modernization theory in general see 
Bernstein H. - Modernization Theory and the Sociologi-
cal Study of Development, in Journal of Development 
Studies, 7, 2, January 1971: 141-160, also Netl J. P. 
- Political Mobilization, A Sociological Analysis of 
Methods and Concepts, London, 1973: ch.7 
Marx 1962a: 152, also Van Herpen 1983: 150-151. Marx's 
disdain for working class intellectuals and artisans, 
whom he contemptuously referred to as knoten (churls, 
boors), is well known 
Lenin 1973d: 385-386 
For a short but illuminative discussion on scientific 
socialism and Marxists opposing this view see Bottomore 
1975: c h . ' 8 2 4 3 
In this context a short note on Lukács may be called 
for. Lukács only attributed false consciousness to the 
ruling class. The proletariat had "true consciousness" 
but it had not yet become clear enough. That is why it 
needed the leadership of the communist party. Lukács 
made explicit the elitist implication of Lenin's 
vanguard party concept. He attributed to the vanguard 
party the role of independent historical entity (sepa-
rate from the proletariat), which alone embodied the 
true revolutionary consciousness. On the other hand he 
showed that Marxism had nothing to do with science. 
See especially his essay Die Verdinglichung und das 
Bewusstsein des Proletariats (Reification and Proleta-
rian Consciousness), in Lukács 1968: 257-397 
Konrad & Szelényi 1979: 22, also Huszar 1960 which 
contains essays by many different intellectuals il-
lustrating this 'schizophrenia' 
In Kolakowski 1978 (II): 292-293. This was why, accord-
ing to Lenin, spontaneity had to be combatted. It ran 
counter to the obedience to the party that was demanded 
and could only lead to a subordination to bourgeois 
ideology (see the discussion between Lenin and Rosa 
Luxemburg on this issue, Lenin/Luxemburg 1971). 
Leninism demanded absolute obedience to the party. 
Lenin, quoting Sombart approvingly, says: "In Marxism 
itself there is not a grain of ethics from beginning 
to end", adding that "in practice it reduces it to the 
class struggle" (Lenin 1960: 421). Morally good or bad 
is only that which helps or hurts the party respective-
ly. Everything is made subservient to realizing the 
final goal. At the 1903 conference of the Russian 
Social Democratic Party in Brussels, Posadovsky had 
already posited the salus revolutiae (sic) suprema 
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lex, that everything must, if necessary, be sacrificed 
to the revolution, including the rights of the in-
dividual, democracy and liberty. Lenin agreed whole-
heartedly (Lenin 1973a: 222) 
82. Borcke 1977: 489. This is what Kolakowski, in his epic 
standard work on Marxism, calls totalitarianism, "the 
principle that the whole life of society (...) must 
not only be supervised by the state, but must be 
absolutely subordinated to its needs...(Therefore) the 
state is the only legitimate source of any social 
initiative, and (...) any organization or crystalliza-
tion of social life that is not imposed by the state 
is contrary to its needs and interests. (T)he citizen 
is the property of the state, and (...) all his acts 
are either directed by the state or a challenge to its 
authority" (Kolakowski 1978 II: 306) 
83. In Berlin 1969c: 137 n.1 
84. Marx 1962: 28 had already indicated that in the transi-
tion period from capitalism to communism the state 
could not be anything else than the revolutionary 
dictatorship of the proletariat 
85. North 1965 
86. In Lasswell & Lerner 1965: 463-464, 459 
87. Woodside 1976: 651 
88. Wolf 1969: 179, also Woodside 1976: 651 
89. Buttinger 1967: 203 
90. Woodside 1976: 649 
9 1 . Schurmann & S c h e l l 1967b: 24 e . g . say t h a t i n g e n e r a l 
communist i d e o l o g y gave t h e s e movements "powerful 
weapons f o r c a r r y i n g out p r o t r a c t e d s t r u g g l e s a g a i n s t 
their enemies and maintaining solidarity within the arganizatim" 
92. Popkin 1979: 214 
93. Marr 1981: 416 ("with the exception of Ho Chi Minh"). 
On the leading role of intellectuals in Vietnam, also 
see Buttinger 1967, White 1974 
94. Wolf 1969: 200-201. It was only possible to ascertain 
the social background of 8 of the 38 names in the 
NLF's high command. Only one had working-class parents. 
Of 22 of them it was possible to ascertain their 
previous occupational history - no workers or peasants 
among them 
9 5 . R e d f i e l d 1965a, 1965b 
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96. Redfield 1965b: 41-42. In reality centre and periphery 
overlap at the edges. The ruling elite will have its 
representatives, the enforcers of its policies, its 
henchmen, at various levels of society and spread over 
the country in sub-centres, skimming off part of the 
surplus. Culturally there will be a gradual, if not 
necessarily conflict-free, transition from the Great 
Tradition to the Little Tradition. Members of the 
periphery may, theoretically at least, move (rise) to 
the centre, becoming members of the ruling elite. I 
would even hold that this mobility is inversely propor­
tional to the bureaucratization of the revolution 
97. Aya 1979: 73 
98. Hobsbawm 1971: 82, referring to all pre-industrial poor 
99. Scott 1979: 120 
100. Shanin 1973b: 257 
101 . Scott 1979: 115 
102. This is a very general problematic, not confined to 
peasants and vanguard parties, see e.g. the "institu­
tionalization thesis" discussion; Hyman 1977: 2-12 (a 
brief review), Luther 1977 (Singapore as a case study), 
Seminar on Third World Strikes 1977. Also the revisio­
nism - reformism debate in the western labour movement 
first part of the 20th century (Bernstein - Kautsky 
debate etc.), the discussions on the bourgeoisification 
of the proletariat, from class struggle to partners in 
the bourgeois-capitalist social order. Directly con­
nected to this is the search for alternative revolu­
tionary agents 
103. Walzer 1979: 33 
104. Ibid: 37 
105. Scott 1979: 120. Belden gives a number of examples of 
peasant distrust of CCP cadre, e.g Belden 1973: 65, 410 
106. Marx 1948: 148 
107. Ibid: 150 
108. Marx & Engels 1977: 491 
109. E.g. Marx 1970: 176, Marx 1948: 154 
110. Lenin 1972g 
111. Mao was one of the most nationalistic of the early 
Chinese communists, see e.g. Schram 1963: eh.Τ 
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112. For a discussion on the evo lut ion of M a o ' s t h i n k i n g 
see e . g . Schram 1963, or Payne 1951 
113. Mao 1967a: 23 
114. Mao 1967c: Э0 
115. Mao 1967a: 24 
116. E.g. Woodside 1976: 657. These d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n 
cannot be discounted by merely r e f e r r i n g t o d i f f e r e n t 
needs the result of different stages in economic development 
117. E.g. Mao 1967a: 54, 1967e: 345, 1967d, 1 9 6 9 a : 3 7 4 , a l s o 
Cass ine l l i 1976: 163, Schram 1969: 34, 1 0 3 , Meisner 
1974: 238-239 
118. Lifton 1967: 135, also Teiwes 1979: 11 
119. E.g. Pfeffer 1971. On Rousseau and the i n f l u e n c e of 
h i s ideas on the terror is t p r a c t i c e s o f R o b e s p i e r r e 
c s . during the French Revolution, see T a l m o n 1955, 
Kolakowski 1978 ( I ) : ch.10 
120. Lifton 1967: 134 
121. Le Duan - Statement presented to the 4th C o n g r e s s of 
the Vietnamese Workers Party, December 1976, i n Vietnam 
International, X, 12, December 1976: 5 
122. Le Duan - The Vietnamese Revolution: F u n d a m e n t a l 
Problems, Essent ia l Tasks, Hanoi, 1970, in i b i d : 4 
123. Trung Chinh c i t e d in Le Chau - Le Viet Nam S o c i a l i s t e : 
une économie de transit ion, Paris , 1966 
124. See e .g . Nguyen Khac Vien's a r t i c l e in Vietnam C o u r i e r , 
51, August 1976, Terzani T. - Giai PhongJ The F a l l and 
Liberation of Saigon, New York, 1976 ( i n t e r a l i a on 
p o l i t i c a l education and punishment i n the a r m y , t h e 
re-education of prost i tutes , the s e t t i n g up o f " s o l i d a -
r i ty c e l l s " in Saigon d i s t r i c t s ) 
125. Le Duan - Statement presented to the 4th C o n g r e s s o f 
the VWP, December 1976, in Vietnam I n t e r n a t i o n a l , X, 
12, December 1976: 4 
126. Gordon 1978: 26 
127. Woodside 1976: 657 
128. During the land reform of the 1950's Le Van L u o n g s a i d 
that i f one had the right s p i r i t f u l l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
were not necessary, but he was dismissed f r o m t h e 
Politburo in 1956, see Moise 1976 : 81 n.29 
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1 2 9 . G o r d o n 1978: 25 
1 3 0 . B a b e u f s conspiracy to overthrow the post-Terror regime 
f a i l e d but thanks to Buonarrotti, chronicler of the 
c o n s p i r a c y , one of i t s leaders and, during the f i r s t 
h a l f of the 19th century, the godfather of European 
r e v o l u t i o n , we do know Babeufs ultimate scheme for 
s o c i e t y , s ee Buonarrotti P. - History of Baboeuf's 
C o n s p i r a c y for Equality, London, 1836 
131 . F a n o n 1970 
1 3 2 . T h e 19th century Russian Narodniki had a s imilar 
e x p e c t a t i o n and were sorely disappointed. And so, when 
t h e i r work of p o l i t i c a l enlightment and service to the 
p e o p l e f a i l e d , the peasants remaining indifferent to 
t h e i r teachings , the populist i n t e l l e c t u a l s increas-
i n g l y turned to e l i t i s t revolutionism. When t error i s t 
a c t s , meant as s igna l s to the masses, to touch of the 
powder-keg of popular discontent, did not have th i s 
e f f e c t they turned more and more to a s t r i c t l y centra l -
i z e d vanguard organization. By concentrating i t s 
a s s a u l t they hoped the revolutionary e l i t e would be 
a b l e t o s e i ze power and e s tab l i sh a revolutionary 
d i c t a t o r s h i p in the name of the masses, which would 
then transform soc ie ty 
133. Quinn 1982: 180-208 
134. Polachek 1983. By distributing land not to family but 
to each member on equal share basis, regardless of sex 
and age, the economic basis for kinship bonds was 
destroyed. This also released the brake on generation 
and gender conflict, which now burst out into the 
open, Hu 1974, Moore 1974: 226-227 
13 5. Schurmann & Schell 1967a: 197. Life in general was more 
libertarian than in later stages of communist rule, 
see e.g. Hu 1974 
136. Mao 1967a: 30-33. The original contains many passages 
giving the poor peasants exclusive credit for the 
revolution, that have been left out in later versions. 
For excerpts from the original version see Schram 
1963: 179-188 
1 37. Mao 1967a: 32 
138. Ibid: 27-29, also Payne 1951: 101 ff. In Mao's praise 
for the "riff-raff", the "déclassé", one can recognize 
Utopian Socialist and traditional Chinese peasant 
sentiments of admiration for those (bandits, robbers, 
prostitutes and such) excluded from and in conflict 
with an unjust society. Here again many of this type 
of remarks were softened or deleted in later versions, 
not in the least because they run counter to proper 
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Marxist and Leninist doctrine and were not politically 
expedient anymore, see Schram 1963: 169 and IVB 
(172-177), Marx 1948: e.g. 88-89 
139. E.g. Payne 1951: 145 ff, Schurmann & Schell 1967a: 
part 2.2. Note that the Xiangsi period receives very 
little attention in the Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung 
(Zedong), as if the rulers of the People's Republic of 
China did not want to be reminded of the 'mistakes' of 
their youth. The softening and deleting of certain 
passages from Mao's original scripts (see notes 136 
and 138 above) tend to confirm this 
140. E.g. Mao 1969b: 182, 1969c: 193, 1969d: 197, also Snow 
1938: 322 ff. Belden 1973: 222 
141. See this chapter note 64 
142. Mao 1967f: 186-187, also Snow 1938: 235 
143. Mao 1967d: 71, also Lenin 1972f 
144. Pluvier 1974: 460 
145. Scott 1979: 128 
146. See Gramsci 1975, also Davidson 1977, Hoare & Smith 
1971, Fiori 1970, and Scholten 1972 
147. For a brief résumé of the "resistance to change" 
discussion, see Huizer 1976: 78-104 who polemizes 
against these three authors, stating inter alia that 
in most of the cases they discuss "resistance to 
change" was mainly "resistance to gradual or in fact 
useless change", ibid: 102 
148. See this chapter note 64 
149. Huizer 1980: 211 
150. Huizer 1976: 14 ff, 30 ff ("culture of repression"), 
102-104, Scott 1976: 232, Flood 1975: 55, Maxim Gorky 
in Shanin 1973a: 370 
151. Scott 1986: 15. For a fine exposé of this problematic, 
as well as that of outsiders bringing revolutionary 
ideas and organization to the peasants, see Allende I. 
- Het huis van de geesten, Amsterdam, 1985 
152. Take the Hindu caste system e.g. where the dominated 
castes, in accepting their inferior status, have helped 
to perpetuate the system. It is a rather pronounced 
example of Gramsci's idea of hegemony. Freiré would 
say these castes have internalized the myth of their 
inferiority under pressure of the superior power of 
and out of fear for their oppressors. The upsurge of 
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rebelliousness among many lower castes and untouchables 
in the last decades, however, indicates that this 
internalization is not a God-given eternal fact. 
Another case is Thailand, where the dominant classes 
have, to a large degree, succeeded in implanting a 
negative image of communism in the minds of the poor. 
Communism was thus equated with sadistic violence, 
anti-religion and an ti-monarch ism, which, in the devout 
Buddhist Thailand context, where the king still recei-
ves divine reverence, is rather serious. Labeling 
someone as communist had the effect of ex-communicating 
that person, even of justifying and licensing his or 
her death. "Almost any independent rural initiative 
outside official definitions runs the risk of attract-
ing the charge of being 'communist'", as Turton 1986: 
43 notes, in an article discussing this issue, also 
Turton A. - The Current Situation in the Thai Country-
side, in Turton cs 1978: 127 ff, cf. Mehden F.v.d. -
Burma's Religious Campaign against Communism, in PA, 
3, 33, Sept. 1960: 290-299. For some recent articles 
on the position of the king in Thailand see FEER 
20-9-1984: 42 (lese majesté), FEER 4-9-1986: 30, FEER 
11-9-1986: 20, also Woollacott M. - Thailand's Royal 
Revolution, in The Guardian, 28-10-1976). On the other 
hand, as Turton 1986: 44 also indicates, peasants in 
some areas do also sometimes use the word 'communist' 
for safety reasons, not out of conviction 
153. Belden 1973: 205 
154. McAlister S Mus 1970, and Marr 1981, both deal with 
this extensively 
155. Marr 1981: 414 
156. Belden 1973: 223-225, 236, 239-257, 639-640, also 
Myrdal 1967, Chen 1973 (various places). On Mao's 
adaption of Chinese tradition for revolutionary goals, 
see Payne 1951: 116-117. The Burmese Communist Party, 
on the other hand, was unable to bridge the gap between 
Marxism-Leninism and the native culture of any con-
siderable segment of the population in the 1940's and 
1950's, see Badgley 1974. The Indonesian Communist 
Party did successfully bridge this gap, it seems, and 
achieved a mass following, but was encapsulated, see 
e.g. Huizer 1980: 64 ff and note 102 above 
157. Sansom 1970: 222 ff. On the NLF's approach regarding 
the peasants see e.g. Pluvier 1983: 110-111, 113. 
Actually the NLF was officially only formed in December 
1960 
158. Ibid: 216 
159. Hobsbawm 1971: 59, 106 
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160. Ibid: 60, 107. On millenarian revolts under impact of 
colonialism see Adas 1979, also Wolf 1969: 29 (Mexico), 
111 (China) 
161. For an example of millenarian speech by Mao see Mao 
1967g: 308 "great moment unprecedented in human history 
(...(completely banishing darkness from the world and 
from China and for changing the world into a world of 
light such as never previously existed". This is the 
sort of language the KR were wont to use 
162. Scott 1979: 125. One example: Prince Dipanagara, leader 
of the Javanese uprising against Dutch colonialism 
(1825-1830) was considered a saviour king by the 
peasants (see e.g. Adas 1979: 93-99). Cf. e.g. to F. 
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considered by many to be "the apostle, the prophet, 
the messiah". The Frisian peasants and workers e.g. 
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163. Tran Van Lieu - Les Soviets du Hghe (sic - RB) - Tinh 
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1974: 94 
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the "pre-feudal" tribals, in rather economic deter-
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black pyjamas by the fact that the mountain tribes 
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peasant working dress (van Damme 1980: 122). Barth & 
Terzani 1980: 81 hold a similar view. Sihanouk, in an 
interview with Der Spiegel, in Barth S Terzani 1980: 
104 says the KR were so cruel because many of them 
were tribals from the northeast, who still lived in a 
half savage state. Belden 1973: 228 in discussing 
peasant revolt in China, also equates barbarousness 
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166. For that see e.g. Wertheim 1977: 208 ff, Moore 1974: 
457 ff. Aya 1979 
167. Zagoria 1974: 59-60 
168. Moore 1974: 208 
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177. Isolated mountain tribes, for instance, were also won 
over through tam cung, a strategic achievement because 
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lower, e.g. Riasanovsky 1977: 557. Also all 17 army 
political commissars and 25 of 28 corps commissars, 
Conquest 1971: 312. And this was only the tip of the 
iceberg. In the army, for instance, about half the 
total officers corps (about 35.000 persons) were shot 
or imprisoned, ibid: 646. The deaths of hundreds of 
thousands of Soviet soldiers during W.W.II can be 
directly attributed to this purge of the officers 
corps. More than 1.200.000 party members were arrested, 
according to Sacharov (in ibid: 9). Earlier western 
estimates gave 1 million. Kravchenko 1947: 303, says 
1.800.000 members and candidates were expelled up to 
1938. Also see Medvedev 1972: 234. According to Shalom 
there is an "important new study (that)casts doubt on 
the work of Conquest and other standard Western ac-
counts of the ' Great Purges ' ". The sources they base 
their studies on are unreliable, according to this 
study, Getty J.A. - The 'Great Purges' Reconsidered: 
The Soviet Communist Party, 1933-1939, Ph.D Diss., 
Boston College, 1979. But the information now becoming 
available thanks to Gorbatchov's perestroika rather 
tends to confirm Conquest's figures 
109. Probably during the course of 1918 the first labour 
camps were set up. Decrees legalizing them were passed 
in September 1918 and April 1919 (Conquest 1971: 453) 
110. Thanks to the purge of the 1930's the number of inmates 
had risen from 2 million in 1932 to around 8 million 
in late 1938, not counting ordinary criminals, who 
were not specifically victims of the purge. The death 
rate in the camps was on average a minimum of 10% a 
year, in some years 20%. With a minimum of 8 million 
inmates in labour camps in any one year between 1936 
and 1950 this indicates 12 million deaths in the camps 
in this period, according to Conquest 1971: 706-709 
who considers it a conservative estimate. Kravchenko 
1947: 302 mentions that whispered estimates close to 
the Kremlin placed the slave labour force in 1938 at 
more than 15 million 
111. Conquest 1971: 482, gives categories and numbers, 
Kravchenko 1947: 336 ff, gives an example of the 
leasing of slave labour to a factory 
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112. See e.g. Kravchenko 1947: ch. 16 ff. Lasswell & Lerner 
1965: 132-133 (case histories of Politburo members) 
113. See e.g. Koestler 1946, Serge 1968, Krivitsky 1939, 
Kravchenko 1947, Moore 1954: 157 ff, Medvedev 1972: 
402 ff, ch.8. But many (under the circumstances) did 
not confess, or retracted their confessions, showing 
real personal courage. Sometimes individual actions of 
resistance can disrupt a terror system (a little) as 
the famous cases of father Kolbe against the SS in a 
German concentration camp, and Col. Laurens van der 
Post against the Japanese in a camp in Indonesia (Merry 
Xmas Mr. Lawrence, the movie, was based on this epi­
sode) indicate 
114. Of the 700 writers to attend the First Writers Congress 
in 1934, for instance, only 50 survived to see the 
second in 1954, Conquest 1971: 437 
115. There were large scale deportations during the collec­
tivization of the ТЭЗО'з. Just before the German 
invasion in 1941 over one million Poles were deported, 
see e.g. Dark Side of the Moon 1946: 50 ff, also 
Conquest 1971: 643 (440.000 Poles and 200.000 Polish 
prisoners of war deported in September 1939). There 
was a massive deportation from the three Baltic states. 
As the German invasion neared, seven minority peoples 
from the area roughly between the Black and Caspian 
seas, their loyalty in doubt, were deported totally, 
Conquest 1960: 54. On the deportation of minorities 
also see Medvedev 1972: 491 ff 
116. Lysenko in the field of biology e.g. or Marr and 
linguistics, see e.g. Medvedev Z.A.- The Rise and Fall 
of T.D. Lysenko, N.Y., 1969, also Medvedev 1972: ch.14, 
Moore 1954: ch.5, Rusland 1917-1921 (Bervoets) 
117. E.g. Lenin 1972e, Trotsky 1921 
118. Kolakowski 1979 II: 516. The Russian poet, Pasternak 
1959 II: 281 speaks of "the 'inhuman' rule of the lie" 
119. Swaan de 1977: 45, 44 
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Notes chapter 11 
1. Dallin & Breslauer 1970: 48 
2. Lifton 1967: 139. On thought reform also Amnesty 1978: 
135 ff and Teiwes F.C. - Politics and Purges in China: 
rectification and the decline of party norms 1950-1965, 
White Plains, 1979 (regrettably I came across this 
impressive work at too late a stage to have been able 
to make more than a very limited use of it). See Karnow 
1967: 462-466 for an example of a self-criticism 
session from a Japanese Chinese, who soon regretted 
his return to the motherland and left for Hong Kong 
3. Ibid: 140-141 
4. It still was, in the late 1970's, according to an 
Amnesty International report, for "major convicted 
offenders in prisons", Amnesty 1978: 141 
5. On "struggle" see e.g. Teiwes 1979, also Bao Ruo-wang 
1973: 58 ff 
6. Lifton 1967: 142 
7. Towards the end of 1956 Mao said that of 4 million 
people recently investigated 160.000 were "doubtful 
elements" of whom 38.000 were found to be counter-revo-
lutionaries. None of these were executed and only 1% 
sent to Reform Through Labour, the rest would remain 
in their positions (Amnesty 1978: 28). Whether this 
statement is true I don't know, but it seems to be an 
accurate reflection of the Chinese communists' ap-
proach. Reform Through Labour was usually from 2 to 20 
years, as opposed to Education Through Labour, a 
standard 3 year term without the loss of one's civic 
rights. For the period up to the GLF Shalom 1984: 
15-16, 41-42 arrives at a figure of "one million, 
perhaps twice that number for all killings", including 
about 700.000 during the land reform (landlords and 
their henchmen as well as party and government cadres), 
KMT remnants, bandits, criminals, political oppositio-
nists and suicides 
8. Shalom 1984: 108 
9. Dallin & Breslauer 1970: 63 
10. On pre-liberation land reform violence see e.g. Hinton 
1966: 141-145, Belden 1973: eh.28, 32 
11. Although extremely rough, the best estimate, according 
to Shalom 1984: 15-16, citing Tanaka Kyoko, for the 
pre-liberation land reform deaths is between 245.000 
and 490.000. This includes party and government cadres 
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killed by landlords or committing suicide as a result 
of party rectification campaigns. Also ibid: 124 n.27 
Edwin Moise's estimate of 265.000-820.000 
12. For the post-liberation land reform (up to 1952) Shalom 
1984: 33 estimates purposive and situational deaths to 
be between 500.000 and 750.000 deaths. He estimates a 
total 750.000 executions during the first years of 
communist rule or "one million for all killings" in 
this period, ibid: 41. Moise, cited in Shalom 1984: 
124 n.27, stimates 680.000-735.000 executions after 
1949 in the land reform. Shalom 1984: 34-35 in fact 
indicates that Mao's contention that 500.000-800.000 
people had been liquidated up to 1954 was probably 
reasonably trustworthy 
13. E.g. Macfarguar 1974: 313 
14. For one example of a provincial party secretary being 
purged for concealing the truth from Beijing, see 
Karnow 1967: 456 
15. Dallin & Breslauer 1970: 70 
16. Shalom 1984: 46, 18 
17. Schurmann & Schell 1967b: 5 
18. Ibid. 
19. Bronkhorst D. - Een eenzame monnik onder een lekkende 
paraplu, in Het Vervolg, Volkskrant 6-9-1986: 9, also 
Amnesty 1978: 62 
20. North 1965: 375, also Teiwes 1979: 12 
21 . One clear example is Li Lisan, who became effective 
leader of the party in 1928, but lost all authority a 
few years later for launching offensives on a number 
of cities that failed. In 1946 he rejoined the CC. He 
was even minister of Labour for a time. Peng Dehuai, 
the minister of Defence, who had opposed the GLF and 
criticized Mao, was dismissed from all his posts, but 
retained his membership of the Politburo 
22. Edgar Snow in Schurmann & Schell 1967b: 86 
23. Meisner 1974: 248 
24. Thurton 1987 
25. The CR has been analyzed in many different ways. Some 
of the problems of analysis in terms of system of 
terror may become apparent in the following brief 
note. The CR was an attack on the ruling elite itself 
(the party and bureaucracy) by the Red Guards, at the 
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initiative of a part of that same elite (Mao c.s.). It 
is even quite possible that students came into action 
of themselves, before being 'invited' to rebel by Mao. 
It was a purge of the party and bureaucracy but not, 
as is normally the case, by part of the bureaucracy 
set up for that purpose, the secret police. It was an 
internal party struggle between various factions of 
the ruling elite for supremacy and control, certainly, 
with the strategy for development of the People's 
Republic as the main Issue, but it also went much 
further. It was an all out attack on the mainstay of 
communist society, the party itself. It became an 
attack on everything old, bourgeois or foreign, an 
xenophobic attempt to regain the purity of the revolu-
tion and behold it for the future. It was not an 
explicit economic philosophy. The masses should regain 
their rightful position as leading element in the 
continuing revolution, should manifest grass-roots 
initiative and creativity. It was therefore also an 
attack on the growing dominance of industrializing 
cities over the countryside, of urban intellectuals 
and specialization over the peasantry and practical 
knowledge. The CR was a Maoist revival - speaking on 
the peasants' behalf - not the peasants speaking for 
themselves. In this sense it is a classic example of 
intellectual revolutionary elites' knowing what is 
best for the (abstract) masses, better than they know 
it themselves and without considering their wishes and 
feelings. As it was, the peasants were, on the whole, 
little affected directly. Mao's call to the college 
and high-school students, the young intellectuals, to 
"bombard the headquarters" and "to rebel is justified" 
struck a responsive chord. In fact their response was 
so overwhelming that it rapidly led to a virtual 
breakdown of central authority in large parts of the 
country. Several million of them descended on Beijing 
from all over the country, creating local rebellion as 
they passed through towns and cities. The capital was 
disrupted. Red Guard and radical Maoist attacks were 
levelled at more or less the same groups that fell 
victim to Stalin's Great Purge. But the youngsters who 
were to spearhead this rejuvenation of the revolution 
and embody the new socialist ideals soon fell to bitter 
internecine warfare. Most of them probably did not 
sufficiently comprehend the situation. Various factions 
were manipulated by central authorities and party 
officials as the struggle for power between radical 
Maoists and others continued. What actually happened 
differed substantially from place to place. Develop-
ments were far from uniform. The army was called in to 
restore order (on the side of the radicals) and emerged 
from the CR as the sole nation-wide organization with 
real power. Before the start of the CR already the 
army had been radicalized and prepared by Lin Piao. 
But had not the party always to lead the army? The 
personality cult surrounding Mao is another discrepan-
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су. Мао had always strongly opposed anything resembling 
personality cults (see e.g. Snow E. - The Other Side 
of the River, N.Y., 1961: 149) and yet it seems he 
resorted to this measure perhaps believing it necessary 
to combat the greater evil. One thing seems certain, 
the CR ushered in a period of chaos. The violence and 
deaths that occurred were mainly the result of things 
getting out of hand. Shalom, in his scrupulous and 
critical evaluation of the number of deaths that can be 
attributed to the Chinese communists, concludes that 
the best guess for the number of deaths between 1966 
and 1976 would be in the neighbourhood of one million, 
including those killed in clashes between Red Guard 
factions among themselves and by the army in order to 
restore order, suicides and executions (rarely official 
or officially condoned), "although it is not a figure 
in which one can place great confidence" (Shalom 1984: 
87). My estimate is that most deaths were the result 
of situational more than purposive terror (see Dallin 
& Breslauer discussion in ch.10.3. On the CR see e.g. 
Thurston 1987, Yuan 1986, Karol K. S. - La deuxième 
Revolution Chinoise, Paris, 1973, Ginneken J. van - De 
linkse stroming in China, Amsterdam, 1974, Robinson J. 
- The Cultural Revolution in China, Harmondsworth, 
1969, Fokkema D.W. & E. Zürcher - China Nu, balans van 
de culturele revolutie, Amsterdam, 1973, Kloosterman 
J. - Het Maoïsme en de culturele revolutie, Utrecht, 
1969 (Katernen 2000), Hinton W. - The 100 Days War, 
London, 1972 
Bao Ruo-wang 1973: 10. He is far from being an apolo-
gist for the Chinese communists. In fact Shalom takes 
issue with him for extreme arbitrariness in a number 
of general contentions (such as the total number at 
forced labour, and that with very rare exceptions 
prison experiences were lifelong, see Shalom 1984: 
182, 188 n.249, 194 n.264 & 268). But most of Bao's 
account makes a very reliable impression 
Bao Ruo-wang 1973: 45 
Which did not yet make them leisure resorts. They 
contained terrorist aspects such as the atomization of 
camp society. E.g. regulations in penal institutions 
"mainly aim at preventing detainees from establishing 
relationships with one another and encourage them to 
report on each other", as Amnesty International notes 
(Amnesty 1978: 118). This is more or less confirmed by 
Bao Ruo-wang 1973: 47. Shalom 1984: 190-192 table 2 
has developed a simple model of the number of Chinese 
"politicals" in penal institutions and "under control", 
on the basis of a niunber of assumptions and the data 
he has researched (for assumptions see ibid: 100-101). 
According to this model the forced labour population 
rose from 286.000 in 1950 to 1 million in 1953 and to 
2 million in 1968. The number of prisoners who "chose" 
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to remain in the camps and work for wages after the 
expiry of their sentences, the "retained", rose from 
36.000 in 1953 to about 400.000 in 1970. "Chose" 
because it is unclear whether this was a free or forced 
choice. "Retained" workers shared many of the condi-
tions of regular inmates but were allowed home visits 
and had better food. The number "under control" varied 
between 400.000 and 600.000 in the early years and in 
the aftermath of the CR, and about 300.000 in between. 
He also calculates a death rate for the camps of 1.5% 
per year, which is about the same as the normal adult 
death rate in China. "(P)erhaps one million died at 
various forms of forced labour in China from 1950 to 
1970, beyond the death rate of the population at 
large", he notes, adding that, "(a)s with many of my 
estimates this figure depends on quite a few arbitrary 
assumptions and may well be in error. I think the 
assumptions are likely to err in the direction of 
overestimating the number of deaths...", ibid: 109-110. 
After 1953 accounts only very infrequently mention 
executions of prisoners, and then as exemplary punish-
ment for escape attempts or serious crimes committed 
in prison. Amnesty 1976: 122, also Shalom 1984: 108 
After Beijing's initial peaceful 'liberation' of Tibet 
failed it tried to subdue the region by force. After 
the 1959 revolt, in which the Dalai Lama and a large 
entourage managed to flee to India, direct Chinese 
administration was imposed, monasteries closed, monks 
forced to work and Tibetan Buddhism curtailed. Public 
health facilities and education have also been expanded 
and improved, economic development undertaken and many 
of the more abominable aspects of the Tibetan social 
system abolished. There has been some forceful recruit-
ment of Tibetan youth into the army. The influx of Han 
Chinese soldiers and civilians, causing a strain on 
the local economy, has also led to resentment. Although 
Tibet was made an autonomous region in 1965 most 
official positions, including such lower jobs as bus 
drivers and postal clerks, are occupied by non-Tibe-
tans. Although the figure of one million Tibetans 
killed mostly as a result of the 1959 uprising, is 
often suggested, Shalom 1984: 81 considers 100.000 a 
"reasonable approximation of the number of people of 
minority nationalities who were killed" before the CR, 
the majority of which were Tibetans 
See e.g. FEER 25-8-1988: 28 ff on Xinjiang (and other 
minorities in China), also FEER 3-8-1989: 36-37. For 
Tibet recall the riots of October 1987 and March 1989, 
see e.g. FEER 16-3-1989: 10-11 
Some 300.000 "rightists" were exposed. According to 
texts collected by Red Guards, Mao said this in May 
1958, see Amnesty 1978: 29. According to Shalom 1984: 
105 "it seems that some 300.000 had been exposed as 
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"rightists", but he does not give any further refe­
rence. In 1976-1977 110.000 of them were released, 
the last of those who had been imprisoned in 1957. 
Shalom 1984: 100, 105 S η.248 believes that about one 
third of the originally arrested would have been 
sentenced to "control" ("people under control of the 
masses"), which was generally a 3 year sentence, but 
could be less. This is reminiscent of Education Through 
Reform which, as Bao 1973: 11 also remarks, was a 
standard three-year term. According to Amnesty 1978: 
58, however, "under control" is a sentence whereby the 
offenders remain in society but under surveillance. 
They have to do productive labour, attend political 
sessions and report regularly to the responsible cadres 
32. Woodside 1976: 654-655 
33. Pluvier 1974: 83 
34. Moise 1976: 75 
35. Ibid: 82 
36. Gordon 1978: 29. He adds that this rectification was 
itself later denounced when the architects of the 
extreme version of land reform made their come back in 
1958. Also e.g. Pluvier 1983: 95-97 
37. Moise 1976: 83, 85 
38. Wolf 1969: 188. Pluvier 1983: 96 says this revolt was 
inspired by a number of Roman Catholic clergy and 
involved mostly Roman Catholic peasants 
39. Fall B. - The Two Viet Nams: A Political and Military 
Analysis, N.Y., 1964: 156. Wolf 1969: 191, inter alia, 
echoes this figure 
40. Porter 1973 
41. Moise 1976: 78. Pluvier 1983: 95 notes that Ho Chi 
Minh, in an interview in 1959, had put the number of 
land reform victims in the 1953-1956 period at "perhaps 
10.000" 
42. For the post-1975 I have relied mainly on the FEER 
43. Race 1972: 160 
44. Pluvier 1983: 246-247 
45. In the summer of 1987 Hanoi released over 6.500 in­
mates, including 480 military and civilian personnel 
of the former Saigon regime, who had been held since 
the end of the Vietnam War, Hiebert M. - 'Re-education' 
students freed, in FEER 8-10-1987: 22. People had been 
39Θ 
released in the past but never in such a large group, 
it appears. According to Hanoi only 90.000 people had 
served time in re-education camps since 1975 and only 
1% of those originally detained still remained, "be­
cause they stubbornly refuse to mend their ways", 
ibid: 22. Critics of the regime claim that the actual 
number still being held is much higher. New people 
have also been detained since the end of the war. 
Recently e.g. two protestant ministers were sentenced 
to 8 years for "preaching against the revolution", 
ibid: 22-23 
46. On life in a re-education camp see e.g. Tran Tri Vu -
Lost Years: My 1,632 Days in Vietnamese Re-education 
Camps, Inst, of East Asian Studies, U. of Cal., Berkeley 
47. On the Hoa exodus see e.g. Benoit, С. - Vietnam's Boat 
People, in Elliot 1981: 139-162 
48. In The Last Joint Plan, a document found at Tuoi Sleng, 
a 25 page summary of conspiracies and conspirators, 
put together on the basis of extracted confessions 
about the "joint plan" of Cambodia's enemies to des­
tabilize the CPK regime, the external enemies, working 
in concord, are named as the Russians, Vietnamese, 
Laotians, Thais and American imperialists, see Hawk D. 
- Verslonden door de eigen revolutie, in Volkskrant 
1-2-1986: 9 
49. Carney 1977: 11. After DK had been toppled by the 
Vietnamese invasion leng Sari admitted they had relied 
too much on political conscience and had too little 
experience in the management of the state, interview 
with H. Kamm early 1980, in Shawcross 19Θ5: 334-335 
50. Vickery 1984: 48 
51. Evans & Rowley 1984: 107 
52. Barnett 1983: 216 
53. How many were executed in other centres I do not know 
54. Heder S. - Letter to the editor, in FEER 16-7-1982: 3 
55. In China the external threat of the Korean War was 
translated into a spirit of sacrifice at home. Stalin 
used external threat to legitimize the Great Purge 
56. In Barth S Terzani 1980: 81 
57. Vickery 1984: ch.5, specifically 280, 281, 287 
58. Cited in Vickery 1984: 137 
59. According to people interviewed by Kiernan 1983: 188-190 
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60. Vickery 1984: 149 
61 . Moore 1978: 13 
62. Horowitz 1976: 35 
63. Shalom 1984: 46 
64. Ibid: 46-47 
65. A comparison that is often made in this respect is that 
between China and India, and always in favour of China, 
e.g. Dumont & Cohen 1980: ch.6, Schurmann & Schell 
1967b: 168 
66. Karnow 1967: 455 
67. Shalom 1984: 51 citing J.S. Aird of the United States 
Bureau of the Census "one of the most respected Western 
experts on Chinese demography", ibid: 49 
68. Ibid: 61 
69. Ibid: 147 
70. Ibid: 61 
71. Karnow 1967: 455. Bao Ruo-wang 1973: 219, in penal 
institutions at the time, says something similar 
72. Mackerras C. - Modern China: A Chronology from 1842 to 
the Present, London, 1982: 499 
73. Karnow 1967: 457 
74. See e.g. Dumont & Cohen 1980: 153, 162, 165, also 
Cathie J. - The Political Economy of Food Aid, Alder-
shot, 1982: 21, 24 
75. Pluvier 1983: 211-212 and reference to VB, 7, 1, 15-7-1972 
76. Walter 1969: 14 
77. Wilkinson 1977: 57 
78. Conquest 1971: 275 
79. Conquest 1971: 540-562, 663-664, Medvedev 1972: 
480-481, 494-495 
80. Medvedev 1972: 558 
81 . The events of Revolutionary France provide us with an 
illustrative example of how, with the centralization 
of power by the revolutionary elite (the Jacobins in 
this case) the process of terror develops and expands 
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to include more and more categories from which more 
and more victims can be selected to finally become 
what seems an end in itself. What started with attacks 
against relatively well defined enemies of the revolu-
tion, the aristocrats, soon started to engulf more and 
more people. Even before the June 1793 Jacobin coup, 
decrees had been passed (in March and April), largely 
due to Robespierre and Marat, outlawing whole groups 
of people. The Law of the Suspects (17th of September 
1793) went much further. It enabled the Committee of 
General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal to 
arrest and execute almost anyone even remotely suspec-
ted of treachery. Inter alia it mentioned those who 
had befriended tyranny, federalism and counter-revolu-
tion by way of personal relations, relatives of nobles 
and emigres, and persons unable to bring evidence of 
their patriotic conduct in the past. On the 10th of 
June 1794 the Laws of Prairial were passed, decreeing 
that the annihilation of enemies of the revolution took 
precedence over formal justice. Any kind of evidence 
was acceptable. The need for examining witnesses was 
dispensed with. The right of the defendant to plead 
before the Tribunal was suspended. All citizens had 
the right to denounce conspirators. As the terror 
progressed it turned more and more onto sections of 
the revolutionary movement itself. In the summer of 
1793 Robespierre ordered the hunting and execution of 
the more moderate faction of the Girondins. The Indul-
gents under Danton and the Hébertists soon followed, 
as did, in April 1794, the Cordeliers. Eventually, 
when Robespierre told the Convention that he had drawn 
up a list of traitors in their midst without revealing 
their names, the National Convention, its members 
fearing for their lives, turned against him. He and 
his associates were guillotined on the 27th and 28th 
of July 1794, and the Terror came to an end (see e.g. 
Talmon 1955, also Kolakowski 1978 (I): ch.10). During 
the Reign of Terror at least 300.000 people had been 
arrested and 17.000 officially executed, whilst many 
died in prison without trial. Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 
vol IX, Chicago, 1974: 904 "Terror", Stohl & Lopez 
1984a: 4. Greer estimates that actually 40.000 were 
executed in this period, Greer D. - The Incidence of 
Terror During the French Revolution, Cambridge, 1935, 
cited in Wardlaw 1982: 15 
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Notes chapter 12 
1. Scott 1986: 6. The Bolshevik economist Preobrazhenski 
explicitly formulates this with his concept of "primi-
tive socialist accumulation". All more or less backward 
socialist economies, including the Soviet Union, had 
to initially exploit the peasant sector in order to 
industrialize, to build and strengthen the socialist 
sector: "(t)he alienation in favour of socialism of 
part of the surplus product of all pre-socialist 
forms", Preobrazhenski 1973: 223 says. It was, he held 
"undoubtedly a reactionary petit-bourgeoisie (which 
included the peasantry - RB) Utopia" to think other-
wise, ibid: 224. Also Lipton M. - Why Poor People Stay 
Poor: Urban Bias in World Development, London, 1977, 
who defends the thesis that socialist countries are 
just as anti-peasant as other states. Julius Nyerere 
observes the same in the Arusha Declaration. The ujamaa 
villages' policy was launched in 1967 precisely to 
prevent getting into the situation "where the real 
exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers 
exploiting the peasants", Nyerere, in Shanin 1973a: 
376. Like Mao's GLF it flopped, the peasants unwilling 
to co-operate with these policies, see e.g. Hyden G.-
Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, London, 1980, and the 
interview with Abdul Balu by Cranenburgh, in Inter-
mediair 6, 6-2-1987: 137-141 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CC Central Committee 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CPK Communist Party of Kampuchea 
CR Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
DK Democratic Kampuchea (only in the footnotes) 
FUNK Front U m National du Kampuchea 
GLF Great Leap Forward 
GRUNK Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea 
ICP Indochinese Communist Party 
KMT Kuo Mintang 
Kp. Kompong 
KR Khmers Rouges 
KPRP Kampuchean Peoples Revolutionary Party 
NCNA New China News Agency 
NLF/NVA National Liberation Front/North Vietnamese Army 
PLA (Chinese) Peoples Liberation Army 
PP Phnom Penh (only in the footnotes) 
PRK Peoples Republic of Kampuchea 
SU Soviet Union (only in the footnotes) 
TCP Thai Communist Party 
UN United Nations 
USA United States of America 
VCP Vietnamese Communist Party 
VWP Vietnamese Workers Party 
List of abbreviated titles of newspapers, periodicals and miscellaneous 
AS Asian Survey 
BoCAS Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 
CAS Concerned Asian Scholars 
Cont SEA Contemporary Southeast Asia 
FEER Far Eastern Economic Review 
HP Haagse Post 
IAF Internationales Asien Forum 
IDOC International Documentation and Communication Centre 
IHT International Herald Tribune 
IndChr Indochina Chronicle 
IS Internationale Samenwerking 
JoCA Journal of Contemporary Asia 
JoPS Journal of Peasant Studies 
JoSEAS Journal of Southeast Asia Studies 
Keesing Keesing Historisch Archief 
Mission 
en France Mission du Gouvernement du Kampuchea Démocratique en France 
NRC Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant/Algemeen Handelsblad 
NYRoB New York Review of Books 
NYT New York Times 
NZZ Neue Züricher Zeitung 
PA Pacific Affairs 
SEAA Southeast Asian Affairs 
SEAChr Southeast Asia Chronicle 
VB Vietnam Bulletin 
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DE OGEN VAN DE ANANAS 
REVOLUTIONAIRE INTELLECTUELEN EN TERREUR I N DEMOCRATISCH 
KAMPUCHEA 
Samenvatting 
Het Pol Pot-regime is niet het enige dat van terreur gebruik 
heeft gemaakt. Ook andere staten hebben zich er van bediend, 
zoals alleen al blijkt uit mijn bespreking van de Sovjet 
Unie onder Stalin, Mao's China en Vietnam. Relatief gezien, 
echter, zijn er weinig gevallen in de geschiedenis geweest 
die zich in dit opzicht met het Pol Pot-regime kunnen meten. 
Het lijkt erop dat in het geval van Democratisch Kampuchea 
de meeste factoren die het gebruik van terreur aanmoedigen 
zich tegelijkertijd voordeden en wel in een zodanige wissel-
werking dat tegenkrachten tot een minimum beperkt werden, 
waardoor een van de ergst mogelijke situaties kon ontstaan. 
Hoe was het mogelijk dat de Khmers Rouges (KR), onder 
leiding van een klein groepje revolutionaire intellectuelen, 
in Cambodja de macht konden grijpen, waarom maakten ze 
gebruik van systematische terreur om die macht te verwerven 
en te behouden, en waarom in die extreme mate - dat zijn de 
centrale vragen van deze studie. In het eerste deel be-
schrijf ik de ontwikkelingen in Cambodja voor zover relevant 
voor het gebruik van terreur door de KR. In het tweede deel 
worden deze dan geanalyseerd, in een breder theoretisch 
raamwerk geplaatst en met een aantal andere revolutionaire 
communistische regimes vergeleken. In deze samenvatting 
geef ik echter eerst een kort overzicht van de belangrijkste 
punten uit hoofdstuk 9 en 10 zodat de analyse van de gebeur-
tenissen in Cambodja die daarop volgt beter te volgen is. 
Macht is een middel om doeleinden te realiseren. Hoewel 
economische exploitatie het surplus levert waarmee de 
heersende elite de middelen kan verkrijgen om te heersen, 
om haar macht te behouden, is politieke macht tegelijkertijd 
een middel om economische exploitatie te realiseren en te 
vergroten. En terreur is een van de middelen om die macht 
te verwerven en te behouden. Een heersende elite kan het 
gebruik van terreur aanwenden als zij de kosten van het 
gebruik ervan lager en de verwachte voordelen hoger inschat 
dan alternatieve methoden om haar situatie de baas te 
blijven, of als zij van mening is dat andere beschikbare 
methoden om te heersen volstrekt ontoereikend zijn ("expec-
ted utility"). Het doel van terreur is controle. Door geweld 
of de dreiging ervan wordt bij de doelgroep chronische en 
extreme angst opgeroepen, hetgeen tot de gewenste onderwer-
ping of meegaandheid leidt. Het er nauw mee verbonden 
concept "forced choice" garandeert medewerking: het laat 
slechts de keuze tussen kwaad en erger open. Het individu 
werkt mee om het afschrikwekkende alternatief te vermijden 
en het relatieve voordeel van het mindere kwaad te verdie-
nen. Honger bijvoorbeeld is een zeer effectieve strategie om 
medewerking af te dwingen. Terreur wordt niet gedachteloos 
gebruikt. Het is niet zonder meer mogelijk het gebruik 
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ervan te voorspellen. We kunnen echter wel de variabelen en 
omstandigheden achterhalen die het voorkomen ervan beïnvloe-
den en vergemakkelijken. Een korte samenvatting van de 
belangrijkste factoren die het gebruik van terreur door 
revolutionaire communistische elites bepalen kan niet anders 
dan generaliserend zijn. ledere factor afzonderlijk roept 
misschien ook meer vragen op dan antwoorden. Het is hun 
specifieke onderlinge samenhang en wisselwerking die het 
gebruik van terreur teweegbrengt. 
Voor sociale en politieke controle zijn sancties nodig. 
Er zijn grofweg drie systemen van sancties: normatieve 
macht, gebaseerd of overreding (zoals socialisatie, onder-
wijs, het bieden van erkenning, prestige, liefde), materiële 
macht, gebaseerd op materiële prikkels (bijvoorbeeld lonen, 
steekpenningen, promoties), en dwingende macht (waaronder 
boetes, straffen en terreur). Terreur onderscheidt zich van 
andere dwangmiddelen door zijn willekeur en onvoorspelbaar-
heid. In veel gevallen heeft een revolutionair communistisch 
elite de neiging om zich direct na de machtsovername sterk 
te verlaten op dwang om haar macht te consolideren door het 
uitschakelen van werkelijke en potentiële vijanden ("take-
over stage"). Deels door de ontwrichting als een gevolg van 
de revolutie mist zij de materiële hulpbronnen om haar 
volgelingen tevreden te stellen. Zij heeft ook geen tijd 
gehad de massa's met haar revolutionaire ideologie als 
normatief beheersinstrument te doordringen. 
Bovendien hebben dergelijke elites zich over het 
algemeen gebonden aan een wezenlijke transformatie van de 
economie, de maatschappij en zelfs de individuele menselijke 
natuur ("mobilization stage"). Ook dan kan een gebrek aan 
normatieve en materiële hulpbronnen deze elites verleiden 
van terreur gebruik te maken. De snelheid en radicaliteit 
van de transformatie, de druk op de economie en de samenle-
ving die deze mobilisatie en herbestemming van menselijke 
en natuurlijke hulpbronnen oplegt, de mate waarin een en 
ander botst met de waarden en belangen van verschillende 
sectoren van de maatschappij, zullen allemaal het gebruik 
van terreur beïnvloeden. Hoe sneller en vollediger de 
verandering, hoe meer doeleinden een revolutionair regime 
tegelijkertijd probeert na te jagen, hoe breder en verbit-
terd de oppositie waarschijnlijk zal zijn, hoe meer terreur 
er nodig zal zijn om de veranderingen op te leggen. 
Wat de revolutie ook moge brengen, zij schept bijna 
altijd een meer dwingend en hegemonistisch staatsapparaat. 
Bijna altijd bevinden boeren ("peasants") zich in de ironi-
sche positie een bewind aan de macht geholpen te hebben 
wiens plannen voor industrialisatie, belasting-heffing en 
collectivisatie lijn-recht staan tegen over dat waar zij 
voor dachten te hebben gevochten. Maar omdat er zoveel 
andere variabelen een rol spelen laat het feitelijk gebruik 
van geweld tegen de bevolking opvallende verschillen zien, 
zoals blijkt uit de geschiedenis van de Sovjet Unie, China 
en Vietnam, waarnaar ik in deel II regelmatig verwijs. Hoe 
een revolutionaire communistische elite omgaat met de 
verschillen tussen de politieke kuituur van het centrum en 
de kulturele traditie van het platteland, de kloof die haar 
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scheidt van de boeren, hun uiteenlopende doelstellingen en 
belangen, speelt bij de vraag of deze elite wel of geen 
terreur tegen de massa's zal gebruiken, een centrale rol. 
De wijze waarop de revolutie uitgevoerd wordt zal de post-
revolutionaire orde beïnvloeden. Een geïsoleerde, sectari-
sche partij, of partij-overheersing tijdens het revolutio-
naire proces zal eerder tot een post-revolutionair regime 
leiden dat zijn wil oplegt. Deelgenootschap in het revolu-
tionaire proces of inschikkelijkheid, aan de andere kant, 
begunstigt interactie en wederkerigheid tussen partij en 
massa. Als de revolutionaire beweging er in geslaagd is de 
steun van de bevolking te winnen, het administratief-organi-
satorisch systeem van het land te penetreren en de overhand 
te behalen over alternatieve organisaties en autoriteiten, 
dan zal er minder 'noodzaak' zijn voor terreur na de over-
name. Bij een goed georganiseerde partij bestaat er boven-
dien minder kans op "situational terror". Dat is Onnodige' 
terreur, meestal een gevolg van ongedisciplineerd en onge-
controleerd gedrag van lagere rangen, en moet onderscheiden 
worden van "purposive terror" dat door de machthebbers 
geïnitieerd en bedoeld wordt. 
Hoe de post-revolutionaire orde eruit zal zien wordt 
mede beïnvloed door de mate van maatschappelijke ontwrich-
ting, de mate waarin trouw aan de staat en de legitimiteit 
van de heersende klasse ondermijnd zijn, factoren die ook 
de kans op succesvolle revolutie bevoordelen. Afhankelijk 
van hun relatieve kracht en onderlinge samenhang kunnen de 
verschillende klassen en sectoren in de maatschappij een 
matigende invloed hebben op de revolutionaire elite, in-
schikkelijkheid en samenwerking met andere groepen aanmoedi-
gen, of juist arbitrair en autoritair handelen vergemakke-
lijken. Hoe zwakker, minder georganiseerd de klasse is, die 
de revolutionaire elite wil mobiliseren, hoe minder kans er 
is dat deze klasse tegenwicht kan uitoefenen ("thermidorean 
pressure"), hoe meer het de onafhankelijkheid van de voor-
hoede-partij en de kans op autoritaire overheersing ver-
groot. In het algemeen kan men stellen dat hoe minder 
tegenkrachten er in de vorm van traditionele structuren en 
patronen bij de overname bestaan, hoe groter de maatschappe-
lijke en economische ontwrichting, hoe groter de manoeu-
vreerruimte van de revolutionaire elite. Een uitgeputte 
economie zal de revolutionaire elite geen of bijna geen 
materiële hulpbronnen laten om haar volgelingen zelfs op 
middellange termijn tevreden te stellen. Ook externe drei-
ging of steun kan van cruciaal belang zijn voor het al of 
niet gebruik maken van terreur door het nieuwe regime. 
Een andere belangrijke factor is de ideologie van de 
revolutionaire elite. In het specifieke geval van communis-
tische regimes, waar ik het in dit werk over heb, duiden de 
begrippen 'vals bewustzijn' en 'voorhoede-partij' op een 
houding jegens de massa die een impliciete legitimatie 
inhoudt van het gebruik van geweld tegen die massa. Deze 
elites meenden dat de massa's misleid waren door de ideolo-
gie van de heersende klasse en dus niet hun eigen ware 
belang konden begrijpen. Zij leden aan 'vals bewustzijn'. 
Deze elites beweerden zelf wel deze ware belangen te kennen, 
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de basis en legitimatie van hun revolutionaire politieke 
activiteiten. De voorhoede-partij was het organisatorische 
instrument waarmee ideologische invloed over de massa 
uitgeoefend kon worden. Het was tegelijkertijd een instru-
ment om de kritische en potentieel politiek concurrerende 
capaciteiten van revolutionaire intellectuelen te beheersen. 
Het smeedde hen om tot een effectieve organisatie voor 
revolutionaire aktiviteit. Om het einddoel te bereiken, het 
ware socialistische bewustzijn en een echte communistische 
maatschappij, waren alle middelen geheiligd. Het ideaal, de 
verinnerlijking door iedere burger van alle voorgeschreven 
waarden en doeleinden, zodat iedere burger een "goede 
communist" zou zijn, zou uiteraard het gebruik van iedere 
vorm van dwang overbodig maken. 
Factoren en omstandigheden beïnvloeden, maar uiteinde-
lijk zijn het mensen die besluiten al of niet van terreur 
gebruik te maken. Tot slot moeten dus die factoren die de 
ervaringen van de revolutionaire elite beïnvloeden, haar 
psychologische 'toestand' (onder andere haar zelfvertrouwen, 
realiteitszin, achterdocht) en haar politieke strategie in 
ogenschouw genomen worden. 
In het specifieke geval van het terreur-regime van de 
KR waren er in de psychologische ontwikkeling van de leiders 
van de Communistische Partij van Kampuchea (CPK), met name 
de Pol Pot-groep, een aantal zaken van bijzonder belang. 
Hun heftig nationalisme was ontstaan tegen de achtergrond 
van de vergane glorie van het grootse Angkor Rijk, geboren 
uit een krachtige afkeer van Cambodja's afhankelijkheid van 
en onderwerping aan vreemde mogendheden, en uit een diepe 
historische angst dat de Khmer-natie voor-goed van de 
aardbodem zou verdwijnen. Onderdompeling in het Franse 
communisme van die tijd (eind jaren veertig, begin vijftig), 
een nogal stalinistische lezing van het marxisme-leninisme, 
verschafte hen een kant en klaar en mechanisch interpreta-
tie- en organisatie-model. De anti-imperialistische buiten-
landse politiek van Sihanoek, die hem de steun van alle 
socialistische mogendheden verwierf, het progressieve 
toonbeeld dat het Sihanoek-regime intern aan de massa's 
vertoonde, en de onmogelijkheid van legale onafhankelijke 
politieke oppositie, marginaliseerden de Cambodjaanse 
communisten. Het moedigde hen aan een nog radicaler en 
nationalistischer imago te presenteren dan dat van Sihanoek. 
Een belangrijke complicerende factor was het bestaan 
van meerdere stromingen binnen de Cambodjaanse communisti-
sche beweging. Een groep had tijdens de onafhankelijkheids-
strijd met de Vietminh samengewerkt, en eigenlijk zich 
onder leiding van de Vietminh geplaatst. Na de Geneefse 
Conferentie van 1954 had een deel van deze Khmer Vietminh 
zich in Noord-Vietnam teruggetrokken, een deel bleef in 
Cambodja. Hoewel de meesten zeker niet pro-Vietnamees waren 
zouden ze daar later wel door Pol Pot van beschuldigd 
worden. Binnen de groep die in Frankrijk had gestudeerd, 
bestond verschil van mening over de mogelijkheid binnen het 
Sihanoek systeem te werken. In 1963 doken Pol Pot en anderen 
onder in het onherbergzame, door bergstammen bevolkte, 
noord-oosten om een gewapende strijd voor te bereiden. 
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Velen van hen die in de stad achterbleven zouden later ook 
gezuiverd worden. 
Het fysieke isolement van de Pol Pot-groep van de 
meerderheid van de Khmer boeren werd versterkt door de 
semi-religieuze verering van de boeren voor de charismati-
sche Sihanoek. Het mislukken van de door de Vietnamezen 
geïnspireerde Khmer Vietminh-strategie (die het belang van 
Noord Vietnam voor ogen had, niet dat van de Cambodjaanse 
communisten), samen met de aloude wrok en angst van de 
Khmer jegens de Vietnamezen, alsmede het gebrek aan steun 
van zelfs de socialistische landen, vergrootte haar isole-
ment, achterdocht, overtuiging van de noodzaak op eigen 
kracht te moeten vertrouwen, en intense onafhankelijkheids-
zin. De radicale revolutionaire hartstocht van het relatief 
kleine groepje linkse intellectuelen in de steden werd 
aangewakkerd door hun geblokkeerde opwaartse mobiliteit, 
het gebrek aan economische en maatschappelijke ontwikkeling 
en de corruptie van het populistische Sihanoek-bewind, de 
Chinese Culturele Revolutie en een zeer specifieke, geïso-
leerde boeren opstand (Samlaut rebellie). De overgrote 
meerderheid van de bevolking, boeren met een eigen lapje 
grond die in meerdere of mindere mate voor eigen gebruik 
verbouwden, waren niet in revolutie geïnteresseerd. Dit 
wordt in hoofdstuk 2 besproken, dat de periode tot 1970 
behandelt. 
De ondergang van het Sihanoek-bewind, bezegeld door de 
rechtse, met Amerikaanse zegen uitgevoerde, staatsgreep van 
Lon Nol, kondigde echter plotselinge en enorme veranderingen 
aan, het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 3. Het bracht de oorlog in 
Vietnam naar Cambodja en gaf de KR de kans hun strijd op te 
voeren en uit te breiden. Het door het Lon Nol regime en 
zijn Amerikaanse en Zuid Vietnamese bondgenoten ontketende 
geweld tegen de plattelandsbevolking, en Sihanoeks oproep 
om zich bij de FUNK, het verzetsfront tegen Lon Nol en de 
Amerikanen, aan te sluiten, dreef veel boeren naar de 
guerilla. Grotendeels dankzij de steun van de Vietnamese 
communisten wisten de KR al gauw het grootste deel van het 
platteland in handen te krijgen. De trouw van de massa aan 
de staat, toch al nooit erg sterk, en in het geval van de 
meeste boeren beperkt tot de God-prins Sihanoek, was door 
zijn afzetting ondermijnd. Het werd ook ondergraven door de 
algehele ontwrichting en vernietiging die de oorlog teweeg-
bracht, de ondergeschiktheid van het incapabele en corrupte 
Lon Nol-bewind aan vreemde mogendheden, en militaire fias-
co's. Dat alles en de groeiende ontgoocheling zelfs onder de 
stedelijke elite, duidden op een zeer ernstige crisis van 
de Cambodjaanse maatschappij, die de weg plaveidde voor een 
revolutionaire voorhoede-partij, de CPK. 
De partij, en vooral de Pol Pot-factie, wantrouwde 
zowel Sihanoek als de Vietnamese communisten. Voor de oorlog 
had Sihanoek de KR als wild opgejaagd. De Vietnamese commu-
nisten hadden ze nooit vertrouwd. Na het uitbreiden van de 
oorlog naar Cambodja was Hanoi begonnen Khmer Vietminh 
(Camodjaanse communisten die onder Vietnamese invloed 
stonden) naar Cambodja terug te sturen om via hen zijn 
controle over de guerilla te vestigen. De angst en het 
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wantrouwen van de CPK werden vergroot toen Hanoi (en 
Beijing), na de Parijse Vredesakkoorden, haar tot onderhan-
delingen probeerde te dwingen. En het warme onthaal dat 
Sihanoeks bezoek in 1973 aan de boeren in bevrijd gebied 
ontlokte, vergrootte het besef van de CPK van de dreiging 
die hij als machtsrivaal vormde. Bang om op een zijspoor 
gezet te worden of om na de oorlog de macht te moeten delen, 
begon zij haar bondgenoten in het FUNK te elimineren. 
Jarenlang zich schuil houden, geïsoleerd, verraden worden 
en een sterk gevoel van onveiligheid, had de achterdocht 
van de KR leiders, en met name van de Pol Pot-groep, dermate 
vergroot dat het iedereen en alles betrof dat niet onder 
hun controle had gestaan, dat door andere culturen, ideolo-
gieën en ervaringen was beïnvloed. Vooral intellectuelen 
werden daarom gewantrouwd. Het zou ook steeds meer de 
communisten treffen, die ooit met de Vietneunezen hadden 
samengewerkt en hen die na 1963 nog binnen het Sihanoek-
bewind politiek hadden proberen te drijven. In tegenstel-
ling tot hun verenigd-front-propaganda probeerde de CPK 
niet, uit angst Trojaanse paarden binnen te halen, brede 
lagen van de bevolking te verenigen om de overwinning te 
behalen. Zij vertrouwde uitsluitend op de boeren en enkele 
bergstammen met wie zij al langer contact had. Het zelf-
opofferende, vaderlandslievende imago van de KR en hun 
aanvankelijk tamelijk gematigde aanpak dwong alom respect 
af. Zij verscholen zich echter achter het anonieme, abstrac-
te en ontzagwekkende Angkar (letterlijk "Organisatie"), in 
plaats van een charismatisch leiderschap te presenteren 
(zoals Мао, Ho en zelfs 'vadertje' Stalin wel hadden ge­
daan), en dat zou mogelijke utopische sentimenten bij de 
boeren nauwelijks aanwakkeren. Over het algemeen waren de 
boeren niet revolutionair. Zij wilden slechts een einde aan 
de oorlog. 
Als een gevolg van de traumatische Amerikaanse bombar­
dementen van 1973 werden haat en wraak veel sterkere facto­
ren om de KR te steunen. In een relatief dun bevolkt land 
als Cambodja is de controle over mensen essentiëler dan de 
controle over land. De KR, munt slaand uit de situatie die 
door de bombardementen werd veroorzaakt, begon steden te 
evacueren, mensen in bevrijd gebied te hervestigen en 
radicale collectivisatie door te voeren. Deze maatregelen 
gaven hen grotere controle over mensen als productiemiddel 
en als reservoir voor hun strijdkrachten. De radicaliteit 
van de collectivisatie, deels een gevolg van het feit dat 
zij zich op de arme en perifere boeren baseerden (radicaler 
en minder beïnvloed door de markt), werd door de bombarde-
menten vergemakkelijkt. Die hadden vooral het centrale 
landbouwgebied getroffen en daarbij de bestaansbasis vernie-
tigd van de eigenerfde boeren-meerderheid die anders moge-
lijkerwijs meer weerstand tegen deze maatregelen had gebo-
den. 
De wreedheid van de oorlog en de eisen die deze stelde, 
het wantrouwen jegens bondgenoten en dientengevolge hun 
zuivering, het feit dat de steun van de boeren niet voort-
kwam uit revolutionaire ijver en de partij dus niet zeker 
kon zijn van hun loyaliteit en meegaandheid met radikale 
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veranderingen, leidden ertoe dat de CPK meer en meer gebruik 
ging maken van dwang om haar beleid uitgevoerd te krijgen. 
Deze ontwikkeling werd beduidend versterkt door het gebrek 
aan politieke en organisatorische kundigheid en ervaring 
van de CPK. Binnen de partij bestonden er ook facties en 
regionale verschillen. De Pol Pot-groep was al bezig de 
alleenheerschappij over de partij te vestigen. Het oorlogs-
geweld decimeerde de gelederen van de weinige kaders die de 
KR hadden, terwijl hun snelle groei juist de dringende 
behoefte aan kaders vergrootte. De achterdocht en gevoelens 
van onzekerheid van de CPK-leiders weerhield hen er echter 
van intellectuelen en andere stedelingen die naar de revolu-
tionaire zaak overliepen als kaders in te zetten. Het 
verergerde ook hun wantrouwen jegens hun bondgenoten, die 
vaak beter getraind waren. 
De CPK ging steeds meer steunen op jongeren van arme 
boeren afkomst. Vooral als een gevolg van de bombardementen 
sloten meer van deze jongeren zich bij de KR aan uit wraak 
dan uit politieke overtuiging. De partij had nauwelijks de 
tijd of het kader hen te scholen. Omdat ze jong waren en 
vooralsnog 'onbesmet' door vreemde ideeën, invloeden en 
ervaringen, waren ze echter ook relatief het makkelijkst 
tot trouwe, gehoorzame uitvoerders van het beleid van de 
partij om te smeden. Zij waren potentieel ook het meest 
radicaal. Deze nieuwe, jonge en fanatieke kaderleden ver-
grootten het gebruik van geweld juist omdat zij de kwalitei-
ten, opleiding en ervaring ontbeerden om het beleid op een 
meer humane manier uit te voeren. De gedisciplineerde 
KR-vechtmachine vergemakkelijkte ook een radicale oorlogs-
voering, waarbij de partijleiders risico's namen en veel 
grotere verliezen accepteerden dan normaal door militaire 
strategen als acceptabel wordt beschouwd. Angst en achter-
docht, alsmede hun geloof dat de mens, uitgerust met het 
juiste bewustzijn, alle obstakels kon overwinnen, zelfover-
schatting en een instrumentele voorstelling van echte 
mensen, moedigde hun radicale en snelle aanpak aan. Zij 
waren zeker door het Maoïme beïnvloed, maar ontbeerden de 
meer humane kanten ervan: een geloof in de veranderbaarheid 
van de mens, overreding in plaats van fysieke dwang, over 
het algemeen een wat geleidelijkere benadering, zorg voor 
het welzijn van de massa's. 
Na in hoofdstuk 4 het soort maatschappij dat de KR-
leiders voor ogen stond besproken te hebben, worden in de 
hoofdstukken 5 tot en met 7 de ontwikkelingen in Democra-
tisch Kampuchea van 1975 tot 1979 behandeld. In hoofdstuk 8 
bespreek ik verschillende pogingen om het aantal slachtof-
fers van het Pol Pot-bewind te berekenen. 
Bij de overname van de macht had de CPK, en vooral de 
Pol Pot-groep, het gevoel dat het land door vijanden werd 
omringd. De helft van de bevolking zat in een stedelijk 
centrum geconcentreerd, geheel afhankelijk van Amerikaanse 
hulp. De vernielingen door de oorlog van een toch al onder-
ontwikkelde economie liet de partij geen materiële hulpbron-
nen. Het verwoeste platteland was niet in staat genoeg 
voedsel voor de hele bevolking te produceren. De angst en 
achterdocht van de partijleiders voor alles wat zij als 
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niet onder hun controle beschouwden, stond een gebruik van 
de weinige normatieve hulpbronnen die ze hadden in de weg. 
Zij hadden vooral ervaring met heimelijke ondergrondse 
activiteiten, met oorlog en een autoritaire uitvoering van 
hun beleid, vaak met gebruik van dwang, door jonge, fana-
tieke kaders, in de strijd gehard, gewend aan de dood, maar 
niet aan tegenspraak, geduldig luisteren, discussiëren, 
uitleggen en overreden. Daar ze door een korte en heftige 
oorlog in zekere zin naar de macht geparachuteerd waren, 
hadden ze veel minder de tijd en gelegenheid gehad om 
bestuurlijke ervaring op te doen dan bijvoorbeeld de Chinese 
en Vietnamese communisten. De partij, vooral de Pol Pot-
groep, miste ook de bereidheid om een meer op samenwerking 
gebaseerde verhouding met de massa's op te bouwen. Zij had 
weinig vertrouwen in de veranderbaarheid van de mens, en 
had nog minder de neiging om de weinige hulpbronnen die 
ter dienste stonden voor een dergelijk doel aan te wenden. 
Maar ondanks dit relatief geringe niveau van organisatori-
sche ontwikkeling voorkwam de loyaliteit en discipline van 
de KR het voorkomen van "situational terror" van enige 
betekenis. 
De belangrijkste directe zorg van de partij was koste 
wat kost controle te verkrijgen. De evacuatie van de steden 
neutraliseerde in een klap hun grootste directe bedreiging. 
Het vernietigde de stedelijke maatschappelijke verhoudingen 
en dus ook de infrastructuur van ieder mogelijk verzet. 
Alles en iedereen die mogelijkerwijs als een potentiële 
haard voor rivaliserende loyaliteiten, voor oppositie tegen 
de partij en haar beleid, zou kunnen fungeren, moest uitge-
schakeld of op zijn minst geneutraliseerd worden; gods-
dienst, de kuituur van etnische minderheden, intellectuelen 
(tenzij reeds onder controle van de partij), alles wat met 
de stedelijke, heersende traditie en met buitenlandse 
invloeden geassocieerd werd, zelfs het gezin. De keuze 
voor terreur werd vergemakkelijkt door de gigantische 
vernietiging en ontwrichting van het economisch en maat-
schappelijk leven. Het was gemakkelijker om een relatief 
kleine bevolking te beheersen. Van de boeren klasse ("pea-
santry"), over het algemeen, en zeker in Cambodja, een 
zwakke, weinig georganiseerde klasse, was weinig verzet te 
verwachten. De rest van de bevolking was geatomiseerd en 
geconcentreerd in wat in feite werkkampen waren. Alles werd 
gedaan om de bevolking te isoleren van waardensystemen die 
strijdig waren met de KR-ideologie. 
De tweede, daarmee samenhangende, zorg van de partij 
was snelle economische ontwikkeling. De keuze voor een 
autarkische ontwikkeling werd ook beïnvloed door angst en 
achterdocht, en ingegeven door de behoefte aan controle. 
Voor de CPK bestond de weg naar het communisme eruit, het 
levenspeil van iedereen tot het niveau van de arme boeren 
te verlagen en vandaaruit een klassenloze samenleving op te 
bouwen. 'Nieuwe mensen', zij die pas in april 1975 onder 
controle van de KR vielen, moesten eerst, door als arme 
boeren te leven en handarbeid te verrichten, een correct 
bewustzijn ontwikkelen. Tot die tijd had de partij geen 
behoefte aan hun kennis en expertise. Dat zou haar slechts 
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van hen afhankelijk maken. Er zou wel gebruik gemaakt worden 
van moderne wetenschap en technologie, maar slechts door de 
vertrouwelingen van Angkar. Een nieuwe maatschappij van de 
grond af opbouwen, wat de CPK wilde, werd vergemakkelijkt 
door de onderontwikkelde en door oorlog verwoeste staat van 
de economie. De partij was bovendien nooit het administra-
tief-organisatorisch systeem van het land binnengedrongen, 
maar had het vernietigd. 
Door de exploitatie van menselijk kapitaal werd een 
rurale economische basis opgebouwd om het surplus te genere-
ren dat nodig was voor industrialisatie. De "takeover stage" 
van machtsconsolidatie en de "mobilization stage" waarin de 
transformatie van de economie en de maatschappij bewerkstel-
ligd moest worden, werden, anders dan in China, Vietnam en 
zelfs de Sovjet Unie, samengesmolten. In verscheidene mate 
dienden beide fasen beide functies. Door de totale evacuatie 
van de steden werden de traditionele urbane verhoudingen 
gedesintegreerd, maar deze politiek vergrootte ook het 
menselijk kapitaal dat geëxploiteerd kon worden enorm. De 
evacuaties, al of niet bewust zo door de partijleiders 
bedoeld, rationaliseerden wel hun arbeidsleger: zij was 
vooral fataal voor bejaarden en zwakken die, omdat zij wel 
consumeerden maar nauwelijks tot hard werken in staat waren, 
slechts een last voor de KR revolutie waren. Bijna gelijk-
tijdig werden de mensen door collectivisatie onder controle 
van de KR geïntegreerd, waardoor "forced choice" geëffectu-
eerd kon worden om meegaandheid te verzekeren. Consumptie 
werd tot een minimum beperkt. Mensen werden vooral als 
productiemiddelen beschouwd, waaruit - tegen de laagste 
kosten zo veel mogelijk meerarbeid gehaald moest worden. En 
hoe meer surplus de heersers in een kortere tijd willen 
afromen, hoe meer ze van terreur gebruik zullen maken. De 
geringe waarde die de leiders van de KR aan menselijk leven 
hechtten, het gebrek aan voedsel en behoorlijke medische 
voorzieningen, waren in feite de grootste moordenaars. Dit 
was niet zo door het regime bedoeld of georganiseerd, maar 
voor een belangrijk deel het gevolg van de prioriteit die 
het gaf aan veiligheid en accumulatie boven het directe 
welzijn van vooral de 'nieuwe mensen'. 
Aanvankelijk trof de terreur voornamelijk de 'nieuwe 
mensen'. Hoewel door arme boeren (en bergstammen) beïnvloed, 
werd de partij nooit een boeren- (of bergstammen-) partij. 
Ze wist hen voor haar karretje te spannen maar voor doelein-
den waar deze boeren en bergstammen nooit van hadden ge-
droomd. De boeren werden, hoewel wat beter behandeld, in 
feite ook tot horigen gemaakt. Behalve dat zij enkele 
aspecten van hun eigen boeren-ideologie herkenden, kon hun 
berusting in de overheersing van de KR ook voortgekomen 
zijn uit een besef van de eigenlijke machtsverhoudingen. 
De mate van 'besmetting' door vreemde invloeden, 
afgeleid uit iemands maatschappelijke achtergrond, bepaalde 
iemands mate van betrouwbaarheid of gevaar voor het nieuwe 
regime. Deze selectievere vorm van terreur richtte zich dus 
eerst tegen de topmensen van het oude regime, en de spiritu-
ele, intellectuele en organisatorische leiders van rivalise-
rende organisaties en waarde systemen. Er ontstonden echter 
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steeds meer problemen met het realiseren van het beleid van 
de partijleiding. De realiteit bleek weerbarstiger en liep 
ver achter bij de utopische doeleinden. De mislukkingen 
moesten verklaard worden maar konden natuurlijk nooit het 
gevolg zijn van de plannen en doelstellingen van de leiding 
zelf. Zij werden dus geweten aan degenen die voor de uitvoe-
ring ervan verantwoordelijk waren. Zij werden van verraad 
beschuldigd. Dit verhoogde de strijd van de Pol Pot-groep 
voor controle over de gehele partij en de staat. Nadat 
eenmaal de interne partijstrijd in haar voordeel was be-
slist, keerde de terreur naar binnen. KR in zones en minis-
teries die nog niet onder controle van de Pol Pot-groep 
stonden, werden gezuiverd. Maar er bleven zich problemen 
voordoen bij de uitvoering van het beleid. Samen met het 
martelsysteem waarbij 'netwerken van verraders' werden 
ontmaskerd door de autobiografische 'bekentenissen' van 
slachtoffers, wakkerde dat de toenemende achterdocht van de 
Pol Pot-groep aan, waardoor de terreur in een spiraal van 
steeds uitgebreidere zuiveringen, martelingen en dood 
terecht kwam. 
De veralgemenisering van de terreur viel samen met de 
escalatie van het conflict met Vietnam. Hoewel een groot 
deel van de schuld voor het oorspronkelijke conflict bij 
Vietnam gelegd kan worden, was het de oorlogszuchtige aanpak 
ervan door de CPK die de grond effende voor daadwerkelijke 
oorlog. Die strijd verergerde de economische problemen van 
Democratisch Kampuchea, stimuleerde meer onenigheid binnen 
de partij, en vergrootte het wantrouwen van de Pol Pot-
groep, waardoor het steeds meer tekenen van verraad zag, 
en, dientengevolge, steeds meer verraders. Uiteindelijk 
begon de terreur zelfs haar eigen kinderen op te eten. 
Zelfs de hoogste leiders van het regime vielen onder verden-
king. De terreur vernietigde ook het doel van de KR: een 
sterk en onafhankelijk Kampuchea. De Vietnamese invasie die 
het Pol Pot-regime ten val bracht, maakte Cambodja opnieuw 
afhankelijk en ondergeschikt aan vreemde mogendheden. 
Democratisch Kampuchea was geen poging tot auto-geno-
cide door een stelletje gekken. Het was een bewuste en 
rationele, alhoewel zeer radicale, poging om een klassen-
loze, moderne en onafhankelijke maatschappij zonder tegen-
stellingen te creëren. Het was een voorbeeld van hoe een 
revolutionaire intellectuele elite, geconfronteerd met de 
discrepantie tussen haar hoogdravende idealen en de reali-
teit, op alle mogelijke manieren en met alle mogelijke 
middelen, probeert die idealen desondanks te realiseren. 
Het is de tragedie van Cambodja dat de ontwikkeling en 
samenhang van variabelen en omstandigheden hindernissen 
voor het gebruik van terreur verminderden of verzwakten, 
terwijl tegelijkertijd die factoren die het gebruik ervan 
konden aanmoedigen, versterkt werden. Dat liep uit op een 
van de meest desastreuze revolutionaire situaties van de 
twintigste eeuw. 
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"Worse than Hitler", The Pol Pot regime in Cambodia has been 
called. How could such a small group of revolutionary communist 
intellectuals come to power and why did they use systematic terror 
to achieve and maintain that power? Why were the towns evacua­
ted, western goods abandoned? Were all intellectuals killed, all 
temples and all books destroyed? How could fine ideals lead to 
mass graves? In "The Eyes of the Pineapple" these and other 
questions dealing with the Khmers Rouges' regime of terror are 
meticulously analysed. The Pol Pot regime is compared to Stalin's 
Soviet Union, Mao's China and Vietnam. In Cambodia isolation and 
betrayal, the God-Prince Sihanouk and a 'weak' peasantry, traditio­
nal fear of the Vietnamese, a brutal war and the traumatic American 
bombing, factional strife and increasingly extreme suspicion are a 
few of the actors reviewed. In the process some widely-held 
fallacies about the Khmers Rouges' regime of terror are punctured. 
It was not an attempt at auto-genocide by a group of lunatics, but a 
conscious and rational, albeit extremely radical, attempt by a group 
of communist intellectuals to realize their goal, a classless, contra­
diction-free, modern utopia, who tried, when confronted with obsti­
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